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                                       Abstract 
Maintaining order and discipline is one of the most challenging aspects of the school-based 
administrator’s role.  School officials make disciplinary decisions within a context that is 
established, in part, by case law, legislation and regulations, school board policies and social, 
organizational and individual values.  The exercise of administrative discretion is vital to the 
decision-making process.  It offers school leaders creativity and flexibility.  The 
interpretation and implementation of school discipline policies by in-school administrators 
can provide insight into their discretionary decision-making. The purpose of this study was to 
determine how principals in an urban school division in Western Canada negotiated within 
the legal parameters of discretion as it is delegated to them in legislation and school board 
policy in order to be faithful to their own values system in matters of student discipline.  The 
study assumed Christopher Hodgkinson’s hierarchy of values as a theoretical framework for 
examining the administrators’ decision-making, and used H.L.A. Hart’s concept of law as a 
system of rules as an additional lens through which to view the exercise of administrative 
discretion.  Employing an interpretive qualitative research methodology, the researcher 
conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with ten elementary school principals.  
Findings of the research reflect that the way principals perceived the exercise of discretion 
enabled them to maintain school safety, to be, in their judgment, fair and just in decision-
making in disciplinary situations, to balance competing rights in the school setting and to 
make decisions in what they understood to be the best interests of their students.  The 
principals’ exercise of discretion, however, appeared to be subject to various values and 
influences which could lead to injustice and arbitrariness in decision-making.  In the end, I 
concluded discretionary power should be structured, limited and subject to review in order to 
provide accountability to stakeholders.  Implications of the study suggest principals should 
develop greater awareness of their own values system and be reflective about their judgments 
and decision-making.  Schools should have clearly-defined codes of conduct, and school 
divisions should outline expectations for discipline policy implementation and adherence by 
principals.  
Keywords 
Administrative Discretion, School Administration, Elementary Principals, Student 
Discipline, Christopher Hodgkinson, H.L.A. Hart, Decision-Making, Values, School Law 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 Introduction and Statement of Problem 
As a teacher I possess tremendous power to  
   make a child’s life miserable or joyous.  I can 
   be a tool of torture or an instrument of inspiration. 
   I can humiliate, humour, hurt or heal.  In all  
   situations it is my response that decides whether a  
   crisis will be escalated or de-escalated, and a  
   child humanized or dehumanized.  (Ginott, 1972, pp. 15–16) 
 One of the most challenging and time-consuming aspects of the in-school 
administrator’s role is that of maintaining order and discipline, the twin legal imperatives 
that form the core of administrative practice, and without which the educational mission 
of the school could not be accomplished.  As iterated in the United States Supreme Court 
ruling in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), “without first establishing discipline and 
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students” (p 747).  Also 
inherent in the administrator’s responsibility is the obligation to ensure school safety, and 
fair and appropriate discipline can help to establish such an environment (Kajs, 2006).  
Indeed, Hyman and Perone (1998) suggest that if the perception by pupils is that “school 
personnel, especially the principal, are fair and caring,” then “they have a stake in making 
the school safe” (p. 12).  Bundy (2006), however, describes student discipline as an “age 
old concern” of school principals (p. 2) and suggests it is one of the “most contentious 
issues in the struggle for improving student achievement” (p. 113).  Brady (2002) 
concurs, adding that the “issues of school and student discipline continue to be a 
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persistent and difficult problem for educators” (p. 160).  Furthermore, the research of 
Gall (2010) finds that school discipline may not foster “collaboration between school 
authorities and student” (p. 137), and suggests “the disconnect between school authorities 
and students (whether real or perceived) as caused by many practices of school discipline 
is a problem” (p. 138).  Again, the United States Supreme Court underscores the 
importance of discipline in schools when it opines “one who does not comprehend the 
meaning and necessity of discipline is handicapped not merely in his education but 
throughout his subsequent life,” and equates students’ understanding of the “necessity of 
rules and obedience” with the importance of “learning to read and write” (Goss v. Lopez, 
1975, p. 745).  The Court goes on to identify “the classroom [as] the laboratory in which 
this lesson of life [the lesson of discipline] is best learned” (p. 746).  The Supreme Court 
of Canada, too, grapples with the meaning of discipline in Canadian Foundation for 
Children v. Canada (2004).   McLachlin C. J. acknowledges the “unclear and 
inconsistent” messages sent in the past by courts which have endeavored to define what is 
“reasonable under the circumstances” in cases of child discipline (para. 39).   She admits, 
though, “on occasion, judges erroneously applied their own subjective views on what 
constitutes reasonable discipline—views as varied as different judges’ backgrounds” 
(para. 39).    
1.1 Decision-Making in School Administration 
 Instances of student misbehavior occur in schools on a daily basis; frequently, 
these incidents result in the application of any one of a number of disciplinary measures.  
The significance of these disciplinary responses cannot be understated—the substantial 
authority educators and school administrators wield may have lasting effects upon 
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students, and research reveals school disciplinary practices may disproportionately affect 
minority students (Brady, 2002; Clark, 2002; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Mendez & Knoff, 
2003; Torres & Stefkovich, 2009; Townsend, 2000), and may contribute to early leaving 
of school (Mendez & Knoff, 2003; Ruck & Wortley, 2002; Wu, Pink, Crain & Moles, 
1982).
1
  Seventy-five percent of those educators surveyed in a study on the work life and 
health of Saskatchewan teachers agreed disciplining students was one of the negative 
stressors contributing to the “difficulties and complexities of teaching” (Martin, 
Dolmage, & Sharpe, 2012, p. 14).  Although there often is little agreement among 
educators, discipline should be educative, corrective, supportive, and equitable.  
According to Kajs (2006), while discipline may be seen as “retributive, preventative, or 
rehabilitative,” usually it is “associated with punishment” (p. 18; see also Duke, 2002; 
Fenning & Rose, 2007).  Ackerman (2003), in a similar way, identifies the use of 
punitive and physical sanctions as the “overarching focus of American school discipline” 
(p. 14; see also Kafka, 2006, p. 239).  Hyman and Weiler’s (1994) study also notes the 
use of “punitive sanctions” (p. 128) in school discipline as being one of six common 
stressors that are “considered to be abusive to children” (p. 129).  Furthermore, “get 
tough” discipline approaches, such as zero tolerance policies, which are prescriptive and 
punishment-based, have not proven to be effective or to reduce serious incidents in 
schools and, in fact, may have unintended negative results (Casella, 2003; Clark, 2002; 
Dunbar & Villarruel, 2002; Nelson, 2008; Skiba, 2002).  Consequently, school-based 
                                                 
1
 In Canada, the dropout rates for young women are 6.6% of the school population, while for young men 
they were 10.3% in 2009-2010.  Graduation rates, on the other hand, were 81% for females and 73% for 
males (Statistics Canada, 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, nearly “40% of Aboriginal people in Canada have not 
completed high school”, as compared with “just over 20% of the total population” (Levin, 2009, p. 689). 
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administrators frequently wrestle with the tension that exists between being, and/or being 
perceived as being, either too harsh or too weak in dealing with disciplinary issues, since 
much of their effectiveness as school leaders may be determined in this way by students, 
staff and parents (Axelrod, 2010). 
1.2 Role of Decision-Making 
At the same time, decision-making has been described as the “sine qua non 
[emphasis in original]” of educational administration (S.H. Davis, 2004, p. 621; see also 
Hodgkinson, 1978b; Tuten, 2000), consisting of far more than “the mechanical 
application of existing rules, regulations and various levels of school and school-related 
policy” (Frick, 2009, p. 50; see also Begley, 1999).   Indeed, Ashbaugh and Kasten 
(1984) believe the “unbalanced” and “undue emphasis upon technical proficiency” of 
leaders is misplaced (p.  195), and Roche’s (1999) study also “challenges the traditional 
perspective of the school administrators as rational, technical bureaucrats” (p. 264).   
Millerborg and Hyle’s (1991) survey of over 300 elementary and secondary principals in 
Washington, DC, suggests that “ethical principles, not the technical aspect” of 
educational administration, drive educational decisions (p. 17).  Davis (2004) insists 
classical positivist decision-making models that reflect “dispassionate analysis, not 
emotion or subjectivity [are] a myth,” since they do not provide effective responses for 
decision-making in the world of schools (see also Bundy, 2006; Morris, Crowson, 
Hurwitz and Porter-Gehrie, 1984).  Tuten (2006) quite simply concludes “scholars and 
practitioners fail to understand how school administrators make decisions in the 
workplace” (p. 56).    
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Studies suggest that principals’ decision-making often takes place in “episodic 
intervals” with nearly half their time spent in activities lasting less than four minutes 
(Crowson & Porter-Gehrie, 1980, p. 51).  Other estimates suggest they attend to nearly 
150 tasks per day (Calabrese & Zepeda, 1999, p. 7; see also Kmetz & Willower, 1982), 
which can result in almost 400 separate daily interactions (Manasse, 1985, p. 441; see 
also Mertz, & McNeely, 1998).  Morris et al. (1984) describe the role of the secondary 
principal as having a “fractionated, piecemeal character” (p. 53), Calabrese and Zepeda 
(1999) note its “hectic” “rapid-fire” and “unpredictable” nature (p. 7), and Willower and 
Licata (1997) point to the “brief, fragmented, and often interrupted activities” engaged in 
by school administrators (p. 1).  Roher and Wormwell (2000) highlight the manner in 
which  principals are “bombarded” and “overwhelmed by demands” (p. 217) as they rush 
“from task to task, not completing one before another interrupts them” (p. 218; see also 
Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 58).  Gronn (2003b) identifies the “work intensification” (p. 18) in 
describing “the new work of educational leaders: long hours, endless demands, punishing 
pace and continual frustration” (p. 68).  W. D. Greenfield (1995) comments on the 
“action-oriented” work of the principal, complete with “ambiguity and uncertainty” in a 
“demand environment” (p. 63).  The research, however, does not appear to distinguish 
between frequency of interactions in schools where principals are the sole on-site 
administrator and frequency of interactions in settings where vice-principals or assistant 
principals also assume administrative duties.   Nonetheless, as multi-taskers 
extraordinaires, principals make countless spur-of-the-moment decisions while 
supervising a lunchroom or while conversing with staff or students as they scurry down a 
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hallway,
2
 and Calabrese and Zepeda (1999) insist they often cannot afford “the luxury of 
delayed decision-making” (p. 8).  
1.3   Notion of Values in Educational Administration  
Much of the literature suggests there is little support for a positivist turn in 
administration and identifies the assumptions of the value-laden nature of educational 
administration (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1984; Begley, 2003; Hodgkinson, 1978b, 1983, 
1991, 1996; Willower & Licata, 1997).  As T. Greenfield (1993) explains, “the central 
questions of administration deal not so much with what is, but with what ought to be; 
they deal with values and morality” (p. 194).  Moreover, he claims, “the school is 
[emphasis in original] a crux of value and for value.  It is the crux of value and of 
administrative value” (T. Greenfield, 1993, p. 192).  Arguing against Simon’s (1957) 
and others’ traditional assumption that “de-valued, but rational decision-making is 
desirable, attainable and scientifically verifiable,” T. Greenfield (1993) contends the 
“science of administration” misses the “moral and educative task of administration,” 
that is, the “dimensions that deal with values and morality” (p. 194).  Simon’s (1957) 
search for effectiveness and efficiency in organizations by focusing on increased 
rationality and the factual basis for decision-making (Griffiths, 1959) is antithetical to 
the subjectivist assumptions of a phenomenological approach.  T. Greenfield (1980) 
queries “but how can the administrator be logical and rational in decision-making?  
How can he make the decision flow from facts rather than from an attitude towards the 
facts or from personal values [emphasis in original]?” (p. 44).  In acknowledging the 
                                                 
2
 Allison and Morfitt ‘s (1996) study of the time-span for  task completion for principals and other school 
administrators provides an alternate context for their administrative duties.  
7 
 
limits of individual decision-making, Simon (1957) contends “two persons, given the 
same possible alternatives, the same values, the same knowledge, can rationally reach 
only the same decision” (p. 241); thus, there is a need for a science of administrative 
theory.   Moreover, “within the area of discretion, once an individual has decided on the 
basis of his personal motives to recognize the organizational objectives, his further 
behavior is determined not by personal motives, but by the demands of efficiency”      
(p. 204).  T. Greenfield (1986), however, rejects what he terms this “neutered science” 
in administration that “relieves the anxiety of decision-making and removes the 
administrator’s sense of responsibility for his decisions” (p. 62).   
W. D. Greenfield (1995) concurs, explaining “schools differ from most other 
types of organizations” in that they are “uniquely moral enterprises” (p. 61), and he 
insists it is the “special responsibility” of school administrators “to consider the value 
premises underlying their actions and decisions” (p. 69).  He contends “valuing is central 
in the doing of school administration” (W. D. Greenfield, 2004, p. 191).  Leithwood, 
Begley and Cousins (1992) also propose that school leaders at all levels of experience 
rely on a “common core of values in their problem-solving” (p. 107).  Toews (1981), too, 
maintains the issues school administrators face “involve the weighing of social and 
personal values” (p. 6), and the making of decisions that are “prescriptive or proscriptive” 
requires them to make “moral judgements” (pp. 6–7).  Leithwood and Steinbach (1995) 
attest to the pervasiveness of values in school administrators’ decision-making and 
further suggest these values are influenced by administrators’ “religion, educational 
training, school district philosophy, and role models” in addition to their professional and 
personal life experiences (p. 189).  Millerborg and Hyle (1991) appear to agree.  They 
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argue for greater attention on ethical decision-making in administrator preparation 
programs since administrators’ ethical belief systems depend upon the “nature of the 
values they have internalized” and significantly affect their decision patterns (Millerborg 
& Hyle, 1991, p. 4).  Roche’s (1999) research reveals that when principals are faced with 
moral dilemmas they “must choose one value or set of values over another” (p. 256; see 
also Campbell-Evans, 1988).  Ashbaugh and Kasten (1984) observe that administration 
consists of the “process of making decisions” and that decision-making “inevitably 
involve[s] values” (p. 196); consequently, it is the “value-based aspect” of decision-
making “that makes administration difficult” (p. 196).  Finally, Begley (1999) considers 
the “resurgence of interest in values as an influence on administrative practice” and 
attributes this focus to the “increasingly pluralistic societies” in which school leaders 
function, and which result in an administrative practice that has become “less predictable, 
less structured, and more conflict-laden” (p. 238). 
1.4  Discretion in Administrators’ Decision-Making   
That administrators in organizations exercise discretion in their decision-making 
is also well-established.   Manley-Casimir (1977–78), for one, argues discretion is “vital” 
to administrators in their decision-making, allowing them “flexibility” and creativity  
(p. 84), and he also pointedly maintains any model of administrative decision-making 
must involve a consideration of discretion (personal communication, November 19, 
2009).  In his insightful analysis, Hawkins (1997) contends discretion is pervasive and is 
part of the daily behavior of administrative officials.  Lacey (1992) muses about whether 
a “decision” can usefully be considered apart from “discretion” (p. 380), and Galligan 
(1986) submits it is “hard to imagine a decision which does not involve some discretion” 
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(p. 11).  Toews (1981) claims the exercise of discretion is “widespread” (p. 7), while 
Paquette and Allison (1997) contribute the view that discretion is at the “heart of 
administrative action” (p. 165).  Sossin (2002) explains discretion “arises whenever 
bureaucrats have a choice as to how to exercise their authority.  Construed broadly, 
virtually every administrative act contains some measure of discretion” (p. 839).  Handler 
(1992) maintains “discretion is ubiquitous” and, as a result, it is “difficult to define”       
(p. 331).  Furthermore, in the implementation of public policy, Handler (1986) argues, 
discretion is “inevitable” (p. 11) and should be seen as “necessary and desirable” (p. 11). 
Morris et al. (1984) argue principals’ exercise of discretion is one aspect of behavior that 
influences “the total learning community” (p. 30), and narrowing the focus, Leithwood et 
al. (1992) suggest secondary school principals may have the opportunity to exercise more 
discretion than their elementary counterparts.  Finally, the research of Meyer, Macmillan 
and Northfield (2009) into principal succession reveals “principals have a framework for 
decision-making that incorporates conscience and discretion” (p. 32).  Their study found 
“the principals’ use of conscience and discretion implicit in the decision-making process 
helped to explain their values in use” (Meyer et al., 2009, p. 22), and they conclude 
“one’s conscience interprets under which contexts, under what influences, and to what 
degree the principal will exercise personal and professional discretion” (p. 33). 
1.5   Discretionary Decision-Making in Schools   
 Baldridge (1995) defines policy-making as “the art of setting parameters for the 
actions of a group’s members,” and cites the creation of laws as but one example of 
“policy-making which governs the behavior of those within a legal system” (p. 44).  If 
the boundaries of administrative action are established through legislation and policy, 
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then the existence of discretion may be considered as absolutely essential for the more 
pragmatic functioning of complex organizations, including schools:  
The school system operates within a dense legal, political, and  
  social environment.  It is subject to municipal, state, and federal 
  laws and regulations.  As a professionally oriented organization, 
  it is influenced by professional educators, ideologies, licensing 
  requirements, employment laws, and so forth.  Nevertheless, 
  within these constraints and influences, there is room to maneuver, 
  to develop and modify styles and patterns of operations, to create 
  and emphasize certain programs.  (Handler, 1986, p. 10)  
 Clearly, a number of conflicting interests, standards, expectations, and obligations 
exist within the highly complex organizations that are schools; however, within that 
sphere there is considerable opportunity for discretion to flourish. Torres and Chen 
(2006) also observe that, given the intricacies of modern bureaucracies, discretion may be 
“indispensible” in the implementation of policy.  They describe its intricate and multi-
layered nature as being those “options or actions not encompassed or governed in 
formalized law or rules” (p. 190).  They further suggest policy implementation in some 
fields may require stricter adherence to policy directives than in others where greater 
discretion and choice are needed in order for implementation to be effective.  Discretion 
in decision-making by administrators in schools appears to be exercised in many areas.  
For example, Handler (1986) suggests that in cases of special education, which require 
programs that are “judgmental, professional, flexible, experimental” (p. 3), student 
placement decisions “should be discretionary” (p. 3) because of knowledge gaps about 
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student performance and achievement, while Larsen and Akmal (2007) identify the 
implementation of student retention policies as being another area where administrative 
discretion is required.   
It may be argued, however, of even greater significance is the “Janus-like 
character of discretion” that may be manifested “benevolently or malevolently, 
reasonably or unreasonably, justly or unjustly” (Manley-Casimir, 1977–78, p. 84).  As 
well, Hall’s (1999) reference to the “dual nature” of discretion (p. 159) and K.C. Davis’ 
(1969) admonition that discretion can provide the opportunity for “beneficence or 
tyranny, either justice or injustice, [or] either reasonableness or arbitrariness” (p. 3; see 
also Handler, 1986) reflect its highly complex character and offer compelling reasons for 
further study of the manner in which discretion operates in decision-making. 
1.6  School-Based Administrators and Discipline   
Principals are generally considered to be leaders of the instructional program 
(Lunenburg & Ornstein, 2008; Morris et al., 1984; see also Mertz & McNeely, 1998) or 
to influence the learning program through their leadership (Brubaker & Simon, 1987; 
Supovitz, Sirinides, & May, 2010; see also Leithwood et al., 1992).  Yet Hanson (2003) 
maintains school administrators “give most of their attention to managing the school and 
pupil control” (p. 95; see also Doud & Keller, 1998), and W. D. Greenfield (1995) 
explains that although principals would prefer to focus upon matters of instruction, “this 
appears not to be the case” (p. 79).  In arguing for a distributed leadership paradigm, 
Gronn (2003b) acknowledges that while leadership is the “core responsibility of 
principals and superintendents” (p. 16), they are not “automatically [leaders] by virtue of 
being administrators and managers” (p. 17).   Bundy (2006) contends principals have 
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“responsibility for student achievement and improvement” (p. 1), but their instructional 
leadership is also assumed in the “arena of student behavioral management” (p. 101).  
Birrell and Marshall (2007) surmise much of a principal’s time is diverted from a focus 
on curriculum and school leadership to disciplinary issues, while Kmetz and Willower’s 
(1982) research reveals principals spend “considerable time on pupil control” (p. 74).   
Dempster and Berry’s (2003) study of Australian principals found they spent a 
“disproportionate amount of time” on social problems, such as drug use among students, 
and, as a result, a significant amount of their time was diverted from curricular planning 
(p. 463).  My own administrative experience supports these assertions; much of my role 
as an in-school administrator focuses on responding to the many complex social issues 
found in today’s diverse and inclusive school settings.   
When administrators make decisions in matters of student discipline, they are 
often required not only to problem solve but also to resolve ethical dilemmas (Cranston, 
Ehrich, & Kimber, 2006; Tuten, 2006).   In order to better “appreciate the responses of 
leaders to complex and non-routine problems,” Leithwood et al. (1992), however, 
suggest decision-making should be considered “only one form of problem-solving”       
(p. 9).  Begley (1999b) extends this argument by contending that in contemporary school 
settings “traditional rational notions of problem solving” are rendered obsolete in some 
respects because school-based administrators “increasingly encounter situations where 
consensus cannot be achieved,” since “there may be no solution possible that will satisfy 
all” (p. 239; see also Begley, 2010).  Most of the issues they face are intricate and multi-
faceted, reflecting the complexity of the contemporary role of the school official and the 
challenges found in the pluralism and diversity of today’s schools (Begley, 1996, 1999b, 
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2010; Bundy, 2006; Davis & Davis, 2004).  Indeed, Cuban (2001) defines many of the 
“wicked problems” or “dilemmas” faced by administrators and educators as “ill-defined, 
ambiguous, [and] complicated,” requiring “undesirable choices between competing, 
highly prized values that cannot be simultaneously or fully satisfied” (p. 10).  Leithwood 
et al. (1992) define what they term “swampy problems” in schools as “non-routine”      
(p. 46) problems “about which the solver possesses very little knowledge regarding how 
to accomplish some valued goal” (p. 43).        
School administrators, it follows, use discretion as a response to value conflicts 
(Begley, 2004; see also Meyer et al., 2009) and to ethical dilemmas (Cranston et al., 
2006; Haynes & Licata, 1995).  Hall’s (1999) research demonstrates administrators “rely 
on their core values in their use of discretion” (p. 96).  Lunenburg and Ornstein (2008) 
echo these assertions and maintain school officials “are granted wide discretion in 
disciplining students” (p. 384), while the work of Morris et al. (1984) highlights the 
notion principals exercise discretion when they discipline students.  Every one of the 
twenty-eight administrators and teachers surveyed in Ackerman’s (2003) study “noted the 
use of personal judgment and discretion in every disciplinary situation faced, regardless 
of the infraction” (p. 51).  Rossow (1984) extends the argument and suggests the 
“exercise of discretion in the decision to suspend is fraught with opportunities for subtle 
prejudices to come into play, and especially in the context of other identified 
discriminatory policies, may be constitutionally unsound.  Three sensitive classifications 
spring to mind in the school environment: race, gender and social class” (p. 428).  A 
study by Chesler et al. (1979) found that “school administration has enormous discretion 
in deciding what behavior to prosecute and what behavior not to prosecute” and, as a 
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result, the researchers concluded due process and fairness may be called into question 
through the arbitrary use of power (p. 503).  Most importantly, then, it is through 
administrators’ exercise of discretionary power in matters of student discipline that “the 
school’s recognition or denial of student rights and interests assumes sharpest focus” 
(Manley-Casimir, 1977–78, p. 84).     
However, certain studies suggest even when the ability to exercise administrative 
discretion is removed, some school administrators still exercise discretion.  For example, 
when policies mandate that no discretion is to be used, such as in zero tolerance 
discipline regimes, Faulk (2006) maintains administrators continue to exercise 
“considerable judgment” (p. 109), and their discretionary decisions in these situations 
raises “questions about the equitable treatment of students” (p. 99).  Torres and Chen 
(2006) likewise claim the limiting of discretion may lead to “overly punitive 
consequences” (p. 191) for students.  Ackerman (2003) builds upon this argument and 
wonders if zero tolerance discipline ever appears in a “pure form” (p. 31) since 
administrators implement zero tolerance policies based on the “level of discretion” they 
assume (p. 24).  Her study reveals zero tolerance policies are used at the discretion of 
educators, and that a misinterpretation of “law and policy” by school officials is 
associated with zero tolerance (Ackerman, 2003, p. 22).  Although Tuten (2006) notes the 
pervasiveness of the exercise of administrative discretion in student discipline, her 
research reveals the greater the potential for school violence in any school situation, the 
less likely educators are to exercise discretion.  If, as Paquette and Allison (1998) 
contend, discretion is “ultimately the power to do what one wants or believes best given 
one’s particular mix of motives, values and cultural context, in a particular case or set of 
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similar cases” (p. 173), school officials may be seen to wield significant authority over 
students, especially in matters of student discipline.  In their discretionary decision-
making, then, administrators must balance their obligation to protect and respect student 
rights in the school setting against their duty to maintain school safety and to preserve 
order.   
1.7  Purpose of the Study 
 School-based administrators derive their authority in part, through case law, 
legislation and regulations, and school board policies, and they make decisions within a 
context that is established by social, organizational, individual, and other values.  They 
interpret what these influences mean in specific cases.   Authority is assumed to be 
“unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor 
persuasion is needed,” and may be “vested in persons” and granted on a “personal” level, 
as in “the relation between parent and child, between teacher and pupil,” or “vested in 
offices” in governments or institutions (Arendt, 1986, p. 65).  Hemmings (2003) contends 
“authority [between educators, administrators, and students] is crucial for meeting the 
formal goals of schooling” and is “typically rendered in models of educational policy and 
pedagogical practice” (p. 417).  As McCarthy and Soodak (2007) reason, imbued with 
authority then, administrators often must “achieve a balance” between competing rights 
in the school setting in order to ensure school safety, and they “must exercise their 
discretion in negotiating just consequences for students with and without disabilities in 
the absence of clear guidelines and within a culture of accountability and public scrutiny” 
(p. 459).   Many scholars have noted administrators’ exercise of discretion, or use of 
judgment, in student disciplinary issues (Ackerman, 2003; Chesler et al., 1979; Clark, 
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2002; Hall, 1999; Heilmann, 2006; Lufler, 1979; Manley-Casimir, 1977–78; Rossow, 
1984).  Yet, discretion appears to be an elusive notion, and has been variously described 
as “sponge-like because it absorbs the values, assumptions, and preferences to which it is 
exposed” (Sossin, 2005, pp. 438–439), a “calculus” (Manley-Casimir, personal 
communication, November 19, 2009), and a matrix of obligations, influences and 
responsibilities (Vinzant & Crothers, 1998).  Paquette and Allison (1997) describe 
discretion as “many-faceted and eminently situational”; consequently, what it is “depends 
on where [one sits]” (p. 179).   
 This study lends insight, through description and explanation, into current 
knowledge of how principals make meaning of their exercise of discretion in their 
disciplinary decision-making processes.  The inquiry seeks to determine how 
administrative discretion structures, confines, directs, supports or refines school 
administrators’ decision-making, and how they negotiate within the legal parameters of 
discretion in order to maintain their own value systems.  The goals of the study reflect a 
values paradigm in educational administration woven within a theoretical framework of 
modern legal positivism.  Such a framework, I believe, can lead to greater appreciation of 
the practice of valuation in principals’ disciplinary decision-making within the structures 
and constraints of administrative discretion. 
1.8  The Research Question 
As evidenced in a review of the literature, and despite repeated calls for further 
investigation of principals’ exercise of discretion, there is little research describing how 
Canadian school-based administrators understand their exercise of discretion or 
explaining how it is exercised in school disciplinary issues.  As a result, the research 
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question is as follows:  How do school principals negotiate within the legal parameters of 
discretion in order to maintain their own values system when they make decisions in 
matters of school discipline? 
 The research question comprises the following sub-questions:  
1. What is the nature of discretion in general? 
2. What are the influences on discretion? 
3. How is discretion understood and practiced by school administrators in their 
decision-making?    
4. What influences, values, or circumstances do school administrators consider in 
their decision-making? 
5. Is there a hierarchy of influences, values, or circumstances that shape school 
administrators’ exercise of discretion in their decision-making? 
6. What kind(s) of knowledge do school administrators believe they need in order 
to make discretionary decisions in matters of student discipline? 
7. What do school administrators perceive to be appropriate and inappropriate 
exercises of discretion in student disciplinary issues? 
8. Do school administrators believe the exercise of discretion assists or hinders 
them as they work to balance competing rights in the school setting? 
9. What do school administrators perceive to be an appropriate measure of 
accountability for their discretionary decisions? 
10. In what ways do school administrators justify their exercise of discretion? 
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1.9  Significance of the Study 
Many scholars and theorists have called for further inquiry into discretion. 
Hawkins (1992), for one, insists that in order “to understand how law works, how the 
words of law are translated into action” and how discretion may be effectively controlled, 
it is necessary to know how it is exercised (p. 44).  He believes discretion is of concern in 
a liberal society because it permits “the substitution of the decision-maker’s own personal 
standards for public, legal standards” (Hawkins, 1998, p. 414).  Building upon this 
notion, Sossin (2005) argues for the “lived experience” of decision-makers to be 
considered in their discretionary judgments (p. 428).  Cartier (2009) reasons it is 
important to “care” about discretion (p. 314) since numerous legislative provisions 
delegate its exercise. The nearly 15,000 statutes involving discretion which were 
identified in 1970 by the Law Reform Commission of Canada would attest to her 
assertion (Anisman, 1970; see also McLachlin, 1992). 
The bulk of the literature considers discretion from a legal, socio-legal or social 
science perspective (Cartier, 2009; Hawkins, 1992, 1998; Jones & deVillars, 2004; 
Lacey, 1992; Lipsky, 1980; Mullan, 2001; Pratt & Sossin, 2009) and not necessarily from 
an educational one.  Biggs (1993) suggests most of the existing work focuses on 
“administrative discretion in public agencies” (p. 56).  This study reconceptualizes the 
notion of discretion in educational administrative decision-making and locates it within 
the larger scholarly tradition of administrative law.  To paraphrase Sossin (2005), the 
study endeavors to enable educators to speak administrative law with an educational 
accent.  Principals derive their authority from law, and their power to exercise discretion 
in their decision-making is provided for in provincial legislation and relevant regulations, 
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case law, school board policies, and, it has been contended, through legal doctrines such 
as in loco parentis
3
 (Manley-Casimir, 1977–78; Sitch & McCoubrey, 2001), parens 
patriae
4
 (Stelck, 2007, p. 336), and the “careful and prudent parent” standard 
(Hutchinson, 2007).
5
   Brien (2005) also contends the fiduciary
6
 concept is a “common 
law principle” that underlies the administrator and student relationship in disciplinary 
issues (p. 6).  La Forest (1997) similarly observes that “fiduciary obligations” are found 
in many different types of relationships, such as “banker-customer, solicitor-client, 
doctor-client,” (p. 122) and “teacher-student” (p. 128).  Two features common to these 
relationships are “‘trust and confidence,’” wherein “the fiduciary has scope for the 
exercise of a discretion or power,” and the “discretion or power is capable of affecting the 
legal or practical interests of the principal” (p. 122).
7
  Arguably, much of the legislation 
directing principals’ actions relates to school discipline.  For example, Sections 306 and 
310 of Ontario’s Education Act (1990) provide for principals to impose discretionary 
                                                 
3
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines in loco parentis as “relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or 
caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent” (Garner, 2009, p. 858). 
4
 Black’s  Law Dictionary defines parens patriae as “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to 
those unable to care for themselves” (Garner, 2009, p. 1221).  The Education Act (1995) in Saskatchewan 
in s. 150(30)(f), for example, allows for students to be disciplined in a manner “that would be exercised by 
a kind, firm and judicious parent.” 
5
 The court in Williams v. Eady (1893), in determining negligence, established the schoolmaster must 
exercise the same standard of care “as a careful father would take of his boys, and there could not be a 
better definition of the duty of a school master” (p. 42).  The standard was affirmed in Myers v. Peel 
Country Board of Education (1981) when the Supreme Court of Canada ruled “the standard of care to be 
exercised by school authorities in providing for the supervision and protection of students for whom they 
are responsible is that of the careful or prudent parent, described in Williams v. Eady” (p. 31). 
6
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a fiduciary as “a person who is required to act for the benefit of another 
person under matters within the scope of their relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good 
faith, trust, confidence and candor” (Garner, 2009, p. 702). 
7
 La Forest (1997) maintains “discretion, influence and vulnerability are inherent in the teacher-student 
dynamic [emphasis in original]” and, consequently, “there is a rebuttable presumption that teachers owe a 
fiduciary obligation to their students” (p. 124). 
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suspensions on students, while principals in Saskatchewan are afforded great discretion 
or latitude in disciplining students under Sections 150, 151, 154, and 178 of The 
Education Act (1995).  Torres and Chen (2006) also predict courts generally will continue 
to defer to the “expertise and judgment” (p. 191) of school officials as they exercise 
discretion in dealing with students.     
It may be further argued that principals exercise this discretion within a quasi-
legal system (Arum, 2003; Biggs, 1993; Bundy, 2006; Duke, 2002; Kajs, 2006; Lipsky, 
1980) and, judge-like, school administrators are required to make decisions in light of 
specific circumstances, a student’s history, and the effects of specific incidents upon 
others.   In their investigation of events, principals determine guilt or innocence and 
assign the appropriate consequences.  At other times, their discretionary choices can 
make them agents of the police, and Dickinson (2009) astutely identifies the “worrisome 
labyrinth” (p. 179) of decision-making which can lead to criminal consequences for 
students.  Millerborg and Hyle (1991) also allude to the “personal ethics…[and] 
professional codes of ethics, policy, laws, and court decisions” that guide the decisions of 
education administrators (pp. 5–6).  MacKay (2008) concedes “educators must now 
operate within a much more extensive and complex legal framework, including the 
Charter”; he further maintains “educational administrators prefer the flexibility of broad 
discretionary jurisdiction, which allows them room to maneuver in carrying out their 
complex tasks” (p. 24).  The United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
(1985), however, describes what it believes is the unique role of the school official as 
being distinct from the “adversarial relationship” which exists between law enforcement 
officers and criminals, and highlights, instead, the “commonality of interests between 
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teachers and their pupils” (p. 747).  Viewed through a legal lens, the discretionary 
decision-making of principals can be more clearly brought into focus and can offer 
insight into contemporary administrative practice with respect to how principals interpret 
and apply the law while negotiating their own values systems.  
 Many scholars and theorists in the field of education note how little is known 
about discretion in decision-making in educational administration and call for further 
study (Biggs, 1993; Faulk, 2006; Hall, 1999; Heilmann, 2006; Manley-Casimir, 1977–78; 
Meyer et al., 2009; Mukuria, 2002;  Rossow, 1984; Torres & Chen, 2006).  Toews (1981) 
calls for greater insight into discretionary decision-making, contending “injustice is 
probably most frequently inflicted when administrators have discretion—where rules, 
principles, and standards do not offer sufficient guidelines for decision-making” (p. 3).  
Faulk’s (2006) study calls for further research in “terms of how discretion is used,” 
especially with respect to its “implications for equity” (p. 100) and the inconsistency in 
severity of consequences for certain groups of students.  In their inquiry into principals’ 
disciplinary decision-making and student rights, McCarthy and Soodak (2007) go even 
further to note the dearth of information regarding how school administrators “understand 
and enact their role in implementing democratic values [such as fairness and due process] 
through school discipline practices” (p. 459), while Manley-Casimir (1977–78) envisions 
the “administration of discipline as a problem of discretionary justice” (p. 97).  This 
inquiry lends insight into the area because, it may be argued, student perceptions of 
justice and equality, tolerance, and respect are formed, in part, by disciplinary outcomes.  
This study, therefore, helps to fill a gap in the existing knowledge about discretionary 
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decision-making in disciplinary matters and seeks to identify “salient themes, patterns, or 
categories of meaning” for the participants (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 34).    
Frick (2006) claims little research has been completed examining “social 
categories,” such as “race, ethnicity, gender, class, age, religion and physical location,” to  
the “values, moral choice and action of building level leadership” (pp. 58–59); however, 
a small, but emerging body of research examines the role gender plays in principals’ 
decision-making (Durrah, 2009; Mertz & McNeely, 1998; Miller, Fagley, & Casella, 
2009).  Eagly, Karau, and Johnson (1992) more broadly examine the leadership styles of 
men and women principals, while the work of Ackerman (2003) suggests that differences 
between male and female teaching styles influence the levels of discretion educators 
exercise in disciplinary issues (pp. 31–32).  Kraft’s (1993) inquiry into the decision-
making of principals regarding staffing decisions, on the other hand, reveals that while 
gender differences were “found more in the psychological reasonings used to employ 
discretion than in the actual process of using it,” gender was not found to be a 
“significant factor in the use of discretion” (p. 170).  Manley-Casimir’s (1977–78) 
exploratory work in the area reflects different decisional premises for male and female 
administrators, and recommends further research in the area of selective enforcement of 
discretionary power.  This study adds to the existing literature in the area.   
As well, this inquiry fills a knowledge gap with respect to how administrators 
understand their decision-making processes, leading to an awareness that informs their 
practice. Anderson and Jones (2000) observe that “the past two decades of academic 
research have seen an increasing emphasis on a need to understand the day-to-day 
reflective processes and decision-making of administrators” (p. 434).  However, they go 
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on to note studies that “shed light on how administrators frame problems [and] engage in 
day-to-day problem solving” are scarce (p. 434).  In the same vein, Riehl, Larson, Short, 
and Reitzug (2000) advocate for more of what they term “practical research” as a 
response to practitioners’ need for knowledge to “aid in decision-making and action,” 
which can lead to “increased understanding or a change of practice in the day-to-day lives 
of practitioners” and which will describe their “knowledge and experience in ways that 
honor the complexity of practice” (p. 397).  On the other hand, as Anderson and Jones 
(2000) point out, they are also critical of administrator research that provides a “limited 
and singular perspective on organizational life” since it does not account for student 
voices, omits teacher collaboration and creates a “false separation between administrator 
and teacher” (p. 434). 
   Ashbaugh and Kasten (1984) note the “paucity of literature” (p. 207; see also 
Frick, 2009) that pertains to values in school-based administrators’ decision-making, and 
this inquiry augments the research that seeks to understand the values “undergirding 
principals’ decisions” (p. 205).  Campbell-Evans (1988) alludes to the need for more 
research on the place of values in decision-making in educational administration.  In a 
similar way, Begley (1999a) concludes that the “nature of values as influences on 
administrators has not figured prominently in research” (p. 213).  He further suggests that 
much of the current research focus is on  the adoption of values that are “organizational 
or collective in nature,”  and does not search for the “intention” that motivates principals 
in the adoption of certain values in their decision-making (Begley, 1999b, p. 238); 
however, he observes there has been what he identifies as a “resurgence of interest in 
values as an influence on administrative practice,” a result of what he terms the 
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“increasingly pluralistic societies” in which administrators work (p. 238).  In fact, he 
concludes, “value-conflict situations” are a “defining characteristic of the role for most 
school principals” (p. 248).  MacDonald (1998) also contends “how one positions the 
values and resolves emerging values conflicts is central to the decision-making process” 
(p.7).      
 W. D. Greenfield (2004) thinks that while “relatively little” is known about how 
administrators and educators “actually make sense of their worlds,” the “sense they make 
of their experience is a critical guide to their practice” and to their responses to situations 
(p. 190).  In outlining his recommendations for enhancing the understanding of the 
experiences of school leaders, he suggests research could focus on the study of “the 
meanings and perspectives underlying what school leaders are doing in their social 
relations with others” (W.D. Greenfield, 2004, p. 191).  In allegiance to a 
phenomenological tradition, Bates (1980) argues for an understanding of the meanings 
and intentions of individuals within organizations.  He believes “the structure of 
organizations provides only the framework within which negotiation is conducted, 
priorities are formulated [and] assumptions about ends and means are debated” (p. 7), but 
that it is “precisely the values and beliefs of the individual that give organizations their 
meaning” (p. 8).  From his perspective, an educational theory of administration must 
include values an as “essential component” (p. 16), and he contends that educational 
organizations cannot be understood “without taking them [values and beliefs] into 
account” (Bates, 1980, p. 8).   
 Begley (1999b) maintains “theory and research on leadership values are highly 
relevant to the field of educational administration” (p. 252), while calling for action 
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research methods to lend insight into the nature and function of values in administrative 
practice.  Meanwhile, Begley and Leithwood (1989) appear convinced a “theoretical 
perspective which accommodates the existence of values as influences on administrative 
practice” may enhance “our understanding of administrative actions beyond that which is 
possible employing the exclusively rational frameworks normally associated with 
effective schools and school improvement research” (p. 27).  They go on to suggest this 
type of perspective “contributes to a more comprehensive description of the influences on 
the administrative actions of principals” since it adds an individual’s “internal mental 
processes” to the more conventional list of “contextual and process factors” normally 
considered by researchers (p. 27).  This study, then, also supplements existing research 
on the valuation process of school principals in their decision-making and focuses on 
“solving the practical problems of the day” (Begley, 1999b, p. 238).      
Much of the literature that considers discretion in school administrators’ 
disciplinary decision-making is somewhat dated (Chesler et al., 1979; Manley-Casimir, 
1977–78; Morris et al., 1984; Rossow, 1984; Toews, 1981).  The investigation expands 
upon previous work, in addition to augmenting more current Canadian research such as 
that completed by MacDonald (1998), Hall (1999), and Heilmann (2006).  While 
MacDonald’s (1998) inquiry investigates principals’ decision-making processes with 
respect to school violence,  Hall’s (1999) study of British Columbia administrators 
focuses on a particular aspect of discretionary decision-making—responding to youth 
violence.  Heilmann’s (2006) research more generally explores discretionary decision-
making by Manitoba principals in all areas of school administration.  Toews’s (1981) 
examination, for another, is a philosophical inquiry that focuses on the exercise of 
26 
 
discretion in resolving ethical issues based on K.C. Davis’s (1969) theory of discretionary 
justice, and seeks to develop a normative framework to aid administrators in ethical 
decision-making in their practice.   
Furthermore, American studies on discretion in administrative decision-making in 
schools frame discretion in localized contexts based on a legal system that, although 
influential, is distinct from Canadian law.  Research such as that completed by Kafka 
(2004), which examines the shift of the loci of discretionary decision-making authority in 
schools in Los Angeles, California, is strictly a policy analysis with an historical 
emphasis at the school board level.  Biggs’s study (1993) focuses on a document analysis 
which reviews nine United States Supreme Court decisions concerning discretion in 
administrative action, but restricts its inquiry to the area of student rights. 
  Most importantly, however, the implications of discretionary decision-making, 
or the lack thereof, with respect to the imposition of zero tolerance policies in both 
Canada and the United States have brought the topic of discretion in disciplinary 
decision-making to the forefront of many discussions concerning issues of social justice 
and human rights (Clark, 2002; Civil Rights Project, 2000; Bhattacharjee, 2003); zero 
tolerance policies eliminate the “gray area” (Dunbar & Villarruel, 2002, p. 97) in 
administrators’ decisions.  What is more, Dolmage (1996) vehemently argues that by 
removing discretion from decision-making, as in the strict interpretation of zero tolerance 
policies, and not allowing latitude for “extenuating circumstance, we deny the basic 
principles which underlie our justice system” (p. 204).  Torres and Chen (2006) also 
claim “policies that severely limit discretion can lead to disproportionately punitive 
consequences” for students (p. 190). This study, then, expands upon existing literature 
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that explores the effects of discipline policies that do not allow for principals’ 
discretionary action.  In a related way, problems connected to the inconsistency of 
discipline policy interpretation and implementation, such as lost opportunities to promote 
the “interpersonal development and competency” of students, or missed occasions “to 
teach community, moral, and ethical values” to students (Dunbar & Villarruel, 2002,      
p. 84) may negatively affect student behavior and outcomes.  The inquiry contributes to 
further understanding of the interplay of disciplinary policies, rules, and laws with respect 
to principals’ discretionary decision-making.  As well, the effects of discretionary 
decision-making may also be reflected in student attitudes and perceptions (Costenbader 
& Merkson, 1998; Gall, 2010; Kupchik, & Ellis, 2008; Ruck & Wortley, 2002; Sheets, 
1995; Soloman, 1992).  This study has implications for current Canadian school 
administrators since schools are more diverse, inclusive, and technologically advanced 
than they were even a decade ago and, as a result, administrators face new and evolving 
disciplinary challenges.   
Additional information on how principals interpret their exercise of discretion is 
required so that they may gain greater understanding of “the nature of the [student 
discipline] situations” (Kilbourn, 2006, p. 571) in which they find themselves.  The study 
provides “detailed descriptions and analyses of particular practices, processes, or events” 
so that principals’ practice can be more fully understood (McMillan & Schumacher, 
2010, p. 325).  As well, a “focus on the informal processes of policy formulation and 
implementation” in contemporary school settings that reflects a “diversity of cultural 
values” provides insight that could aid in anticipating “future issues” (p. 325).  The 
inquiry also adds  to a “theoretical or practical knowledge base” of the nature of 
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discretion as it is exercised in disciplinary decision-making that is “educationally 
significant” (Kilbourn, 2006, p. 544; see also McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 325) not 
only to principals, themselves, as reflective practitioners, but also to educational policy-
makers and stakeholders at all levels.   
1.10  Assumptions of the Study 
The research is conducted and the data analyzed based upon the following 
assumptions: 
1.  This study assumes the central claim of the law is positivist, that is, “it is 
essential to a legal system that what the law is can be established without 
considering what the law morally ought to be [emphasis in original]” 
(Dyzenhaus, Moreau, & Ripstein, 2007, p. 3), and accepts the tenets of 
modern legal positivism as the undergirding assumption, as defined in large 
part by eminent legal scholar H.L.A. Hart.    
2. The study assumes the pervasiveness of values in educational administration 
and the recognition that administration is a “value-laden, even value-saturated 
enterprise” (Hodgkinson, 1978b, p. 122), and that the administrator is 
“constantly faced with value choices” (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 109).  It accepts 
the subjectivist world view of scholar Christopher Hodgkinson’s (1978b, 
1991, 1996) typology of values which provides the conceptual framework for 
understanding values in educational administration. 
3. The study assumes the participants answered truthfully since it examines only 
the participants’ interpretation and perceptions of their exercise of discretion 
in disciplinary issues.  In the same way in which Tuten’s (2006) inquiry into 
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high school principals’ decision-making processes “deals with the 
administrator/leader’s perception of how they [sic] would solve a given 
problem,” neither does this study “directly observe administrators making 
decisions in the school setting” (p. 67).  Thus, because the researcher was 
“relying solely on the participant’s perception of how they [sic] make 
decisions, [and] not [on] empirically observed reality,” (p. 67), the assumption 
is that the participants were truthful in their responses.    
1.11  Theoretical Framework 
1.11.1 H.L.A. Hart’s Modern Legal Positivism 
 Burge-Hendrix (2008) submits “legal positivism is the currently dominant 
analytical theory of law” (p. 1; see also Bix, 2005, p. 29; Cotterrell, 1989).  More 
specifically, a legal positivist position strives to “establish a study of the nature of law, 
disentangled from proposals and prescriptions for which laws should be passed or how 
legal practice should be maintained or reformed [emphasis added]” (Bix, 2005, p. 2), that 
is, keeping “‘is’ and ‘ought’ (‘description’ and ‘prescription’) separate, understanding 
that the second cannot be derived from the first” (p. 32).  Moreover, legal positivism 
contends that “it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain 
demands of morality though, in fact, they have often done so” (Hart, 1961, pp. 181–182).  
The modern legal positivism of H. L. A. Hart (1994) includes the core presumption there 
is not an “important necessary or conceptual connection between law and morality”  
(p. 259) and the belief that legal and moral obligations are “conceptually distinct” (Hart, 
1982, p. 147).  As Hart (1983) observes, however, despite the prevailing belief in legal 
positivism in the need for the separation of law and morals, the development of the legal 
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system has been, in fact, “powerfully influenced by moral opinion” (p. 55; see also Hart, 
1963, p. 1, Hart, 1961, p. 181).  Hacker (1977) observes that Hart’s theory supports 
classical legal positivism insofar as “what the law is, is one matter—to be discovered by 
examining social facts.  What the law ought to be is another matter—to be discovered by 
applying moral principles” (p. 8).    
 This study assumes Hart’s (1994) theory of the law as a system of “primary rules 
of obligation” (Hart, 1961, p. 151) that are “directed at citizens” (Bix, 2005, p. 33), and 
“secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication” (Hart, 1961, p. 151) that tell 
“officials how to identify, modify or apply the primary rules,” in addition to rules that 
impose “duties” and others that confer “powers” (Bix, 2005, p.33).  In short, “primary 
laws [set] standards for behavior and secondary laws [specify] what officials must or may 
do when they are broken” (Hart, 1962, p. 163).  Furthermore, Hart’s (1961) legal system 
contains a rule of recognition which “comprises the basic criteria of legal validity” within 
the system and is justified by its acceptance (Bix 2005, p. 35).  The criteria for this rule of 
recognition include “a written constitution, enactment by a legislature, and judicial 
precedents” (Hart, 1961, p. 98).  Hart (1961) argues that while rules and principles are the 
main form of social control, these “general standards” of behavior are communicated 
through the devices of  “legislation” and precedent” (p. 121).  He suggests an important 
fact remains: that although “general language” and “authoritative example” of legislation 
and precedent, respectively, provide guidance for human conduct, this guidance can be 
limited (p. 123), and in the application of rules “the discretion left by language” is ‘‘in 
effect, a choice” (p. 124).  Moreover, “whether precedent or legislation” is chosen to 
communicate “standards of behavior,” it will, at times, when its “application is in 
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question, prove indeterminate” and have an “open texture [emphasis in original]” (Hart, 
1961, p. 124).  As well, there is a “core of settled meaning” in cases of open texture that 
constitutes the standard from which the official or decision-maker “is not free to depart” 
(p. 140), and the exercise of discretion must align with this solid core of meaning.   
 Dyzenhaus (2002) notes that statutory provisions may be ambiguous because 
ambiguity in language is “unavoidable” (p. 500).  However, the “deliberate use of open-
textured language by the legislature” permits “interpretative delegates to develop the law 
in accordance with their expert understanding of how it is best applied to particular 
circumstances, including circumstances that could not have been anticipated” or which 
may have “changed over time” (p. 500).   He concludes that, as a result, “no hard and fast 
distinction can be drawn between deliberate and inadvertent open-texturedness” 
(Dyzenhaus, 2002, p. 500). 
 Hart’s (1994) concept of law is regarded as “‘soft positivism’” since it 
incorporates “as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive 
values” (p. 250).  Bix (2005) notes that  Hart’s  “soft legal positivism” or “inclusive legal 
positivism” finds that “while there is no necessary moral content to a legal rule (or a legal 
system), a particular legal system may, by conventional rule, make moral criteria 
necessary or sufficient for validity in that system [emphasis in original]” (p. 123).  As 
well, while “moral terms can be part of the necessary or sufficient criteria for legal 
validity in a legal system,” Bix (2005) explains that for Hart “the use of moral criteria is 
contingent—and derived from the choices or actions of particular legal officials—rather 
than part of the nature of law (and thus present in all legal systems) [emphasis in 
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original]” (p. 38).  At different times, then, moral criteria may be either “necessary” or 
“sufficient” conditions for legal validity (Bix, 2005, p. 38).   
 The second tenet of Hart’s modern legal positivism is the belief that “the courts 
exercise a genuine though interstitial law-making power or discretion in those cases 
where the existing explicit law fails to dictate a decision” (Hart, 1994, p. 259).  Hart 
(1983) suggests that when legal rules are applied, “someone must take the responsibility 
of deciding what words do or do not cover some case in hand” (pp. 63–64).  Since legal 
rules and principles “guide only in a certain way” (Hart, 1994, p. 127), often there are 
cases when “the law fails to determine an answer either way and so proves partially 
indeterminate” (p. 252).  It is in these instances, he argues, rules and principles have what 
he terms “open texture,” where a balance is struck “in the light of circumstances, between 
competing interests which vary in weight from case to case” (Hart, 1961, p. 132).  This 
“open texture” is what Bix (2004) terms “the inevitable uncertainty [emphasis in original] 
in the application of terms and rules to borderline cases” (p. 153).  It is in these 
“borderline” cases, (Bix, 2004, p. 166) or “‘hard cases’, controversial in the sense that 
reasonable and informed lawyers may disagree about which answer is legally correct” 
(Hart, 1994, p. 252), that the law is “fundamentally incomplete: it provides no answer to 
the questions at issue in such cases [emphasis in original]” (p. 252).  Such cases “are 
legally unregulated and in order to reach a decision” the courts exercise “law-creating 
discretion” in order to fill the gaps left by the incompleteness of the law (p. 252).  
Discretion is used “in rendering initially vague standards determinate, in resolving the 
uncertainties of statutes, or in developing and qualifying rules only broadly 
communicated by authoritative precedents” (Hart, 1961, p. 132).  Gavison (1987), too, 
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contends judges “interpret the law” (p. 30) but emphasizes that abstract legal theory is of 
no help to them in “hard cases” (p. 33).  Nonetheless, “theories of precedent and 
legislation” may “guide answers” in such cases or else “provide rationalizations to 
decisions” (p. 33). 
Discretion is necessary because of the “indeterminacy” of rules, that is, the 
inability to determine or anticipate all future circumstances (Hart, 1994, p. 128).  Bix 
(2004) defines “indeterminacy” as being when legal questions do not have “unique 
correct answers” (p. 97).  In these cases, there is not “one uniquely correct answer to be 
found” (Hart, 1961, p. 128) but, instead, an “answer which is a reasonable compromise 
between many conflicting interests” (p. 128).   It is in cases of uncertainty, when 
discretion is required, that Hart (1983) identifies the “problem of the penumbra” (p. 64).  
This is a “penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable 
nor obviously ruled out” (Hart, 1958, p. 607).  If this “penumbra of uncertainty” exists 
“outside the hard core of standard instances or settled meaning” of all legal rules, then 
“deductive reasoning…cannot [always] serve as a model” for judicial reasoning, and the 
rationality of “legal arguments and legal decisions” must “lie in something other than a 
logical relation to premises” (p. 64).   If these “penumbral questions” in the gray area are 
to be rational, however, the criterion that makes the decision sound is the “concept of 
what the law ought to be” which “must be a moral judgment” (Hart, 1983, p. 64).  
Discretion, then, is the “point of necessary ‘intersection between law and morals’” (Hart, 
1983, p. 64).  Hart (1983) argues where there is indeterminacy in rules and discretion is 
exercised, judges are required to make their decisions in accordance with “broad 
principles and established values” and to choose “at the higher level of principles or 
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received values,” and not merely on what they think is “best” (p. 137).  It is at those times 
“that the judge must, when the explicit rules prove indeterminate, push aside his law 
books and start to legislate in accordance with his personal morality or conceptions of 
social good or justice” (p. 138).  Furthermore, “judicial decision…involves a choice 
between moral values, and not merely the application of some single outstanding moral 
principle, for it is folly to believe that where the meaning of the law is in doubt, morality 
always has a clear answer to offer” (Hart, 1961, p. 200).  Hart (1983) refutes the 
“mechanical application” (p. 70) of judicial decisions and, instead, identifies “the 
intelligent decision of penumbral questions” as being “one made not mechanically but in 
the light of aims, purposes, and policies” (p.71), although he cautions against being 
“preoccupied” with the penumbra and considering “all questions…in light of social 
policy [emphasis in original]” (p. 72).       
Arguably, it is through the exercise of discretion that the rules-based positivism of 
law may be reconciled with the subjective, value-laden judgments of administrators; 
when they exercise discretion, principals through their decision-making can meet the 
demands of both facts and values.  In much the same way in which the exercise of 
discretion by judges “is a freedom to apply their own moral beliefs or values, rather than 
merely [being] a discretion to interpret the law in their own way” (Tebbit, 2005, p. 58), so 
might principals also exercise discretion; however, for judges this freedom is not 
unlimited and neither, one may assume, is it for principals. Thus, discretionary decision-
making may be one site where the objective realm of legal facts and rules accommodates 
valuation in administrative decision-making.  By considering administrative decision-
making in this way, then, the ways in which school administrators subjectively negotiate 
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within the legal parameters of discretion in order to maintain their own values system 
may be more fully appreciated.    
1.11.2 Christopher Hodgkinson’s Typology of Values 
 Begley (2004) insists there must be movement beyond the mere “rhetoric of moral 
leadership” because the “new reality of school leadership is responding to value 
conflicts” (p. 15).  This dissertation draws upon the notion of the pervasiveness of values 
in educational administration and accepts the subjectivist world view of Hodgkinson’s 
(1978b, 1991, 1996) typology of values.  In acknowledging there are various types of 
decisions made by individuals and groups, Hodgkinson (1978b) theorizes that “the 
intrusion of values into the decision-making process is not merely inevitable, it is the 
very substance of decision” (p. 59).  He refutes a scientific and traditional systems theory 
approach, arguing instead that central questions of administration are “philosophical” 
(Hodgkinson, 1978a, p. 272).  Gronn and Lacey (2004) note Hodgkinson has “strongly 
enjoined leaders to ‘know thyself’” (p. 419).  Hodgkinson (1983) argues against the 
separation of fact and values in the positivist tradition, since “fact and value are always 
inextricably intertwined” and focuses instead on administration, not management, where 
the latter is a “relatively value-free” science (p. 12).  He disagrees with Simon’s (1957) 
“construction of means-ends chains” (p. 62) as a “series of causally related elements”   
(p. 77) in rational decision-making, and disputes his criteria of “‘efficiency’ and 
‘coordination’” (p. 61) in administration.  Instead, Hodgkinson (1983) contends 
“technology and modern organizations are committed to the metavalues of efficiency and 
effectiveness but while they raise productivity they leach away meaning” (p. 16).  Gronn 
(2003a) maintains Hodgkinson has “tried to show that the decisions and actions of 
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administrative and leadership practitioners, at all levels and in all spheres of action, are 
informed by one or the other of…three value types” (p. 256).    
 Hodgkinson’s (1978b, 1991, 1996) typology of values provides the conceptual 
framework for understanding values and valuation processes in educational 
administration in this study.  Values influence an individual’s decisions, choices, and 
judgment (Hodgkinson, 1978b).   Hodgkinson (1978b) describes values as “concepts of 
the desirable with motivating force” (p. 120).
8
  Needs, wants, and desires are “sources of 
value [emphasis in original],” and are related to the notion of motive (Hodgkinson, 1996, 
p. 111).  Motives, which are either “conscious reasons (pulls)” or “unconscious drives 
(pushes),” or “some combination of both,” are also “a source of value [emphasis in 
original]” (p. 111), and they “have a sort of push-pull correlation with consciousness and 
the faculty of reason” (p. 112).   As motives “provide a source of value, so value is a 
source of attitudes” which themselves are manifestations of values at the “interface of 
skin and world” (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 112).  How people “attend” in the world is a 
“function of [their] attitudes” (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 112).  With values defined in this 
way, their function in “making choices” is highlighted, underscoring the decision-making 
aspect of administration (Begley, 2003, p. 3).  Hodgkinson (1978b) contends that within 
the realm of action there exists a dynamic continuum where, at one end, are “intensely 
private” values while, at the other, there are public “purposive behaviours and strivings” 
which can be “expressed verbally as ideals, summa boni, social norms, and cultural 
                                                 
8
 Hodgkinson (1978) adapts his definition from Kluckhohn (1962) who defines a value as “a conception, 
explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which 
influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action [emphasis in original]” (p. 395).  
Kluckhohn (1962) further characterizes it as “a preference which is felt and/or considered to be justified—
‘morally’ or by reasoning or by aesthetic judgments, usually by two or all three of these” (p. 396). 
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standards [emphasis in original],” and which can be “objectified into systems of law, 
codes of ethics, systematized philosophies and ideologies” (p. 109).  Between “these 
extremes lie[s] the gamut of attitudes, opinions, preferences” (p. 109).  Begley (2004) 
insists Hodgkinson’s (1978b, 1991) values typology is integral for “understanding 
valuation processes” (p. 6), enabling “authentic leadership practices and ethical decision-
making within social contexts of increasing cultural diversity” (p. 4). 
 For Hodgkinson (1978b), values have two components—”the axiological (good)” 
or that which is “enjoyable, likeable [and] pleasurable,” and “the deontological (right),” 
that which is “proper, ‘moral’, dutybound, or simply what ‘ought to be [emphasis in 
original]’” (p. 110).  He continues that good is a “matter of preference” and is essentially 
“part of our biological make-up,” or else is “learned, [or] conditioned” (Hodgkinson 
(1978b, p. 110), while “right” is “a sense of collective responsibility, a conscience” 
Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 116).  The deontological, or “right”, is the dimension that causes 
the most angst for administrators, since whenever the “desirable and the desired 
contend,” what is required is a reconciling of  “idiographic desires in favor of other more 
nomothetic demands” (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 116).  The way the individual is able to 
“validate, justify, determine, [and] rank order” (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 116) these values 
in given contexts is classified in four ways.   
 Hodgkinson (1978b; see also 1991, 1996) rank orders values in a hierarchy that 
“classifies the grounds” for value judgments (p. 112) and creates the tension inherent in 
making values conflict choices.  At the bottom of the hierarchy are Type III (or 
Subrational) Values; these values reflect individual preferences (p. 98), are “self-
justifying” and include personal taste (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 117).  Hodgkinson (1991) 
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refers to Type III values as “primitives,” which correspond philosophically to logical 
positivism, hedonism, and behaviorism (p. 98).  Begley (1996) suggests Type III values 
do not require “rational processing” the way Type II values do and that they are the 
“nonrational bases of thought and action” (p. 419).  Situated above these values are Type 
II (or Rational) Values, which enlist reasoning and correspond with utilitarianism, 
pragmatism, and humanism.  Type II Values are social and depend upon “collectives and 
collective justification” (Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 98).  Type II, identified as “the modal 
administrative value orientation [emphasis in original],” corresponds to the organization 
as a whole, where values are contextual and established by laws, traditions, and customs 
(Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 120).  Type II Values are further classified as either Consensus 
(Type IIB) or Consequence (Type IIA), which is a “‘higher level’ of rationality” 
(Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 117).   Type II values are ultimately adjudged based on either 
Type I or Type III values (Hodgkinson, 1978b, p. 112).  Residing at the top of the values 
framework, Type I (Transrational) Values, or “principles,” are those values which are 
grounded in “ethical codes” and which go beyond reason and cannot be verified by logic 
or rationality. Their “adoption implies some kind of act of faith, belief, [and] 
commitment” (p. 99) and they are “highly idiographic” (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 119).  The 
“typical administrative mode” (Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 122) is Type II Values, although in 
the end such decisions are made by referring to either Type I or Type III Values, or both, 
and resolving the “dialectical tensions between principles and preferences” (p. 127).  
Begley’s (2003) research supports these motivational bases as being behind the adoption 
of particular values by administrators.  He further suggests the “normative motivational 
bases for administrative decision-making are the rational domains of consequences and 
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consensus [Type II],” with self-interest infrequently being a motivator, and ethics and 
principles being used by administrators only in “special circumstances” (p. 7). 
 There are three ways a “value can be adjudged to be right [emphasis in original]” 
(Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 117).  As it moves upward in the hierarchy, if it agrees with the 
majority “in a given collectivity or context” (p. 117) and is based on consensus, then it 
becomes a Type IIB value; however, if some desired future state of affairs is the 
consequence of the “pending value judgment” (p. 117), then it is a Type IIA value.  Both 
these values choices “enlist the reason,” and are “rational and social” for they are based 
on “collectivities and collective justification (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 117).  The final value 
level, Type I, is based upon a “conviction” that is manifested “in the acceptance of a 
principle [emphasis in original] (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 118). 
 The values hierarchy is especially helpful in resolving conflict between and 
within levels of the paradigm (Hodgkinson, 1991; 1996).  Hodgkinson’s (1991) general 
rule is that when a values conflict occurs, the “lower ranking value should be 
subordinated to the higher” (p. 146).  However, an exception to this maxim, called “The 
Principle of Most Principle,” exists; in certain situations the “summative knowledge” of 
the decision-maker will “override the general logic” of the conflict resolution, and require 
the leader’s “moral art” (p. 147).  An example would be when an administrator knows a 
colleague is incompetent.  The value of “collegial solidarity” is in conflict with the 
“larger interest of the organization” (p. 146) and by deciding to keep the employee on, 
the administrator resolves the conflict at the Type I level of principle, even if it means the 
organization will become less efficient.   The other exception to the rule of “higher 
subordinating lower” (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 236) is called “The Principle of Least 
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Principle” which requires the decision-maker to reduce conflict by invoking the lowest or 
the “less principle” (p. 236).  An example of this value conflict would be when the head 
of an organization affected by “grievance group activity” works to keep “potential 
controversy” away from the group level and to reduce it to the level of “individual 
opinion” or a Type III value level.  Conflict within the same level must be reduced to two 
values and resolved by “preference,” “dialogue,” “cost-benefit analysis,” or divine 
intervention, depending upon the level at which the conflict appears (Hodgkinson, 1996, 
pp. 238–240). 
 Hodgkinson (1978b) argues that while the resolution of value conflicts and the 
“dialectical tension” that accompanies them is “a universal feature of the human 
condition,” more than that it is “the administrative condition” (p. 121).   He contends 
administrative leadership is the ability to creatively resolve “moral conflicts”  (p. 116), 
and this must be achieved not by avoiding or resisting them, but by raising consciousness 
of one’s values through philosophical reflection for “authenticity”, that is, being  true to 
one’s own personal morality (p. 187).  He observes that policy decisions involving 
administrative discretion can be times of intense “moral complexity” (p. 195).  Thus, 
administrators must know when to resolve conflicts on principle or at a lower, more 
pragmatic, level.  Alternatively, when the aims of policy are in contention among a 
number of parties, administrators must consciously consider all relevant values and make 
a judgment  either by choosing one side (a Type I value) or by making a compromise 
(Type IIB value).  As a result, Hodgkinson (1978b) concludes, administrators would be 
well-served by having a “rich personal value structure” (p. 195).  
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1.12    Definitions of Key Terms 
1. Discretion—in its legal sense, discretion typically resides in the field of 
Administrative Law and is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “wise 
conduct and management; cautious discernment; prudence; individual 
judgment; the power of free decision-making” (Garner, 2009, p. 534).  Bix 
(2004) defines discretion as “the right or power to select among a range of 
alternatives” (p. 54), and Handler (1992) maintains it is opposed to the “Rule 
of Law” (p. 333). 
2. Values—”concepts of the desirable with motivating force” (Hodgkinson, 
1991, p. 110). 
3. Valuation processes—are the linkages “between motivation and values and 
between values and administrative action” (Begley, 2004, p. 4) which are the 
“primary enabling strategy for authentic leadership practices [that are 
professionally effective, ethically sound, and consciously reflective]”         
(pp. 3–4).  The processes occur within “multiple external and internal 
environmental sources” (p. 10), such as the self, profession, organization, 
community and spirituality. 
1.13   Limitations of the Study 
 Findings of the study are limited by the number of participants and by the 
geographic area in which they practice.  The choice of ten participants contributes to a 
more insightful and in-depth analysis than that provided by a greater number of 
participants, since qualitative inquiry “focuses on the quality and texture of events rather 
than how often those events occur” (Kilbourn, 2006, p. 552).  The number of participants 
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provides for depth of analysis, enough balance, and some representation of the larger 
population, although the participants cannot be “presumed to be representative of all 
principals in the geographic area of the study” (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1984, pp. 203–204).   
Mertens (2010) submits the “proof for generalizability lives with the reader, and the 
researcher is responsible for providing the thick description that allows the reader to 
make a judgment about the applicability of the research to another setting” (p. 430); thus, 
the generalizability of the study is limited to the participants interviewed, since other 
principals may respond differently.  The research is based on the interpretations, 
“recollections and perceptions of principals,” (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1984, p. 204), and 
the quality of the data is further limited by their selections of “the decisions they chose to 
discuss, and their self-awareness and candor” (p. 204), their depth of understanding of the 
topic and the information they shared during the interview (MacDonald, 1998).   The 
principals were asked to recall disciplinary situations and “different values might have 
emerged if the focus had been on another aspect of administration” (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 
1984, p. 204).  Other principals may have chosen different situations and decision-
making experiences.  As well, the document analysis is limited to the analysis of 
legislation, relevant regulations, case law, and school policies authorizing the 
discretionary actions of school administrators in Saskatchewan.  The study is also limited 
by the fact no school documents outlining discipline policies or codes of conduct peculiar 
to the participants’ school were provided to the researcher (MacDonald, 1998). 
 In their study of principals’ decision-making in disciplinary issues, McCarthy and 
Soodak (2007) note their interpretation of findings was limited by the fact that “no 
attempt was made to match reported practices to actual practices” (p. 472); consequently, 
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they recommend that future research employ “direct observations” which may serve to 
“develop a richer understanding of how discipline policies are enacted in schools”  
(p. 472).  Biggs (1993), too, observes that inquiry into discretion “rarely focuses” on 
actual educational practice (p. 56), although, as Begley (1999b) suggests, the “observable 
actions” of individuals “may or may not be accurate indicators of underlying values” and 
“true intentions” behind these actions maybe “transparently obvious” or deeply hidden   
(p. 238).  He also emphasizes that individuals may “deliberately or unwittingly manifest 
or articulate one value while being actually committed to another,” which may 
complicate the connection between “motivational” bases and values and values 
interpreted by the participant and the researcher (Begley, 1999b, p. 238; see also Roche, 
1999, p. 269).  One way for the researcher to overcome this “value attribution” is to 
develop a “partnership” with participants based on “mutual trust, good faith, and a 
commitment to deliberate dialogue” about the value (Begley, 1999b, p. 243).  Despite 
Hawkins’s (1992) tangential argument for “empirical studies” into the nature of 
discretion (see also Lacey, 1992), much current research does not clarify whether the 
study is “descriptive of actual practice, or prescriptive of preferred practice” and 
mistakenly imputes “goals and motives” of decision-makers based on unexamined 
assumptions (p. 46).  Such empirical methods are beyond the scope of this study.  Given 
privacy and confidentiality issues concerning student discipline in schools, and given the 
sporadic, episodic, and unpredictable nature of administrator/student disciplinary 
interactions, direct observation, in many cases, may not be feasible.  McMillan and 
Schumacher (2010) contend qualitative methods are preferred when topics under 
investigation require confidentiality.   Observation can be limiting because it focuses on 
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“external behaviors and since the observer cannot “see what is happening inside people,” 
the “selective perception of the observer may distort the data” (Patton, 1990, p. 244).  
Therefore, this study focuses on the topic of discretionary decision-making from the 
perspective of the lived experience of principals, and their interpretation and 
understanding of their actions, and not from the phenomenon of discretionary decision-
making as it is observed in practice.  Thus, the interpretation of findings of the proposed 
research also is limited in this way.  
1.14  Chapter Summary 
 Decision-making is generally considered the essence of administration.  
Administrators in schools make decisions within a context that is established, in part, by 
case law, legislation and regulations, school board policies, and social, organizational, 
individual, and other values, and they interpret what these influences mean in specific 
cases.  That administrators exercise discretion in their decision-making is also well-
established.  The exercise of administrative discretion can be seen as indispensible for the 
pragmatic functioning of schools and as vital to the decision-making process, offering 
school leaders flexibility and creativity.  Discretion in decision-making is not absolute, 
however, and school administrators must adhere to certain legal constraints in their 
exercise of discretionary power.  At the same time, educational administration is 
considered to be a moral art and a value-laden enterprise.  It can be argued that when 
administrators exercise discretion they make choices that are influenced by personal, 
professional, organizational, social, and other values.  Many scholars have noted school 
administrators exercise discretion in student disciplinary issues and, and a result, they 
maintain administrators must work to achieve a balance between competing rights in the 
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school setting, on one hand, and maintaining order and discipline, on the other; moreover, 
they must exercise their discretion within a culture of accountability and transparency.  It 
follows, then, that in-school administrators’ interpretation and implementation of school 
discipline policies, legislation, and case law can provide insight into both their 
discretionary decision-making and their underlying application of values in student 
disciplinary issues. 
 This study seeks to determine how school principals negotiate within the legal 
parameters constraining their discretion in order to be faithful to their own value systems 
when they deal with student disciplinary matters.  The inquiry lends insight, through 
description and explanation, into current knowledge of how principals make meaning of 
their exercise of discretion in their disciplinary decision-making processes.  The study 
uses the concept of Hodgkinson’s (1978b, 1991, 1996) typology of values and H. L. A 
Hart’s (1961, 1982, 1983, 1994) modern legal positivism as its undergirding theoretic 
framework.  By considering not only a paradigm of values in educational administration, 
but also a “soft” positivist theoretical framework of the law, this study offers a fuller 
appreciation than past studies of the application of values by principals as they engage in 
disciplinary decision-making within legally fixed parameters to their administrative 
discretion.  In this way, through the latitude the law affords school officials when they 
exercise disciplinary discretion, principals’ subjective, value-laden decision-making may 
be reconciled with objective, modern legal positivism.  Consequently, at the “practical” 
juncture where discretion is exercised, the distinction between what is and what should 
be, that is, “the line between fact and value,” becomes, at the very least, “blurred”          
(T. Greenfield, 1978, p. 8).  
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1.15   Overview of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation is organized in a seven-chapter format.  Chapter One presents the 
background to the problem, the purpose of the study, the significance of the study, the 
limitations of the study, and the assumptions that undergird the theoretical framework.  
Chapter Two presents a review of the applicable literature concerning discretion as it 
appears from not only a legal but also a social-science perspective.  The role of values in 
administration is examined, in addition to the nature of discretion in administrative 
decision-making and its role in issues of student discipline.  Chapter Three presents the 
methodology chosen for conducting the research, the population and sample, the design 
of the interview protocol, the process used to obtain the data, and the method of analysis 
of the data obtained.  Chapter Four presents a document analysis of relevant provincial 
legislation and school board policies authorizing principals’ exercise of discretion in 
Saskatchewan.  Chapter Five presents a description of the participants and the findings of 
the data which include quotations from the semi-structured interviews.  Chapter Six 
presents a discussion of the eight emergent themes from the data, as well as an analysis of 
the data, guided by the research questions.  Chapter Seven presents conclusions based on 
the analysis of the data and implications for relevant constituencies, as well as 
implications for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2 Literature Review 
 Efforts to capture the essence of discretion may prove elusive; as Hawkins (1992) 
pointedly observes, “the topic is huge” and “no monograph can make claims to 
comprehensiveness” (p. vi).  This review of the literature traces the concept of discretion 
from a brief historical perspective through to a consideration of its nature in law and the 
requirements of its exercise.  From there, discretion is analyzed first from a social-science 
perspective and then from its place in policy implementation in organizations.  The focus 
is then narrowed to the school setting and, more particularly, to administrators’ exercise 
of discretion in dealing with student disciplinary concerns.  Relevant American and 
Canadian cases that consider discretion are explored as well as the impact of discretion 
upon student disciplinary issues.  Finally, a potential lens for viewing discretion in 
decision-making is offered as a guide for principals when they work with students on 
behavioral issues.   
2.1 Historical Perspective 
 The concept of discretion appears to have been long-associated with judgment, 
discernment, and understanding.  In the Bible, discretion and knowledge, counterparts to 
the personification of wisdom, appear to be acquired as one grows and matures: “I, 
wisdom, live with prudence/and I attain knowledge and discretion” (Proverbs, 8:12).  
This notion reappears in the writings of medieval theologian and natural-law philosopher 
Thomas Aquinas who considered man a rational being and reason as being “pivotal as the 
source of legal validity” (Tebbit, 2005, p. 44).  In his examination of the nature of sin, 
Aquinas (1945) argues that “before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of 
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years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin” (p. 740).  Aquinas’s 
notion is echoed by eminent British jurist Sir William Blackstone (1771) who, in his 
analysis of the rights of parents and child, identifies the age of twenty-one as the point at 
which the “power of a father” over his children ceases, “for they are then enfranchised by 
arriving at years of discretion” or at that point “when the empire of the father, or other 
guardian, gives place to the empire of reason” (p. 453).   
Gelsthorpe and Padfield (2003) claim discretion has been around “since Plato,” 
and has been “equated with what remains after one has elucidated what the legislation or 
law should be” (p. 2). In the history of English law, they maintain, discretion was 
recognized under other names, such as “the Royal pardon,” or “the benefit of clergy,” or 
exercised through indictments being quashed on “technicalities of language,” or the 
“ability of women to offer pregnancy as a consideration in sentencing” (p. 2).  They 
claim their most significant finding from a historical perspective is that “however precise 
the law, theory or policy might be, there is always a certain flexibility, ambiguity or 
discretion in how it is applied in practice” (pp. 2–3).  They conclude, quite simply, that 
discretion is the difference between “the formal position and the actual practice” 
(Gelsthorpe & Padfield, 2003, p. 3).   
2.2  Golden Age of Discretion 
King (2000), however, identifies the last three-quarters of the eighteenth century 
as the “golden age of discretionary justice in England” (p. 1).  At that time the “criminal 
justice system relied on the participation of a wide range of social groups at almost every 
stage in the prosecution process and gave them extensive discretionary powers” (King, 
2000, p. 1), despite the fact the prevailing legal handbooks appeared “rigid and 
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inflexible” (p. 2).  Furthermore, there were many “interconnected spheres of contested 
judicial space” in the criminal justice system, wherein “deeply discretional choices were 
made” (p. 1).  For example, when “jury nullification and mitigation” were at their peak, 
acquittal rates were high, and the pardoning system, with judges’ rights to automatically 
“reprieve many capital convicts,” extended sentencing options (p. 355).  Pretrial 
processes, such as choices whether or not to prosecute, the type and length of 
punishments, as well as the type of charge issued, suggested the participants in criminal-
justice decision-making exercised “wide and often almost untrammeled discretion”        
(p. 355).  Magistrates, too, “enjoyed important freedoms” and dealt with many 
“indictable property offenders informally” (p. 356).  Prosecutors also “maintained 
considerable flexibility between committal proceedings and trial” (p. 356).  As a result, 
the criminal justice system appeared as a long and complex series of decision-making 
processes, wherein decision-makers acted “primarily on the basis of their own interests, 
interactions, and ideas of justice” (p. 356) and countless opportunities existed for the 
exercise of discretion.  
Discretionary power was exercised by numerous groups throughout the justice 
system—from the laboring poor who could choose whether or not to prosecute, to the 
middling class who had extensive leeway to pardon or to charge if they were property 
victims and to act as jurors in acquitting or reducing the charges against property 
offenders, to the ruling elite’s and the assizes judges’ exercise of their sentencing power 
(p. 360).  King (2000) observes the law at that time was an area of “contest and 
negotiation” among all social groups in England, where “factors such as youth, gender, 
family property, previous offences, good character and the nature of the offence” would 
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be criteria upon which all groups could agree in sentencing (p. 361), and a site where 
groups could resolve disputes, air their grievances, or express opposition to game and 
excise laws, for example.  He further notes justice was an “approximate word,” 
represented by “hurried trials, overawed prisoners, ambivalent judges [and] convictions 
on flimsy evidence” (p. 371), in addition to “gender- and property-based qualifications” 
for jurors and judges.  Nonetheless, justice was essential to the “rhetoric of the ruling 
elite,” and the law had to be “seen, in part, at least, to work” (p. 371) so that they could 
ensure their dominance, the middling class could protect their property, and the laboring 
poor could use it to “appeal for wages or relief” (p. 373).    
The elite, however, found “rituals, discretionary opportunities and legitimating 
functions of the law” to be only marginally useful in maintaining their dominance over 
other social classes (King, 2000, p. 372). As a result, in order to strengthen their 
authority, the ruling class also exercised power through “terror, exploitation and bloody 
sanction,” in addition to “negotiation” and “accommodation,” so as to establish control 
over the “laboring poor” and the “middling sort” (p. 373).  Thus, the law was used not 
only to maintain and support the status quo but also to legitimize the ruling elite who 
were able then to govern England without a police force or an army (p. 373). 
2.3  A. V. Dicey’s Law of the Constitution 
A. V. Dicey (1885), in his analysis of the law of the English Constitution, 
distinguished between the principle of the rule of law and the exercise of discretionary 
power:  he found the two incompatible.   Wade and Forsyth (2004) comment that this 
belief currently does not contain much truth and contend the point is not that 
discretionary power should be eliminated, but that the law should “control its exercise” 
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(p. 343).  Dicey (1915), however, identifies the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in 
England, from the “accession of the Tudors” to the “expulsion of the Stuarts,” as an 
historical period in which the French system of “droit administratif” potentially could 
have gained a foothold in that country (p. 365).  Droit administratif, which was 
“absolutely foreign to English law,” was a wide discretionary authority whereunder the 
“relation of individual citizens to the state is regulated by principles different from those 
which govern the relation of one French citizen to another” (Dicey, 1915, p. 383) and 
“the government, and every servant of the government, possesses, as representatives of 
the nation, a whole body of special rights, privileges, or prerogatives” based on different 
principles (p. 332).  This system contradicts “modern English convictions as to the 
rightful supremacy or rule of the law of the land” (Dicey, 1885, p. 203); as a result, it 
failed to be enacted in England, because it was fundamentally inconsistent with the rule 
of law.   
Dicey (1915) takes great care to contrast the English rule of law with droit 
administratif in France where judges “are under no circumstances to disturb the action of 
the administration,” which could lead “to the exemption of every administrative act, or, to 
use English terms, alleged to be done in virtue of the [administrative] prerogative, from 
judicial cognizance” (p. 366).  In tracing the history of the rule of law, Dicey (1915) also 
criticizes the situation in seventeenth-century England when the “[Royal] prerogative was 
something beyond and above the ordinary law,” and was not unlike the “foreign doctrine 
[droit administratif] that in matters of high policy the administration has a discretionary 
authority which cannot be controlled by any Court” (p. 366).   
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In his lengthy defence of the rule of law, Dicey (1885) acknowledges the “rightful 
supremacy” of the “rule of the law of the land” (p. 203), which serves as a fundamental 
principle of the unwritten Constitution in England, which, in turn, owes its existence to 
the “ordinary law of the land” (p. 216).   The rule of law is, among other things, the 
“absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of 
arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness and prerogative, or even of 
wide discretionary authority on the part of government” (p. 215).  It also recognizes the 
equality of all people before the law, where no one is above the law and where “no man 
is punishable” or can be made to suffer unless there is a “distinct” breach of law 
established in an ordinary manner before the Courts (Dicey, 1885, p. 172).  He maintains 
the “absence of arbitrary power on the part of government” in England, even during the 
last part of the nineteenth century, distinguishes that country from other European nations 
where “persons in authority [exercised]…wide, arbitrary or discretionary powers of 
constraint” (Dicey, 1885, p. 172), such as exemplified by the principle of droit 
administratif in eighteenth-century France, and insists “there exists in England no true 
droit administratif” (Dicey, 1915, p. 386).  
In arguing for Parliamentary sovereignty in England, Dicey (1885), nonetheless, 
recognizes that although there are times the English executive requires the right to 
exercise discretionary powers,” such as in times of war, “the English Courts must 
prevent, and will prevent at any rate where personal liberty is concerned, the exercise by 
the government of any sort of discretionary power” (p. 338).  In England, “the fact that 
the most arbitrary powers of the English executive must be exercised under Act of 
Parliament” then places the government, even with wide authority, “under the 
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supervision, so to speak, of the Courts” (p. 339).  He identifies the dichotomy between 
ordinary law and discretionary power when he concludes that the English Parliament is 
the “supreme legislator” (Dicey, 1885, p. 340), but that laws are subject to judicial 
interpretation.  As he reasons, “from the moment Parliament has uttered its will as 
lawgiver, that will becomes subject to the interpretation put upon it by the judges of the 
land” because judges “are disposed to construe statutory exceptions to common law 
principles” (Dicey, 1885, p. 340).   
2.4 The Nature of Discretion 
 More recently, Hawkins (1997), in his analysis, defines discretion as “the means 
by which the words of law are translated into action” (p. 140), and posits that discretion 
has long been considered by both lawyers and social scientists, albeit from divergent 
perspectives (Hawkins, 1992).  Lawyers, he claims, are concerned with “decision-making 
procedures and questions about the scope for the play of individual judgment afforded 
within a structure of rules…discretionary power…official authority…[and] questions of 
legitimacy” (p. v).  Social scientists, on the other hand, seek “understanding of the ways 
in which people reach decisions, and how various social, economic, and political 
constraints act upon the exercise of choice,” and see the law as “merely one set of 
restraints upon, or guidance for, individual action among a varied array of social forces” 
(p. v).  Hawkins (1992) suggests both groups are interested in ways discretion may be 
limited or guided: for lawyers, “in terms of legal constraint by rules, procedures, or forms 
of accountability,” and for social scientists, in terms of the other constraints upon choice, 
“including those which officials and organizations impose upon themselves,” such as 
“incentives or disincentives to forms of behavior, questions of socialization or training, or 
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the importance or organizational routines” (p. v).  This study seeks to enhance 
understanding in both realms.   
2.5 Discretion as a Legal Concept 
 Bell (1992) distinguishes between the “varying degrees of choice” in the 
interpretation and application of discretion, such as “deliberately created discretion” 
provided for in law, in addition to the “leeway of interpretation and other situations of 
choice of a less deliberate kind” (p. 98).  Discretion, then, exists in its formal role in law, 
and Schneider (1992) points to the tension that exists between the concept of rules in law 
and discretion, believing that “despite the recognition of the primacy of rules…discretion 
is both invaluable and inevitable” (p. 48).   
Formal discretion falls under the ambit of administrative law, a “coherent system 
of principles” (Jones & de Villars, 2004, p. xi) wherein cases are contextually based.  In 
many areas of law, rules, as differentiated from principles, provide certain answers to 
“legal problems arising from particular fact patterns” (p. xi); however, the general 
principles which constitute administrative law provide a most challenging aspect insofar 
as they provide “no single correct answer to a problem” (p. xi).  Unlike in other areas of 
public law where the application of rules generally results in “definite answers” to 
problems arising from facts (Jones & de Villars, 2004, p. xi), the application and 
consideration of general and “competing principles of public policy” (p. xi) are used in 
administrative law to find solutions.  As a result, one of the main challenges 
administrative law presents is that the contexts within which cases appear are so diverse 
and complex that it may be difficult to achieve anything but an application of broad 
principles to the facts as they are presented, and “to glean precedential dicta from such 
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cases without referring to general principles” is “exceedingly difficult” (Jones & de 
Villars, 2004, p. xi).  In the absence of rules, then, each case must be considered on “its 
own merits,” and, as a result, discretion will be “exercised differently in different cases” 
(Jones & de Villars, 2004, p. 192).  Mullan (2001) envisions discretion in administrative 
law as a continuum “characterized at one end by extremely broad, unstructured 
discretion,” while “at the other end of this spectrum, there are provisions that depend 
upon the application of legal terms sharply defined either in the statute itself or by clear 
common law principle” (p. 108).  In short, there is “no bright line distinction” between 
questions of law and the exercise of discretionary powers (p. 109).  He concludes “the 
resolution of questions of law will involve almost invariably elements of judicial 
discretion, and the exercise of discretion is just as invariably constrained in some 
measures by legal principles” (Mullan, 2001, p. 108).     
 Grey (1979) argues “if administrative law is seen as the study of the use of power, 
one of its most important interests is discretion, since the limits on discretion are at the 
same time the limits on the power that anyone can have in our type of democracy”        
(p. 107).  He continues that discretion may best be defined as “the power to make a 
decision that cannot be determined to be right or wrong in any objective way”; this power 
creates “rights and privileges” but does not determine by whom they are held (p. 107).  
Discretion positively confers power upon officials when they require more freedom than 
a “detailed system of rules” allows (Galligan, 1986, p. 2).  Wade and Forsyth (2009) 
conclude “all legal power, as opposed to duty, is inevitably discretionary to a greater or 
lesser extent” (p. 259).   
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 Jones and de Villars (2004) further distinguish between the notions of duty and 
discretion when they submit that many delegated powers do not allow for the exercise of 
discretion, such as the power given to an immigration officer who has the duty to admit 
Canadian citizens into Canada but who has “no discretion to decide—as a matter of law 
—who is a citizen or whether that citizen can be excluded from Canada; on the contrary, 
the officer has a duty to admit citizens into the country” (p. 87).  Furthermore, they 
contend it is necessary to determine  if the powers delegated are “really duties,” or 
powers “which are discretionary in nature” (p. 86), if the administrative powers can be 
“sub-delegated” (p. 85) to others, and if the “general duty to be fair” or the “principles of 
natural justice” (p. 85) apply.   Grey (1979) maintains discretion is usually “coupled with 
a duty,” although the duty simply may be to exercise the discretionary power or to “act 
honestly and in good faith” (p. 108).  Thus, “review of discretion means determining how 
far the power extends and at what point the ‘duty’ is ignored and the correlative ‘right’ 
violated” (p. 109).  At that point the courts will interfere (Grey, 1979).   
 Although there is no established standard as to when discretion should be 
exercised, reasons that discretionary power may be delegated include the following: 
(a) the difficulty of providing a rule which is applicable to all cases; 
(b) the difficulty of identifying all of the factors to be applied to a particular case; 
(c) the difficulty of weighing those factors; 
(d) the need to provide an easy vehicle for changing the considerations to be 
applied to the problem over time; 
(e) the complexity of the issue; and 
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(f) the desire not to confer vested rights on a particular party (which might be 
called the ‘short leash’ principle).  (Jones & de Villars, 2004, p. 86)   
Galligan (1986) adds discretion is necessary because of the “vagaries of language, 
the diversity of circumstances, and the indeterminacy of official purpose” (p. 1).  Bix 
(2004), in distinguishing indeterminacy from predictability in law, contends the former is 
based on the vagueness of language; contradictions within the law; the many exceptions 
to, and the inconsistency and overlap within, rules; the “indeterminacy of precedent,” and 
the “indeterminacy in applying general principles to particular cases” (p. 97).    
The Supreme Court of Canada considers the standard for vagueness in Canadian 
Foundation for Children v. Canada (2004), a case involving parents’ and teachers' use of 
reasonable force to correct children in their care.  McLachlin C. J. submits that the law 
“must set an intelligible standard” for those who are governed and for those who “must 
enforce it”; however, a vague law does not “provide an adequate basis for legal debate” 
(para. 15) and, as a result, puts “too much discretion in the hands of law enforcement 
officials, and violates the precept that individuals should be governed by the rule of law, 
not the rule of persons” (para. 16).  As a result, “legal requirements for precision” must 
be applied to a statute (para. 14), since “legislators can never foresee all the situations 
that may arise, and if they did, could not practically set them all out” (para. 17).  
McLachlin C. J. concludes “areas of uncertainty exist” in our legal system, and “judges 
clarify and augment the law on a case-by-case basis,” whereby their “decisions may 
properly add precision to a statute” (para. 17) so that “discretionary decision making” is 
not left for police officers and the judiciary to resolve on an “ad hoc and subjective basis” 
(para. 16).   
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Others believe discretion may be exercised to “fill in legislative gaps” (Baker v. 
Canada, 1999, para. 54), although the Supreme Court acknowledges “there is no easy 
distinction to be made between interpretation and the exercise of discretion; interpreting 
legal rules involves considerable discretion to clarify…and make choices among various 
options” (para. 54).  LaViolette (2008) argues, however, not all judicial discretionary 
decisions are able “to fill these [legislative] gaps in any coherent, consistent and policy 
driven way” (p. 667), citing advances in reproductive technologies and changing social 
conditions with respect to parenting as examples of current gaps which present challenges 
for family law reform. 
2.5.1 Language of Discretion  
The language used in legislation delegating discretionary power provides the basis 
for its exercise.  Mullan (2001) observes the “use of the term ‘may’ or ‘may in its 
discretion’ in the language of the empowering section [signifies] the presence of a 
discretionary power” (p. 105).  He continues that it “connotes choice over a course of 
action as opposed to a duty to take action or to make a particular decision based on 
closely worded legislative language or even existing common law principles” (p. 105).  
When a statutory power or authority is conferred by the use of the word may, Sullivan 
(2008) explains, “the implication is that the power is discretionary and that its recipient 
can lawfully decide whether or not to exercise it” (p. 70).  When may is used in 
legislation, “the issue that arises in these circumstances is not the meaning of the word 
‘may,’ but rather the nature and extent of the discretion that is enjoyed by the recipient of 
the power” (Sullivan, 2008, p. 70); in other words, “the use of ‘may’ implies discretion, 
but it does not preclude obligation” (p. 71).  Sullivan (2008) observes “the duty, if it 
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arises” from the use of the word may, must be “inferred from the purpose and scheme of 
the Act or from other contextual factors” (p.73).  The use of the word shall, on the other 
hand, often overlaps “conceptually and in practice” with may; however, the two concepts 
are not “mutually exclusive categories” and the two words are used in various ways in 
legislation (Sullivan, 2008, p. 69).  Sullivan (2008) concludes that the issue is not the 
meaning of the word may, but, in more recent case law, the “degree [emphasis in 
original]” (p. 73), “scope” (p. 74) and context of the discretion conferred.   
 Focusing on the relational and conditional aspects of discretion, Mullan (1993) 
alludes to the “broad, subjectively-worded grant of discretionary power” (p. 176), that is, 
the way it is perceived or interpreted.   Similarly, Wade and Forsyth (2009) refer to the 
“subjective element in all discretion” (p. 355), and note that sometimes “it is plain from 
language and also from context that the “discretion granted is exceptionally wide” (Wade 
& Forsyth, 2004, p. 420).  However, the limits upon discretion (i.e., acting reasonably, in 
good faith, and upon proper grounds) are such that no matter “how subjective the 
language” is, there is protection against the “abuse of power” that was not authorized 
under the Act (Wade & Forsyth, 2004, p. 420). 
2.5.2 Requirements for Discretion 
Discretion is not absolute.  Wade and Forsyth (2009) maintain the courts are 
required to limit discretionary power in such a way that “strikes the most suitable balance 
between executive efficiency and legal protection of the citizen” (p. 286).  As Jones and 
de Villars (2004) point out, in much the same way in which power must be restrained, 
“unlimited discretion cannot exist” (p. 186) and, as a result, “very few discretions are 
completely unfettered” (p. 87).  Legislation usually enumerates the “factors which delimit 
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the amount of the discretion delegated” (Jones & de Villars, 2004, p. 88).  In  Roncarelli 
v. Duplessis (1959), the Supreme Court of Canada outlined the parameters for discretion 
when Rand J. ruled on its behalf that “there is no such thing as absolute and untrammeled 
‘discretion,’” or action that is “taken on any ground or for any reason that can be 
suggested to the mind of the administrator” (p. 140).  Furthermore, a court cannot 
contemplate “an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however 
capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute” (p. 140). 
Mullan (2001) points out the Supreme Court in Roncarelli (1959) also referred to 
“underlying constitutional values, such as freedom of religion and speech” as restricting 
very “broad statutory discretions” (p. 128).  Discretionary power must be “wielded only 
by those to whom it is given,” and those so delegated “should retain it unhampered by 
improper constraints or restrictions” (Wade & Forsyth, 2009, p. 259).  McLachlin (1992) 
adds the exercise of discretion must “conform to a normative framework (substantive and 
procedural)…coined the decision-maker’s ‘jurisdiction’” (p. 173).  Jurisdiction is 
determined, in part, by “statutory construction…the nature of the interests to be protected 
and the character of the decision and the decision-maker” (p. 173).  Courts also are 
inclined to acknowledge a “duty of fairness,” in the exercise of discretionary power, 
which McLachlin (1992) defines as a “less strict application of the two principles of 
natural justice: the rule against bias…and the right to be heard” (p. 174).  
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Suresh v. Canada (2002), a case that involved a 
Sri Lankan refugee who was deemed to pose a security threat to Canada and who fought 
a deportation order, outlines further requirements for the exercise of discretion.  The 
Court ruled a discretionary decision may be set aside only if “it was made arbitrarily or in 
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bad faith, it cannot be supported on the evidence, or the Minister failed to consider the 
appropriate factors” (Suresh v. Canada, 2002, para. 29).  According to the Court the 
ultimate question in discretionary decisions is “always what the legislature intended” 
(para. 30), and must include the “weight of particular factors” (para. 37), that is, the 
“relevant” ones (para. 37) to be considered, in addition to the “relative expertise of the 
decision-maker” and the “purpose of the legislation” (para. 31) in finding a balance “of 
various interests” (para. 31).  In exercising the discretion the individual “must evaluate 
not only the past actions of and present dangers to an individual…but also the future 
behavior of the individual” (Suresh v. Canada, 2002, para. 116). 
2.5.3  Canadian Charter Guarantees 
The guarantees enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Charter) also act “as a limitation on the scope of discretion and the manner of its 
exercise” (Mullan, 2001, p. 122), and can “act as a brake on apparently broad discretions” 
(p. 123).   McLachlin (1992), on the other hand, points to the introduction of new areas of 
discretion conferred by “the language in which the rights and freedoms [of the Charter] 
are cast… [which are] broad and open-textured.  What does free speech mean?  Liberty? 
Equality?” (pp. 170–171).  She goes on to describe how judges “faced with this sort of 
language must shape and carve and sometimes limit it, like a sculptor shapes a stone, 
finding the ultimate shape within the undefined block” (p. 171).  Such is the language 
that “confers wide discretionary power” (p. 170).   
In Baker v. Canada (1999), however, L’Heureux-Dubé J. defines the notion of 
discretion as referring “to decisions where the law does not dictate a specific outcome, or 
where the decision-maker is given a choice of options within a statutorily imposed set of 
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boundaries” (para. 52).  She contends it is “inaccurate to speak of a rigid dichotomy of 
‘discretionary’ or ‘non-discretionary’ decisions,” since the “degree of discretion” can 
range from “where the decision-maker is constrained only by the purposes and objects of 
the legislation,” to “where it is so specific that there is almost no discretion involved” 
(para. 54).  The Court also notes that although “courts should not lightly interfere with 
such [discretionary] decisions,” discretion must be exercised in a manner that is 
“consistent” with the rights and freedoms entrenched in the Charter (para. 53).  In 
articulating guidelines for the judicial review of discretion, the Court not only recognizes 
the deference usually given to discretionary decision-making, but also points out that 
although “discretionary decisions will generally be given considerable respect, discretion 
must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles 
of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of 
Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter” (Baker v. Canada, 1999, para. 56).   
Mullan (2001) wonders if the Court in Baker (1999) intended the reference to the 
Charter as a rhetorical device” or if it was to “have a bite?” (p. 128).  If so, he predicted a 
decade ago, the courts “may be on the verge of a new era of controlling executive 
discretion by reference to implied constitutional principles” (Mullan, 2001, p. 129).  
However, in the days before the Charter, “courts were often much more alert in their 
scrutiny of the exercise of discretionary power” since they considered themselves 
guardians of the “underlying values of Canadian society” against “statutory bodies with 
no particular insights in such matters and likely to be influenced unduly by more 
parochial or narrow concerns” (Mullan, 2001, p. 14).  Nonetheless, grounds for a review 
of the abuse of discretion include “bad faith, acting for an improper purpose or motive, 
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taking account of irrelevant factors, failing to take account of relevant factors, undue 
fettering of discretion, and acting under the dictation of someone without authority” 
(Mullan, 2001, p. 100).  
2.5.4   Acting Reasonably and in Good Faith 
 Wade and Forsyth (2004) claim the courts will not support “arbitrary power” and 
“unfettered discretion” (p. 343).   To these ends, they insist, the courts have declared 
there are “restrictive principles” regarding the exercise of discretion so that it must be 
“exercised reasonably and in good faith,” for “proper purposes only,” in “accordance 
with the spirit as well as the letter of the empowering Act,” and they have imposed 
“stringent procedural requirements” (Wade & Forsyth, 2004, p. 343).  Grey (1979) 
maintains there is not always a duty to exercise discretion in every case, although 
discretion, if provided for, must be exercised.  He argues that even when there is a duty to 
act, it must be in good faith, uninfluenced by irrelevant considerations or motives, 
reasonable and within the statutory bounds of the discretion (Grey, 1979; see also 
Mullan, 2001, p. 100).  Jones and de Villars (2004) maintain the presumption is that the 
delegate will not exercise discretion “unreasonably, discriminatorily, retroactively, or in 
an uncertain manner” (p. 184).  They contend “reasonableness is an implied limitation 
[emphasis in original]” on the discretionary power conferred upon the delegate (Jones & 
de Villars, 2004, p. 184).  This clarification of the requirements of discretion may be 
augmented by Wade and Forsyth’s (2009) insight that when officials are not acting in 
good faith, or “merely ‘for legitimate reasons,’” it does not necessarily mean that they are 
to be “found guilty of intentional dishonesty: normally they are found to have erred, if at 
all, by ignorance or misunderstanding” (p. 352).   
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In Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959), the Supreme Court also observes “discretion 
necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty” (p. 140).  It goes on to clarify 
the meaning of “good faith,” which it describes as “carrying out the statute according to 
its intent and for its purpose; it means good faith in acting with a rational appreciation of 
that intent and purpose and not with an improper intent and for an alien purpose; it does 
not mean for the purpose of punishing a person for exercising an unchallengeable right; it 
does not mean arbitrarily and illegally attempting to divest a citizen of an incident of his 
civil status” (Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 1959, p. 143).   
 The requirement to act in good faith may often “impute no moral obliquity” 
(Wade & Forsyth, 2009, p. 352), but if absent, the notion of bad faith can be used to 
describe various forms of behaviors, ranging from clear “moral turpitude” to “errors not 
intrinsically different from those influenced by irrelevant consideration or unreasonable 
acts” (Grey, 1979, p. 115).  Grey (1979) contends officials must not exercise discretion 
for “ulterior motives, such as personal gain, dislike, ethnic feeling and so on” (p. 115), or 
with “conduct so arbitrary, capricious, or blatantly erroneous that no reasonable, properly 
directed person could have engaged in it” (p. 118).  “‘Discretion’ necessarily implies 
good faith in discharging public duty; there is always a perspective within which a statute 
is intended to operate [emphasis in original]; and any clear departure from its limits or 
objects is just as objectionable as fraud or corruption” (Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 1959,     
p. 140). 
 Galligan (1986) envisions discretion as a decision requiring judgment, “in 
particular good judgment,” exercised within a “sphere of autonomy” (p. 8).   However, he 
highlights the requirement of defensibility when he focuses on discretionary power as the 
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ability “to choose amongst different courses of action for good reasons [emphasis in 
original]” (p. 7).  He adds that discretion must be exercised “consistently, fairly and 
impartially,” and the reasons not only must comply with “considerations of morality,” but 
also must adhere to rules and standards (Galligan, 1986, p. 6).   
2.6   Perspectives on Administrative Discretion 
2.6.1    Law/Discretion Dichotomy 
 Pratt and Sossin (2009) argue discretion “is about power and judgment” (p. 301) 
and suggest that it has been the subject of much analysis, theorizing, and debate.  
Whereas “the rule of law” is linked to justice, the notion of discretion has conventionally 
been seen as “more open-ended” (p. 302).   They further argue that discretion in decision-
making is usually considered either from a legal perspective and the adjudication of 
discretion, or from a social-science viewpoint that focuses on “social forces” and the 
‘non-legal’ influences on discretionary decision-making” (p. 304).   The legal assumption 
sees discretion and law as “discrete and distinct entities that are negatively correlated” 
(Pratt & Sossin, p. 302).  In tracing the roots of discretion, they claim the pendulum 
swung away from its traditional meaning as being synonymous with arbitrariness—”the 
antithesis of law” (Pratt & Sossin, 2009, p. 302) and a threat to justice—to its association 
during the last century with the rise of the welfare state as an individualizing and 
“‘humanizing’” (p. 303) force which considered the circumstances of individual cases.  
However, as individual rights have been brought into sharper focus, they assert the 
pendulum has swung back to the point where discretion is again considered as a power 
that requires restraints because it poses “a serious threat, both real and potential, to 
individual justice” (Pratt & Sossin, 2009, p. 303).  Lately, however, there has been a 
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branch of scholarship that views discretion as being an agent for “dialogue [and] 
democratization” (Pratt and Sossin, 2009, p. 303).   Despite these changes in perceptions, 
“discretion as a binary contrast to law remains the dominant paradigm” and is still seen as 
a “threat” to “certainty, objectivity, and fairness” (Pratt & Sossin, 2009, p. 303).   
 Pratt and Sossin (2009) argue that, while a critical lens might view discretion as 
the pawn of “oppression and political interference” (p. 305), current Western liberalism 
and the “dominant legal paradigm” of the rule of law see three distinct perspectives of 
discretion.  First, discretion is seen as a necessary aspect of “individualized justice        
(p. 307) which allows for the  tailoring of  laws to suit circumstances, although the 
possibility for discrimination and capriciousness exists and “law and law-like rules” are 
needed to constrain them (p. 308).  Second, discretion is a “dialogic relationship” 
between those who exercise discretion and those upon whom it is exercised so that, 
although constrained, it has the ability to respond to economic, cultural, and racial 
diversity.  Finally, discretion may be regarded as accommodating and reconciling “the 
gap between law and equity” and may be considered a tool of governmentality, from a 
Foucaultian viewpoint, where governance is enabled “through [emphasis in original]” the 
exercise of discretion (Pratt & Sossin, 2009, p. 308). 
2.6.2 Discretion as Dialogue 
 Cartier (2009) refutes the law/discretion dichotomy, maintaining that discretion is 
compatible with the rule of law.  She submits the characterization of discretion as a “top-
down authoritarian approach” that is in opposition to law (p. 316) has slowly been eroded 
over the last thirty years through decisions made by the Supreme Court of Canada.  Three 
cases in particular, Cartier (2009) believes, provide grounds for changing the 
67 
 
conventional model of discretionary power to a bottom-up approach.  In Roncarelli v. 
Duplessis (1959), the Supreme Court ruled there were limits to discretionary power; in 
Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (1979), it ruled discretion had to be exercised within 
“the obligations of procedural fairness” (p. 318); and in Baker v. Canada (1999), it 
determined that discretionary decisions had to be based on reasonableness, with 
demonstrated sensitivity, and with reasons given. Cartier acknowledges that “discretion 
as power” still serves to direct administrative law, given decisions such as Suresh v. 
Canada (2002) in which, in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the Court 
seemed reluctant to undertake a “substantive review of discretionary decisions dealing 
with matters of national security” (p. 323).  Nonetheless, she asserts, the courts have 
imposed principles that create a “reciprocal relationship between the decision maker and 
the individual,” and she argues for the possibilities inherent in a dialogic model of 
discretion.  Discretion as dialogue reflects “a common bond, mutual respect [and] a 
genuine listening” (Cartier, 2009, p. 321) that internalize the participation and 
accountability constituting the rule of law.  While the argument for a bottom-up approach 
has merit, the direct application of the dialogic model of discretion may not transfer 
readily to the school setting because it does not appear to account for the considerable 
power differential inherent in the relationship between administrator and student. 
2.6.3 Inequality of Discretion 
 Handler (1992) defines discretion as that which gives “the official choice”         , 
and comments upon the fact that, unlike the “idealized version of the rule of law where 
parties have equal access and the court applies neutral rules evenhandedly,” discretion  
“allows for the bargaining away of publicly defined normative standards” (p. 333).  
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While much that is written about discretion assumes the relative equality of the parties 
and considers how they can “better relate to each other,” he is concerned about discretion 
when there are “serious inequalities” between parties” (p. 333).  He contends discretion 
“contemplates a conversation within a normative framework,” and may seriously 
disadvantage “the poor, minorities, the uneducated, and unsophisticated” because those 
who are “poor and weak” often “lack the information, the skills, and the power to 
persuade,” while the official with the power to exercise discretion “has the unfair 
advantage” (p. 333).  Therefore, it is necessary to find “conditions which facilitate and 
create and nurture empowerment in discretionary decision-making” (p. 354) through 
“active participation by all stakeholders, by increasing [the] information and knowledge” 
(p. 357) of all parties, through the skill-building of those about whom discretion is 
exercised, and through greater accountability by the decision-makers.  
2.6.4 K. C. Davis’s Notion of Discretionary Justice 
 Legal theorist K. C. Davis’s (1969) insightful work has contributed much to an 
understanding of discretion and the concept of justice.  While he acknowledges discretion 
is indispensible for “tailoring results” (p. 17) to unique circumstances, or in situations 
when  rules alone cannot cope with the “complexities” of modern organizational life, he 
also argues that when it is used improperly its abuse results in “nine-tenths of the 
injustice” in legal systems (p. 25).  Davis does not see discretion as being exercised in a 
single, “final disposition” of a problem but, rather, as being a process which extends to 
“procedures, methods, forms, timing, degrees of emphasis, and many other subsidiary 
factors” (p. 4).  While discretion usually entails the “freedom” to choose from possible 
options, K. C. Davis (1969) describes the exercise of discretion as deciding what is 
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“desirable in the circumstances” once the individual has found the facts and applied the 
law (p. 4). The symbiotic act of finding facts and applying law is quite complex, and the 
individual who exercises the discretion “does not necessarily separate facts, law, and 
discretion” (p. 5). While maintaining most discretionary decisions are generally 
“intuitive,” he believes responses to various influences may suppress values, and even 
speculates that emotions, more than intellect, may determine the choices of values in 
discretionary decision-making (p. 5). 
2.6.4.1 Ways to Minimize Injustice   
K. C. Davis (1969) acknowledges discretion is desirable, since it is “indispensible 
for individualized justice [and] for creative justice” (p. 216), but he argues for the 
elimination of “unnecessary [emphasis in original]” discretion by finding ways to control 
“necessary [emphasis in original]” discretionary power in order to minimize injustice    
(p. 51).  While the courts must determine what discretionary power is necessary or 
unnecessary, he contends the best way to control discretion is by confining, structuring, 
and checking it—that is, by confining it through better rules or statutes that clearly 
establish the boundaries of discretion; by structuring it through rules that clearly specify 
the duties of the administrator; and by checking it through objective review of the 
discretionary power.  Hawkins (1998) supports the notion of controlling discretion, and 
maintains it is controlled in organizations by statements of policy, codes of practice, the 
rights of individuals, and by providing reasons for decisions.  However, he questions 
whether  “in the absence of better understanding of the conditions under which rules are 
interpreted and acted on in particular ways, it is simplistic of Davis (1969) to imagine that 
if discretion is reduced, somehow greater justice will be a natural consequence” 
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(Hawkins, 2003, p. 207).  Manley-Casimir (1971) advocates for the application of K. C. 
Davis’s (1969) approach in the school setting for three reasons: school officials possess 
and exercise extensive power over a range of student behavior; discipline is exercised on 
a one-to-one basis in a closed context; and discipline is enforced through rules and 
sanctions.   By applying the principles of discretionary justice to student discipline, he 
argues, it can “reduce the likelihood of injustice, enhance the climate of mutual respect, 
facilitate the maintenance of effective control,” and possibly restore “the school’s 
institutional legitimacy” (Manley-Casimir, 1971, n.p.).  
2.6.4.2 Goal of Discretionary Justice 
K. C. Davis (1969) maintains that while it is “impossible and undesirable” to 
eliminate discretionary power, he believes the “sensible goal is development of a proper 
balance between rule and discretion” (p. 42).   He concludes “discretionary power can be 
either too broad or too narrow.  When it is too broad, justice may suffer from arbitrariness 
or inequality.  When it is too narrow, justice may suffer from insufficient individualizing” 
(p. 52).  In a similar way, Hall’s (1999) study reveals discretion can “yield consistency or 
disparity in decision depending on administrative values and ideologies, social 
constraints, decision context and ambiguous student discipline objectives” (p. 159).  
Thus, it would appear that the exercise of discretion, much like Goldilocks’s porridge, 
needs to be “just right.” 
2.7    Distinction between Rules and Discretion 
In contemplating the tension that is formed between rules and discretion, 
Schneider (1992) identifies what he sees as the many advantages the latter allows.  
Discretion permits “the decision-maker to resolve the conflict in ways that accommodate 
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all the interests involved,” and it can be “tailored” to the special circumstances of each 
case (p. 61).  It can let the decision-maker “do justice” (p. 67) and deal with situations 
that are highly complex.  Discretion can be used to form compromises, to allow for a 
more expansive interpretation of circumstances than was envisioned by the rules, to allow 
for incremental adjustments to changing societal norms more readily than legislative 
changes, and to take the standards of the decision-maker’s community into account     
(pp. 62–68).      
2.7.1 Disadvantages of Discretion 
On the other hand, Schneider (1992) sees discretion as “a kind of power” that 
seems “conducive to an arrogance and carelessness” in dealing with the lives of others  
(p. 68), and he points to the disadvantage that discretionary decisions may not have the 
“legitimacy” that strict rules-based decisions do.  Furthermore, there is a risk of “bias” in 
discretionary decision-making and a potential for abuse that is not found in strict rules-
based decisions, insofar as decision-makers may substitute “private for public standards” 
in their decision-making (p. 71).  Yet, Schneider (1992) does not simply endorse 
substituting rules-based decisions for discretionary ones.  He suggests the concern about 
bias may be addressed by assessing the potential for abuse of discretion in an individual 
case, by determining “the best means of diminishing that risk, and…the costs of those 
means” (p. 71), and by prohibiting decision-makers from using “improper standards”    
(p. 72).  Schneider (1992), however, points to the advantage of rules-based decision-
making and the possibility the rule-maker may be “better situated” than the discretionary 
decision-maker in terms of time, resources and a broader perspective, in determining  
how justice may be achieved in both in a specific case and in general (p. 72).  One 
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disadvantage he identifies is that discretionary decision-making may appear to violate the 
assumption “like cases should be treated alike” (Schneider, 1992, p. 74), and it may 
contest the individual’s sense that he or she has been “treated fairly” (p. 74).  Schneider 
(1992) notes as another disadvantage is the rather “private” nature of discretion as 
opposed  to the more “public” nature of rules that are “formulated” (p. 76)  in 
legislatures, through hearings and by committees, and “disseminated” (p. 76) through the 
press or some “importantly public way” (p. 75).  As a result, individuals may not 
necessarily know how to “plan their lives and work in accordance with the law” (p. 76) as 
in custody disputes, for example.  Finally, Schneider (1992) believes rules, not discretion, 
can often “promote efficiency by telling decision-makers which facts and arguments will 
be relevant” (p. 77).  He concludes the “correct mix of discretion and rules must be 
determined situation by situation” (p. 79). 
2.7.2 Constraints Upon Decision-Makers 
Schneider (1992) argues, however, that discretion is not as “unfettered” as it 
appears and, in fact, is “regularly constrained in multitudinous ways” (p. 79).  Some of 
those limitations include decision-makers’ “socialization and training” (p. 80).  Strong 
social and professional norms can “equip decision-makers with a common language, with 
shared assumptions, and with standard ways of reasoning” that to aid in predictability and 
consistency in decision-making (p. 81).  As well, criticism by the community, press and 
“interested publics” (p. 82) serves to constrain discretionary decision-making.   The 
internal dynamics of decision-makers, such as “simple laziness” or “a wish to avoid 
responsibility,” also can limit their exercise of discretion.  The development of their 
decision-makers’ own rules by “categorizing” (p. 83) the issues and situations they 
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encounter, based upon their experiences, may limit their creativity and further constrain 
discretionary decisions.  External dynamics, such as lacking the authority to make a 
decision, having to defer to others, or being required to make decisions in consort with 
another group or agency, can also restrict the exercise of discretion.  Finally, the need to 
make decisions hierarchically in organizations, or to be forced to follow a “set of 
procedures” or to be guided by “policies and principles” may further constrain discretion 
(Schneider, 1992, 84–86).       
2.8   Predictability of Discretion 
 Baumgartner (1992) submits that discretion, when exercised, is not 
“unpredictable” but is, in fact, constrained and shaped not by statutes, but by “social 
contexts” (p. 129).  Citing evidence that shows discretion is “clear” and “remarkably 
patterned and consistent,” she contends it is a myth that officials’ decisions are 
“mysteriously rooted in the unknown peculiarities of individual cases” (p. 129).  Instead, 
she argues, their discretionary decisions can be “anticipated with considerable accuracy,” 
since the constraints upon discretionary decision-making are found not in legislation, but 
in “the social context of legal cases”; that is, discretion is not structured by 
“governmental laws” but by “social laws” (p. 130).  The discretionary choices made by 
legal officials, such as jury selection, are “socially patterned and socially predictable”    
(p. 156) and based not only on social characteristics of the decision-makers (e.g.,  jurors, 
prison guards, police officers, or judges), such as status, religion and ethnic background, 
but also on other influences, such as, respectability, level of connectedness or intimacy, 
gender, and race of the subject of the discretion.   Furthermore, Baumgartner (1992) 
asserts, those who exercise the discretion, in addition to those who are “subject to it,” 
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“often appear unaware” of the “social factors” influencing its exercise (p. 130).  While 
officials may believe in the need for unique interpretation in individual situations, 
Baumgartner (1992) claims that, instead, their “behavior conforms to sociological laws 
that transcend particular incidents” (p. 156).  
  Extending her argument, Baumgartner (1992) maintains that while discretion 
traditionally may have been regarded as “personal, situational, and idiosyncratic”          
(p. 157), its true nature is something quite different.  Even legal rules are “the products of 
discretion” and are “formulated according to the same social principles that govern all 
other discretionary legal behavior” (p. 157).  Discretion, she argues, admits favoritism; in 
practice, discretion “amounts to what is commonly known as discrimination” and 
advantages some people over others (p. 157).  For example, social factors influence 
sentencing decisions in the United States, resulting in disproportionate effects in capital 
and domestic violence cases. When laws are applied, she insists, there is interpretation in 
judgment and in applying “abstract standards” such as “reasonable doubt” or “probable 
cause” to factual cases (p. 161).  As a result, it is very difficult to reduce “social 
discrimination in the use of discretion” (p. 160) and, since she concludes that “discretion 
may be too basic an element of legal systems to root out completely” (p. 161), it follows 
that the “law will always be discriminatory to some extent” (p. 162; see also Lipsky,  
pp. 111–16).   
2.9   Discretion as Discrimination 
Similarly, Gelsthorpe and Padfield (2003) claim that in a criminal justice context 
“discretion, discrimination and disparity” are “related, if not also used interchangeably” 
(p. 3); indeed, they believe discrimination and disparity are discretion’s “first and second 
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cousins…respectively” (p. 2).  The authors, however, take care to distinguish between the 
terms.  Discretion refers to the “freedom” to make a decision or judgment that is 
“constrained” by “formal (and sometimes legal) rules” and by “many social, economic 
and political constraints” (p. 3).  While discrimination can involve the “showing of good 
judgment,” it can also be aligned with the “concept of prejudice,” and may occur when 
“individual discretion [is] wide” (p 4).  Disparity involves differences in outcomes and 
“concerns ‘equal treatment’” (p. 4), when the assumption of  “uniformity of treatment 
would mean ‘better’ treatment” (p. 5).   It is linked to inconsistency, or treating similar 
situations “differently or unequally,” even when “circumstances are similar” (p. 4).  Both 
disparity and discrimination, however, “involve the exercise of discretion [emphasis in 
original]” (p. 5).  Discretion, however, is “critical to the meaning of justice” (p. 2)  and 
can provide a mechanism for  “the concept of mercy” (p. 5) and  “compassion” (p. 6) in 
the determination of punishments or consequences.  As a result, an “inherent tension 
exists” between the positive and negative exercise of discretion, and there is a need to 
“maintain a balance between uniformity and individualization of treatment” (Gelsthorpe 
& Padfield, 2003, p. 5).   
Gelsthorpe and Padfield (2003) point to research that has shown “ethnicity,” 
“clothing,” and “gender-appropriate or inappropriate behavior” can influence officials’ 
decision-making in the criminal justice system, despite the fact officials “are prohibited 
from basing their decisions upon arbitrary or irrelevant standards…. race, ethnicity, social 
class, socio-economic status, sex or sexual orientation, for example” and must “apply 
rules impartially” (p. 9).   In their analysis they also highlight the notion of power in 
decision-making—the “power to decide, to choose, to discern or to determine”—and 
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maintain the power to exercise discretion also includes the potential for abuse  (p. 9).   
They further argue that in order to gain a fuller understanding of how discretion is 
exercised, it is necessary to consider aspects such as “who has the authority to decide, to 
choose, to judge,” the source of the “legitimacy of the exercise of discretion,” the need 
for accountability, and “factors such as process, environment or culture, organizational 
culture and occupational culture…all of which go well beyond the law” (p. 9).  They 
conclude by emphasizing that any discussion of a framework involving discretionary 
decision-making must also involve the “subjects of the decision” (p. 23) and the effects 
of the decision upon them.    
2.10 Discretion in the Criminal Justice System   
McMahon (1992) offers similar arguments with respect to discretion, 
discrimination, and the over-representation of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian jails, 
especially in Manitoba.  To substantiate his claim, McMahon (1992) notes “56% of the 
total inmate population of Manitoba in 1989” were Aboriginal (p. 9), yet “Aboriginal 
people comprised just less than 12% of Manitoba’s total population” (p. 10).  He adds 
“the disproportionate Aboriginal incarceration rates are shocking” and “demand 
immediate government action” (McMahon, 1992, p. 14), all the while observing that 
nothing has been done in the last twenty-five years “to reverse the trend” (p. 14).
9
  
                                                 
9
 It may be reasoned that McMahon’s (1992) observation is still relevant; in the almost twenty years since 
the dates he cites, incarceration rates of Aboriginal persons in Canadian prisons remain disturbingly 
disproportionate.  For example, in Manitoba, Aboriginal people accounted for 71% (up from 58% in 
1996/1997) of sentenced admissions in 2005-2006, while they comprised 16% of the outside population.  In 
Saskatchewan, Aboriginal adults currently make up 79% of the prison population but only 15% of the 
outside population.  In Quebec the representation of Aboriginal offenders was the closest to their 
representation by population in that province, 3% versus 2% (Landry & Sinha, 2008, p. 7). 
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Although McMahon (1992) does not “attribute intent, prejudice or racism to most 
of the systemic discrimination in the justice system” (p. 8), he believes the test for 
discrimination is “whether the system adopts laws, procedures and practices which have a 
disproportionate impact on Aboriginal people,” and whether “the laws, procedures or 
practices are related to the guilt or moral wrongdoing of the accused” (p. 8).  He 
concludes that discrimination in the criminal justice system is “cumulative” (beginning 
with over-policing) and impacts those who are already marginalized by poverty, race, or 
unemployment (p. 323).  The criminal justice system, he maintains, “permits subjective 
discretion to determine outcomes at every stage, and it allows penalties to be imposed 
with almost no guidance for the decision-maker” (p. 325). 
2.10.1 Discretion in Sentencing 
Sentencing is considered to be a highly discretional exercise (Makin, 2010; 
McIntyre, 2010; McLachlin, 1992; Mullan, 2001).  The Alberta Court of Appeal’s 
criticism of a “lenient rape sentence given to an aboriginal man who raped a sleeping 
friend” by a Queen’s Bench judge, for example, underscores the “vast sentencing 
discretion currently enjoyed by trial judges” and serves to make “the search for just 
sanctions at best a lottery, and at worst a myth’” (Makin, 2010, p. A11).  The Court of 
Appeal argued the judge in the case was but one of many who “mete out rape sentences 
based on outdated myths and stereotypes” and who dispense justice “in accordance with 
personal predilections, preferences or philosophies” (Makin, 2010, p. A11).   Makin 
(2010) contends the “wide disparities in sentencing” precipitate a “crisis of confidence in 
the justice system” and notes suggestions that the “creation of a sentencing commission” 
may help to balance “judiciary discretion and predictable sentencing ranges” (p. A11). 
78 
 
On the other hand, the broad “sentencing discretion of judges” has also been suggested as 
one way to “reduce overall sentences” that result in the lengthy pretrial custody of 
prisoners and “to treat defendants leniently” in order to mitigate the harsh conditions they 
endure in “provincial remand centers” awaiting trial (Makin, 2011, p. A1).  Therien 
(2011), though, disputes the advantages such a suggestion might have.  He maintains the 
Supreme Court of Canada “established what’s known as the Gladue Court.  The landmark 
ruling called on judges to exercise discretion and be sensitive to the historical plight of 
aboriginal people” (n. p.).  However, “the overall response by the judiciary to that ruling, 
as evident by the growing incarceration rate of aboriginals,
10
 has been a sporadic 
application, varying from one extreme to the other, depending on jurisdiction” (n. p.).    
2.10.2 Disproportionate Effects of Discretion 
Citing the lack of cultural appropriateness in discretionary decisions made by 
people within the justice system, McMahon (1992) believes “discretion has very 
important consequences for Aboriginal persons” (p. 325).   He says the simple fact 
remains that “the rule of law in criminal justice takes a back seat to individual discretion 
and Aboriginal people suffer for it” (p. 327).  McMahon further identifies the variability 
in “access to counsel,” probation, parole, and “fine option programs” (p. 324) as being 
other aspects of the justice system that are not uniform, in addition to the lack of respect 
for  “numerous legal principles” (p. 324).  He believes if the criminal justice system 
“operated in a perfectly even-handed manner, Aboriginal people would get all the 
benefits of discretion and lack of attention accorded to non-Aboriginal people” (p. 323), 
                                                 
10
 Therien (2011) cites incarceration rates for aboriginal peoples in Canada in 2008 as being nine times the 
national average (n. p.). 
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but because there is lack of accommodation for cultural differences, penalties for 
Aboriginal people are greater, recidivism rates are higher, and rehabilitation is less 
effective.  As well, Hamilton and Sinclair (1991) observe that excluding Aboriginal 
persons from any decision-making positions in the criminal justice system ensures that 
“none of the discretionary decisions made by system personnel will be culturally 
appropriate to Aboriginal people” (p. 107).  The large amount of discretion along the 
continuum of the justice system, juxtaposed “with detailed rules and procedures,” leads to 
“a confusion of roles and inconsistency in the exercise of justice” (McMahon, 1992,       
p. 342).  MaMahon (1992) concludes Aboriginal persons are “discriminated against by 
the justice system” (p. 334) as a result of being “over-represented in groups of persons 
exposed to unfair practices and unchecked exercises of discretion” (p. 335).   
Hamilton and Sinclair (1991) contend Aboriginal people in Canada have been 
victims not only of overt forms of bigotry, but also of systemic discrimination that is 
“rooted in policy and law” (p. 101).  They identify as evidence the “adverse impacts” of 
discrimination that have resulted in the “over-incarceration of Aboriginal people”          
(p. 101) in Canadian prisons and clearly pinpoint discretionary decision-making in their 
analysis of the Canadian justice system: 
A significant part of the problem is the inherent biases of those with  
decision-making or discretionary authority in the justice system.   
Unconscious attitudes and perceptions are applied when making  
decisions.  Many opportunities for subjective decision-making exist  
within the justice system and there are few checks on the subjective  
criteria being used to make those decisions. We believe that part of  
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the problem is that while Aboriginal people are the objects of such  
discretion within the justice system, they do not “benefit” from  
discretionary decision-making, and that even the well-intentioned  
exercise of discretion can lead to inappropriate results because of  
cultural or value differences.  (Hamilton & Sinclair, 1991, p. 101) 
 It can be argued, then, that the relatively few constraints upon discretion as it is 
exercised throughout the entire criminal justice system contribute to the  adverse affects 
upon Aboriginal people and to their over-representation in Canadian prisons. 
2.11   Discretion in Organizations 
2.11.1 The Role of Policy 
Davies and Brickell (1962) maintain policy is a “guide for discretionary action” 
(p. 15) in organizations; they claim it must be narrow enough to provide guidance and 
broad enough to leave room for discretionary decisions.  Downey (1988) suggests that 
while no one “simple definition” for policy exists, it is characterized as an “authoritative 
allocation or choice from among competing values or desires…a declaration of 
intent…future oriented…a directive for action…and allows for discretion on the part of 
the actor…as a general and flexible guideline [emphasis in original]” (p. 54). Similarly, 
Simon (1957) defines policy as “any general rule that has been laid down in an 
organization to limit the discretion of subordinates” (p. 59).  The “strategic intent” (Dr. J. 
Paquette, personal communication, July 7, 2011) is considered the focus of policy which 
may be further defined as “a course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to 
address a given problem or interrelated set of problems” (Pal, 2001, p. 3; see also Dye, 
1975).  Shipman (1969) makes an important distinction between policy as “statements of 
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intent and purpose” and “operational and procedural specifications” (p. 122).  Procedures 
can be defined as a type of  “policy instrument”  or the  means by which “the problem is 
to be addressed and the goals achieved” (Pal, 2001, p. 8; see also Hodgkinson, 1978b,  
pp. 66–79).   
Galligan (1986) asserts policy-making is the “very heart of the discretionary 
process” and maintains officials in organizations may simply be concerned with “getting 
the job done” and, accordingly, will modify, embellish or depart from statutory directions 
(p. 110).  Shumavon and Hibbeln (1986) likewise contend administrators are thoroughly 
involved in the formulation of policy and “have become policy makers in their own right, 
often enjoying virtual autonomy as they exercise discretionary authority accorded to them 
by legislative and executive institutions” (p. 1).  They go on to  suggest discretion is a 
“fundamental component of any attempt to explain administrative behavior and the 
formulation and implementation of public policy” (Shumavon & Hibbeln, 1986, p. 2; see 
also Hawkins, 1997), while Hawkins (1997) adds discretion is “clearly exercised” in 
policy formation (p. 151).  McMillan and Schumacher (2010) add that “school 
administrators and teachers, in a real sense, make policy as they carry out their day-to-
day jobs” (p. 438).    
2.11.2 Effects of Discretion Upon Policy 
Hawkins (1997) observes that while discretion may exist throughout legal 
bureaucracies, large amounts “inevitably shift” (p. 158) to the perimeter and, therefore, 
the interpretation of rules transforms and changes policy as it moves down and outward 
in the organization.  As a result, the greatest discretionary power often resides with those 
individuals on the peripheries of organizations, or with those who are not delegated 
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specific discretionary power.  He maintains it is at the “field” level where the “tensions, 
dilemmas, and sometimes contradictions embodied in the law are worked out in practice” 
and where officials sometimes “distort the word or spirit of the law” by either assuming 
power they are not authorized to have or by choosing to ignore authority they do possess 
(Hawkins, 1992, p. 12).  Rules and policies may become “reference points” around which 
decision-makers exercise discretion in a “rather unconstrained way” (Hawkins, 1997,     
p. 156).  “Legal rules,” he argues, signify “objective, formal justice,” while discretion 
represents “subjective, personal justice” (Hawkins, 1998, p. 414).  Frequently, then, 
“policy at this level” becomes “practical, particularistic, [and a] here-and-now matter” 
and possibly “rather remote from the real world” (Hawkins, 1997, p. 156).   
Decisions, as a result, are usually made in a “heavily decentralized fashion,” and 
the risk of policy being fragmented, distorted, or even subverted as it moves down and 
outward in the organization is great (Hawkins, 1997, p. 158; see also Handler, 1986).  
Thus, policy in action may be quite transformed from policy as it is envisioned at the 
center of the bureaucracy.  Hawkins (1998) acknowledges the inevitability of discretion 
and, while insisting it does have its usefulness, he claims the problematic nature of its 
“invisibility” makes “methods of accountability and control extremely difficult” (p. 413).  
As well, discretion’s “reflective” and “anticipatory” character (Hawkins, 1997, p. 147) 
has a “serial” nature and relies upon “precedents” (pp. 147–148).  These qualities have 
implications for principals’ decision-making insofar as administrators’ judgments may be 
influenced by what is “likely to happen” (Hawkins, 1997, p. 147) based on past practices, 
or by “understandings of the ‘normal ways’ of acting” that are categorized by behavior 
which is “typical” or “routine” (p. 149) and part of the organization’s culture.  
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2.11.3 Issues with Policy Implementation 
Shumavon and Hibbeln (1986) surmise that an excess of “discretionary authority” 
can “favor narrow private interests” and lead to the “loss of individual freedom” (p. 8), 
all the while acknowledging the benefits of discretion, such as its ability to adapt to 
individual situations and its responsiveness to “unique…needs and problems” (p. 8).  
They worry about the “possible misuses of public trust” when administrative discretion is 
not controlled, and maintain that a balance must be struck “between the need for 
flexibility and the need for control” (p. 8). 
Hawkins (1992) notes that although discretion is either “formally granted” or 
“assumed” (p. 11), it is rule-guided and is a “product of individual knowledge, reflection 
and reasoning” (p. 18).  He points to concerns about issues of power, propriety and 
inconsistency when discretion is exercised. He claims discretion may be conducive to 
“arrogance” or “carelessness” (Hawkins, 1998, p. 414), and its application over time and 
place by various individuals allows for “inconsistency” and does not always allow “for 
like cases to be treated alike” (p. 415).  What is more, he suggests, discretion can be 
shaped by personal constructs such as “laziness, or a desire to avoid responsibility,” since 
exercising discretion “takes time and effort” (p. 417).   Paquette and Allison (1997) 
identify other influences in organizations that affect  “locally contextualized de facto 
policy” such as empire-building, self-aggrandizement, neutralization of competing groups 
and power bases, [and] avoiding controversy” (p. 172).  Arguably, similar elements can 
influence principals’ disciplinary decision-making in schools. 
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2.11.4 Street-Level Bureaucrats  
 Lipsky’s (1980) authoritative work on the field of public administration 
describing the work of “street-level bureaucrats” (p. 3) supports much of Hawkins’s 
claim about policy creation and implementation.  However, his research extends to the 
identification of individuals who exercise substantial discretion in their decision-making 
roles and who execute their roles with relatively little supervision; these street-level 
bureaucrats include teachers and school administrators because the complexity of their 
environment requires discretion, and the “human dimension” of their work requires 
judgment (Lipsky, 1980, p. 15; see also Faulk, 2006, p. 127).  He believes “the decisions 
of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope 
with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry 
out” (Lipsky, 1980, p. xii).  Policy, therefore, is “not best understood as [being] made in 
legislatures or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators” but in the “crowded 
offices and daily encounters” of the street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980, p. xii).  
Lipsky (1980) identifies in street-level bureaucrats what he calls “worker bias,” 
that is, differentiation among people because of personal “preferences” on the part of the 
decision-maker (p. 108).  He believes subtle patterns of prejudice, or bias, especially in 
organizations “dedicated officially to equal treatment” can occur in three ways and are 
difficult to address (p. 109).  First, he claims some decision-makers simply “prefer some 
clients over others” and receive greater satisfaction working with them (p. 108).  Biased 
behavior is also apparent when decision-makers respond to what they determine is the 
relative “social worth” of an individual (p. 109).  The decision-makers’ resources of time 
and energy, and their opportunities for successful intervention, are key determinants in 
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informing decisions as to the “worthiness or unworthiness” of the client (p. 109). Third, 
some street-level bureaucrats have “explicitly moral judgments to make,” such as “school 
disciplinarians,” among others, who are “charged with allocating punishments,” “fitting 
the sanction to the offender as well as the offense,” and determining whether “lenience or 
severity” is necessary (p. 110).  The problem,  Lipsky points out, “is not that moral 
judgments are made,” but that “moral assumptions of dominant social orientations” or 
“dominant values” can shape decisions, and the decision-maker will not search for  
“alternative solutions” (p. 110).  Finally, street-level bureaucrats can “regularly display 
biased behavior” if they feel some individuals are “more likely to respond” positively to 
their decisions or, conversely, if they feel a group is “unlikely to respond to intervention” 
(p. 111).  He cites as an example educators who “favor” children who “assimilate 
information easily” because they provide “more frequent and positive feedback” of their 
teaching.  (p. 111). 
One reason “it is difficult to assess equity of treatment” by street-level bureaucrats 
is the various contexts of treatment, and it may be difficult to collect the data which 
would “demonstrate patterns of bias” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 112).  Furthermore, street-level 
bureaucrats believe they “treat all clients alike,” while “norms of equal treatment” serve 
to reduce “tendencies towards bias” and create “powerful myths” about equality (p. 112).  
Finally, when there is differentiation in treatment of individuals, decision-makers 
attribute it to policies “alleged to be in the best interests” of the individual or of the group 
(p. 112).  Lipsky (1980) maintains this “ideology of differentiation” is used to rationalize, 
excuse and justify their decisions (p. 112). 
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  Differentiation in client treatment  is supported by “social inequality,” and 
decision-makers’ need to “routinize [and] simplify” within this context results in 
“institutionalization [emphasis in original]” of stereotypical tendencies” (p. 115).  The 
inherent need to differentiate  is receptive to “prejudicial attitudes” which are “nurtured 
in a context” (p. 115).  Decision-makers may see validity in their attitudes which are 
“forged from experience,” while clients may see “unfairness” (p. 116).  As a result, the 
problem of bias among street-level bureaucrats is “a profound one” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 
116).  Lipsky (1980) concludes “at best, street level bureaucrats invent benign modes of 
mass processing that…permit them to deal with the public fairly, appropriately, 
successfully.  At worst, they give in to favoritism, stereotyping, and routinizing” which 
he believes “can serve private or agency purposes” (p. xii). 
Quinn (1986) describes the phenomenon of “triage” which he argues serves as the 
model for discretion exercised by street-level bureaucrats (p. 129; see also Lipsky, 1980, 
p. 107).  Based on the practice of French physicians during World War I, the term 
reflected the method of optimizing “scarce medical resources” where priority was given 
to those soldiers who were able to be saved, while those who were too seriously wounded 
were left to die and those who were mildly injured were left to wait for other medical 
help (p. 124).  Quinn maintains triage can serve as an effective paradigm for the manner 
in which “professional norms and economic restraints…shape the exercise of 
administrative discretion” (p. 129), but cites the use of the strategy to enforce housing 
codes in St Louis, Missouri, in the 1960s and 1970s as inequitable and unfair.    
Taylor (2007) suggests professional discretion in schools in the United Kingdom 
reflects more of what Lipsky (1980) said “ought to be [emphasis in original],” because of 
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current educational reforms that include mechanisms for enforcing policy at the street 
level, “in particular the self-policing and self-managing aspects of discretion” (p. 569), 
and a national curriculum that requires teachers to be “more technicians than 
professionals” (p. 560).   He argues British educators cannot be characterized as the same 
type of “street-level bureaucrats” Lipsky (1980) identifies who “interpret and devise their 
own rules in order to implement policy” (Taylor, 2007, p. 566) because of “prescriptive 
policies and targets [in classrooms], as well as the high degree of accountability required 
in [British] schools” (p. 569), that have “undermined [their] autonomy” (p. 561) and 
compromised their exercise of rule and policy-making discretion.  Taylor’s (2007) study 
revealed, however, that while some educators may have lost their ability to exercise 
discretion, they did not necessarily feel disempowered.   
2.11.5 Technological Perspective   
Bouvens and Zouridis (2002) argue that in large “decision-making factories”       
(p. 180) the street-level bureaucrat has been affected by “information and communication 
technology (ICT) systems” (p. 177) and is becoming, instead, the “screen-level” or 
“system-level” bureaucrat (p. 175).  Although they do not consider teachers, judges, or 
health care officials in their analysis, Bouvens and Zouridis contend that whereas 
administrators’ authority was once based on existing law, and decisions made were often 
reviewed by an organization’s legal counsel, or even the judiciary, the decisions of case 
managers and adjudicating officers are increasingly being taken over by “information 
refineries” wherein decisions are “preprogrammed by algorithms and digital decision 
trees” (p. 175) through new bureaucrats who are information and communication 
technology (ICT) experts and systems designers.  Bouvens and Zouridis wonder if this 
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scenario of system managers controlling decisions in rooms with servers is the 
consummation of the “ideal of perfect legal and rational authority” (p. 175) as envisioned 
by Dicey (1885).  They maintain “knowledge-management systems and digital decision 
trees have strongly reduced the scope of administrative discretion” (p. 177), since 
decisions are also being made by computer software programs and the “automation of 
one step in a process demands the standardization and formalization of the preceding 
steps” in order to be accepted by computers (Bouvens & Zouridis, 2002, p. 178).   
2.11.5.1 Examples of Technological Discretion 
Bouvens and Zouridis (2002) suggest that street-level bureaucrats are being 
replaced by data-entry clerks, and decisions are based solely on data that has been 
entered, as in the case of grant applications for students in the Netherlands. In a similar 
way, the monitoring by cameras of speeding on roadways in the Netherlands is handled 
entirely by computers, and “no legal or professional assessment is involved” (p. 179).   
A ticket is sent to the individual and no judicial intervention is required unless there is an 
appeal, at which point “a street-level bureaucrat will take a look at the case for the first 
time” (Bouvens & Zouridis, 2002, p. 179).  In fact, the researchers maintain, the 
emphasis has shifted from legal judgment and the “criminal-judgment process” required 
in individual traffic violations, to the “technical” administrative work in the simple 
collection of fees (Bouvens & Zouridis, 2002, p. 179).  There is now a “standardized 
judgment under administrative law” whereby fines are issued “regardless of the 
circumstances of the case” (p. 179) and the “law does not permit” nor is the “executive 
organization” equipped to permit a reduction or cancellation of fines (p. 179).   Bovens 
and Zouridis (2002) also submit that in the student grant application process, which had 
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formerly been individualized, “the street-level bureaucracy, which focused on a 
professional, legal judgment of each individual situation, has been replaced by a system-
level bureaucracy in which computer networks are maintained, perfected, and intricately 
linked to one another” (p. 180).  
2.11.5.2 Technological Predictions  
While Bovens and Zouridis (2002) suggest it remains to be seen if similar 
transformations will occur in “non-legal, non-routine, street-level interactions such as 
teaching, nursing and policing” (p. 180), they predict centralized organizations, 
formalized legal routines, and standardized work will increase.  With a growing emphasis 
on a legal culture of certainty, they further suggest that if a “legal framework” such as an 
“if/then structure” can be “transformed into algorithms and decision trees” (Bouvens & 
Zouridis, 2002, p. 181), then, “in principle, all administrative discretion can be mapped 
out entirely in syllogisms and algorithms” (p. 181); as a result, administration will 
become less responsive, and policy execution will “no longer [relate] to the application of 
rules to individual cases” (p. 181). 
2.12 Discretion in Schools 
2.12.1 School Administrators’ Exercise of Discretion 
 Discretion appears to be essential for the pragmatic functioning of schools. Kafka 
(2004) sees it as a “basic component” of both principals’ and teachers’ “traditional source 
of authority” (p. 97).  Hall’s (1999) research reveals school administrators believe 
discretion is essential for the interpretation and implementation of district policy (p. 162), 
while Heilmann (2006) also suggests discretion in schools may be exercised “when an 
individual deliberately chooses to ignore the established rules or policies” (p. 9).  
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Crowson and Porter-Gehrie (1980) assert school principals are a vital part of the 
“accumulated decisions that lead to the implementation of education policy” (p. 45), and 
their findings indicate “principals do exercise discretion in the day-to-day delivery of the 
services of their schools” (p. 49).  They maintain principals, as enforcers of school policy, 
use a variety of discretionary coping mechanisms, such as “spotlighting” situations, in 
order to save time (p. 51).  Larsen and Akmal (2007) argue that, irrespective of the origin 
of educational policy, “implementation is not likely to be as simple as ordering the 
principal or the teacher to ensure that school practices reflect the will of the policy 
makers” (p. 47).  They further state that if the aims of policy are not congruent with either 
personal or professional ethos, then “compliance with policy directive” may not occur  
(p. 47).  Additionally, other aspects such as miscommunication and self-interest may 
result in what they term “discretionary insubordination” (p. 47).  In a similar way, 
Haynes and Licata (1995) explain how school officials often practice a form of discretion 
they term “creative insubordination” (p. 21) as one means to adapt central office 
mandates in order to tailor them to the local context, and “to ensure that system directives 
do not impinge unfairly or inappropriately on teachers and students and to avoid the 
possible backlash that outright defiance might incur” (Roche, 1999, p. 258).  Mukuria 
(2002) feels more research is necessary to learn “how to bridge the gap between the 
intentions of the central office and a principal’s behavior” (p. 449).   Although his 
American study found that “principals value personal autonomy and should be 
empowered to make rules and regulations at individual school level [sic],” he has a 
concomitant belief that “little is known” about principals’ adherence to rules, especially 
with respect to student suspensions (p. 449).   
91 
 
2.12.2 Requirements for Discretion in Schools  
 Discretion is especially helpful to administrators when policy does not provide 
adequate or sufficient direction, or when precedent does not prove illustrative.  Haynes 
and Licata (1995) claim discretionary decision-making for principals is “the 
implementation of central office decisions, policies and programmes at the school level in 
a way that fits the principal’s values, philosophy, goals, and situation” (p. 21).  
Heilmann’s (2006) study reveals principals consider discretion necessary in various 
aspects of their practice, such as finance, interactions with staff, and discipline, and he 
suggests discretion also may be exercised “when an individual deliberately chooses to 
ignore the established rules or policies” (p. 9).   
Martin (1995) frames the requirements for the exercise of discretion in the school 
setting.  She specifies administrators are “expected to render administrative justice; that 
is…employ the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness” (p. 241; see also Manley-
Casimir, 1977–78; Rossow, 1984).  Thus, in their discretionary decision-making, school 
principals should be mindful of the following tenets: 
 Four important principles govern the exercise of discretion by 
 administrators in public schooling.  First, their decisions must 
 be according to the dictates of the law; second they must not fail  
 to exercise or otherwise avoid discretion granted them; third, 
 these powers must not be used excessively or be abused; and 
 fourth, they must not be used for purposes other than those 
 dictated by law.  (Martin, 1995, p. 241). 
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2.12.3 Discretionary Action and School Discipline  
Crowson and Porter-Gehrie (1980) contend that to simplify and routinize their 
complex roles, principals “must assert authority in order to exercise leadership” (p. 47), 
and that one strategy employed by administrators, in their need to maintain control in the 
school setting, is the use of “wide discretionary latitude in situations that call for 
decisions regarding pupil discipline and school control” (p. 58).  Mukuria (2002) thinks 
principals may “modify” policy to suit their own needs and “value personal autonomy” in 
their decision-making at the expense of policy implementation (p. 449).  His research 
reveals that when principals view a discipline policy as being a “flexible guideline but not 
a rigid document” (p. 441), they have lower rates of suspension in their schools.  
Conversely, those principals who do not “seem to have any flexibility or [who do not] use 
their discretion in implementing” school discipline policies have higher rates of 
suspension and “more disciplinary challenges” (p. 447).  His study concludes the 
administration of suspensions is “arbitrary,” and although there are “common strategies” 
used by administrators in discipline, there also is a “lack of uniformity” among educators 
in implementing suspension policies (p. 445).  Hall’s (1999) research tends to support 
these assertions.  She recommends the need for “heightened awareness of the defensible 
element of discretion” and a clearer understanding of its nature in order to reach “more 
consistent discipline and documentation practices” (p. 106). 
2.12.4 Student Perceptions of Discipline 
Rawls (1962) distinguishes between justice and fairness when he states “the 
fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness” (p. 132); the two are not inherently 
the same.  He goes on to add  “the usual sense of justice” is “essentially the elimination 
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of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment, within the structure of a practice, of a 
proper balance between competing claims” (Rawls, 1962, p. 133).  Furthermore, that 
which is fair “must often be felt, or perceived” (Rawls, 1962, p. 146).   
The extent to which student attitudes and perceptions of fairness are affected by 
discretionary decision-making in disciplinary matters has come under scrutiny.  A study 
of Canadian students conducted by Ruck and Wortley (2002) reveals that “minority status 
appears to be an extremely important predictor of student’s [sic] perceptions of inequality 
regarding how they are treated by school authorities and police at school” (p. 192–193), 
and that male students are more likely to believe there will be “bias in terms of their 
treatment relating to school punishment” (p. 193).  Furthermore, racial/ethnic minority 
students believe they will receive “suspensions” or “police action” at school (p. 194).   
Mendez and Knoff (2003) believe suspensions, in particular, are perceived as 
punishment by students and result in negative attitudes and rarely result in improved 
student behavior (see also Clark, 2002).  These findings support, in part, the work of 
Solomon (1992) whose Canadian study shows that some minority students believe 
disciplinary consequences are “handed out arbitrarily” (p. 52).  Brown and Beckett 
(2006) discovered “the problem of student discipline in urban schools is compounded by 
a wide-spread belief among disadvantaged students and their parents that school 
disciplinary policies are administered unfairly” and that is one reason “disadvantaged 
parents consistently give for not being more involved in their children’s schools”           
(p. 239).  A national study in the U. S. conducted by Kupchik and Ellis (2008) found 
minority students perceived less fairness in school and specifically that “African 
American students hold lower opinions of the fairness and consistency of school rules 
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and their enforcement than White students do” (p. 570).  Gall’s Canadian (2010) inquiry 
into perceptions of discipline by students revealed they “do not perceive safe school 
rules, punishments, or rule enforcement practices to be fair overall” (p. 136).  
Interestingly, student perceptions of “justice and fairness” appeared to be based on how 
the school treated one student in relation to the next, and not on “whether the school is 
able to meet generalized criteria [of fairness]” (p. 137).  Her research indicates what 
underpins students’ perceptions of the “fairness of school discipline is a particular theory 
of justice” (Gall, 2010, p. 138), and that they “evaluate fairness based on the standard of 
equal treatment” (p. 139).  This research would suggest that from students’ viewpoints, 
discretionary decision-making may not always be perceived to be fair.   Gall (2010) 
concludes school discipline “has the ability to drive a wedge between these two groups 
[i.e., school authorities and students]” (p. 137).  Lufler’s (1979) research shows student 
perceptions of arbitrary punishment in school can result in cynicism and further 
misbehavior.  Arguably, even the perception by students of arbitrariness or lack of 
fairness in discipline can negatively affect their behavior and attitudes and lead to 
possible disengagement and detachment from school. 
2.13  Discourses of Discretion in School Discipline 
When administrators are denied the ability to exercise discretion it is suggested 
that discrimination results (Bhattacharajee, 2003; Civil Rights Project, 2000); on the 
other hand, there are allegations the exercise of discretion allows opportunities for 
personal prejudices and bias to surface, and that due process rights can be violated, 
especially in cases of student suspensions (Clark, 2002; Rossow, 1984; see also Mukuria, 
2002; Torres & Chen, 2006).  School administrators formally exercise discretion within 
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the parameters outlined in law in addition to the many, more informal discretionary 
decisions they make daily in their practice, such as “snap suspensions” (Dunbar & 
Villarruel, 2002, p. 95).  Both the formal and informal exercise of discretion may have 
wide-ranging implications for, and effects upon, students.  Lufler’s (1979) two-year study 
found systems of discipline to be “highly particularistic, dependent upon the attitudes of 
teachers and administrators” (p. 457).  His research suggests principals often interpret 
school rules based on what they believe is appropriate, and that “punishment” varies 
considerably, “often bending to the expectations expressed by teachers” (p. 462; see also 
Martin et al., 2012).  
2.13.1 Regulation of Student Behavior 
According to Crowson and Porter-Gehrie (1980), principals have a tendency to 
exercise “discretionary latitude” in order “to define appropriate behavior in schools” and 
have used this flexibility in determining “procedures and rules for student suspensions” 
(p. 58).  Clark (2002) suggests discretionary decisions regulate and constrain behavior 
and that “discretionary discipline policies” tend to “perpetuate cultural reproduction, with 
teachers as the instrument to transmit the accepted culture”  (p. 143).  In a similar way, 
Kupchik and Ellis’s (2008) extensive study concluded, in a manner consistent with 
reproduction theory, “that schools use discipline to reproduce existing social [i.e., class 
and status] inequalities” and that “school rules are indeed applied differently for minority 
students” (p. 567).  As a result “school punishment experiences” vary greatly between 
“White and non-White youth” (p. 553; see also Clark, 2002). 
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2.13.2 Patterns of Control 
Chesler et al. (1979) argue that discipline policies are implemented by educators 
with a great deal of “socially patterned discretion”; such practices “support current 
patterns of power, and the prevailing culture of those people who exercise control,” and 
may preclude administrators from considering relevant details in their disciplinary 
decision-making (p. 497).  From a similar perspective, Scheurich (1994), in his critique 
of conventional policy studies, illustrates how Foucaultian policy archaeology examines 
and identifies the “networks of [social] regularities” (p. 301), such as gender, class, or 
race, that generate what becomes visible and acceptable in the social order and that 
constitute or construct social and education problems.  He contends that labeling a 
targeted group as a problem “is critical to the maintenance of the social order” 
(Scheurich, 1994, p. 308).   If one extends this argument to student discipline, it follows 
that pupils who “do not break rules, are not disobedient…are not disruptive” (p. 315) are 
taught through the “‘appropriate management of schools” to be “social-order-congruent 
citizens” (p. 307).  Scheurich (1994) maintains that through the naming and treating of 
the “public display of ‘wrong behavior’” (p. 307) and by continually “producing ‘bad’ 
groups who are publicly identified as such,” a “proper productive citizen” is defined, and 
the behavior of  “‘good’ citizens” is reaffirmed and reinforced (p. 308); this contention 
may merit consideration in terms of discretionary decision-making in schools.  Other 
disciplinary discourses involving discretion focus on “the rule breaker,” effectively 
identifying the student as the cause of the problem
11
 and thereby deflecting consideration 
                                                 
11
 Henriksson (2008) identifies a “hidden teacher discourse” that exists among some Swedish educators  
(p. 150).  Alongside the “official discourse” of pedagogy and curricular theory, there exists a “shadow 
97 
 
of the school itself for its contribution to the situation (Lufler, 1979, p. 462; see also Hall, 
1999; Harber, 2004).   
2.13.3 Discretionary Practices 
 Torres and Chen (2006) insist principals’ perceptions of appropriate student 
conduct may influence how they exercise discretion in disciplinary matters, and what is 
normalized through a discourse of “good” youth may result in discretionary action that 
can have consequences which privilege one group over another.  They believe 
“unchecked” discretion can be “threatening to fairness and liberty” (p. 190).  Dunbar and 
Villarruel’s (2002) research also questions how principals’ social construction of 
“students of color” as “bad youth” affects their interpretation and implementation of 
school discipline policies (p. 102).  McCarthy and Soodak’s (2007) investigation of the 
discipline of students with disabilities indicates that, “absent accountability to the law,” 
some American administrators “would have subordinated the rights of students with  
disabilities for the sake of eliminating problematic behavior” (p. 472).  They believe 
legislation restricting the ability to suspend or expel if the “misbehavior is a 
manifestation of the student’s disability, (i.e., the student’s disability impaired his or her 
ability to control or understand the behavior)” reflects “the power of the law to safeguard 
the rights of individual students” (p. 472).   Faulk’s (2006) study reveals “the possibility 
of unequal student treatment” may result from enhanced administrative discretion (p. 
100).  As well, his research highlights the challenges for educators dealing with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
discourse” where “students are very often seen as ‘problem containers’” who have “reading and writing 
problems,” in addition to “concentration problems, behaviour problems, and attitude problems; in short, 
students are ‘bad news’” (p. 150). 
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“‘gray’ area” in student fights, for example, where “district fighting policy may not let 
administrators exercise full discretion to determine if a student should be expelled for 
fighting” (p. 53).  He describes how individual interpretations and subjective definitions 
of fighting, perpetrator, and victim and the notions of self-defense or instigation could 
result in inconsistent application of zero tolerance policies. The work of Biggs (1993), 
Clark (2002), and Kaesar (1979) also contests the notions of consistency, justice, and 
accountability in discretionary decision-making in student disciplinary issues. 
Nonetheless, Gall’s (2010) study reveals—from a progressive discipline viewpoint in 
discretionary decision-making—that “differential treatment of students may not only be 
legitimate, it may also be preferred in many situations” (p. 139). 
As Drizin (2001) observes, administrators are often accused of abusing discretion 
and “criticized for being too lenient, too harsh, discriminatory, racist, [or] preferential to 
athletes” (p. 40). He counters that “the cure is to demand that administrators use their 
discretion wisely” and to demand a “statement of reasons for their decisions” and a 
system of “review of their decisions” to ensure accountability (p. 40).  Maintaining a 
delicate balance can be exceedingly challenging for principals because “they face 
potential liability for incidents involving students under their responsibility,” while at the 
same time “they face the risk of complaints of discrimination by expelled or suspended 
students, all in the face of the wrath of their stakeholders if they fail to fulfill their 
mandate” (Birrell & Morgan, 2007, p. 48).  Furthermore, as Casella (2003) warns, other 
influences may infringe upon the exercise of judgment in student discipline, despite the 
consideration of context:  
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Violence prevention and discipline policy must deal with the context 
of situations.  The nature and history of conflicts, the circumstances of  
people, what individuals have to lose when criminalized, the relationship  
between those  involved, and the meaning that people make of situations, 
are all part of that context.  Prison policy rehashed as school discipline  
policy does not take into account the context of situations; rather 
discretion and understanding are likely to be supplanted by preventative 
detention and the questionable practice of consistency.  Yet even with 
peoples’ [sic] best intentions to understand and take into account the 
context of situations…success is not guaranteed.”  (Casella, 2003, p. 889) 
2.14   Student Rights and Administrative Discretion 
 MacKay (2008) argues that in Canada “lawyers and judges are no longer 
restricted to comparisons with American law,” and he reasons, because of the Internet, 
“international law has also taken on a new significance” (p. 25).  Nonetheless, Canadian 
law often looks to American law for “points of comparison and clarification,” since there 
are similarities in American and Canadian constitutional jurisprudence (Kiedrowski, 
Smale, & Grounko, 2010, p. 45); as a result, leading cases in the United States which 
delineate the exercise of discretion by school officials in the area of disciplinary actions 
and students rights may offer insight into the examination of decision-making by school 
principals. However, Pitsula and Manley-Casimir (1989) caution that Canadian and U. S. 
legal traditions and norms are distinctly different and these differences should be 
acknowledged in an analysis of school law in Canada.  As a result, they advise avoiding 
an “uncritical adoption of U. S. case law as a guide to interpreting and applying the 
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Charter” which is, “at best, a hazardous undertaking, and, at worst, a thoroughly 
mistaken practice” (p. 71).  McConnell and Pyra (1989), however, dispute the claim that 
there is a different type of educational administration in Canada.  They maintain the two 
societies are similar and that Canada does draw on the “judicial reasoning” of the U. S. 
Supreme Court because “there exists much accumulated judicial experience and 
wisdom…in interpreting analogous Bill of Rights provisions” (p. 211).   
MacKay (2008), nonetheless, maintains that despite what may be generally 
believed, “the United States courts have been quite restrained on matters of students’ 
rights in schools” (p. 29) and references Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) as being the first 
case of students’ rights to be argued before the U. S. Supreme Court.  This case, which 
involves student freedom of expression, and Goss v. Lopez (1975), which involves 
student due process rights, help to define student rights in American schools and establish 
that principals’ discretion is not unbounded or unlimited, especially in the area of 
students’ constitutional rights.  These two landmark cases, in addition to New Jersey v. T. 
L. O. (1985) and Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986), serve to contextualize 
the exercise of administrative discretion. 
2.15   An American Perspective 
2.15.1 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com. Sch. Dist. (1969) 
 The iconic line articulating the United States Supreme Court’s acknowledgement 
of student rights in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) has been cited innumerable times in 
judgments and has become part of the parlance of lawyers and legal scholars. The Court’s 
determination that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” (p. 736), 
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reflected its opinion that it was unconstitutional to prohibit students from wearing black 
armbands to protest the Vietnam War, and to impose suspensions upon some of those 
who did.  In delivering the judgment of the Court, Fortas J. clearly stated that “school 
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students” and that “students in 
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.  They are possessed 
of fundamental rights which the State must respect” (p. 739).   
 However, in so defining student rights the Court identifies a Gordian knot with 
which school administrators continue to wrestle more than forty years later: “The 
problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights 
[freedom of speech] collide with the rules of the school authorities” (p. 737).  The Court 
in Tinker states that for the school to impose the sanction of suspensions for what was 
“closely akin to ‘pure speech’” (p. 736), that is, the “silent, passive expression of opinion, 
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners” (p. 737), was an 
infringement of the students’ constitutional rights to freedom of expression.  The Court 
further maintains students may express their opinion so long as they do not cause 
“substantial disruption of or material interference” (p. 740) with the school’s mission or 
the rights of others.  The “Tinker test, as it has been called, prescribes that freedom of 
expression in the public school community should be allowed provided such freedom is 
not disrupting the orderly operation of the school or interfering with the rights of others” 
(Kiedrowski et al., 2010, p. 56).  In rendering its judgment, the Court in Tinker cites 
Burnside v. Byars (1966), a case in which African-American students had been arbitrarily 
suspended from school for wearing “freedom buttons” (p. 749).   In Burnside (1966), 
Gewin C. J. of the Circuit Court considered the ambit of administrator discretion:   
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  School officials have a wide latitude of discretion. But the school 
  is always bound by the requirement that the rules and regulations 
  must be reasonable.  It is not for us to consider whether such rules 
  are wise or expedient but merely whether they are a reasonable  
  exercise of the power and discretion of the school authorities. (p. 748)                    
  Allowing that discretion which is not reasonably exercised may be open to 
judicial scrutiny, the Court in Tinker reserves judgment on the wisdom and efficacy of 
policy and procedures developed in schools.  Nonetheless, Tinker has as a corollary a 
cautionary note about the element of capriciousness in the exercise of discretion by 
administrators; the Court observes that schools are not “enclaves of totalitarianism”      
(p. 739), that rules cannot be enforced merely upon administrative whim, and it concludes 
that school officials should avoid arbitrariness in their decision-making.  Brady (2002) 
contends that historically “public schools exercised broad authority in disciplining 
students” (p. 169), aided by the principle of in loco parentis, but that the Tinker ruling 
“challenged” this previous practice and “shifted both the law and school administrators to 
a more active protection of students’ rights” (p. 170).  MacKay (2008) feels that while 
courts in Canada have generally “been sympathetic to the ‘substantial disruption’ test” of 
the U. S. Supreme court in Tinker, “like their American counterparts” they still give 
“front-line educators considerable deference in determining what is ‘substantial 
disruption’” (p.  29).    
2.15.2 Goss. v. Lopez (1975) 
 The issue of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, more 
specifically with respect to student suspensions in school, was considered by the United 
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States Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez (1975), along with the concomitant notions of 
administrative discretion and the purpose of student discipline.  In rendering its judgment, 
the Court acknowledges the need to find a balance in the tension that exists between “a 
student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest that is 
protected [by due process]” (p. 732) and the need to ensure that school officials are able 
to deal with disciplinary matters with “acceptable efficiency” (pp. 739–740) and 
“effectiveness” (p. 741).  The requirement for the student to be given “notice of the 
charges against him” and “an opportunity to present his side of the story” (p. 740), albeit 
“rudimentary procedures” (p. 741), not only ensures the safeguards enshrined in the 
Constitution, but also minimizes “unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary 
exclusion from school” (p. 740).  The Court ruled that “requiring effective notice and [an] 
informal hearing permitting the student to give his version of the events” provides a 
“meaningful hedge against erroneous action” (p. 741) on the part of school officials and 
determined that legislation allowing suspensions of less than ten days to be applied 
without a hearing or notice was unconstitutional.  In delivering the judgment of the Court, 
White J. notes the imposition of the requirements of a hearing would not infringe upon 
students’ rights; moreover, the school principal’s “discretion will be more informed” and 
“the risk of error [of unfair suspensions] substantially reduced” (p. 740).   The ruling 
reflects the Court’s sensitivity to the concern that formal suspension processes, 
adversarial in nature, along the lines of “truncated trial-type procedures,” may 
“overwhelm administrative facilities” (p. 740) and remove any educative component of 
the disciplinary process.  Student suspensions, it concludes, require “at least an informal 
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give-and-take between student and disciplinarian” and “longer suspensions or expulsions 
may require more formal procedures” (p. 741).   
 In dissent, Powell J., along with three other justices (one of whom was the Chief 
Justice), focuses upon the need for principals to be able to exercise discretion in their 
decision-making in matters of student discipline.  He maintains that “in prior decisions 
[i.e., Tinker v. Des Moines], this Court has explicitly recognized that school authorities 
must have broad discretionary authority in the daily operation of public schools.  This 
authority includes wide latitude with respect to maintaining discipline and good order” 
(p. 744).  Mandating due process requirements would pre-empt the authority of 
educators, and curtail the discretion afforded them.  Powell J. goes on to insist “the 
teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating formalities,” noting “there is no 
evidence indicating the frequency of unjust suspensions,” and that “common sense 
suggests that they will not be numerous in relation to the total number, and that mistakes 
or injustices will usually be righted by informal means” (p. 746).   The “statutory 
requirements” in Ohio requiring “written [emphasis in original] notice including the 
‘reasons therefor’ to the student’s parents and to the Board of Education within 24 hours 
of any suspension” is a “deterrent against arbitrary action by the principal,” and he doubts 
rushing to “mandate” constitutional requirements for due process would not “in any 
meaningful sense [provide] greater protection than that already afforded under Ohio law” 
(p. 747).    
 Powell J. warns requiring due process procedures would hinder administrators in 
their role and would “sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of 
discretionary decisions in the educational process” (p. 747), not the least of which include 
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student promotion, assessment, instruction, placement, and extracurricular activities.  
Predicting “federal courts should prepare themselves for a vast new role in society”       
(p. 749) on the heels of any requirement of the Court for due process procedures 
whenever “routine school decisions” are challenged, Powell J. contends there will be a 
“serious” impact upon public education since the “discretion and judgment of federal 
courts across the land often will be substituted for that of the 50 state legislatures, the 
14,000 school boards, and the 2,000,000 teachers who heretofore have been responsible 
for the administration of the American public school system” (p. 748).   
2.15.3 New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 
 In rendering its judgment in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), the United States 
Supreme Court establishes that, although not divested of their constitutional rights, 
students have a “lesser expectation of privacy” (p. 746) in schools.  White J. delivers the 
opinion of the Court and defines the reduced standard for searches of students in the 
school setting, alluding to the belief that “in recent years, school disorder has often taken 
particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in schools have become major 
problems” (p. 741).  The Court determines “maintaining order in the classroom has never 
been easy” (p. 741) and argues about the need for administrative latitude by stating that 
ensuring “security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in 
school disciplinary procedures” (p. 742).  In recognition of the necessity to “strike the 
balance between the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s 
equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place”     
(p. 742), the Court rules the legality of student searches in schools “should depend simply 
on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search” (p. 735).  The standard 
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of reasonableness “will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of 
schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause”; this lesser standard is 
expeditious for school officials, offering them greater discretion and permitting “them to 
regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense” (p. 743).    
Blackmun J., concurring, notes the constitutional guarantee of freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure would not be violated by the adoption of this standard, 
but he mentions, as well, the “special need for flexibility justifying a departure from the 
balance struck by the Framers [of the Fourth Amendment]” (p. 748).   A balance must be 
struck between “the interests of the student against the school official’s need to maintain 
discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to 
which students and adults are entitled” (p. 746).  White J., with O’Connor J. concurring, 
also states “we have recognized that maintaining security and order in the schools 
requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary policies” (p. 742), thus 
identifying the need for latitude on the part of school administrators and respecting that 
“strict adherence” (p. 742) to requirements was not required.   
2.15.4 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) 
In Bethel v. Fraser (1986), the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court alludes to the 
inability of school rules to cover every disciplinary infraction, thus recognizing the 
requirement of “flexibility” (p. 3166) for school officials in responding to student 
misbehavior: 
 Given the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions 
 for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational 
 process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal 
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 code which imposes criminal sanctions.  (p. 3166) 
The Court ruled that “giving a lewd and indecent speech” (p. 3165) during a high 
school assembly is not constitutionally protected under the First Amendment guarantee of 
freedom of expression.  Overturning a ruling by the lower Court of Appeals, and 
acknowledging that school officials do not have “limitless” (p. 3168) authority to 
“regulate” (p. 3167) such speech, the Supreme Court maintains “that in light of the 
discretion school officials have to teach high school students how to conduct civil and 
effective public discourse, and to prevent disruption of school educational discourse” (p. 
3166), the imposition of a suspension upon the student did not violate his constitutional 
right to free speech, and confirms the need for administrators to have flexibility in their 
disciplinary decision-making.  Citing Thomas v. Board of Education (1979), in which the 
Court of Appeals ruled students could not be punished for distributing an off-school 
newspaper that was “morally offensive, indecent, and obscene” (p. 1044), Brennan J., 
concurring, notes that school administrators, nonetheless, do not enjoy unrestricted 
authority when he observes that Thomas had shown “‘school officials . . . do [not] have 
limitless discretion to apply their own notions of indecency’” (p. 3168).  
The Bethel Court also cited Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education (1971), a case 
where prior restraint of student publications had been found unconstitutional and had 
opposed students’ free speech.  The Court in Eisner warned overly broad policy had to be 
reworded since there is a possibility that overly vague policy “because of its tendency to 
over-generalization, will be administered arbitrarily, erratically, or unfairly” (p.809).  The 
policy allowing the prior restraint by school officials amounted to “censorship” (p. 89), 
and the Court reminded administrators that they “must demonstrate a reasonable basis for 
108 
 
interference with student speech” (p. 810).  Furthermore, Kaufman J. also cited the 
Burnside decision and maintained arbitrariness on the part of school officials would not 
be tolerated.  He ruled “school authorities must demonstrate a reasonable basis for 
interference with student speech, and that the court will not rest content with officials’ 
bare allegation that such a basis existed” (p. 809). 
Dissenting in Bethel, Marshall J., while agreeing that an administrator’s discretion 
must not escape scrutiny, especially when the right of freedom of speech is concerned, 
contends there was no evidence the student’s remarks had disrupted the educational 
process,  the standard that had been established in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969).  He, too, 
recognizes “the school administration must be given wide latitude to determine what 
forms of conduct are inconsistent with the school’s educational mission; nevertheless, 
where speech is involved, we may not unquestioningly accept a teacher’s or 
administrator’s assertion that certain pure speech interfered with education” (p. 3168).  
2.16  Deference to Discretionary Decision-making   
  Biggs’s (1993) analysis of administrative discretion in selected students’ rights 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court reflects the “imprecision” he finds in 
discretionary decision-making by administrators (p. 161).   He argues the earliest 
decisions of the Court, such as those rendered in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) and Goss v. 
Lopez (1975), determined principals’ discretion was not unlimited or unbounded, 
especially when administrative action sought to limit students’ constitutional freedoms.  
Wood v. Strickland (1975), a case involving suspension and student substantive due 
process rights, supported the exercise of discretion by school officials while emphasizing 
that school officials were protected by a “qualified immunity” in their discretionary 
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actions unless “they knowingly violated the constitutional rights of students” (Biggs, 
1993, p. 75); consequently, their decisions must be made in good faith and be reasonable 
or administrators could be held personally liable.   In Wood, the Court affirms the 
decision-making of administrators when it states that “the system of public education that 
has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school 
administrators and school board members” (p. 326).  The Court held that school officials, 
when acting in good faith in fulfilling their responsibilities, will not be punished but they 
will not be immune from damages if they know their actions violate the constitutional 
rights of students.   
 Biggs (1993) points out subsequent decisions of the Court, such as New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.(1979), and Bethel v. Fraser (1986) and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), which 
concerned student rights to freedom of expression, “involved significant constitutional 
issues and controversial interventions on the part of school administrators” (p. 93).   This 
trio of cases “signaled a shift away from controlling students’ rights through additional 
restrictive protections, entrusting greater discretionary authority to school officials”       
(p. 95).  As evidenced in T.L.O. and Hazelwood, Biggs (1993) maintains, the Court 
deferred to the administrators’ actions if their behavior was “reasonable” (p. 93) and 
“justified” when it considered administrators’ “spur-of-the-moment decisions” (p. 94) 
that resulted in disciplinary responses.  Moreover, in Hazelwood the Court ruled school 
officials could impose reasonable restrictions on student speech and could limit the 
discourse as long as the restrictions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns” (p. 571).  Biggs (1993) concludes the principles contained in these Supreme 
Court decisions suggest that courts in America will “usually support” discretionary action 
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as long as it is not “arbitrary, inconsistent, discriminatory or heavy-handed” (p. 180) and 
if it complies with “standards of fairness” (p. 179).  Arum (2003) concurs with Biggs’s 
appraisal of the courts’ deference to principals, and maintains that appellate court cases at 
the state and federal levels in the U.S. generally had a “pro-school tendency” after 1975 
and supported administrators’ decisions, whereas before that time, judges had “tended to 
adopt pro-student orientations” (p. 86) which served to undermine what he calls the moral 
authority in schools. 
2.17   Shift from Discretionary Authority 
Kafka (2008), on the other hand, disputes the claim that by the time of Goss v. 
Lopez (1975) court decisions in America were contributing to what she sees as the 
“centralization” of school disciplinary authority (p. 249) away from the discretionary 
decisions of educators in schools.  Instead, she insists that “racial conflict” and “distrust” 
(p. 249) of White teachers and administrators in Los Angeles during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s led to the erosion of the in loco parentis doctrine and its “considerable 
discretion in the administration of discipline” and to the establishment of the school 
district as a centralized bureaucracy that regulated and controlled the disciplinary policies 
of schools (Kafka, 2008, p. 247).  By the mid-1970s, Kafka (2008) contends, as a result 
of this racial strife the Los Angeles School Board responded to claims that “local school 
rules and disciplinary procedures” were seen to “perpetuate injustices and preserve 
inequities,” and limited “teachers’ and principals’ control over school discipline”          
(p. 263).  
Consequently, Los Angeles became a national prototype for models of 
“centralized regulation and bureaucratic rule making” (Kafka, 2008, p. 262) that “reduced 
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local discretion and increased centralization” in all areas of school administration and 
governance, including student discipline (p. 264).  The Los Angeles board “enacted 
policies that limited teachers’ and principals’ disciplinary discretion, [and] framed school 
discipline in terms of [centralized] district-level mandates”; in the years to follow, 
administrators and teachers were able to maintain and regulate school discipline through 
their roles as “members of the district bureaucracy” who clearly derived their authority 
from the board itself (p. 262). 
More recently, however, Torres and Stefkovich (2009) suggest that ambiguity in 
lower court rulings in the U. S, especially since New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), has left 
school officials with “considerable discretionary interpretation and application of [the] 
law” (p. 469).  They call for policy checks to ensure that administrative actions comply 
with Supreme Court rulings in order that administrators’ decisions do not have a 
disproportionate impact upon students. 
2.18  Discretion as Moral Authority 
Arum (2003) advocates “limiting and redefining the scope” of U.S. student due- 
process rights in cases where students face school discipline “that does not involve long-
term exclusion or violation of First Amendment rights” (p. 207), that is, “rights of 
freedom of speech, press, and peaceful assembly” (p. 204).  Maintaining that due process 
guarantees afforded students by Goss v. Lopez (1975) and subsequent cases were 
“rudimentary” at best, Arum holds students are provided “little formal protection from 
inappropriately exercised discipline” that does not include long-term suspension or 
expulsion (p. 208).  The majority of suspensions issued are not long-term and, in these 
more informal cases, students are “offered no real protection from administrators who act 
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in arbitrary, authoritarian or discriminatory fashion” (p. 208).  He suggests legal 
constraints in court decisions that challenge “the administrative discretion of school 
personnel” have “undermined the effectiveness of school discipline” and led to 
“deteriorating public school climates” (p. 189).   
As it stands, Arum (2003) submits, the widely held belief that American students 
are able to invoke their constitutional rights at any time has not resulted in greater 
protection for them but, instead, in “the legalization of school practices, the intimidation 
of school personnel faced with an ambiguous legal terrain, and an undermining of the 
school’s moral authority” (p. 208).  Narrowing student rights, he contends, would be 
“largely symbolic,” and would indicate “faith in public educators’ discretionary 
judgment” (p. 213) and could be off-set by increased measures of accountability at the 
district level, dedicated in-service development sessions for administrators and by the 
professionalism of educators (Arum, 2003, p. 213).  Limiting any student rights, on 
principle, appears counter-intuitive and, it can be argued, may lead to greater arbitrariness 
in administrative decision-making.  Arum’s point remains, however, that minority 
students do not appear to have been particularly well-served by due process rights to this 
point, given that studies indicate they are disproportionately affected by school discipline, 
and over-represented in suspension rates (p. 211).  
2.19   A Canadian Perspective 
Zuker, Hammond, and Flynn (2009) maintain Canadian law has afforded 
administrators in schools “some degree of discretion” to make “reasonable decisions in 
their particular school contexts or while supervising students outside of school” (p. 333).  
There are limits to the discretion afforded school authorities, however, and they reason 
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“this lenience will not necessarily be accorded to every decision made by a teacher or 
school authority in every context, particularly where the action taken subverts the interest 
of pupils to the individual’s self-interest” (Zuker, Hammond, & Flynn, 2009, p. 334).  
Pitsula and Manley-Casimir (1989) provide an historical context for 
administrators’ decision-making when, shortly after the enactment of the Charter, they 
suggest judicial reasoning in Canada is grounded in “deference to the good faith behavior 
of educational administrators” (p. 60).   As a result, “the public standard…is determined 
by local school board policy and the discretion of the disciplinarian” (p. 67).  They argue 
Canadians seek redress and change “through the political process rather than through the 
courts,” that school law is mostly found in “the actions of school boards, ministry 
officials, and teacher professional organizations,” rather “than in the written decisions of 
judges” (p. 67), and that Canadian school administrators have not seen the intrusion into 
“matters of school discipline” that has occurred in the United States (p. 68).  Canadian 
courts grant  broad discretionary powers to school authorities “based on an interpretation 
of the relevant school act and long-standing principles such as in loco parentis…and 
parens patriae” (p. 58), and judicial reasoning reflects the “belief that educational 
administrators rarely behave in a capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable manner” (p. 59).  
They go on to note courts are “very reluctant to interfere with the reasonable exercise of 
this discretion” (p. 59).  Their authority to discipline students at common law is based on 
a willingness to delegate “considerable autonomy” to educational administrators through 
the doctrine of in loco parentis and as state agents carrying out the important function of 
“peace, order and good government” (p. 59) as articulated in Murdock v. Richards 
(1954): 
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It is sometimes said that the parent, by sending the child to  
 school, has delegated his discipline to the teacher; but since 
 many children go to public schools under compulsion of the 
 law, and the child may well be punished over the objection 
 of the parent, a sounder reason is the necessity for maintaining 
 order in and about the school. (p. 769).  
Dickinson and MacKay (1989) at that time also allude to the “traditional 
approach” of courts in Canada before the arrival of the Charter where deference to 
“school officials’ discretion” reflected a preference for “the virtues of discipline and 
obedience over those associated with individual rights and challenging authority”          
(p. 318).  The “flexibility of broad discretionary jurisdiction” MacKay (2008, p. 24) 
identifies as being exercised by educational administrators is considered in the following 
three cases which involve searches of students by school officials in Canadian 
jurisdictions. 
2.19.1 R. v. J. M. G. (1986) 
In this case in which a student appealed his conviction for possession of narcotics, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal identifies the complex nature of administrative decision-
making, particularly in cases of student searches in schools.  Grange J. A. affirms “the 
type of information required to justify a search” (p. 710) by citing New Jersey v. T. L. O. 
(1986), wherein the Court determined searches in schools need not adhere to the standard 
of probable cause.  The  “twofold inquiry” found in Terry v. Ohio (1968), whether the 
search is “justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place” (New Jersey v. T. L. O., 1986, p. 341), 
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determines the reasonableness of all circumstances of the search.  Grange J. A. notes the 
obligation of school principals to “enforce school discipline in schools efficiently and 
effectively” is balanced against the “substantial interest not only in the welfare of the 
other students but in the accused student as well” (p. 710).  He acknowledges principals 
require latitude to make judgments that are reasonable in order to “maintain proper order 
and discipline” (p. 712), explaining “a principal has a discretion in many minor offences 
whether to deal with the matter himself, whether to consult the child’s parents and 
whether to call in the law enforcement authorities.  He cannot exercise that discretion 
until he knows the nature and extent of the offence” (p. 710).  The Court supports 
administrators’ decision-making that is reasonable under the circumstances, indicating 
such decisions will not violate students’ Charter rights.    
2.19.2 R. v. M. R. M. (1999) 
The Supreme Court of Canada affirms the discretionary decision-making of 
school principals when it establishes the more “lenient and flexible” standard of 
reasonableness for educators who conduct searches of students in the school setting       
(p. 395) and supports the need to maintain order and discipline in schools.  As well, the 
Court notes the “significantly diminished” (p. 413) expectation of privacy for students in 
addition to determining that “the actions of school officials as an extension of 
government are subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (p. 430).  The 
Court acknowledges the significant responsibilities of school officials and considers the 
balance they must find between respecting the rights of students and maintaining a safe 
school environment.  On behalf of the Court, Cory J. notes the recent increase in “illicit 
drug and dangerous weapons in the schools,” which present considerable barriers to 
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school officials in meeting their obligations to provide a “safe and orderly environment” 
(p. 415).  He acknowledges that since school administrators must “be able to respond 
quickly and effectively to problems” (p. 420), they must be provided with “the flexibility 
required to deal with discipline problems in schools” (p. 415).  Reiterating that “school 
authorities must be accorded a reasonable degree of discretion and flexibility to enable 
them to ensure the safety of their students and to enforce school regulations” (p. 421), the 
Court goes on to support the decision-making ability of school authorities who, “as a 
result of their training, background and experience,” are “in the best possible position” to 
evaluate the information they receive (p. 421).  Consequently, school officials occupy a 
“preferred position” (pp. 421–422) in determining whether reasonable grounds exist for a 
search to be conducted; as a result, the Court maintains a “modified standard for school 
authorities is required to allow them the necessary latitude to carry out their 
responsibilities to maintain a safe and orderly school environment” (p. 425) within the 
context of the particular circumstances as they are presented.  Cory J. concludes that, 
although the standard for searches is lessened, school administrators must remember “the 
manner in which students are treated in these situations will determine their respect for 
the rights of others in the future” (p. 424).    
In dissent, Major J. argues the school’s vice-principal in the case had acted as an 
agent of the police and not in his capacity as a school official; therefore, he believes the 
search requires a warrant with the standard being elevated from reasonable suspicion to 
“reasonable and probable grounds” (p. 425) and, as such, violated M.R.M.’s Charter 
rights.   Major J. also enumerates an important consideration regarding school policy.  
For the case in point, the school district’s policy requirement to call the Royal Canadian 
117 
 
Mounted Police (RCMP) if a student was found to be in possession of drugs or alcohol 
“of a criminal nature” (p. 433), served to make “a school official a de facto agent of the 
police when and if the police engage the services of that person to conduct the subsequent 
investigation” (p. 433).  It may be inferred from this ruling that school discipline policies 
directing administrative action should be reviewed for alignment with legislation and 
significant court rulings. 
 Dickinson (2009) points to the courts’ “traditional emphasis on order and 
discipline” underscoring the “special ‘case’” of discipline (p. 180), and notes the “role-
based test” for school searches by school administrators in their roles either as agents of 
the police or as careful, prudent parents established by the courts in M.R.M. (as well as in 
R. v. J.M.G) focuses on the “subjective intentions [emphasis in original] of the 
administrator,” but he maintains that in matters “where school rule breaches and criminal 
acts coalesce, discretion becomes a moot point” (p. 179).  He asserts that the two 
judgments support the “considerable discretion, latitude, and flexibility” (p. 180) afforded 
school administrators but do so at the expense of students’ Charter rights.  Noting the 
“transition from educational state agent to police state agent” can be a rapid-fire one for 
principals (Dickinson, 1998, p. 452), and highlighting the importance of the “fiduciary 
relationship between educator and student” (p. 451), Dickinson (2009), instead, offers 
that  “[A.W.] MacKay’s impact- or results-based” approach, which focuses on the impact 
of what a search might reveal, would determine students’ rights “based on the objective 
test of whether there were reasonable grounds to believe there would be criminal 
consequences” (p. 179).  As a result, he contends, all searches of students would then be 
left to the police, a condition which may make greater practical sense, and which may 
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relieve principals of much of their burden of discretionary decision-making in finding the 
balance between enforcing school rules and assisting in the enforcement of the criminal 
law.  
2.19.3 R. v. A. M. (2008) 
That administrative decisions involving discretion are not unfettered, however, is 
confirmed in R. v. A. M. (2008).  Binnie J., on behalf of the Supreme Court, agrees with 
the Court’s earlier decision in R. v. M. R. M. (1999) that “greater latitude must be given to 
school authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities than to the police” (para. 47).  
This case, involving a random drug search conducted by sniffer dogs in an Ontario 
school, recognizes the “teaching of M.(M.R.) is that in matters of school discipline, a 
broad measure of discretion and flexibility” (para. 45) is afforded school officials, yet it 
also confirms that students do enjoy a measure of privacy in the school setting.  
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that, despite the lower threshold required in school searches, 
the exercise of discretion afforded school officials insofar as the use of sniffer dogs is 
concerned must be balanced against the need to establish the standard of reasonableness 
based on “objective facts” (para. 90).  The majority ruling affirmed there is a higher 
standard for searches by sniffer dogs in schools (Kiedrowski et al., 2010) and that school 
administrators and police officers cannot decide to conduct random searches in schools 
based on a mere whim; instead, the “prior requirement of reasonable suspicion” must be 
met (para. 90).  In its ruling, MacKay (2008) maintains, the Court came down on the side 
of individual rights.    
In dissent, Bastarache J. agrees administrative decision-making cannot be 
capricious or arbitrary and “reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch,”  
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while confirming a “generalized, ongoing suspicion” entitling principals to use their 
authority to indiscriminately search students whenever they please “does not exist in 
relation to schools” (para. 152).  He reasons that although school officials had thought it 
likely drugs might be discovered in the school, they had not first established a reasonable 
suspicion drugs would be found; as a result, the search of the student’s backpack by the 
sniffer dog was deemed unreasonable, and the rights of the student were upheld.  As he 
observes, although reasonable suspicion is a “recognized legal standard that has been 
adopted where considered appropriate by both Parliament and the courts” (para. 79), if it 
is “construed as nothing more than a subjective standard, it may lead, as critics fear, to 
abuse in terms of arbitrary police action and racial profiling” and must be backed by 
“objectively verifiable indications” (para. 80).  Bastarache J. emphasizes school 
administrators and others must establish a reasonable suspicion at the time when a search 
takes place, and not base their decision upon an educated guess that illegal drugs will be 
discovered; otherwise, it would appear that arbitrariness and capriciousness on the part of 
administrators with respect to random school searches would be found to be unreasonable 
by the courts.   
2.20   Increasing Influence of Rights  
MacKay (2008) describes what he sees as the growing impact of the law upon 
education and identifies one of the benefits of the “expanded judicial role in education” 
as contributing, in part, to the need for the clarification of school rules in order to meet 
the “justification standard” of the Charter, “thereby diminishing discretion” (p. 32).  The 
pressure on school boards “to meet the ‘prescribed by law’ dictate” has resulted, he 
believes, in the  end to “‘the good old days’ of open-ended administrative discretion for 
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teachers and principals” (p. 32).  However, he concedes “courts and most administrative 
tribunals” are still “willing to show considerable deference to the educational experts on 
the substance of educational policy” and they “have been mindful of the practical 
demands of the school context” in “matters of jurisdiction, fair process, and constitutional 
and human rights” (p. 23).  
MacKay (2008) also points to the growing “focus on students and their rights 
within the school system” (p. 32), and the “increased presence of lawyers in schools has 
produced a greater focus on process rights” (p. 31); the increasing “importance of human 
rights agencies” and tribunals in Canadian schools is reflective of this “rights 
consciousness” (p. 25).  He maintains these agencies play a more prominent role in 
education, occupy much of the “time and energy” of schools and are “less deferential to 
the front-line educational experts” (p. 25) and their discretionary decision-making than is 
the judiciary.  The courts, he suggests are focused on “fair process for students and 
parents,” while human rights agencies seem more concerned with “substantive human 
rights” (p. 25), and he points to the emphasis by the courts of “the importance of fair 
process at all levels of decision making in the educational system” (p. 31).    
MacKay’s (2008) contention appears to be supported by Silbert (2010) who notes 
the recent case of J. O. v. Strathcona-Tweedsmuir School (2010) involving the expulsion 
of a student from an independent school in Alberta for alleged unacceptable off-campus 
conduct.  In this case the court did not defer to the decisions of the administration.  The 
lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, maintaining that “expulsion decisions [by 
school officials] must not be arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith,” and that the 
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school was required to “incorporate the principles of fundamental justice into its 
disciplinary rules” (p. 8).   
Sitch and McCoubrey (2000), however, suggest courts continue to defer to 
administrators’ exercise of discretion because the “judiciary [tends] to subordinate 
children’s rights to the interests of order and discipline” (p. 191).  Judges have been 
reluctant “to examine the method of discipline, or the extent of the school’s disciplinary 
role” because of this deference to the decisions of school boards and school officials, and 
also because of a failure to examine the application or the effects of the power of “state 
authority”; consequently, they have neglected “to consider the existence of students’ 
rights” (p. 188). They further contend the “impenetrable nature”  (p. 191) of  the broad 
discretion afforded school administrators in order to preserve the orderliness in schools 
“is a consequence of the preservation of in loco parentis — a principle that is 
inappropriate when applied to a 21
st
 century understanding of children’s rights” (Sitch & 
McCoubrey, 2000, p. 191).   
2.21   Impact of Discretion on Discipline Policies 
 School administrators exercise discretion when they make disciplinary decisions 
involving student misbehavior; they use their judgment to choose from any number of 
responses, from ignoring the behavior to levying a suspension. Student suspension has 
become one of the “most commonly used forms of discipline in the United States” 
(Mendez & Knoff, 2003, p. 31; see also Fenning & Rose, 2007, Skiba, 2002) and it is 
frequently relied upon as a disciplinary measure in Canada as well.  Mendez and Knoff 
(2003) contend suspension “rarely has a logical, functional, or instructive connection” to 
the offence (p. 30).  Historically, suspension became an alternative form of discipline 
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replacing corporal punishment in Ontario (Axelrod, 2010; see also Brown & Beckett, 
2007) and the trend to suspend students appears to have spread throughout the rest of 
Canada.  Brien (2005) reasons that with the ability to suspend encased in legislation, 
coupled with due process requirements and the opportunity for judicial review, 
suspension “can trigger more legal consequences than many other disciplinary measures” 
(pp. 10–11).  What is more, Hall (1999) believes decision-making regarding student 
suspensions highlights “the impact of values on administrative discretion”  
(p. 141).   
2.21.1 Reasons for Suspension 
 Mendez and Knoff (2003) suggest suspension is “intended”  by administrators 
and “perceived by students” as a “punishment” (p. 30).  Birrell and Marshall (2007) 
maintain that “strict discipline in the form of suspensions and expulsions,” coupled with 
the inculcation of values such as “responsibility, accountability and civility,” has been 
used “to address violence and bad behavior in schools” (p. 33).  Ironically, Costenbader 
and Merkson (1998) identify attendance concerns as being one of the most often-cited 
reasons for issuing school suspensions (see also Chobot & Garibaldi, 1982; Kaesar, 
1979).  Another study revealed that 63% of all suspensions were for non-dangerous 
offences and for nonviolent acts such as defiance or disruption (Chobot & Garibaldi, 
1982, p. 317).  Other inquiries claim the majority of student suspensions are subjectively 
issued for minor offences, not violent incidents, and are applied under quite broad 
categories such as “disobedience/insubordination” (Mendez & Knoff, 2003, p. 48; see 
also Kaesar, 1979) and for more nonspecific offences, such as “disrespect” 
(Bhattacharjee, 2003; Fenning & Rose, 2007) and “noncompliance” (Clark, 2002, p. 41; 
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see also Mendez & Knoff, 2003).  Much is left to teachers’ and administrators’ 
interpretation and judgment in many cases when student suspensions are issued.   
 It may be argued discretion also holds the potential for bias or, at the very least, 
decision-making that may be influenced by socially and culturally constructed individual 
perceptions of appropriate behavior and conduct.  With very subjective offenses such as 
“disrespect,” “noncompliance,” “disobedience,” and “defiance” open to individual 
interpretation, there is opportunity for subtle prejudices to enter into the decision-making 
process in disciplinary matters.  Research by Clark (2002) shows racial stereotypes 
influence “teachers’ perceptions, judgment and behavior” since their ontology defines the 
“accepted culture and behaviors” (p. 143) and, as a result, those “students not exhibiting 
‘normal’ behavior experienced increased discipline actions and special education 
placements” (pp. 142–143).   
2.21.2 Effects of Suspension Upon Students   
 The United States Supreme Court offered its own consideration of the effects of 
suspension in Goss v. Lopez (1975).  Powell J., in dissent, argued “a deprivation of not 
more than 10 days’ suspension from school” does not “assume constitutional 
dimensions” (p. 743) since the right to an education “is not a right protected by the 
Constitution” (p. 742) and is, instead, “encompassed in the entire package of statutory 
provisions governing education in Ohio” (p. 743).  Noting there was recourse to air 
“grievances…available to pupils and their parents” (p. 747), he stated the prevailing 
provision for suspension in Ohio was sufficient and allowed “no serious or significant 
infringement” of a student’s education since “it authorize[d] only a maximum suspension 
of eight school days, less than 5% of the normal 180-day school year” (p. 743).  Such 
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suspensions, the Court determined, “will rarely affect a pupil’s opportunity to learn or his 
scholastic performance,” and there was no evidence to support the claim that students 
could experience “damage” from such suspensions, or that the suspension could harm “a 
student’s reputation” (p. 743).  Current literature, however, appears to challenge such 
traditional beliefs. 
 Torres and Stepkovich (2009; see also Costenbader & Merkson, 1998; Townsend, 
2000) claim suspensions may end up adversely affecting minority students.  Indeed, the 
literature is replete with allegations that zero tolerance and zero tolerance-like policies, 
which remove the possibility for administrative discretion, usually with respect to 
suspension and expulsion, disproportionately affect minority, male, and special education 
students (Arum, 2003; Bhattacharjee, 2003; Casella, 2003; Civil Rights Project, 2000; 
Wu et al., 1982).  Even when such policies are not considered, other studies show a 
relationship between race and suspension rates.  For example, data from a survey of 
31,000 students by Wu et al. (1982) support their hypothesis that “racial bias is a 
contributing factor in student suspension” (p. 269), even when “poverty, behavior and 
attitudes, academic performance, [and] parental attention” are considered (p. 270).   As 
well, “academic bias” plays a role since the “greater the emphasis on academic ability,” 
the greater the probability that “low ability students” would be suspended (Wu et al., 
1982, p. 267).  Although they also found students’ behavior and attitudes are a “basic 
determinant” of  student suspension (p. 254), the “subjective judgments and attitudes of 
teachers” appear to be “highly relevant” as well (p. 260).  They further discovered when 
the authority for discipline in the school is “centralized,” that is, when “administrative 
control” over student discipline and rules is increased, as opposed to awarding 
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“discretionary power” to teachers for school discipline, this focused control leads to an 
increased number of suspensions (pp.262–263).  
Much research has indicated suspensions and other forms of school exclusion 
provide temporary, short-term relief for frustrated administrators and teachers, but the 
damaging effects of these measures may far exceed any benefits that may ensue.  As 
previously noted, they are usually levied for very subjective reasons (Bhattacharjee, 
2003; Civil Rights Project, 2000; Conroy et al., 1999; Kaesar, 1979; Lufler, 1979), and 
the efficacy of suspensions as an effective, educative disciplinary strategy is much 
debated (Kaesar, 1979; Arum, 2003; Mendez & Knoff, 2003).   Costenbader and 
Merkson (1998) contend suspension exacerbates misbehavior, reinforces inappropriate 
behavior, does not improve attendance, is correlated to drug use, and can force the 
school’s problems onto the streets (see also Mendez & Knoff, 2003; Mukuria, 2002).  
Students who are suspended or expelled have “increased opportunity to engage in illegal 
behaviors” and are most susceptible to “early school leaving” and dropping out 
(Townsend, 2000, p. 382; see also Wu et al., 1982).  Skiba (2002) sees suspension being 
used as a “push-out tool” for “persistent troublemakers” and associates suspension and 
expulsion with an increased likelihood of gang involvement (p. 90).  Clark (2002) 
connects suspension to the future academic progress of students and maintains there is a 
“negative relationship between discretionary removal and academic achievement”       
(pp. 133–134) and believes it deprives minority students, who are already marginalized, 
of access to academic experiences.  When suspensions are levied, schools officials may 
assume students always think before they act, or that they are capable of linking causes 
and effects.  Some students, especially younger students under ten years of age, may be 
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developmentally incapable of separating the sanction of the behavior from the sanction of 
the self (Clark, 2002). 
 Principals often may issue shorter suspensions from one to three days that, in 
some school divisions, may not be part of a formal documentation process.  These 
suspensions may be the easiest and quickest disciplinary consequence to administer.  
Arguably, informal suspensions still may cumulatively impact students’ progress, 
engagement, feelings of self-worth, desire for reparation, and sense of belonging (see 
Henriksson, 2008, p. 133), in addition to potentially exposing them to jeopardy in their 
own homes.  As well, these suspensions can be levied with little external accountability, 
and their application would seem to be a highly discretionary aspect of the disciplinary 
process. 
MacKay’s (2008) argument for inclusive school environments has validity in a 
discussion about suspensions.  He believes it would “be fair to say that the failure to 
properly accommodate diversity, in its many manifestations, is a significant cause of 
student frustration, alienation, and withdrawal.  This, in turn, can lead to acting out in 
ways that are disruptive and that lead to discipline problems” (p. 48).  He notes that the 
fact Aboriginal students, especially, are not “properly” included in Canadian school 
systems “goes a long way” to explaining the “high levels of discipline problems and drop 
outs” among them (MacKay, 2008, p. 48). At the core of many student suspensions, then, 
may be an incorrect or inappropriate response to the actions and behaviors which result 
from the diverse needs of students. 
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2.22  Student Suspension Rates 
Suspension can become the default disciplinary consequence for school 
administrators responding to student misbehavior in schools and, as Howe and Covell 
(2010) argue, reviewing student suspension rates can offer insight into administrators’ 
decision-making and its impact upon children and youth.  What is more, it can also 
illustrate how legislation and policies concerning disciplinary actions may affect them.  A 
study completed by the Civil Rights Project in 2000 for a national summit on zero 
tolerance policies in the United States sought to determine, among other things, if the 
principal’s philosophy on discipline correlated to suspension rates and explained wide 
discrepancies in rates of suspensions and expulsions among counties that had the same 
discipline policies.  The study’s authors discovered that principals’ philosophy and 
attitudes have a significant impact on disciplinary procedures and outcomes, and that they 
exercise their philosophy through student code of conduct policies (Civil Rights Project, 
2000).  Noguera (2003), for one, contends those principals who believe in harsh 
punishments for students have higher suspension/expulsion rates, but these punishments 
“do not necessarily translate into more effective discipline” (p. 19).  Meanwhile, he 
explains, those school authorities who have a “penchant to punish” (p. 346) can create 
environments of mistrust and resistance in schools (Noguera, 1995).  
2.22.1 The United States   
 A national report sponsored by the United States Department of Education (2009) 
reveals that student suspensions in that country appear to disproportionately affect racial 
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minority and male students.
12
  About 7%  of students received out-of-school suspensions 
of at least one day for disciplinary reasons in 2006; this number increased from 3.1 
million to 3.3 million between 2002 and 2006 (p. 70).  Suspension rates (of one day or 
more) for elementary and secondary school students in the United States in 2006 reveal 
that the number of males (2.3 million) suspended was twice that of females (1.1 million) 
(p. 68).  As well, 15% of the suspensions issued were to Black students, 8% were to 
American Indian/Alaskan Native students, 7% were to Hispanic students, 5% were to 
White students, and 3% were to Asian/Pacific Island students (p. 70).  In terms of total 
student population, however, White students comprised 56.9% of the enrollment in public 
schools, Hispanic students 20.2%, Black students 15.6%, Asian/Pacific Island students 
4.0%, and American Indian/Alaskan Native students 0.7%  (p. 136).  These figures would 
appear to support the assertion of Mendez and Knoff (2003) that “race [and] gender” 
have  “strong relationships to suspension rates” (p. 49).   
Narrowing the focus, Clark’s (2002) study of the “discretionary removal” rates of 
students in kindergarten to grade five in a large urban center Texas in the late 1990’s 
reflects a similar trend.  She defines “discretionary removal” as the “removal of students 
from the traditional academic setting for any behavior deemed disruptive to the learning 
environment” (Clark, 2002, p. 7).  Such exclusionary responses “are classified as 
‘discretionary’ because each school district may define the types of behavior that will not 
be tolerated,” as opposed to federal statutes, for example, that mandate zero tolerance for 
                                                 
12
 Bhattacharjee (2003) claims that Nova Scotia is the “only province in Canada where there has been 
some collection and analysis of school board statistics on race and the application of discipline” (p. v).  
Data obtained from the “Halifax Regional School Board from 1987 to 1992” revealed that “Black students 
were being disproportionately impacted by the application of suspensions” (p. v).  
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weapons in school (p. 6).  She indicates several “notable patterns” with respect to 
ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status and special education designation (p. 134).  For 
example, even though “African-American student enrollment declined by 24% between 
1998–99 and 1999–2000, the discretionary removal rate jumped from 9.2% to 13.37%” 
(pp. 134–135).  As well, her research points to the negative effect any type of discipline 
referral by the classroom teacher may have on students’ future academic achievement, 
especially in the areas of mathematics and reading scores.   
2.22.2 Province of Ontario    
 In Ontario, discretionary decision-making would appear to serve as one part of the 
foundation upon which school safety rests.  School discipline in Ontario, in part, focuses 
on principals’ choice and judgment.  Brown (2009) argues that principals make 
“judgment calls” daily with respect to acts of misbehavior, and “assess how to 
respond….Principals develop a sense of what disciplinary measure is appropriate for a 
particular student under the circumstances” (p. 24).    
While many alternatives are available to school administrators in their responses 
to student misbehavior, under Bill 212 (2007) and its attendant regulations, principals 
have the duty to apply discretionary suspensions, as well as to consider “mitigating 
factors” and “other factors,” which are enumerated as being those considerations that 
reduce the seriousness of the actions, when determining disciplinary consequences:  
‘Mitigating’ and other factors are not concerned with whether  
the student committed the prohibited activity.  They pertain to  
 what, if any, disciplinary consequences will be imposed.  They are   
  nothing more than a requirement to consider the ‘whole picture’  
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of the student, instead of a lock-step, automatic, arbitrary imposition  
of disciplinary consequences free of any genuine use of discretion  
or other hallmarks of judicious or educationally-sound decision-making.  
(Brown, 2009, pp. 13–14).    
Progressive discipline—part of the province’s strategy for safe schools—is a policy 
which “promotes positive student behavior and enables the principal to choose the 
appropriate consequences to address inappropriate student behavior” (Ontario Ministry, 
2010, Safe Schools).  Progressive discipline is a “whole-school approach that utilizes a 
continuum of prevention programs, interventions, supports and consequences to address 
inappropriate student behaviors and to build upon strategies that promote and foster 
positive behaviors” (Ontario Ministry, 19 October, 2009, Policy/Program).  Principals 
are also to consider the “nature and severity” of the infraction and its “impact upon the 
school climate” in determining the appropriate consequence, which can range from 
“verbal reminders” to suspension and expulsion (Ontario Ministry, 19 October, 2009, 
Policy/Program).  Additionally, Bill 157 (2009), a recent amendment to provincial 
legislation which came into effect on February 1, 2010, requires those who work directly 
with students to respond to any incidents that “may have a negative impact on the school 
climate” (Ontario Ministry, 19 October 2009, Policy/Program); such incidents may 
include cyber-bullying, which may take place off campus but which has the potential to 
drastically affect students and staff within the school environment. 
Although the Ontario Ministry of Education does not disaggregate its provincial 
school suspension and expulsion data by ethnicity, records indicate the number of 
students suspended in the province’s schools in the 2009–2010 school year was 86,140, 
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or 4.18% of all students attending Ontario schools; the total number of suspensions issued 
was 149,080 which include “multiple suspensions for individual students” (Ontario 
Ministry, 2012, Safe Schools: Suspensions).  Twenty-three percent of the suspensions for 
that year involved students with “Special Education Needs” where a student with special 
education needs is “a student who has been identified as exceptional by an Identification, 
Placement and Review Committee (IPRC) of the school board and who has an Individual 
Education Plan (IEP) that describes the special education program and services required 
by a particular student in order for the student to learn and to demonstrate learning 
[emphasis in original]” (Ontario Ministry, 2012, Safe Schools: Suspensions).  As well, 
76% of the suspensions involved male students, and 24%  involved female students.  
Suspension rates for individual school boards ranged from 12.62% to as 0.95% in that 
same year.  Expulsion rates for the province were 0.03% or 608 of all students; 7% were 
elementary students, and 89% were males (Ontario Ministry, 2012, Safe Schools: 
Suspensions).  
2.22.3 Toronto District School Board 
 A review of the suspension and expulsion data of the Toronto District School 
Board (2010), Canada’s largest school division, provides insight into current disciplinary 
practices.  However, the Board states the use of the data from its suspension and 
expulsion analysis in 2009 to 2010 and posted on its website is “encouraged” for “use in 
schools of the Toronto District School Board,” but that “for any other purpose, 
permission must be requested and obtained in writing” (Toronto District School Board, 
2010, p. ii).  Two email requests from the researcher were sent to the Superintendent of 
the Safe and Caring Schools and Alternative Programs; one request was sent on March 3, 
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2010  and the second request was sent on September 27, 2011.  The website specifically 
indicated this process was to be followed in requesting and receiving permission to use 
the school board’s data.  Neither request received acknowledgement from the Board.   
2.22.4 Province of Saskatchewan 
Saskatchewan’s Ministry of Education does not keep provincial data on student 
suspension rates; individual school boards collect this information, however, as they feel 
it is required (Ken Feltin, Assistant Registrar, Saskatchewan Ministry of Education, 
personal communication, March 23, 2010).  Additionally, an email sent February 25, 
2010, by the researcher to Saskatchewan’s Deputy Minister of Education inquiring 
whether there is a requirement for the collection of suspension and expulsion data by 
individual school boards in the province and, if so, whether the data are ever published, 
did not receive a reply. 
2.23  Best Interests of the Child          
Biggs (1993) contends administrative choices cannot be “willful, arbitrary, 
unaccountable, and closed to analysis” (p. 186).  He maintains it is difficult for 
administrators to follow any deliberate process or itemized procedure in discretionary 
decision-making because, in part, discretionary action is very imprecise and the decision-
making and behavior that occur when “an administrator creates and applies school rules, 
investigates misconduct, attempts to follow certain legal-like procedures, and in some 
instances, assigns punishment” are “multifaceted” (p. 160). While the law serves to 
establish, authorize and define the actions of school administrators, principals must 
negotiate within the parameters of discretion in a way that allows them not only to meet 
their statutory obligations but also to make value-laden decisions that are fair, reasonable, 
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and in good faith.  In short, they must find the tension that exists between the rights of the 
individual and the rights of the entire school population.  How, then, might principals be 
directed in their exercise of discretion in making decisions involving matters of student 
discipline?   
2.23.1 Best Interests as Basis for Decision-Making 
Biggs (1993) suggests school officials should make decisions in the best interests 
of the child; moreover, Cranston et al. (2006) contend educators have a responsibility and 
duty of care to act in students’ best interests (see also, Lipsky, 1980, p. 112).   Ashbaugh 
and Kasten (1984) identify the conviction of acting in the best interests of children as 
being “central to the ethos of the principalship” (p. 199).  W. D. Greenfield (1995) also 
claims school administrators have a professional obligation to ensure that policies and 
procedures “serve the best educational and developmental interests of children (minors 
within the law and attending school involuntarily)” (p. 64). Indeed, many principals insist 
this putative standard forms the basis for many of their decisions about what they believe 
is best for students (Frick, 2006, 2009; Haynes & Licata, 1995; Roche, 1999; Tuten, 
2006), although here, too, a tension often exists between the best interests of the 
misbehaving pupil and those of other students.   Others, including Larsen and Akmal 
(2007), propose a moral element is invoked if administrators use “creative 
insubordination” to counter balance those school-district policies they consider to be not 
in the “best interests of the students” (p. 49).  Simply being well-intentioned, however, 
may not be sufficient to inform school administrators’ disciplinary decision-making.   
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2.23.2 Legal Definitions 
In the legal arena in Canada, the best interests of the child is the “sole test for 
determining custody and access” (Fodden, 1999, p. 182), and statutes governing the 
standard are found in the federal Divorce Act (1985), the Youth Criminal Justice Act 
(YCJA) (2002) and in “parallel provincial or territorial legislation,” such as family law 
and children’s law acts (Williams, 2007, p. 634).   Fodden (1999) contends there is “no 
formula or guiding method for determining which outcome of a dispute” is in the best 
interests of the child, and “the task of knowing this…can be dauntingly large”               
(p. 188).  Nonetheless, a judge is often called upon to decide what is in a child’s best 
interests, and this determination “requires an exercise of discretion after the consideration 
of relevant factors” (Fodden, 1999, p. 188).  
2.23.3 Supreme Court Interpretation  
In Young v. Young (1993), L'Heureux-Dubé J., in delivering the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, considers that “the best interests of the child cannot be 
equated with the mere absence of harm; it encompasses a myriad of considerations”  
(p. 13) including “age, physical and emotional constitution and psychology” (p. 8).  
Furthermore, in Canadian Foundation for Children v. Canada (2004), the Court 
acknowledges that while “‘the best interests of the child’ has achieved the status of a 
legal principle” (p. 94), and is “a factor for consideration in many contexts, it is not vital 
or fundamental to our societal notion of justice, and hence is not a principle of 
fundamental justice” (p. 95).  The Court goes on to note the imprecision of the principle 
and its function “as a factor considered along with others” (p. 95).  As a result, “its 
application is inevitably highly contextual and subject to dispute” (p. 95).    
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Hovius and Maur (2009) insist some legal scholars believe the best interests 
standard is “inherently vague and inevitably permits or even requires judges to decide 
cases based on their personal values, beliefs or ideology” (p. 519).  As well, Bala (2000), 
in describing professionals and assessors who are called upon to provide insight and 
information to the court about what might be in a child’s best interest in divorce 
proceedings, concludes that “values, biases and competencies [also] affect their 
judgments” (p. 529).  Hovius and Maur (2009) add that “given the inherently speculative 
and value-based nature of many of the assessments they [mental health professionals] are 
asked to make, it is understandable that their views provoke controversy in the legal 
profession and among the judiciary” (p. 532; see also Millar, 2009, p. 72).  Because 
psychological theories are not necessarily indicative of future behavior, Hovius and Maur 
(2009) maintain it is “difficult and sometimes impossible to predict the effects of a 
particular alternative for the child with any certainty” (p. 519).  Arguably, the same may 
be said about principals’ decision-making in determining what is in a student’s best 
interests.  Part of the difficulty, Fodden (1999) maintains, is determining what “factors” 
and “values” are to be considered relevant in the “best interests calculus,” since there is 
“no matrix provided” for determining the summum bonum for the child (pp. 190–191).  
Millar (2009), too, observes “the best interests of children and their predictors 
have not been established,” but he does suggest that in order to measure the best interests 
of children, the factors to take into account include “those that demonstrably affect 
children’s behavior, health and educational success” (p. 5).  However, it is unclear what 
factors contribute to or help to determine the best interests of the child and to what 
degree.  Millar (2009) maintains the “Supreme Court [of Canada] has developed a 
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framework whereby even the Constitution does not apply to decisions involving the best 
interests standard” (p. 109).  As a result, since there is no set of criteria to define the 
“supra-constitutional idea of ‘best interests,’” the criteria for best interests degenerate 
“into judicial discretion unfettered by any legal constraint save the review of superior 
courts”;  however, he believes this discretion “has not been exercised at random”            
(p. 110).
13
  Millar (2009) believes a paradigm of best interests that exposes the child to as 
many sources of support as possible through open communication and that connects 
“children to the best resources in the optimal context possible under the circumstances,” 
can “guide legal principles and [support] children’s best interests” (p. 116).     
Best interests decisions may be highly subjective, and may rely on the 
predisposition of the decision-maker in much the same way the discretionary judgments 
of principals may be influenced by competing rights, interests, and needs in the school 
setting.  In Baker v. Canada (1999), a case involving an immigration claim, the Supreme 
Court of Canada links the two notions of discretion and best interests.  L'Heureux-Dubé 
J., on behalf of the Court, submits that “for the exercise of discretion to fall within the 
standard of reasonableness, the decision-making should consider children’s best interests 
as an important factor, give them substantial weight, and be alert, alive and sensitive to 
them” (para. 75).    
                                                 
13
 For example, Miller (2009) claims federal Department of Justice custody data illustrate that mothers 
currently obtain custody “far more often than fathers” (p. 118).  He believes the “judiciary in Canada 
cannot be said to be acting in children’s best interests with respect to the assignment of custody” (p. 110), 
since the “gender of the parent is not a predictor of parental ability” (p. 117).  Yet, he points to a 
“pronounced reliance on stereotypical notions of gender roles” (p. 110) in identifying the “lopsided nature 
of custody outcomes” (p. 117).  Millar (2009) argues that variables affecting children include “physical 
punishment,” “household income,” and “intact biological family” [emphasis in original] (pp. 111–112), 
while “custody is assigned mainly on the basis of criteria unrelated to children’s welfare” (p. 122).  As a 
result, such decisions do not achieve the “best possible outcomes for children” and actually act “against 
their best interests” (p. 122).   
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2.23.4 Application in Administrative Practice 
Nonetheless, some principals, in maintaining their decisions are based on the 
educational “shibboleth” of the “best interests” of students, may be making what Walker 
(1995) sees as “sententious” responses (p. 3; see also Dunbar & Villarruel, 2002).  In 
considering the limitations of the criteria for the best interests test, Walker (1998) 
reiterates the need for administrators’ “ethical competence in the exercise of discretion,” 
and warns against the “danger of statism and [the] potential tyranny of the expert”         
(p. 293).  He maintains that their decisions must be “grounded in applied jurisprudential 
and ethical considerations” (p. 304) in much the same way “the wide latitude under the 
best interests test permits courts to respond to the spectrum of factors which can both 
positively and negatively affect a child” (Walker, 1998, p. 293).  Consequently, he 
concludes there is a requirement for educational administrators to use their “ethical 
discretion and dialogical competence to resolve difficult cases” (p. 293).  Haynes and 
Licata’s (1995) research suggests that administrators’ rationale for decision-making is 
taking what they see as the “professional or moral high ground” (p. 33) in doing what 
they believe is in their students’ best interests to aid in their learning.  In this way they are 
able to avoid “negative sanctions” for their decisions by stakeholders or censure by their 
superiors (p. 33).     
2.23.5 Best Interests and Rights 
Williams (2007) extends the best interests argument by suggesting that decision-
making be based on best interests and rights, mindful of Canada’s international obligation 
as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989), 
which recognizes the child not as a “passive recipient” but as an “active participant” in 
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the acknowledgment of his or her rights (pp. 643–644) and which provides an 
“opportunity [for all children] to be heard and have their views considered” (p. 648).  
Arguing that the test has “evolved from one of ‘best interests’ to a ‘best interests and 
rights of the child’ test consistent with guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada [ i.e., 
Young v. Young, 1993] and Canada’s ratification of the CRC” (p. 634), Williams claims 
this means the test “moves from one of ‘charity’ in protecting the child’s best interests to 
one of ‘entitlement’ that recognizes the child as an independent person with rights”       
(p. 635).  The premise is, she continues, that a child’s best interests “must be determined 
from the child’s perspective” (Williams, 2007, p. 639). 
2.23.6 Alignment with CRC 
Howe and Covell (2010) argue that with Canada’s ratification of the Convention 
in 1991, this country was “officially committed to implementing the rights of the child 
and the principles of the Convention” (p. 18), one being “the principle of the best 
interests of the child” (p. 19).   The principle no longer applies solely to child custody 
disputes but to “all [emphasis in original] actions concerning children, including in the 
field of education” (p. 19).  According to Howe and Covell (2010), though, the best 
interests of the child principle does not refer to the “educational best interests” or the 
“best interests of the student” but to “the well-being of the child as a whole” (p. 23).  
While there are many criteria for the principle’s implementation, of particular note is the 
need for “an evidence-based approach to decision-making” that encompasses not only the 
views of children and their parents and guardians, but also “the impact of decisions” upon 
them (p. 21).  They further suggest the attention of educational administrators and policy-
makers is focused upon the daily operation of schools, and these groups do not want to be 
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constrained by “rights, rules, and principles” (p. 23).  As a result, they use their “broad 
discretionary power” to “maneuver in achieving their goals” and appear less concerned 
with determining the best interests of the child than with budgets and personnel matters 
(p. 23).   
Although Howe and Covell (2010) concede the principle of the best interests of 
the child has been considered by the Canadian Supreme Court in such cases as Brant 
County Board of Education v. Eaton (1997), involving the educational placement of 
children with disabilities, and Canadian Foundation for Children v. Canada (2004), 
involving the corporal punishment of children, there are still shortcomings in the 
implementation of this principle.  For one, children must be able to enjoy their right to 
education based on equal opportunity; yet, Aboriginal children, special needs children, 
and children of poverty still experience inequality in terms of educational outcomes and 
resources (Howe & Covell, 2010).  As well, children do not participate in decision-
making that affects them in a manner proportional to their age and maturity.  Children 
have “little awareness and little understanding of their basic rights,” and with their wide 
discretionary power, schools have not provided “mechanisms” for student input into 
decision-making (Howe & Covell, 2010, p. 27).  Gall (2010) likewise contends if 
students’ needs and well-being are at the forefront of educational issues, then “their 
viewpoints should not be overlooked throughout the process of developing best practices 
for schools” (p. 141) in determining disciplinary consequences.  Howe and Covell (2010) 
maintain decision-makers must be held more accountable “on the basis of their reasoning 
and judgment” (p. 29).   If the best interests principle is applied, they conclude, there will 
be greater benefit in administrative decision-making, because “instead of ad hoc decision-
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making and [the] wide use of discretionary power” they now exercise, school officials 
would be obligated to make “rational and principled decisions” providing accountability 
and transparency (Howe & Covell, 2010, p. 29). 
2.23.7 Implementation of CRC 
Others, too, have noticed the “lack of voice and participation by children in 
discipline policies and decisions” (Canadian Coalition, 2009, p. 52).  The Canadian 
Coalition for the Rights of Children (2009) points out that the principle of the best  
interests of the child (BIC) is the primary consideration of Article 3.1 of the CRC.  While 
conceding there are tensions between the interests of one student and the entire class or 
school, they emphasize that “it [BIC] is now applicable to all policies and practices that 
affect children individually and as a group” (Canadian Coalition, 2009, p. 6) despite the 
“different interpretations of best interests by students, parents, teachers and school 
administrators” (p. 51).  They suggest “incorporating the provisions of the Convention 
into provincial laws that govern education, including mechanisms for considering the best 
interests for children as a group and for individual children within decision-making 
processes, for both mandatory policies and discretionary decisions” (Canadian Coalition, 
2009, p. 53).  As well, the Canadian Coalition for the Rights of Children (2009) 
advocates a transformation from “the paradigm for decision-making in education” that is 
“processes based on competing powers and interests” to a more inclusive and 
collaborative model that is based on “accountability,” includes “all voices,” “alternative 
choices,” and considers best interests (p. 53).  Furthermore, they want to ensure that 
“research and educational programmes [sic] for professionals dealing with children are 
reinforced and that article 3 of the Convention [best interests of the child] is fully 
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understood, and that this principle is effectively implemented” (p. 7), as well as providing 
“guidance and training on strategies for disciplining children” that respect them as rights-
bearing individuals (p. 53).   
2.24  Need for Ethical Decision-Making 
Stefkovich and O’Brien (2004) contend the discretion and authority afforded 
school officials must enhance student rights beyond what is provided for in the United 
States Constitution; they should use their discretion to make ethically wise decisions 
based on the best interests of the student.  They maintain there is no clear definition of 
what defines the best interests of the child, but they admit administrative decisions must 
be made that consider rights, responsibility, and respect.  Millerborg and Hyle (1991) 
advocate for training in ethics for educational administrators, explaining that there is a 
need to give “serious attention to ethical issues and ethical aspects of decision-making” 
(p. 17) because “ethics play a major role in educational administrative decisions” (p. 18).  
Begley (2004) cautions, however, that although a focus on ethics may be noble, it “does 
not necessarily accommodate the full range of human behavior” (p. 5).  Ethics are 
“culturally derived” and do not necessarily serve as “an appropriate basis for decision-
making” in all situations, especially those which occur in “culturally diverse contexts” 
(Begley, 2004, p. 5).   
2.25  Other Considerations 
In that same vein, McMahon (1992) notes that in Aboriginal cultures, for 
example, the “best interests of the child” also take into account the best interests of the 
community, because the two cannot be separated.  He argues that the community needs 
children “in order for the community to function properly and in order to provide the 
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support the children will need” (McMahon, 1992, p. 181).  Community break-down, then, 
will affect the child negatively, with loss of support and “negative stereotypes” 
(McMahon, 1992, p. 181). Using a unique approach, Dupre (1996) argues for an 
attorneyship model for school officials’ decision-making that would have educators 
acting in the “best pedagogical interest” (p. 103) of those students whom they must 
discipline for misbehavior and that would also meet the obligations of ongoing 
communication and allow for transparency in decision-making with administrators 
exercising independent judgment regarding school concerns.  
While there is general agreement that in their decision-making school 
administrators must determine what is best for their students, there does not seem to be 
any certainty about what that condition might entail.  Intended and unintended 
consequences of decisions should be aspects to be considered.  School officials who wish 
to do what is best for students in their discretionary decision-making should also be 
guided by context and circumstances.  Principals make decisions based upon values and 
influences and their own perceptions and interpretations framed within the boundaries of 
the law.  It is at this point, then, in the gray area, in the penumbra of decision-making, 
that the exercise of discretion flourishes.  To what extent and with what consequences the 
values of administrators are manifested, supported or constrained in their discretionary 
decision-making in matters of student discipline is the focus of this research. 
2.26  Chapter Summary 
Discretion, in its earliest references throughout history, has been synonymous 
with judgment and wisdom.  More recently, it has been analyzed as a concept of interest 
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to scholars in the fields of law and social science, with the latter interest specifically in 
the area of administration of organizations and bureaucracies.   
From its legal perspective, discretion has been considered as the scope of 
decision-making within a structure of rules; however, in its specific setting in 
administrative law, concerns are raised about its use, constraint, and potential abuse by 
those authorized to exercise it.  The authority to exercise discretion is signaled by the use 
of the word may in legislation which, depending upon the context, can indicate obligation 
as well as permission.  There are a number of requirements under which discretion is to 
be exercised, such as reasonableness, good faith, and requirements of the Canadian 
Charter.  Because of the indeterminacy of law, discretion is necessary for those occasions 
when law cannot cover every eventuality.  It is also valuable in adapting laws to suit 
specific circumstances, contexts and community standards, and is beneficial in decision-
making involving complex issues.  Nevertheless, disadvantages have been associated 
with the exercise of discretion: discretion may disadvantage those over whom it is 
exercised, bias may creep into decision-making, discretion is discriminatory, and those 
authorized to exercise discretion may lack the jurisdiction to make the required decisions.  
Lack of consistency among similar cases is another concern.  Discretion is evident 
throughout all aspects of the criminal justice system in Canada, especially sentencing, in 
which, it has been argued, its exercise can have a disproportionately negative impact on 
racial minorities. 
In the administration of organizations, discretion chiefly manifests itself in policy 
formulation and implementation.  Discretion naturally shifts downward and throughout 
an organization, moving to the periphery; as a result, policy as it is implemented may be 
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quite different from policy as it is envisioned.  Those individuals who exercise great 
discretion on the peripheries of organizations typically do so with little supervision as 
they deal with complex human situations.  As well, recent advances in technology have 
been seen to replace human decision-making with computer software programs that have 
eliminated some discretionary human judgment. 
In organizations such as schools, discretion is also necessary in organizations such 
as schools for the implementation of policies, yet educators and administrator must 
adhere to its exercise as prescribed by law.  Discretion is exercised in administrative 
decision-making involving discipline concerns, and research suggests certain disciplinary 
consequences, such as suspension, which can be highly discretionary, may be modified to 
suit individual administrators’ purposes or philosophies and, as a result, may not be 
implemented consistently in similar situations.  Consequently, students may perceive that 
certain groups are treated unfairly, or that they have been disciplined in an arbitrary 
manner.  Some scholars suggest that discipline policies which define social norms and 
define appropriate behavior support patterns of power and thus reinforce prevailing 
dominant cultural expectations in order to maintain the prevailing social order. 
A number of Supreme Court cases in the United States and Canada allude to 
discretion in student disciplinary issues; typically courts defer to administrators’ 
discretionary actions of administrators they consider reasonable.  A review of student 
suspension rates in the United States and in Ontario suggests that the interpretation of 
policies in imposing suspensions has been seen to affect students disproportionately on 
the basis of race, gender and the designation of special needs. 
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Some scholars suggest that discretionary decision-making by administrators 
should be guided by the child’s “best interests.”  The best interests of the child doctrine, 
as it is envisioned by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) to 
which Canada is a signatory, outlines that children’s rights must be taken into 
consideration in all matters, including education.  Decision-making that is collaborative 
and accountable, and that includes the input of the child, appears to be best suited in 
determining what is in the child’s or student’s best interests.   
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CHAPTER 3 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Qualitative Research Rationale 
Given the complexity of decision-making, and his belief that discretion is a 
“dynamic and adaptable phenomenon,” Hawkins (1992) suggests that acquiring a 
“sophisticated understanding” of discretion is a complex task (pp. 45–46).  He maintains 
the “organizing assumptions” must be continually identified and examined when 
discretion is studied (p. 46), and he argues for a naturalist perspective which “emphasizes 
a holistic view of discretion and decision-making as a collective process” (p. 26) and 
which attends to the political, social, and economic processes and contexts within which 
decisions are made in organizations in order to better understand the nature of legal 
discretion.   He believes decision-makers in organizations do not necessary “hold the 
same conception of what their legal mandate is” or “consistently seek to attain the same 
goals” (p. 24).  Rational decision-making assumes “decision-makers’ conception of their 
interests are congruent with the interests of their organization, and that their decisions are 
not informed by matters of self-interest, economics, politics, and the like” (p. 24).  In 
advocating for “naturalism” as an alternative approach to rational decision-making        
(p. 24), he points to the centrality of the “notions of context and meaning” in the 
“naturalist tradition,” and of interpretation in the “structure of knowledge, experience, 
values, and meanings which a decision-maker uses to make sense of the decision 
problem” (p. 25) and which is particularly relevant to an understanding of discretion.  
Naturalism, he contends,  is “situatedly rational” in that decisions are rational in a 
“particular context” and  are a response “to a particular set of circumstances” where 
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people “follow rules, but they also create rules, norms, [and] patterns of behaving”        
(p. 26).  Discretion, viewed from a naturalist perspective, focuses on decision-makers’ 
interpretation, the way they make sense and the way they “acquire meaning” (p. 25). 
Lacey (1992), too, maintains that while “social scientists and legal theorists” 
recognize the need to study discretion, its context-relative nature has resulted in a 
necessary focus upon not only the importance of context in understanding discretion but 
also the need to “gather an appreciation of agents’ own understandings of their 
discretionary actions” (p. 364).  Thus, the investigation of discretion should be concerned 
with the “meaning and significance of those decisions and actions to the agents 
undertaking them,” in addition to exploring the “basis” for the agents’ decision and their 
“understanding of the significance of discretion” when they make their decisions (p. 364).  
As a result, Lacey (1992) concludes, such an “interpretive” and “agent-centered 
approach” in the study of discretion has the ability to generate insights about the “systems 
of values and beliefs” (p. 364) of the decision-makers as they make sense of their 
exercise of discretion, as opposed to a discourse of law that sees a “monolithic, black-
and-white view of the world” which may establish an “objective reality or truth” (p. 371).  
The assumption that there is a right answer in disputes based on a series of facts 
marginalizes “alternate views of reality and understandings of the world” (Lacey, 1992, 
p. 371).  
The inquiry seeks “the informative voice of school principals” (Wright, 2008,     
p. 2) with respect to their understanding of discretion and to their construction of 
meaning in their disciplinary decision-making in schools.  Discretion, which involves 
“interpretation and choice” (Hawkins, 1997, p. 140), “is the means by which the words of 
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law are translated into action” and is necessary because the detailed structure of legal 
rules does not afford the flexibility and responsiveness helpful in dealing with complex 
issues and with the “various tensions, dilemmas and conflicts of values” that are found in 
organizational life (p. 141). Thus, discretionary decision-making is an inherently 
interpretive exercise and is best explored through a qualitative research methodology 
where the participants’ “interpretation becomes important” during the research process 
through “detailed stories and quotes” (Creswell, 2002, p. 145).  Taylor (2007) argues that 
since discretion “cannot be measured and is ultimately unique and personal to those 
exercising it,” a qualitative is the most “appropriate” way in which to study it (p. 564). 
Robinson (1996) maintains research studies that make a “practical contribution” 
to the field are required and calls for methodologies that are “capable of informing 
[administrative] practice” (p. 428).  She expresses concern for the need for problem-
based methodologies in which methods are used that allow “for data to be collected and 
analyzed in ways that reveal and preserve the problem-solving processes that constitute 
administrative practice” (p. 449).   
Creswell (2002) also suggests qualitative research is generally concerned with a 
“central phenomenon” (p. 146).  Because qualitative study seeks “to explore and 
understand one single phenomenon [emphasis in original]” (p. 147), it is an effective 
methodological fit for this study’s research questions, since the phenomenon under study 
is discretion as it is understood and exercised by in-school administrators in student 
disciplinary issues.  Marshall and Rossman (2006) support this contention, maintaining 
the historic purpose of qualitative research has been threefold: “to explore, explain, or 
describe a phenomenon,” that is, to “understand, develop, or discover [emphasis in 
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original]” (p. 33).  Hoy (2010), in arguing for a quantitative approach in educational 
research, submits that qualitative research focuses on “in-depth understanding of social 
and human behavior and the reasons behind such behavior,” where researchers are 
interested in “understanding, exploring new ideas, and discovering patterns of behavior” 
(p. 1).  Merriam (2002) maintains that if a researcher wishes to determine how 
individuals “make meaning of a situation or phenomenon,” then the “meaning is 
mediated through the researcher as instrument, the strategy is inductive, and the outcome 
is descriptive,” and an interpretive qualitative research approach would be the 
methodology supporting those requirements (p. 6).  She adds the aim of a basic 
qualitative study is “to discover and understand a phenomenon, a process, the 
perspectives and worldviews of the people involved, or a combination of these” 
(Merriam, 2002, p. 6).     
Furthermore, if the notion of the pervasiveness of values in administration is an 
undergirding assumption of the study, the tenets of a scientific and positivist 
methodology are incongruent with a qualitative methodology, since values are “beyond 
the scope of positivist science” (T. Greenfield, 1986, p. 68).  Subjectivist assumptions 
that organizations are “invented social reality” mean “organization theory must not only 
describe the process people use in constructing reality; it must also somehow be that 
reality with all the possibilities that the human mind reads into experience [emphasis in 
original]” (T. Greenfield, 19778, p. 12).  Begley and Leithwood (1989) maintain it is 
necessary to assume a theoretical framework that accommodates “the existence of 
values” in administrative actions, since it will lead to a more “comprehensive 
description” of decision-making than what is normally found in “exclusively rational 
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frameworks” (p. 27).  Begley (1999a) observes that most of the research in educational 
administration has been positivist and not particularly informative “given the relevance of 
values” in the field, since “values are explicitly excluded [emphasis in original] from 
research methodologies conducted in the positivist and postpositivist modes” (p. 212).  
He does acknowledge the challenges of researching “the nature and function of values in 
administration” because “values resist empirical verification.  Like the wind, they are 
unseen forces” (Begley, 1999b, p. 243).    Although one may determine the impact of 
either the wind, or values, “the presence or influence of values cannot be reliably or 
explicitly tracked by scientific methods alone” (p. 343).  He notes that “qualitative 
research methods” are “most appropriate” to a study of values and include “face-to-face” 
data collections, “simulated recall activities and case problem analysis” (Begley, 1999b, 
p. 244).   
This study, then, assumes a subjectivist approach because an objective, positivist 
perspective would not readily enable recognition of the ways in which administrators’ 
values impact their disciplinary decision-making. 
3.2  Research Design 
3.2.1 Role of the Researcher 
 Rossman and Rallis (2003) claim personal assumptions concerning the nature of 
reality and the construction of knowledge will “incline” the research “toward different 
methods” (p. 42). This inquiry, with its goal of exploring principals’ exercise of 
discretion in disciplinary issues, is consistent with an interpretive frame which “places 
primary emphasis on this process of understanding” from which “patterns of meaning 
will emerge,” leading to generalizations (Connole, 1993, p. 20).  As a researcher, my 
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worldview, then, acted as a “personal biography” that provided an interpretivist lens 
through which the data were analyzed, geared towards “working understandings” of 
principals’ decision-making (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 42).  As researcher, I “enter[ed] 
the lives of the participants” and, in doing so, became “the instrument” of the research 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 72).  Viewed in another way, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) 
describe the qualitative researcher as “bricoleur” (p. 2) whose inquiry is “an interactive 
process shaped by his or her personal history, biography, gender, social class, race, and 
ethnicity, and those of the people in the setting” (p. 3).  Thus, my methods, strategies, 
experiences and lifestory all contributed to the “bricolage” that represents my “images, 
understanding, and interpretations” (p. 3) of the principals’ exercise of discretion in 
disciplinary decision-making.  Furthermore, Anderson and Jones (2000) suggest the “tacit 
knowledge” acquired over months and years by administrators in school divisions raises 
“logistical and epistemological issues,” since it tends to be full of “bias, prejudice, and 
unexamined impressions and assumptions” (p. 443).  Notions of power and authority, too, 
cross lines in face-to-face interactions.  As Rossman & Rallis (1998) observe, issues of 
power, such as “race, age, and gender” all play out in the interview.  However, these 
issues can be partly overcome by strategies such as a review by a “critical friend” 
(Anderson & Jones, 2000, p. 445) or a “peer debriefer” (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 69).  
Both strategies were used in this study.   
3.2.2 Insider Stance 
  Since in qualitative research, as Patton (1990) also asserts, “the researcher is the 
instrument,” credibility, in many ways, hinges “on the skill, competence, and rigor of the 
person doing fieldwork” (p. 14; see also Connole, 1993, p. 23). My personal experiences 
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over the past ten years as an in-school administrator served to improve my depth of 
understanding and support the legitimacy of my interpretation of participating principals’ 
experiences (see also Tuten, 2006).  These experiences permitted me to “raise additional 
questions, check out hunches, and move deeper into the analysis of the phenomenon” 
(McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 349).  Additionally, Gall, Gall, and Borg (2007) 
maintain “carrying out your research in a setting where you are known as a friend and 
colleague makes it much easier than if you are regarded as an outsider with unknown 
motives” (p. 90).  They go on to argue that, positioned in this way, researchers will “gain 
insights that improve [their] research design and contribute to [their] findings” (p. 90).  
Rossman and Rallis (1998) believe “sharing social group identity can be powerful”       
(p. 128), yet the researcher must continue to be sensitive to what is being said and must 
constantly reflect upon and assess how he or she is part of the interview process.  They 
caution that participants may assume the researcher has tacit understanding that is 
“reflective of comembership [sic] in a social group” and this understanding may preclude 
“eliciting and recording rich, detailed data” (p. 127). 
Kraft’s (1993) research into principals’ decision-making was conducted in the 
school district wherein she was employed as a vice-principal, yet she wished to “distance 
herself in order to render the results as fair and accurate as possible” (p. 32).  She 
indicates she knew some of the interviewees in her study “personally or by reputation,” 
and feels this knowledge is “an advantage” because “it allowed for access to the 
interview and provided for a common understanding” of the topics discussed (p. 33). 
Because I also serve as an elementary school principal, the criticism can be raised 
that, as an insider, I had personal expectations, beliefs, biases, and dispositions that could 
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have distorted the data collection during the semi-structured interviews with the 
participants and the analysis afterwards.  Insider, indigenous, or native research refers to 
“conducting research with communities or identity groups of which one is a member” 
(Kanuha, 2000, p. 440).  As researcher, I was seeking “more knowledge, more analysis, 
and ultimately more understanding of others whose life experiences were similar to 
mine” and I hoped to contribute to the “knowledge and practice foundations” of those 
who are similarly situated to me (Kanuha, 2000, p. 440); consequently, my insider 
position “guide[d] and inform[ed] this research endeavour” (Hamdan, 2009, p. 384). 
  However, as Anderson and Jones (2000) point out, some of the limitations of the 
“outsider within” cause epistemological and methodological problems for administrative 
research because often “validity criteria is designed with outsiders in mind” (p. 439). 
Kanuha (2000) claims the insider researcher assumes an “emic perspective” with a 
“subjective, informed, and influential standpoint” (p. 441), while Toma (2000) maintains 
“involvement and bias” are “inevitable” in research and the relationship between the 
subject and the research is “subjective and transactional” (p. 177).  Hamdan (2009) adds 
that in any qualitative research there is “no detached, objective position from which to 
study human beings” (p. 386).  Toma (2000) suggests that in this subjective relationship 
“researchers and subjects collaborate to determine meaning, generate findings, and reach 
conclusions” (p. 177).  He assumes “personal values necessarily influence any 
investigation,” and reasons subjective researchers cannot “separate themselves from the 
phenomena and people they study” because the research process is a “two-way” 
exchange (Toma, 2000, p. 178).  Hamdan (2009) discovered insider research enabled her 
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to develop an awareness of “how and when to ask questions, when to interrupt and 
clarify, and how to interpret the answers” given by her research participants (p. 386).   
Campbell-Evans (1988) believes her insider stance and the “working relationship” 
she had with the participants in her research project helped to reduce concerns about 
reliability of her data.  During the interview process with the principals, she maintains 
they did not appear to feel the need to “make an impression,” and her reputation in the 
school district was such that the subjects “felt confident in my integrity and 
professionalism in the researcher role” (p. 43).  As well, the relaxed, “thoughtful” and 
“freely given” answers of the participants reflected the comfortable environment she was 
able to create for the interviews and the “confidence in and respect for” her as an 
interviewer (p. 44).  Not one of the principals showed “distress,” and their comments 
indicated to her their interest in the collection of date (Campbell-Evans, 1988, p. 44).  
One limitation of her study, however, was the reduced “possibility of replication” 
(Campbell-Evans, 1988, p. 44).  
Marshall and Rossman (2006) identify some of the concerns with research 
conducted in one’s own setting.  They suggest these include expectations of the 
researcher “based on familiarity with the setting and people”; the ability to transition to 
researcher from a more “familiar role”; effects of any “ethical and political” dilemmas; 
the discovery of potentially damaging knowledge; and the struggles the researcher may 
experience with closeness and closure (pp. 61–21).  However, they also enumerate the 
possible benefits of insider research as relatively easy access to participants, feasibility of 
location, “reduced time expenditure” for certain aspects of the data collection and, 
finally, the potential for the researcher to build trust, establish rapport, and gain the 
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“subjective understandings” that “greatly increase the quality of qualitative data” (p. 62).  
Kanuha (2000) concurs with the last point as she believes research on colleagues has the 
potential to establish trust, which may help the researcher to address the topic more 
effectively (Kanuha, 2000); moreover, Toma (2000) writes, “getting closer to your 
subjects makes better qualitative data” (p. 179).  It is most important, however, no matter 
where the inquiry is based, that the study is “conducted and reported ethically” and that 
“the data quality” and the “credibility of the study are reasonably assured” (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2006, p. 62). 
3.2.3 Establishing Researcher Credibility 
Patton (1990) contends that during interviews, distortion in interpretation and 
perception may occur due to “personal bias, anger, anxiety, politics, and simple lack of 
awareness” (p. 245).  In order to establish “investigator credibility,” I indicated “any 
personal and professional information that may have affected data collection, analysis 
and interpretation [emphasis in original]” to those who may use the findings (p. 472) and 
have reported them in order to support the credibility of my research.  However, since 
“every researcher brings preconceptions and interpretations to the problem being studied, 
regardless of methods used,” the “stances” of “neutrality and impartiality” are impossible 
to achieve (Patton, 1990, p. 476).  Maxwell (2005) argues that the concern of qualitative 
research is not primarily with “eliminating variance between researchers in the values and 
expectations they bring to the study,” but is focused on “understanding how a particular 
researcher’s values and expectations influence the conduct and conclusions of the study” 
(p. 108).  Patton (1990) adds that the issue concerning qualitative rigor in research is 
about “researcher credibility and trustworthiness, about fairness and balance” (p. 481), 
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since distance from the phenomenon “does not guarantee objectivity; it merely 
guarantees distance [emphasis in original]” (p. 480).  Consequently, being aware of how 
my “perspective affect[ed] the fieldwork,” describing the limitations of my perspective, 
clearly documenting all procedures so that others may “review [my] methods for bias,” 
and indicating my assumptions and experiences further aided in establishing the 
trustworthiness and credibility of my analysis (Patton, 1990, p. 482).  What is more, 
debriefing of the results with my academic supervisors and colleagues also assisted in 
supporting the credibility of the investigation (Tuten, 2006).   
3.2.4 Ethics 
This study received ethics approval from the Faculty of Education Research 
Ethics Review Committee at The University of Western Ontario (see Appendix A).  No 
data were collected until ethics approval was received.  I gained access to the field site by 
applying for and receiving permission from the superintendent in charge of research 
projects in the school division under study (see Appendix E) before I sent out the general 
call to the potential research participants (Gall et al., 2007).  The research participants 
were given, read and signed a consent form (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, pp. 74–75) after 
being given a letter of information (see Appendix B) that outlined the purpose of the 
research, their “right to privacy,” the efforts used to create anonymity, and their 
“protection from harm” (Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 662). 
3.3  Data Collection   
Merriam (2002) explains that since qualitative research is not concerned with 
degree or frequency, random sampling does not make sense; consequently, purposive 
sampling is that “from which the most can be learned” (p. 12).   Patton (1990) suggests 
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qualitative inquiry, as opposed to quantitative methods, “typically focuses in depth on 
relatively small samples,” selected “purposefully [emphasis in original]” (p. 169), and 
maintains since “there are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry [emphasis in 
original]” (p. 184) purposive samples should “be judged on the basis of the purpose and 
rationale of each study, and the sampling strategy used to achieve the study’s purpose” 
and must “be judged in context—the same principle that undergirds analysis and 
presentation of qualitative data” (p. 185).  Furthermore, since the goal of a purposeful 
qualitative study is “credibility, not representativeness” (Patton, 1990, p. 180; see also 
Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 71), this inquiry aimed for understanding of 
administrators’ value systems and not for the generalizability of their decision-making 
processes.  As Gall et al. (2007) also note, the aim of purposeful sampling is to achieve 
an “in-depth understanding of selected individuals and not “to achieve population 
validity” (p. 178).  Patton (1990) concludes “in-depth information from a small number 
of people can be very valuable, especially if the cases are information-rich” (p. 184).  In 
summary, since “no rules [emphasis in original]” exist for size of sample in qualitative 
inquiry, I determined the sample size base of ten principals on the “purpose of the 
inquiry,” what is “at stake,” what was “useful,” what has “credibility,” and what was 
available considering “time and resources” (Patton, 1990, p. 184).  
3.3.1 Research Participants 
For this study a purposeful sampling of ten school-based administrators was 
chosen as the method to best “illuminate the question” of how principals negotiate their 
values system when exercising discretion (Patton, 1990, p. 169).  Moustakas (1990) 
suggests a “study will achieve richer, deeper, more profound, and more varied meanings 
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when it includes depictions of the experience of others—perhaps as many as 10 to 15”   
(p. 47), while Creswell (2002) contends a small number of participants will provide more 
of an in-depth understanding than will a project with a large, broadly-based 
representative sample.  As well, Hall’s (1999) study of principals’ exercise of discretion 
includes interviews with ten participants, and Tuten’s (2006) inquiry into principals’ 
decision-making has nine participants.  MacDonald’s (1998) project and Kraft’s (1993) 
study each has twelve principals as participants, and Frick’s (2006) research into 
administrators’ decision-making has eleven participants, as did Frick and Faircloth’s 
(2007) investigation.  Campbell-Evans (1988) interviewed eight principals in her 
investigation into values in administrative decision-making.  Additionally, another aim of 
the study was to gain  insight into administrative decision-making offered by in-depth 
analysis, and not that provided by a broad range of participants and the frequency with 
which decisions occur.  As a result, the choice of a small number of research participants 
to provide “rich, thick description” (Gall et al., 2007, p. 450; see also Merriam, 2002, p. 
29) and “information-rich cases for study in depth [emphasis in original]” (Patton, 1990, 
p. 169) supported the research question.  My sample size of ten participants was “based 
on expected reasonable coverage of the phenomenon” given the purpose of the research, 
and what was useful, credible, and capable of meeting time and resource requirements 
(Patton, 1990, p. 186).  Additionally, “exercising care not to overgeneralize from  
purposeful samples, while maximizing to the full the advantages of in-depth, purposeful 
sampling, will do much to alleviate concerns about small sample size” (Patton, 1990, p. 
186). 
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Rapley (2004) reminds researchers that “interviewees don’t always speak ‘as 
individuals’” but may speak at different times during interviews as “representative of 
institutions or organizations or professions” or as “specific (sub)cultural groups” or as 
“experiencing individuals” (p. 29).  In this way, researchers cannot simply use interviews 
to “understand peoples [sic] lived, situated, practices [emphasis in original]” (p. 29) and 
must not treat them simply as individuals but as part of a “broader-story-of-the-whole-
research” (p. 29).     
In their examination of administrative decision-making concerning moral 
judgments about “students’ best interests” (p. 23), Frick and Faircloth (2007) identified 
and chose principals as being those individuals who are “organizationally situated within 
school systems where student contact is most likely high” and whose “activities are 
replete with decision-making activity” (p. 23; see also Frick, 2006, p. 90).  Campbell-
Evans (1988) believes “principals make a difference” in schools and that the 
consequences of their decision-making can have a great affect upon all individuals in the 
school.  Eagly et al. (1992) claim the investigation of principals’ leadership styles has 
been a “very popular research area for many years” in doctoral research conducted in 
educational administration (p. 78).  More specifically, however, statutes and board 
policies confer “substantial legal discretion” upon principals (Manley-Casimir,1977, p. 8) 
“over a  wide range of student behavior” (p. 3).  Consequently, these in-school 
administrators were chosen as the participants for this research inquiry to provide the 
“information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the questions under study” 
concerning administrative discretion in disciplinary decision-making and about which 
one “can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the 
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research” (Patton, 1990, p. 169).  Individuals who are not school-based administrators do 
not necessarily exercise daily the discretionary decision-making that maintains order and 
discipline in the school as authorized by provincial legislation.  By purposefully choosing 
only elementary principals, as opposed to secondary principals, in the school division, I 
was able to request participation from a greater number of potential candidates.   
Crowson and Porter-Gehrie (1980) suggest both elementary and secondary 
principals spend a “good portion” of their day “on school control and pupil discipline”   
(p. 57).  MacDonald (1998) claims principals at the junior high level (i.e., grade seven 
through nine) “would be most familiar with the issues of school violence” and related 
discipline issues (p. 11; see also Mendez & Knoff, 2003).  Kmetz and Willower (1982) 
suggest both elementary and secondary principals spend approximately the same amount 
of time on “pupil control” (p. 71), that is, on monitoring student behavior and on 
discipline, although the research of Leithwood et al. (1992) may counter this latter claim 
(p. 182).  Their research suggests the most non-routine problems in schools involve 
students and, while similarities between elementary and secondary principals exist with 
respect to non-routine problems in schools, elementary principals encounter “50% more” 
of the student non-routine problems than do secondary principals (Leithwood et al., 1992, 
p. 48).  They speculate, however, that in some cases this percentage may be more a 
function of “school size rather than school level” (Leithwood et al., 1992, p. 70).  Allison 
and Morfitt (1996) appear to concur when they note “school size (enrolment) appears to 
be a more influential variable than school type (elementary or secondary) in determining 
the level of work faced by Principals” (p. 31). 
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3.3.2 Entry Into Field 
Upon receiving permission for entry into the field by the school district, I sent a 
general email to all elementary school principals and requested their participation in the 
study.  I emphasized that participation was strictly voluntary and that there was no 
pressure to participate (Bogden & Bilken, 2007).  Then, the participants were 
“purposefully selected by determining accessibility and willingness to participate” (Frick 
& Faircloth, 2007, p. 23; see also Frick, 2006, p. 92) in the in-depth one-interview 
format.  I was not in any type of line-authority relationship with any of the participants, 
and while the participants were known to me as colleagues, if any principal who 
responded to the general call for interested participants was closer than arm’s length to 
me or was someone with whom I had a social relationship, then that individual was not 
included in the research sample (Gall et al., 2007).  I presented myself as a “researcher, 
not as a colleague” (Campbell-Evans, 1988, p. 43).  Two participants who volunteered to 
be part of the study were not included because they responded to the call a number of 
weeks after all the interviews had been scheduled.  One interview was not included 
because the participant would not provide specific references, details, and examples and 
was able to answer only a few of the questions due to personal time constraints.  For that 
reason, an additional interview was conducted to bring the total number of semi-
structured interviews to ten.  
3.3.3 Characteristics of Participants  
Alversson and Sköldberg (2009) advise that “researchers should stop now and 
again to think for a moment in gender terms” (p. 248).  They suggest that researchers 
should also “develop a certain level of sensitivity to gender aspects” (p. 247); however, 
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for this study, the main interest was not “in clarifying gender conditions or emphasizing 
the gender perspective as a key to the understanding of the object studied” (p. 249), but 
instead those aspects of discretionary decision-making, such as valuation processes, that 
seemed most appropriate to the subject   In order to be sensitive to aspects of gender, 
however, principals were also selected based on their representativeness of the gender 
distribution of the elementary school-based administrators in the school division; 
approximately 40% of the elementary school principals in the school division are male.  
As a result, four of the participants were male.  The other criteria include representation 
of a variety of levels of administrative experience (i.e., one principal considered himself 
experienced, having served eleven years in an administrative role, six principals 
considered themselves inexperienced, having been principals for less than five years, 
three principals were within five years of retirement, and one principal indicated she was 
both inexperienced and within five years of retirement).  The participants served in 
schools with varying student enrollments (i.e., school populations ranged from 144 
students to 520 students).  The first ten participants who volunteered and who represented 
these attributes of gender, years of experience and size of school were selected. 
3.4   Research Design Rationale  
As Merriam (2002) asserts, there are “three major sources of data for a qualitative 
research study—interviews, observations, and documents” (p. 12), while Rossman and 
Rallis (2003) are convinced “in-depth interviewing is the hallmark of qualitative 
research” (p. 180).  In order to determine how administrators understand discretion and 
how they exercise it in student disciplinary cases, data were collected through in-depth 
semi-structured interviews.  Anderson and Jones (2000), in their study of fifty doctoral 
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dissertations completed by school administrators, discovered nearly 60% of the methods 
used included “interviews, observations, and document analysis” (p. 436).  Also, Gall et 
al. (2007) maintain interviews provide information that the participant would not reveal 
“by any other data collection method” (p. 228). 
3.4.1 Limitations of Interviews  
Limitations of interviews as strategies for data collection techniques include the 
dependence of the researcher “upon the cooperation of a small group of key informants” 
and the fact that the strategy is “difficult to replicate” and particularly “dependent upon 
the honesty of those providing the data” and “highly dependent” upon the ability of the 
researcher to be “resourceful, systematic, honest” and able “to control bias” (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1989, p. 104).  The study employed semi-structured interviews because of “the 
degree of flexibility for the interviewer and participant to clarify and elaborate beyond 
the scope of predetermined questions and to probe unexpected responses” (Wright, 2008, 
p. 6).  Patton (1990) points out that the flexibility in questioning of the semi-structured 
format may result in different responses from different participants, making 
“comparability of responses” (p. 288) more difficult, and risking the chance that 
important or significant topics may be missed or not included.  As well, the phrasing of 
certain questions might predispose the participant to certain answers and certain ways of 
responding based on the assumptions and biases of the researcher (Hamdan, 2009).  
Semi-structured interviews also allow for the collection of more standardized data, but 
with the benefit of allowing greater depth of detail (Gall et al., 2007).  Rossman and 
Rallis (1998) point out interviewees may be “uncomfortable” sharing, or may not be 
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willing to share their experiences, or may not understand fully questions posed to them, 
or may have different notions about the purpose of the interview (p. 125).  
Fontana and Frey (2000) also note three sources of “response effects, or 
nonsampling errors” may be found in structured interviews: “respondent behavior,” 
where the participant deliberately tries “to please the interviewer”; the “sequence or 
wording of the questions”; and the “characteristics or questioning techniques” of the 
interviewer (p. 650).  The last is the greatest source of error since not every “contingency 
can be anticipated,” and although there is not much room for researcher improvisation, 
“not every interviewer behaves according to the script” (p. 650).  However, they maintain 
research on interviewer effects show “age, gender and interviewing experience to have 
relatively small impact on responses” (Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 650).  Mason (2002) 
warns of the “vagaries of memory, selectivity and deception in interviewees’ accounts,” 
in the researcher’s “enthusiasm for the rich and fascinating data which can be generated 
in interviews” (p. 237).  She suggests participants may find it difficult to put all their 
ideas into words, and that non-verbal expressions, as well as emotions and feelings may 
not be discussed in interviews; as a result, the researcher might be wary of reading 
“interviewees’ accounts as straightforward descriptions of social experience” (p. 239).   
3.4.2 Advantages of Interviews  
Marshall and Rossman (1989) identify some of the strengths of interviews as a 
data collection technique in qualitative studies as giving the researcher the ability to 
obtain “large amounts of expansive and contextual data quickly”; facilitating the 
“discovery of nuances in culture”; and having “great utility for uncovering the subjective 
side of the ‘native’s perspective’ of organizational processes” (p. 103).  Patton (1990) 
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claims the strength of the semi-structured interview format includes minimizing the 
effects of interviewer bias, and of variation in questioning, and getting more 
comprehensive information from some participants than others.  Moreover, the researcher 
is able to make better use of interview time because interviews will be more focused than 
if they were informal conversations, and asking the same questions increases the 
“credibility” of the data (p. 286).  The semi-structured form allows for the further probing 
of topics that may not have been anticipated; on the other hand, important and “salient 
topics” may not be included (Patton, 1990, p. 288) and standardizing of questions may 
limit the participants’ responses.  My choice of the semi-structured interview format with 
its relative inflexibility, standardized and “predetermined nature” was designed to lessen 
the influence of these  interviewer effects; nevertheless, as researcher, I had to be 
“sensitive to how interaction [between participant and interviewer] can influence 
responses” and to “make the proper adjustments” (Fontana and Frey, 2000, p. 650) during 
the interviews with an awareness of the “forces that might stimulate or retard [the 
participants’] responses” (p. 651). 
Bogden and Bilken (2007) suggest the use of semi-structured interviews enables 
the researcher to obtain “comparable data across subjects,” but possibly to lose “the 
opportunity to understand how the subjects themselves structure the topic” (p. 104).    
Gronn (2003b) advises that the form of semi-structured interviews should be “broadly 
consistent for each informant in respect of question order and wording, but also 
sufficiently flexible to seek other information if the principals deviated or strayed from 
the anticipated line of inquiry” (p. 53).  Also, researchers are encouraged to use 
triangulation of methods of data collection since “multiple methods enhance the validity 
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of the findings” (Merriam, 2002, p. 12); therefore data were collected through field notes, 
document analysis, semi-structured interviews with multiple participants, a literature 
review and informal reflections.  Denzin and Lincoln (1994), however, point out 
triangulation “reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon 
in question” and “is not a tool or a strategy of validation, but an alternative to validation” 
(p. 2).  
3.4.3 Strategies for Trustworthiness of Data  
 Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest that instead of the “conventional benchmarks of 
rigor,” such as “internal validity,” “external validity,” reliability,” and “objectivity” of a 
quantitative approach (p. 114), an interpretive orientation would seek the 
“trustworthiness criteria [emphasis in original]” of “credibility,” “transferability,” 
“dependability,” and “confirmability” (p. 114; see also Rossman & Rallis, 2003).   
Marshall and Rossman (1989) expand upon these alternate constructs by arguing that in 
order to maintain credibility the study must be conducted “to ensure that the subject was 
accurately identified and described” and include an “in-depth description showing the 
complexities of variables and interactions…so embedded within data derived from the 
setting that it cannot help but be valid” (p. 145).   
 Second, the transferability of the data which is “the applicability of one set of 
findings to another context…may be problematic” (pp. 145–146).  Marshall and Rossman 
(1989) state this problem can be overcome by referring to how the data collection is 
guided by the “original theoretical framework” (p. 146) or by the triangulation of 
multiple sources of data, participants or techniques.   They also note that while “no 
qualitative studies are generalizable in the probabilistic sense, their findings may be 
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transferable” (Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p. 42; see also Rossman & Rallis, 2003).  
 Dependability requires that the researcher attempts to account for “changing 
conditions” in the phenomenon under study through an “increasingly refined 
understanding of the setting” and through a set of assumptions different from the 
“positivist notions of reliability” of an “unchanging universe” (Marshall & Rossman, 
1989, pp.  146–147).  Finally, the construct of confirmability “captures the traditional 
concept of objectivity” by “stressing whether the findings of the study could be 
confirmed by another” by removing “evaluation from some inherent characteristic of the 
researcher (objectivity) and plac[ing] it squarely on the data themselves” (p. 147).  
Creswell (2007) concurs, noting that “the naturalistic researcher looks for confirmability 
rather than objectivity in establishing the value of the data” (p. 204).   
 Maxwell (2005) argues qualitative research is not, foremost, “concerned with 
eliminating variance between researchers in the values and expectations they bring to the 
study, but with understanding how a particular [emphasis in original] researcher’s values 
and expectations influence the conduct and conclusions of the study” (p. 108).  In terms 
of the trustworthiness of the findings, then, the goal is not to eliminate researcher 
influence “but to understand it and to use it productively” (p. 109), since “reactivity is 
generally not [emphasis in original] as serious a validity threat” as some may believe    
(pp. 108–109).  Gall et al. (2007) add that in order to increase the rigor of qualitative 
research the researcher should use an “authentic reporting style” (p. 474), that includes 
direct quotations from participants, and should fully describe the context of the study, 
including researcher reflection and peer examination (pp. 475–476).  Additionally, 
member checks, that is, the use of “research participants’ review statements” should be 
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used to achieve “accuracy and completeness” (p. 475); therefore, they become part of the 
study protocol.  As a result, the participants were asked to change, add to, or delete from 
the original transcript after reviewing the transcribed statements in order to ensure there 
was no misrepresentation, to “reconcile discrepancies,” to “include contrasting views” 
and to “correct factual errors” (Gall et al., 2007, p. 475).  They were allowed to vet their 
transcripts and were encouraged to delete those statements they did not wish to be 
included, or to change statements in order to ensure accuracy.   
3.5 Structure of the Interviews 
McMillan and Schumacher (2010) contend the interview is a qualitative research 
technique that focuses on values; it follows that participant interviews which provide 
“rich” (p. 332), “thick” (p. 336) description (see also Merriam, 2002) offer the most 
appropriate way to elicit principals’ understanding of their own value systems when they 
exercise discretion in decision-making.  Fontana and Frey (2000) refer to the “sharedness 
of meanings” in the interview process which enables participant and research to 
“understand the contextual nature of specific referents” (p. 660), where the participant is 
an “equal” in the interview (p. 664).  What is more, they point out, the negotiated 
accomplishments” (p. 664) of both the researcher and the participant are shaped by 
context; interview data must be considered contextually, and not as an “objective unit” 
(Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 663).   
In order to address the research questions, interviews were conducted “using a 
predetermined set of questions” (Mukuria, 2002, p. 437), leaving room, however, for 
probes, that is “explorations of the topic in detail” (Creswell, 2002, p. 208), and further 
comments by the participants.  The use of follow-up questions and rephrasing also 
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allowed for greater clarification, elaboration and development of details and examples, 
and for a more complete understanding of responses (Rossman & Rallis, 2003).  Follow-
up questions also enabled the researcher to discuss topics further which may not have 
been anticipated and which allowed for more individualization in responses (Patton, 
1990).  
3.5.1 Interview Protocol Questions 
The interview questions (see Appendix C) were based on “a set of key issues 
derived from the literature” (Cranston et al., 2005, p. 109; see also Ackerman, 2003; 
Bogden & Bilken, 2007; Faulk, 2006; Frick, 2006; Frick & Faircloth, 2007; Hall, 1999; 
Heilmann, 2006; Manley-Casimir, 1977–78; Patton, 1990; Tuten, 2006) and were framed 
by the research questions.  McMillan and Schumacher (2010) recommend the use of 
“standardized open-ended questions,” which are “completely open-ended” (p. 356) and of 
predetermined question order and wording.  They believe questions should focus on 
participants’ “experiences or behaviors, opinions and values, feelings, knowledge, [and] 
sensory perceptions” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 357).  Patton (1990) agrees, 
claiming open-ended questions also enable the researcher to understand the participants 
without “predetermining [their] points of view” (p. 24).  He maintains that by asking the 
same questions of each participant, the researcher is able to “minimize interviewer 
effects,” and the necessity for “interviewer judgment” during the interview is reduced” 
(Patton, 1990, p. 285).  In this way, data analysis is easier because the researcher is able 
to organize questions and answers that are similar.  Finally, Patton (1990) suggests use of 
the same questions “increases credibility” (p. 286), although he concedes the spontaneity 
of participants’ responses may also be limited or reduced by the standardizing of 
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questions.  In order to further increase the credibility of the semi-structured interview 
technique, the questions on the interview protocol were vetted by the researcher’s 
committee and by the participant in a pilot study (Gall et al., 2007). 
3.5.2 Use of Vignette 
The interview protocol also included the use of a vignette (Bundy, 2006; Frick, 
2009; Hall, 1999; Heilmann, 2006; Roche, 1999; Tuten, 2006) wherein the participants 
were asked to respond to a scenario and pre-determined questions based on a case study 
involving discretionary decision-making and student discipline (see Appendix C).  The 
vignette was used to introduce the topic, to provide a focus for the interview, to “engage 
participants” and to “set the stage for a sustained reflection” (Frick & Faircloth, 2007,    
p. 24; see also Frick, 2009) on discretionary decision-making, although Patton (1990) 
maintains the use of a vignette may predispose the participants to a certain way of 
considering the topic and “limit the naturalness” of some of the responses (p. 289).  
Roche’s (1999) research demonstrates vignettes can serve as memory triggers, and can 
remind participants of similar events in the past.  In order to increase “the validity of 
reports” (p. 259), the participants in his study were asked to refer only to events that had 
occurred within the past year.  In a similar way, to increase trustworthiness the 
participants in my study were asked to rely upon short-term memory, “notwithstanding 
that these interviews involved hypothetical situations” (p. 259).    
Frick (2006) reasons flexibility and variety in the interview structure are used “to 
elicit…challenging self-reflections and sustained ruminations” (p. 95); consequently, 
both a vignette and follow-up questions, in addition to a series of separate, but related, 
questions, were used.  The vignette was entirely fictitious, but the ideas were based on a 
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compilation of disparate incidents in which the researcher had been involved or to which 
she had been exposed over her administrative career.   The form of the vignette was 
adapted from a format used by Lam, Hurlburt, & Bailey (1996).   
3.5.3 Use of Demographic Profile 
The participants were also asked to complete a short demographic profile (see 
Appendix D) which asked for their gender, the number of years of experience they had as 
a principal or as an in-school administrator, whether or not they worked with a vice-
principal, their age, the enrolment of their school, and whether or not they considered 
themselves experienced principals. Gronn (2003b) suggests an “experienced” principal 
has spent five years in the role (p. 25), while St. Germain and Quinn (2005) identify 
expert as opposed to novice principals as those having more than five years’ experience.  
Begley (1999b) defines an experienced principal as having at least two years of 
experience in the role (p. 244).  For the purposes of this study, I made the assumption an 
experienced principal was one who had five years’ experience in the role. 
3.5.4 Pilot Study   
Once school-district permission had been received, I conducted a pilot study in 
order to identify any unanticipated problems and issues, to seek clarification on wording 
of questions, to ensure that the audio recording device was in good running order, and to 
help to pace and time the questions during the interviews (Gall et al., 2007).  The pilot 
study participant was female, indicated her age was between 50 and 60 years of age, 
considered herself an experienced principal, did not work with a vice-principal, had 
approximately 200 students enrolled in her school, and was two years away from 
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retirement.  She was the first principal in the school division to respond to my email 
agreeing to participate in the research study.   
The participant of the pilot study identified one aspect of the protocol which 
caused uncertainty for her; she required clarification on the question which asked for the 
participant’s definition of discretion.   In response to my request for suggestions on 
effective changes that might be made during the interview, the pilot-study participant 
recommended clarifying the topic of the research once participants had completed the 
vignette questions, just before they began to answer the remainder of the semi-structured 
interview questions.   Although I was reluctant to divulge the over-arching assumptions 
about discretion upon which the study is based, the participant in the pilot study did pose 
some specific questions to me about the study’s purpose and the premise of the research.  
This insight prompted me to clarify orally the goal of the inquiry and to provide greater 
details about the subject under study before reading the vignette aloud to the participants 
during the semi-structured interviews.  The principal in the pilot study noted the 
interview questions were clearly worded, straightforward, and focused upon what was, 
for her, the key features of decision-making in student disciplinary issues, such as finding 
a balance among competing needs, making decisions which may cause conflict among 
stake-holders, and determining consequences for misbehavior which are fair and 
equitable for all students.  She also indicated the nature of the interview protocol allowed 
for sustained reflection on decision-making.   
There were three other insights into the data collection techniques that were 
evident during the pilot study.  One key insight for me into the interview protocol was my 
observation that the participant did not appear to readily have a specific definition 
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(whether found in a dictionary, a personal definition, or a synonym) for the term 
discretion but, rather, she had more of a sense of the manner in which she exercised it in 
decision-making.  The second insight was that the vignette not only provided a place of 
orientation for the participant, but also became a point of reference as she referred to the 
scenario in her responses to questions on the interview protocol, commenting that she had 
had similar experiences.  The third insight was that the protocol questions appeared to be 
relevant to the daily practice of a principal, since the participant readily gave specific 
examples of recent student disciplinary situations she had encountered as she responded 
to the questions.  The participant in the pilot study was very willing to draw upon recent 
experiences, including even those from the very day of the interview, in order to 
elaborate or to clarify upon certain points.  The data from the pilot study were not 
included in the research findings.  
3.5.5 Interview Procedures  
Each of the participants was interviewed at a time and place most convenient for 
him or her.  I electronically mailed the vignette to participants two days before their 
interviews so they could have the opportunity to review the scenario and the specific 
questions relating to it if they so chose.  Some principals chose to take advantage of the 
opportunity to prepare themselves for the interviews, while other principals indicated the 
constraints on their time had not permitted them to read the scenario.  Once I entered  the 
research site, I worked to gain trust by establishing rapport with the participants through 
clarifying the purpose of the research project, discussing my role as a doctoral student 
and by mentioning that reasonable steps were taken to maintain confidentiality and 
privacy (Gall et al., 2007; Marshall & Rossman, 2006).  At that time, participants were 
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given the letter of introduction and the informed consent (see Appendix B) for signature 
and time was allowed to discuss any questions or concerns they had.  Interviews were 
held at the end of the school day in the participants’ own offices, except for one which 
was held in my office.  The central tasks during the interviews involved having the 
principals read the vignette, with “questioning and probing” for responses, in addition to 
a more extensive series of protocol questions which required them to draw on personal 
experiences, insights, perceptions, and observations (Frick, 2009, p. 58).   
Once the interview began, the recording device was turned on, and I read the 
vignette aloud with each participant because not all participants had read the scenario 
prior to my arrival, and also because I wished to establish a common starting point for 
each interview.  I then proceeded through the questions in the listed order. This same 
procedure was followed for every interview.  After the vignette follow-up questions had 
been fully discussed, the participants responded to the fifteen prompt questions in 
numerical order as outlined in the interview protocol.  The same prompt questions were 
asked of all respondents; however, there was some flexibility in questioning through the 
use of follow-up questions and probes to allow for a more complete understanding of the 
participants’ responses (Rossman & Rallis, 2003).  Throughout the course of data 
collection, there were “significant clarification, rephrasing and participant response 
checks” as part of “the conversational nature” of the interviews (Frick, 2009, p. 58).  The 
field notes I made during the interviews consisted of “observational notes” and 
“reflective-analytic journaling based on the interview experience” (Frick, 2009, p. 58).  
The original estimated time for each interview was approximately sixty minutes; 
however, all interviews exceeded that time, lasting from approximately seventy to ninety 
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minutes.  Once the interview had been completed, I thanked each participant for his or 
her willingness to take part in the research project and exited the site.  Participants were 
sent a formal thank you via email within the next few days following the interview, in 
addition to a hand-written personal note of thanks upon receipt of the final version of the 
transcription from the participant (Marshall & Rossman, 2006).   
I transcribed four of the semi-structured interviews and then, for reasons of time 
and efficiency, I hired a professional transcription company to transcribe the remaining 
six interviews.  Once each of the audio files of the semi-structured interviews had been 
transcribed, participants were emailed a copy of their transcript and asked to make any 
changes or deletions they felt were necessary in order that the transcript would accurately 
reflect their understanding and perception of their responses and comments during the 
semi-structured interviews.  Participants were asked to return the transcripts within one 
week of receiving them.  Five participants took longer than one week to return their 
transcripts, and in four cases participants remarked on their own perceived tendency to 
verbosity, their peculiarity of expression, and, in some cases, the depth and the amount of 
detailed information their interview had contained.  For example, one female principal 
emailed back with her revised transcript, “I certainly went on for quite a while, didn’t I?”   
One of the male principals emailed me the day following the interview to mention that he 
had found the entire process to be professionally invigorating.  He added, “I haven’t had 
a chance to do an indebt [sic] reflection on the goings on as a principal.  Sometimes you 
just go through the motions without thinking about it.  It was good.  Good luck with the 
rest of your work.”  He also thanked me for including him in the research.  
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3.6  Credibility of the Research 
Triangulation and coherence were established through document analysis and a 
literature review.  Strategies used to enhance the credibility and rigor of the qualitative 
study included keeping a researcher log, or journal, and using “interim analytic memos” 
(Rossman & Rallis, 2003, pp. 67–68).  As well, “participant validation” of the interview 
content for accuracy and elaboration, or member checks, and the use of a “peer debriefer” 
and a “community of practice,” that is, colleagues with whom to engage in “critical and 
sustained discussion” with respect to reviewing ideas and challenging notions, are all 
strategies that I employed to enhance trustworthiness and usefulness of the findings       
(p. 69; see also Creswell, 2007, pp. 207–208).  What is more, I used “inter-rater 
reliability, intercoder agreement, or scorer agreement [emphasis in original]” to 
determine if there was “agreement” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006, p. 186) in the 
identification of codes, categories, and themes.  However, it was noted that “when two or 
more observers or raters independently observe or rate something to determine if there is 
some consistency,” this “type of analysis does not indicate anything about consistency of 
performance or behavior at different times” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006, p. 186).  
The inter-rater reader, who has extensive experience in the field of education, is also a 
retired school principal with a graduate degree and currently works with pre-service 
teachers at a local university.  There was a high level of inter-rater agreement with the 
codes and themes I had identified.  These techniques, therefore, helped to offset 
limitations that could arise with respect to sample size and reliance on the data collection 
techniques employed.  They were also used to enhance the trustworthiness and 
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dependability of the study of principals’ exercise of discretion and their efforts to 
maintain their value systems (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). 
Although the selected research design was not an empirical study in the positivist 
sense and did not attempt to observe directly school-based administrators exercising 
discretion in disciplinary situations in their educational practice, it did focus on how 
principals interpret and make sense of their disciplinary actions.  In this way, I was able 
to gain access to those things that could not be observed, such as the perspectives, 
feelings, motivations, and understandings of the participants (Patton, 1990).  Likewise, 
Gronn (1984) argues, in empirical studies what is being observed “in natural settings is 
action not behavior [emphasis in original]” (p. 125).  If one is concerned only with what 
can be observed or measured, as was Mintzberg’s (1973) study of the daily activities of 
managers, then this assumption may create an initial bias from which it is difficult to 
escape.  Gronn (1984) contends that less quantifiable elements and more information on 
administrators’ interpretation, perspectives and attitudes are required in naturalistic 
research studies.  
The data collection ended at the conclusion of the tenth interview “based on the 
substantial amount of information that had been acquired through lengthy discussions” 
(Frick, 2009, p. 58).  As well, the “practical exigency of time and resource constraints 
balanced against the potential for expanding the boundaries of participants’ shared 
understanding” (Frick, 2009, p. 58) of their administrative practice signaled data 
collection was complete.  The data collection process “rendered a full account of 
participants’ views and perceptions” based on the fact the participants had shared “similar 
structural and social conditions within middle class schooling bureaucracies” (Frick, 
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2009, p. 58).  As Frick (2009) observes, the “ultimate criterion” for determining the 
trustworthiness of the participants’ responses in a study is the “accumulation and analysis 
of a wealth of rich data and thick descriptions” (p. 58).  
As researcher, I sought to develop safeguards to maintain as much as possible the 
privacy and anonymity of the participants (Gall et al., 2007).  I removed any identifying 
marks, words and phrases from the transcripts so that participants could not be linked or 
related to the data.  Once the data had been coded and analysis completed, the transcripts 
were and continue to be kept in a locked cabinet in my home.  Hard copies of the data 
will be kept for two years after the inquiry has been completed and then will be shredded.  
Audio files will be erased two years after the inquiry has been completed as well.  
Electronic copies of the six transcripts made by the transcribing service were destroyed 
by the firm one month after transcription had been completed.  The transcribed data were 
password protected on my personal laptop computer, and I kept back-up electronic copies 
of the transcripts on a flash drive device that was secured with a password encryption.   
3.7  Method of Data Analysis 
 The raw data used for analysis included the interview transcripts, observations 
and notes made during the interviews, journal notes, memos, and legal documents 
(Patton, 1990).  The interviews themselves generated 190 pages of transcripts.  
Transcripts were verbatim and included spontaneous laughter on the part of the 
participants and myself, participant asides, interruptions by students (in one case for a 
disciplinary issue), interruptions because of phone calls, and profanities.  My 
“preliminary analysis” began during the fieldwork phase when I began a “rough 
formulation” of the observational and journal notes into broad areas. All statements with 
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relevance to the study were listed without judgment as to their relative worth (St. 
Germain & Quinn, 2005). Then, once formal analysis began, I immersed myself in the 
data through careful reading and re-reading, or “prolonged engagement” with the 
verbatim transcripts in their entirety (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 159), in order to 
search for “patterns of meaning [emphasis in original]” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006, 
p. 374) using the research questions and protocol questions as a framework.  My 
understanding of the principals’ “experiences and the meanings they attributed to them” 
was achieved by integrating their “perceptions, thoughts, feelings, examples, ideas,” as 
well as “recollections” and their responses to the vignette (Frick, 2009, p. 59).  As 
McMillan and Schumacher (2006) note, “pattern seeking starts with the researcher’s 
informed hunches about the relationships in the data” (p. 373).  I coded the data to 
identify common ideas or categories that emerged from the data (Patton, 1990) and which 
were also based on my own self-knowledge (Maxwell, 2005) and reflections of my “own 
experiences” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006, p. 376) which served to inform and to 
answer the research questions.  In that way, “an overall description of the meaning of the 
experience [was] constructed” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006, p. 376). 
Once I had generated preliminary coding categories I assigned to them units of 
data and segments of text (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; see also McMillan & Schumacher, 
2006); I identified 790 segments of text throughout the ten interviews.  Each specific text 
segment was labeled and color coded according to participant, and then grouped into one 
of the ninety coding categories the meaning of which I had previously described 
(Creswell, 2002).  I then highlighted patterns within these more general coding categories 
according to their relevance, such as definition of discretion, and the participants’ 
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interpretation of activities, events, relationships, people and objects, and behaviors 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; see also Frick, 2009).  The data was cross-referenced to the 
patterns found in the transcribed documents, field notes, and relevant literature, and I 
considered “causes, consequences and relationships” when I was analyzing the data, 
making decisions based on “speculation, interpretation, and hypothesizing” (Patton, 
1990, p. 422).  Those portions that formed the essence of the themes were listed (St. 
Germain & Quinn, 2005).   
 Four separate sets of analyses were required to elicit the final eight common 
themes which were found within the more broadly-defined thirteen categories.  
MacMillan and Schumacher (2010) observe “typically qualitative studies will have 
between four and eight categories” or themes (p. 377).  Once coding had been completed, 
I clustered codes, searched for redundancies, eliminated irrelevant and unrelated 
segments, and reduced the number of codes from ninety to thirteen categories (Creswell, 
2007, p. 267).  The meaning of these categories depends on “both the content of each and 
the comparison made with that content—other categories or patterns” (McMillan & 
Schumacher, 2006, p. 374).  As Ashbaugh and Kasten (1984) state, determining 
categories “was sometimes problematic” as many of the participants’ statements were not 
“mutually exclusive” and there were many commonalities in the codes (p. 201).  I 
reduced these categories to the eight emergent themes that were “most frequently 
discussed” or “unique” (Creswell, 2007, p. 267).  The themes are presented in the 
findings, along with excerpts from the transcripts—the “rich data” (Maxwell, 2005,          
p. 112) and “thick description” necessary “to enhance the study’s trustworthiness”—
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(Merriam, 2002, p. 15) in order to expand upon and to illustrate these themes and 
patterns.   
3.8  Chapter Summary 
 An interpretive approach in a study of discretionary decision-making can generate 
insight about the values and the valuation processes of the decision-makers.  The purpose 
of the study is to determine how principals negotiate within the confines of discretion 
available to them by law in order to maintain their values system in matters of student 
discipline.  Discretion is the phenomenon under study and, since discretion is incapable 
of being measured and discretionary decision-making is an interpretive exercise, a 
qualitative research methodology is appropriate for this inquiry.  Similarly, in order to 
determine the nature of values in administrative decision-making, qualitative research 
methods are required.  Because the research participants were elementary school 
principals, as researcher and insider, I was able to effectively establish trust among the 
participants.   By providing any information that may have affected the collection of data 
and its interpretation, I am able to work to enhance the credibility of the research.  Some 
critics contend it is difficult for any qualitative researchers to achieve neutrality and 
impartiality and that, in any case, it is more important to understand how the researcher’s 
values and assumptions influence the conclusions of the study. 
 The research methodology included purposive sampling of ten elementary school 
principals participating in individual, semi-structured, in-depth interviews.  A pilot study 
helped to confirm the order, coherence, and clarity of questions.  The participants were 
initially given a vignette and five supporting questions to answer to introduce the topic 
and to establish the framework for the discussion.  Fifteen additional prompt questions 
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relating to how principals exercised discretion in student-discipline issues guided the 
interview protocol.   
 In order to achieve trustworthiness of the data, such strategies as member checks, 
inclusions of direct quotations from participants, inter-rater reliability, researcher 
reflections and triangulation were used.  Ethics protocols were adhered to and procedures 
put in place to ensure as much as possible the anonymity of the participants.  Data 
analysis was conducted by coding using categories based on the research questions as the 
guiding framework in order to identify patterns, and by clustering of codes in order to 
discover emerging themes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 Document Analysis  
 This research inquiry sought to determine how administrative discretion provided 
for in law confines, directs, supports or refines principals’ decision-making, and how 
principals negotiate within the legal parameters of discretion in order to maintain their 
own value systems. This chapter provides a document analysis of the provincial 
legislation and relevant school board policies granting the participating principals 
discretionary power in matters of student discipline.  
4.1 The Education Act (1995) 
In Saskatchewan, The Education Act (1995) outlines the General Duties of Pupils 
in Section 150.   The obligations of each student are outlined in subsection 3.   
(3)  Every pupil shall:   
(a)  attend school regularly and punctually; 
(b) purchase any supplies and materials not furnished by the board of education… 
(c)  observe standards approved by the board of education…with respect to 
(i) cleanliness and tidiness of person; 
(ii) general deportment; 
(iii) obedience; 
(iv) courtesy; and 
(v) the rights of other persons; 
(d) be diligent in his or her studies; 
(e) conform to the rules of the school approved by the board of education…; and 
(f) submit to any discipline that would be exercised by a kind, firm and judicious 
parent. 
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(4) For the purpose of clause (3) (f), discipline must not include the use of any of 
the following: 
 (a) a strap, cane or other physical object; 
 (b) a hand or foot in a manner meant to punish. 
 Under Section 151, the student is accountable to the teacher for his or her 
“conduct on the school premises during school hours” and also in “authorized school 
activities conducted during out-of-school hours” (ss. 1).  The pupil is also “accountable to 
the principal” for “general deportment” while at any time he or she is under the general 
supervision of the school, “including the time spent in travelling between the school and 
the pupil’s place of residence” (ss. 2).  The pupil is also “accountable to the driver of a 
school bus and to any other person appointed by the board of education…for the purposes 
of supervision during hours when pupils are in the personal charge of those employees of 
the board of education…” (ss. 3).  Furthermore, those employees “mentioned in 
subsection (3) are accountable to and shall report to the principal in accordance with the 
procedures approved by the board of education…” (ss. 4). 
 The Act also contains a separate section on Discipline: 
 152 (1) Every pupil is subject to the general discipline of the school. 
1.1 For the purpose of subsection (1), discipline must not include the use 
of any of the following: 
(a) a strap, cane or other physical object; 
(b) a hand or foot in a manner meant to punish.  
 In this same section, school boards are required to “make provisions” in their 
bylaws for the “expeditious investigation and treatment of problems arising in the 
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relationship between a pupil and the school.”  Under 153 (2), if a situation arises that 
adversely affects “the pupil’s educational development or the well-being of other pupils 
in the schools the principal may refer the matter to a committee of staff members and 
consultants.”  The referral to committee may be made if “in the opinion of the principal 
and the staff, a pupil is not complying with the pupil’s general duties” as established in 
Section 150 or if a situation has developed with respect to the pupil’s 
(a) attendance; 
(b) studies; 
(c) deportment; 
(d) personal relationships in the school; or 
(e) attitude towards the school. 
If such a referral is made, the principal must contact the parents or guardians of the child 
immediately. 
 Section 154 deals with student suspension.  Provision is made for suspensions of 
less than three days, and for more than three days but less than ten.  Provision is also 
made for student expulsion. 
 154 (1) A principal: 
(a) may suspend a pupil from school for not more than three school days 
at a time for overt opposition to authority or serious misconduct; and 
(b) where he or she suspends a pupil pursuant to clause (a), shall 
immediately report the circumstances of the suspension and the action 
taken to the parent or guardian of that pupil. 
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     (2)  A principal may suspend a pupil for a period not exceeding 10 school days 
where the principal receives information alleging, and is satisfied, that the pupil has: 
  (a)  persistently displayed overt opposition to authority: 
  (b)  refused to conform to the rules of the school; 
  (c)  been irregular in attendance at school; 
  (d)  habitually neglected his or her duties; 
  (e)  willfully destroyed school property; 
  (f)   used profane or improper language; or 
  (e)  engaged in any other type of gross misconduct. 
 Once the principal has suspended a student under subsection (2), he or she must 
report the matter to the director, notify the parents or guardians of the student, “inform 
the pupil of the reason for his or her suspension” and then prepare a written report for the 
director and the parents or guardians.  A hearing may be granted whereupon the director 
or designate may “confirm, reduce or remove” (subsection (4)) the suspension.  As well, 
the board may investigate the “circumstances” of a suspension before the end of the 
period of suspension and may suspend the student from any or all of the schools in the 
division for up to a period of one year.  The pupil and his or her parents or guardians have 
the right to appeal the decision.  Section 155 of the Act authorizes a board of education to 
expel a student from any or all schools in the division for a period of greater than one 
year based upon “an investigation” or “the unanimous report” ((1) (a), (b)) of a 
committee of the board.  This expulsion may, at the end of the year, be reviewed and 
rescinded by the board.   
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 The duties of a principal outlined in Section 175 of the Act include supervision of 
staff and organization of school programming, leadership in terms of staff professional 
development, and plans for reporting to parents and guardians.  Subsection 2 contains 
specific duties relating to school discipline: 
  (i) define and prescribe the standards of the school with respect to the duties of 
 pupils and give direction to members of the teaching staff and to pupils that may 
 be necessary to maintain the good order, harmony and efficiency of the school; 
 (j) administer or cause to be administered any disciplinary measures 
 that are considered proper by him or her and that are consistent with this Act. 
 (m) maintain regular liaison with the director with respect to all matters pertaining 
 to the well-being of the school, the staff and the pupils. 
 Provision is also made in the legislation for the suspension or expulsion of 
intensive needs students, or students whose “capacity to learn” is “compromised by a 
cognitive, social-emotional, behavioral or physical condition” (Section 178 (1) (d)). The 
legislation indicates the following process may be considered: 
178 (12)  If a pupil with intensive needs displays behavior that poses a risk of 
harm to others within the school and if that behavior is not caused by the pupil’s 
intensive needs, the pupil may be suspended or expelled in accordance with 
section 154 or 155, as the case requires.      
4.2 Analysis of Legislation 
 Shipman (1969) concludes “legislation usually recites a set of formal values, 
attributed to constitutional or other philosophical sources, but these are not inevitably the 
values conveyed to the society by subsequent governmental action” (p. 122).  The 
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education legislation assumes certain norms, values and standards for behavior.  
Saskatchewan’s Education Act (1995) makes assumptions about how good behavior is 
defined and describes “standards of behavior to encourage certain types of conduct and 
discourage others” (Hart, 1962, p. 163).  The legislation assumes “there is a single norm 
for appropriate behavior that people of all races, sexes, classes, and ethnic groups should 
be expected to exhibit” (Chesler et al., 1979, p. 504; see also Henriksson, 2008).  In other 
words, there are no “culturally plural notions of good behavior” (Chesler et al., 1979, p. 
504).  The Act does not countenance teachers and administrators taking into account any 
cultural differences among students as they interpret the statute to effect disciplinary 
consequences.   
In their discussion of the sources of law, Proudfoot and Hutchings (1988) point 
out “crimes are created by statute” (p. 42); the same might be said of misbehavior at 
school insofar as legislation defines what constitutes unacceptable behavior.  Using the 
reasoning of Hamilton and Sinclair (1991), in the same way that a “functionalist” theory 
suggests crime is used to help “define normalcy,” so the identification and naming of 
inappropriate behavior under The Education Act (1995) actually delineates acceptable 
behavior and makes it “more attractive” (p. 89).  In this way, by defining behavior that is 
unacceptable, the Act reproduces social norms and emphasizes social conformity (Clark, 
2002).  What is more, as King (2000) suggests, “all definitions of crime are, of course, 
social constructions changing over time and between societies, social groups, and 
individuals” (p. 6), so student misbehavior as constructed by the Act, and behavior that 
may have been inappropriate in 1995 may be acceptable in 2011, or vice versa.  The Act’s 
solid core of meaning of appropriate student behavior is based on certain assumed values, 
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cultural preferences, and standards that may or may not be shared by all educational 
stakeholders in a pluralistic and diverse student population.  It authorizes definitions, 
such as “standards” of  “general deportment,” “obedience,”  and “courtesy” based on 
what may be perceived to be “White middle-class values” (Nelson, 2008, p. 33) 
presumed to be shared by all stakeholders; this presumption creates conditions or 
expectations for behavior that are untenable for certain students or groups of students and 
may create oppressive conditions for them.  Rules become solely instruments of “adult 
control” of students (Chesler et al., 1979, p. 504), and learning becomes synonymous 
with “following orders” (p. 503).  Even the elasticity of discretion delegated to principals 
legitimizes these dominant rules and patterns of control.  Furthermore, notwithstanding 
Section 153—the option of referral to a committee for review of behavior—the 
legislation is solely reactive to misbehavior, and makes minimal provision for  preventive 
or alternate strategies that may serve to guide or support what it considers appropriate 
student conduct, such as that prescribed in the Ontario Education Act (1990).  
  The consequences for misbehavior outlined in Saskatchewan’s Education Act 
(1995) concern, for the most part, suspension and expulsion as the only identified 
alternatives for misbehavior.  The Act does not take into account the fact children often 
do not consider the consequences of their actions (Hall, 1999) and if the misbehavior is 
impulsive, suspension will not serve as a deterrent.  Some students may not recognize the 
cause-and-effect relationship between misbehavior and suspension.  The Act has been 
amended to reflect the Supreme Court ruling in Canadian Foundation for Children v. 
Canada regarding the corporal punishment of children.  To paraphrase Clarke (2002), 
suspension becomes the gate-keeper of behavior in schools insofar as it determines which 
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students will stay and which students will go.  Within The Education Act (1995) “there is 
no specific process set out” for  “suspensions of less than 3 days”  and “no statutory 
requirement for the principal to report a suspension of 3 days or less to the director” 
although it may be required in specific school division policy (Saskatchewan School 
Boards, 2009, p. 7).  As such, in these shorter suspensions under Section 154 (1) there 
appears to be no requirement for the student to be afforded the chance to give his or her 
account of the events leading to the suspension; if such an account is provided, this 
opportunity is implicit, rather than explicit, as a procedural fairness doctrine.  As well, in 
cases of suspension, there should be provision “for continuous access to the established 
curriculum” and to classroom instruction (Clark, 2002, p. 10); yet, whether this access 
would occur at the school the student normally attends is not clear.  Alternatives that are 
educative or instructive, such as conflict resolution or mediation, are not required to be 
considered.  Suspension and expulsion are solely reactive measures, and will not help to 
solve behavioral problems or to support students.   
Offences for which students may be suspended, such as “gross misconduct” and 
“opposition to authority” are highly subjective and open to interpretation by 
administrators and educators.  The “wide categories” in the language of the legislation 
“indicates that the behavior must be more than merely trivial” (Saskatchewan School 
Boards, 2009, p. 7).  The hierarchy of misbehavior reflects conduct that is very wide-
ranging—from swearing to vandalism to incomplete assignments—and makes no specific 
provision for what many would consider serious infractions such as the possession and 
use of weapons or drugs, although delineating every conceivable offence is impossible.  
Moreover, the doctrines of in loco parentis and parens patriae, reflected in the “kind, 
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firm and judicious parent,” are broad in scope and, again, subject to various 
interpretations which can lead to inconsistency in assigning consequences.  These 
provisions also assume much about the good faith and common sense of administrators 
and teachers who may, or may not, consider mitigating circumstances in applying rules.  
Infractions, such as a lack of “diligence in studies” or “irregular” attendance, construct 
student behavior from the perspective of pupils who, it is assumed, are not affected by 
social challenges that may be barriers to their compliance and to achievement, such as 
poverty.   What is more, the legislation assumes that support staff, such as bus drivers or 
lunch room supervisors to whom students are accountable for their behavior, have the 
appropriate training to deal with and respond to incidents of student misbehavior.  
Finally, it is not clear, if all school administrators have the knowledge, ability, or training 
to differentiate between behavior that is compromised by special needs and that which is 
not, when they consider serious disciplinary consequences such as suspensions or 
expulsions.  
 The duties of pupils are in tension with the responsibilities of educators but are 
circumscribed without reference to the obligations on the part of the school or school 
division.  The legislation assumes that individual students are engaged in learning, and 
that the school is meeting its responsibility in showing respect to students (Chesler et al., 
1979), meeting the individual needs of students and providing an educational 
environment that is “stimulating” (Clark, 2002, p. 32).  The responsibility for behavior is 
placed upon the student; as a result, the rules outlined in the legislation have a “unilateral 
component” (Chesler et al., 1979, p. 502), and there appears to be no “reciprocal 
discipline” for staff (p. 507).  For example, students who text or who use a cell phone in 
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class may be subject to disciplinary action for not conforming to the rules of the school 
while, one presumes, a teacher who texts or uses a cell phone in class would not.  Finally, 
the Act does not specifically reflect the current reality of technology which has the 
potential to greatly affect the environment and climate of the school and which would 
appear to warrant due consideration by itself, although it may be interpreted that under 
Section 152 students are accountable for the “use of phones, email or the internet to 
harass or bully [other] students” (Saskatchewan School Boards, 2009 p. 1). 
 It would appear much is left to the interpretation of principals as to the values 
legislated in The Education Act (1995).  The duties of the principal include broad 
discretionary authority in terms of the administration of discipline that is “proper,” 
however “proper” may be defined, and that maintains the “good order” and “harmony” 
and “efficiency” of the entire school but not necessarily for the benefit of the individual 
student.  No provision is made for officials consider mitigating circumstances or context, 
or progressive disciplinary measures.  The approach is unilateral, imposing ill-defined 
standards for behavior that may not be attainable for all students in all situations or that 
may create conditions of privilege for others. 
4.3 STF Policy—Student Discipline: Rights and Responsibilities (2011)  
 The Saskatchewan Teachers Federation (STF) is the professional governing body 
for both school-based administrators and teachers in Saskatchewan.  As an advocacy 
group, the STF outlines in this policy document the rights and responsibilities of 
principals and teachers with respect to student discipline.  The policy acknowledges that 
“sometimes teachers and principals feel that their hands are tied in dealing with students 
whose misbehavior makes it difficult for teachers to teach and other students to learn” 
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(Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  The organization briefly quotes from Saskatchewan’s 
Education Act (1995), pointing out the responsibility of principals, not teachers, to 
suspend students from school for “overt opposition” to school authorities or for “gross 
misconduct” (Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  The Federation understands “gross 
misconduct” as behavior that is defined by the “opinion of the principal,” and it may be 
constituted by the “persistence of misconduct” or by a single incident (Saskatchewan 
Teachers, 2011).  The Federation emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the 
“principles of natural justice” are followed when students are suspended, noting “courts 
are usually more concerned about the process and are content to let the discretion rest 
with the principal in determining what is serious or gross misconduct” (Saskatchewan 
Teachers, 2011).  Principals are “only required to notify parents” regarding suspensions 
of up to three days, but are reminded that the “requirements for natural justice are more 
rigorous” for suspensions of more than three days (Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  The 
Federation also observes school board policies “MAY NOT [sic] restrict the duty of 
teachers to exclude students from a class for overt opposition to authority or gross 
misconduct” (Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  School board policies cannot “forbid 
[student] exclusion from class or require approval of a principal or director before the 
exclusion” or “take away from principals the discretion they have in making 
suspensions,” although they may impose additional guidelines or requirements 
(Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).   
The age of the student is not a consideration in discipline, since “the law is 
applied the same for all students” (Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  When an 
administrator considers applying a suspension—the only stated option or consequence for 
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student misbehavior—the Federation indicates “it is important that the focus be on the 
fact that the behavior is unacceptable rather than on the nature of the child [emphasis 
added]” (Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  The STF goes on to clarify that the student is 
“being removed because he or she did something bad not because the child is bad” 
(Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  Teachers, nonetheless, are allowed “considerable 
discretion” in maintaining their obligations to “[their] other students” by excluding 
children from class, but are required to admit students “back into [their] classroom the 
next day” (Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  
4.4    Analysis of STF Policy  
 The Federation’s position on student discipline deals solely with discipline from a 
punitive stance, with a unilateral focus on student misbehavior.  It does not consider an 
educative or supportive component to discipline.  Since the Federation is a provincial 
advocacy group for its teachers and administrators, it narrowly frames student discipline 
from the perspective of the well-being of educators in their workplace and emphasizes 
the legal aspect of their responsibilities in addition to the rights of parents and students.  
The policy does not consider any social or cultural issues that may affect student behavior 
in schools.  It emphasizes the rights and responsibilities of educators, creating an 
adversarial tone in discipline among teachers, principals and students.  There is no 
indication that mitigating or aggravating circumstances and context are to be considered 
in administering discipline to students, and students are assumed to be able to 
differentiate between the act of misbehavior and themselves.  The policy offers no 
process for progressive discipline; suspension and exclusion from class and school are the 
only options or consequences for misbehavior.  The policy does not allude to the 
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subjective interpretation of the grounds for suspension, such as “persistent overt 
opposition to authority,” but simply cites the physical threat of a teacher by a student as 
an example of “gross misconduct” (Saskatchewan Teachers, 2011).  In its support of 
educators’ discretionary decision-making, the policy assumes their knowledge of natural 
justice principles and the requirements for the exercise of discretion, their knowledge of 
the standard of reasonableness, and assumes that their decisions will involve sound 
judgment. 
4.5 School Board Policies 
 School board policies and by-laws are a “form of subordinate legislation” 
(Proudfoot and Hutchings, 1988, p. 72).  School boards have “no inherent constitutional 
power to make laws as do federal and provincial governments” and, as a result, “their 
laws can be made only pursuant to a delegated authority under statute” (Proudfoot & 
Hutchings, 1988, p. 72).  The school division in Saskatchewan where the study was 
conducted has policies for educators and administrators to follow when disciplining 
students; these policies are posted on the school division website.  A number of policies 
and procedures relate directly to student behavior:  Discipline, Administrative Procedure 
375 (March 2008); Suspensions and Expulsions, Administrative Procedure 377 (March 
2008); Threats/Violent Behavior—Students, Administrative Procedure 380 (March 2008); 
Bullying Behavior—Student to Student, Administrative Procedure 381 (March 2008); and 
Prevention of Drug Use and/or Alcohol Abuse, Administrative Procedure 382 (June 
2007). 
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4.5.1 Discipline, Administrative Procedure 375 (March 2008) 
 The guiding principle for the board’s policy is “positive discipline” that “assists 
students to develop self-control and leads to a school environment which is conducive to 
learning” (p. 1).  The policy references The Education Act (1995) and delegates to the 
“Principal and staff” the task of arranging for “corrective measures to deal with 
inappropriate student behavior” (p. 1).  Corporal punishment is not permitted, although 
“restraining force” is one of the “behavior management techniques” that may be used 
with the objective of providing “a positive school climate for students” (p. 1).  Section 3 
of the policy outlines a progressive form of discipline that is to be used by identifying 
unacceptable behavior and assisting the student “in taking responsibility for his/her 
actions” (p. 1).  According to subsections 3.2 and 3.3, teachers must show “that actions 
have been taken to assist the student in resolving the problem” before discipline is 
administered for classroom misbehavior (p. 1).  Next, subsection 3.4, provides that 
student behavior should be discussed with parents/guardians, and then collaboration with 
student support services consultants may ensue for “classroom management strategies” 
(p. 2).  Finally, the policy indicates discipline is an “individual matter,” and students are 
dealt with “according to age, maturity, experience, abilities, interests, and values” (p. 2).  
If these measures do not result in “appropriate student behavior” the Principal is directed 
to discuss the situation with his or her Superintendent and “plan further action” under 
Administrative Procedure 377—Suspensions and Expulsions (2008) (p. 2).  The 
Appendix to this policy outlines options for responses to student behavior, such as “in-
school disciplinary alternatives,” “restitution,”  “anger management,” “individual 
behavior plans,” and “community team approaches” (p. 3). 
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4.5.2 Suspensions and Expulsions, Administrative Procedure 377    (March 
 2008) 
 This policy identifies the Principal and staff as responsible for “establishing and 
maintaining acceptable standards of discipline,” and cites The Education Act (1995) in 
providing the foundation for suspensions and expulsions for “overt opposition to 
authority, or for serious or gross misconduct” (p. 1).  It also defines suspension as being 
imposed for a period of one year or less and expulsion as being imposed for a period of 
more than one year, and a day of suspension being equivalent to one-half to one full 
school day (p. 1).  The policy states “gross misconduct” is “considered to include” such 
behavior as possession or ingestion of drugs or alcohol, vandalism, theft, inappropriate 
computer use, possession of weapons, “hate violence”, harassment, threats, intimidation 
or bullying, assault, sexual assault, fighting, discrimination, profanity, vulgarity, and 
“inappropriate language/attire and/or ethnic slur to another person including offensive 
language or graphics on clothing and person/school items” (p. 1).  The procedures follow 
the actions required under The Education Act (1995), but  also provide in Sections 1.1.2 
and 2.2.2 for the “student to respond” to the reason(s) for “Suspensions For Up To and 
Including Three Days,” and “Suspensions Greater than Three Days Up To, and Including 
Ten School Days,” respectively (p. 2).  Sections 1.3 and 2.2.5 of the policy direct the 
Principal to immediately remove the student and follow Administrative Procedure 380—
Threats/Violent Behavior—Students, if the “safety of students or staff” is compromised 
(p. 2).  For both categories of suspension, the Principal is required to “provide the student 
with appropriate instructional/assessment materials in a timely manner” (pp. 2–3) under 
Sections 1.4 and 2.2.7.  As well, the Principal is to complete reports for both types of 
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suspension and submit them to the designated Superintendent.  For any suspensions 
levied under Section 4, the Principal and student support services personnel will meet to 
“consider and plan for appropriate follow-up interventions and/or placement for students 
returning to school” and convey to parents/guardians information concerning school 
safety and any relevant contingency plans (p. 3).  
4.5.3 Threats/Violent Behavior-Students, Administrative Procedure 380 
(March 2008) 
 This policy cites The Education Act (1995) and is premised on the belief that “all 
students have the right to learn and interact in a safe, affirming environment” and be 
treated with “respect and dignity,” and that action “will be taken by staff” to respond to 
violent behavior that threatens that environment (p. 1).  The policy defines a threat as “a 
written or oral communication or action that implicitly or explicitly states or 
demonstrates a wish or intent to damage, injure or cause life-threatening harm to oneself 
or another individual” and presents a hierarchy of “low risk threat,” “moderate risk 
threat,” and “high risk threat” (p. 1).  The procedure to be followed is that every school 
will establish a Threat Assessment Committee that is “situational” and formed “at the 
discretion of the Principal” (p. 2), and based upon an investigation, this Committee will, 
determine the level of threat and the appropriate procedures to be followed in each case.  
Some of the outcomes include consultation with outside agencies, suspension or 
expulsion, notification of the police, and interventions at the school level.  Appendices to 
the policy include a schematic of the “sequence of action” to follow in “dealing with a 
threat” (p. 5); the information crucial for determining if a student is at moderate or high 
risk, such as history of violence, involvement with legal system, social background, 
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personality, gang involvement, or substance abuse; and the personnel to be involved 
depending on the level of risk, such as school counselor, school psychologist, consultants, 
police, or other outside agencies. 
4.5.4 Bullying Behavior—Student to Student, Administrative Procedure 381 
(March 2008) 
 The policy is premised on the belief that “bullying behavior shall not be tolerated 
and shall be dealt with in a serious and timely manner” (p. 1).  The policy defines 
“’bullying behavior’” as “an assertion of power through aggression, abuse and social 
manipulation.  It is intentional repeated oppression of a less powerful person/group by a 
more powerful person/group” (p. 1).  Various types of bullying such as physical bullying, 
psychosocial bullying, and cyber-bullying are listed.  The procedures to be followed in 
cases of bullying include the individual’s responsibility to report, method of 
investigation, and the actions to be taken, based on circumstances such as maturity of 
individuals, context and type of behavior exhibited.  The Principal, teacher, counselor, 
and/or school resource officer are responsible for follow-up on the bullying behavior, 
which may include contacting parents/guardians or making a referral to support personnel 
such as a school counselor or resource officer.  If the bullying behavior continues, the 
incidents must be properly documented, parents/guardians are to be notified, and 
suspension/expulsion may be considered.  The policy concludes with Section 4 that 
mandates educational programs on bullying for students and awareness of policy 
provisions for parents and staff.  An Appendix references The Education Act (1995), the 
mission statement, and the Shared Values of the school division, which include 
belonging, respect, responsibility and desire for knowledge, in addition to indicating the 
200 
 
need for policy alignment with rights provided for under the Charter and provincial 
human rights legislation. 
4.5.5 Prevention of Drug Use and/or Alcohol Abuse, Administrative 
Procedure 382 (June 2007) 
 This policy is based on the premise that “healthy lifestyles” will be taught to 
students in order to “discourage drug and alcohol abuse,” and outlines measures that can 
be taken to “establish school environments that are drug and alcohol free” (p. 1).  The 
procedures under Section 2 require health education programming that is provincially 
mandated and the identification and intervention by staff regarding any student who 
“appears to be experiencing” problems with drugs or alcohol (p. 1).  Responses may 
include such interventions as use of peer support teams, provision of information, 
recommendation to community agencies, development of prevention procedures, referral 
to drug and alcohol services, assessment by outside agencies and school counseling.  If 
students are suspected of being under the influence of or possessing drugs or alcohol, 
Principals are to use a progressive disciplinary approach which may include a plan for 
intervention or school attendance, or suspension or expulsion of the student according to 
required procedures (Section 3).  If students are suspected of supplying or trafficking 
drugs or alcohol, the Principal shall determine an appropriate course of action, in 
consultation with the Superintendent and the police. 
4.6    Analysis of School Board Policies 
 While the provincial legislation is a system of “primary laws setting standards for 
behavior,” the school division policies would be the “secondary laws specifying what 
officials must or may do when they are broken” (Hart, 1962, p. 163).  The board policies 
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noted above are quite prescriptive in nature and are designed to regulate student behavior 
and to direct the administrator’s response to misbehavior.  The policies are solidly based 
on legislation; however, the procedures contain rules that are much more specific and 
detailed than those outlined in The Education Act (1995).  The procedures do allow for 
the school administrators’ exercise of discretion with respect to determining 
consequences for student misbehavior and within a framework of progressive discipline.  
There is an expectation of and requirement for shared decision-making among educators, 
administrators and support staff such as psychologists, counselors, and resource officers 
in determining appropriate consequences for misbehavior.  These collaborative 
procedures also encourage the consideration and use of alternate discipline strategies 
which may serve to mitigate cultural or other types of misunderstandings on the part of 
educators.   The procedures attempt to itemize types of “gross misconduct,” a highly 
subjective term, and this attempt serves to limit the interpretive ability of principals and 
educators in exercising discretion.  However, this description supports Brown and 
Zuker’s (2007) contention that school boards should “provide some guidance” in their 
policies for terms such as “‘swearing,’” since interpretation can result in “inconsistent 
and possibly unfair application of the law” (p. 239).   
Suspension and expulsion are clearly regarded as options for disciplinary 
consequences and are the final consequences when other alternatives do not result in the 
desired behavior.  Collective student rights are outlined, yet individual rights are omitted, 
and the school’s responsibility in contributing to appropriate discipline is not directly 
stated.  The policies appear to offer accountability for decision-making and refer to the 
completion of forms and reports and the documentation that must be adhered to in student 
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disciplinary issues.  The procedures imply the dispensing of disciplinary consequences to 
students will be fair and equitable and that the school has engaged its students and 
accommodated learning styles and needs.  No mention is made of the responsibility of 
staff for creating situations that may lead to the imposition of disciplinary consequences. 
4.7 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter includes a description and document analysis of the relevant sections 
of the province’s Education Act (1995) authorizing school administrators’ exercise of 
discretion in matters of student discipline in Saskatchewan.  The chapter also includes a 
description and analysis of the Saskatchewan Teachers’ Federation (STF) policy on 
student discipline; the Federation is the provincial professional organization which 
governs teachers and school-based administrators.  There are also descriptions of relevant 
school board policies of the school division in which the research was conducted that 
direct administrators’ actions in student disciplinary situations.  The chapter also includes 
analysis of these documents. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE 
5.1 Presentation of Research Findings 
This chapter provides a description of the participants in the semi-structured 
interviews.  It also presents the research findings which include quotations from the 
interviewees, in addition to quotations from relevant documents found in the literature 
and scholars in the field, to illustrate the eight themes that emerged from the data.  The 
findings of the study respond to the research question and the ten sub-questions and are 
presented within the framework of the eight themes.      
5.2    Description of Participants 
 The participants were asked to provide demographic information by completing 
the brief demographic questionnaire in pen and returning it to the researcher just before 
the semi-structure interview started.  Each of the participants was given a pseudonym. 
(a) Frank is in his fourth year of the principalship, and has been an in-school 
administrator for a total of eleven years.  He indicated his age was between forty 
and fifty years, and “eleven years in an admin chair,” he “did not consider himself 
inexperienced [as a principal].”  He mentioned that he was six years from 
retirement.  There are 144 students at his school and no administrator serving as a 
vice-principal. 
(b) Miriam has been a principal for five years.  She has been an in-school 
administrator for ten years, and indicated that she was between forty and fifty 
years of age.  She is within five years of retirement, and she indicated she did not 
work with a vice-principal or assistant principal.  The enrolment at her school is 
330 students. 
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(c) Harold has been a principal for ten years and a school-based administrator for 
fifteen years.  He revealed he was 57 years old and was retiring at the end of the 
current school year, and considered himself an experienced principal.  He works 
with a vice-principal, and the enrolment at his school is 160 students. 
(d) Shawna has been a principal for four years and an in-school administrator for the 
last seven years. She indicated she was between 50 and 60 years of age, was two 
years from retirement, and considers herself an experienced principal.  She works 
with a vice-principal and the enrolment at her school is 200 students. 
(e) Amanda is in her second year of the principalship, but she has been an in-school 
administrator for six years.  She indicated she was over 50 years of age, and she 
considers herself an inexperienced principal.  She does not work with a vice-
principal, and the enrolment at her school is 132 students. 
(f) Adam is in his third year of the principalship and he has been an in-school 
administrator for the last five years.  He says he is between 40 and 50 years of age 
and indicated on his demographic information sheet that he considered himself an 
inexperienced principal.  He works with a vice-principal and the enrolment at his 
school is 430 students. 
(g) Danielle, a newly appointed principal, had served as a vice-principal for three 
years.  She indicated her age was between 50 and 60 years of age.  She considers 
herself an inexperienced principal, but one who is within five years of retirement.  
She does not work with a vice-principal, and the enrolment at her school is 260 
students. 
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(h) Melvin has been a principal for two years and an in-school administrator for four 
years.  He indicated he is between 30 to 40 years of age and considers himself an 
inexperienced principal.  He works with a vice-principal and the enrolment at his 
school is 160 students.  
(i) Lauren is serving in her fourth year as a principal, but has been an in-school 
administrator for eight years.  She indicated she is between 50 and 60 years of age 
and considers herself inexperienced as a principal since she had been less than 
five years in the role.  She works with a vice-principal and the enrolment at her 
school is 530 students. 
(j) Sarah has been a principal for four years and an in-school administrator for the 
last ten years.  She indicated she is between 50 and 60 years of age, and she 
considers herself an inexperienced principal.  She works with a vice-principal, 
and the enrolment at her school is 340 students. 
5.3  Observations of Participants’ Responses 
The participants in the interviews responded quite freely to the questions posed to 
them and willingly provided details and specific examples to illustrate the points they 
made.  As Roche (1999) describes, the principals replied “with surprising candor,” and 
with apparent “critical, personal reflection” spoke “freely, clearly and at considerable 
length” (p. 260).  The probes and follow-up queries with the prompt questions tended to 
reveal their interpretation of their actions in the situations they described, and a number 
of principals commented on the opportunity for reflection the interviews and, more 
specifically, the questions provided.  As Roche (1999) also discovered, the vignettes, or 
“hypothetical scenarios, readily gave way to vivid memories of similar experiences that 
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the principals had previously encountered” (p. 260).  In their responses to the prompt 
questions, six of the principals also referred to the vignette, and indicated they had 
experienced, in part, similar situations in their own practices (see also Campbell-Evans, 
1988).  In a manner similar to that found in Roche’s (1999) study, these participants at 
various times during the interviews appeared to express “feelings of self-doubt, 
optimism, and some disillusionment, but especially of genuine care for those within their 
school communities” (p. 260).   
5.4  Results of the Interviews  
 As Rapley (2004) indicates, during the interview process, researchers may “raise 
some of the themes” that begin to appear “by asking interviewees specific questions 
about them” or, sometimes, “telling them” about their “thoughts and letting them 
comment on them” (p. 27).  In this way, researchers may assess their “analysis of these 
specific themes by asking interviewees to talk about them” (p. 27).  I found that certain 
patterns and themes, such as time in decision-making, trust, and experience, appeared 
early on in the data collection; however, although these topics were not part of the 
interview protocol per se, I nonetheless asked participants to talk about them.  
5.5  Identification of Themes  
Although each participant’s worldview was unique, I discovered eight themes in 
the categories and patterns in the data obtained during the semi-structured interviews.  
These themes include “participant perspectives” as well as “in vivo codes” that use the 
wording of the participants themselves (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 371), while 
“verbatim language from the participants” serves to illustrate these themes  
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(p. 376).  Descriptions of “what was experienced” by the participants and reflections of 
my “own experiences” were “integrated with those of the participants” in order to 
“construct an overall description of the experience” (p. 376).  I used a “recursive 
[emphasis in original]” process in forming the categories or themes, which necessitated 
“searching for both supporting and contrary evidence about the meaning of the category” 
and the progressive grouping and regrouping of “codes and data segments” until eight 
“specific” themes were established (p. 377).  The themes which emerged from the 
analysis are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Themes Revealed in Data Analysis 
Theme  
Number 
Description of Theme 
1 Principals’ Understanding of Discretion in Disciplinary Decision-making 
2 Principals’ Understanding of Their Role in Discretionary Decision-making 
3 Principals’ Espoused and Identified Values in Their Discretionary Decision-making 
4 Principals’ Understanding of the Significance of Experience in Discretionary 
Decision-Making 
5 The Role of Policy/Legislation in Principals’ Use of Discretion in Their 
Disciplinary Decision-Making 
6 Student-Specific Influences Affecting Principals’ Discretionary Decision-making 
7 External Influences and Pressures Affecting Principals’ Discretion in Disciplinary 
Decision-Making 
8 Principals’ Use of Discretion to Find the Balance Between Individual and Group 
Interests and Rights 
 
The research questions that frame the study will serve to undergird the 
presentation and discussion of the findings within the identified themes.  While certain 
themes may relate to more than one research question, all ten sub-questions are addressed 
in the following discussion.  Since “some codes fit into more than one category” or 
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theme, the “elasticity” of “codes and category meanings” underscore the inter-relatedness 
of the questions, and the “complex links” among the participants’ “beliefs,” thought 
processes, and “actions” allows “patterns of meanings [emphasis in original] to emerge” 
(McMillan & Shumacher, 2006, p. 378).  These patterns of meanings elicited from the 
themes or categories are used to illustrate and answer the over-arching research question 
of how school principals negotiate within the legal parameters of discretion in order to 
maintain their own values system when they make decisions in matters of school 
discipline.  This research question comprises the following sub-questions: 
1. What is the nature of discretion in general? 
2.  What are the influences on discretion? 
3.  How is discretion understood and practiced by school administrators in their 
decision-making?    
4.  What influences, values, or circumstances do school administrators consider in 
their decision-making? 
5. Is there a hierarchy of influences, values, or circumstances that shape school 
administrators’ exercise of discretion in their decision-making? 
6. What kind(s) of knowledge do school administrators believe they need in order 
to make discretionary decisions in matters of student discipline? 
7. What do school administrators perceive to be appropriate and inappropriate 
exercises of discretion in student disciplinary issues? 
8.  Do school administrators believe the exercise of discretion assists or hinders 
them as they work to balance competing rights in the school setting? 
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9.   What do school administrators perceive to be an appropriate measure of 
accountability for their discretionary decisions? 
10.  In what ways do school administrators justify their exercise of discretion? 
5.5.1 Theme One: Principals’ Understanding of Discretion in Disciplinary 
Decision-Making 
This theme focused on the way in which principals appeared to understand the 
nature of discretion and how they exercised it in their disciplinary decision-making.  The 
participants appeared to understand discretion in various ways, such as an unarticulated 
element of decision-making and as a feeling and a gray area.  Their perceptions of how it 
was exercised included the necessity for gathering information, the time required for 
decision-making and the importance of not making decisions in haste, and the imposition 
of a line in the sand or a finite point.  The principals’ understanding of discretion and 
their perceptions of  how they exercised it in decision-making answered research sub-
question 1 concerning the nature of discretion in general, research sub-question 3 
concerning their understanding of discretion as they practiced it in decision-making, 
research sub-question 5 concerning a hierarchy of influences, values or circumstances 
shaping their exercise of discretion, and research sub-question 7 concerning appropriate 
and inappropriate exercises of discretion.  
Discretion did not appear to be foremost in the perceptions of principals as an 
element of their decision-making despite their being informed that it was the topic of 
inquiry. In fact, in answer to research sub-question 1 concerning the nature of discretion, 
most participants seemed unable to articulate a definition of how they interpreted it, and 
many seemed to describe, instead, what they perceived to be the effects of discretion in 
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their practice.   Only one of the principals provided anything approaching a concrete 
definition when asked to describe discretion in decision-making. 
Shawna:  “When I use the word judgment, I am referring to the capacity to assess 
situations or circumstances shrewdly and to draw sound conclusions, not based 
on a value judgment.  The discretion I would use would be based on the needs of 
children and interventions to promote growth for the child involved…discretion 
should be based on sound decision-making practice.”   
 
Many principals appeared not to have considered discretion per se as an element 
of their decision-making in disciplinary issues although, upon reflection, they indicated 
that they did exercise it:   
Amanda:  “Discretion is based on your own paradigm…probably not congruent 
with others…it could, could be judgment, I guess.   I can use that as a synonym, 
but it does not sound as polite as discretion, does it?”   
 
Danielle:  “[Being a fairly new principal] I have sort of stuck fairly closely to 
what I know is sort of accepted procedures [and have not exercised discretion].”   
 
Shawna:  “In the course of the day, I have lots of discretion on how we are 
making any decision in terms of our kids in this building, be it academically, 
behaviorally, whatever the case is.”  
 
Miriam:  “I always try to say is this the right thing for the kid?  Is this the right 
thing for the school?  Is this the right thing for the teacher?” 
 
Melvin:  “When you [Nora] say discretion, what do you mean?  [Nora: Is it like 
applying judgment?].  Yes, absolutely.” 
 
Sarah:  “Equity [Is a synonym for discretion].” 
 
Lauren:  “Discretion, knowing the background of the children, knowing what their 
relationship is with their teachers within the school and knowing how many times 
they have been in the office.” 
Harold:  “Well, I mean you take a look at the whole situation, right?  You take a 
look at the background, you take a look at the community, families…at safety 
features…the past experience of the individuals.” 
Adam:  “I guess I have measured everything off of, well, what I do with my own 
kid in the situation, so that whole in loco parentis thing.  It’s kind of my guiding 
principle in terms of discretion.” 
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Frank:  “I’m responsible for everything that goes on here, so if we’ve decided as a 
group that…we have policy, we have provincial policy…so if you have a kid that 
hasn’t been to school for ten days, and we don’t know where he is…then we take 
him off the books now.  There’s not discretion in that any more.  There are things 
that we do that we don’t have discretion about.”  
Other principals appeared to understand discretion as a type of feeling they had 
when they made a decision: 
Miriam:  “Probably a little bit [that guides you] is your gut and your heart.” 
 
Lauren:  “I think you go through gut sometimes.” 
 
Amanda:  “Sometimes when you are making those decisions you got to go with 
your gut and if your gut misleads you, then I think you have to apologize and you 
have to say, ‘I didn’t make the best choice there’…[sometimes] it is just a gut 
feeling.’” 
 
One principal likened the feeling or sense to an intuitive one: 
 
Adam:  “I think it is a lot of body language that you read, it is even the words that 
you hear.  It is the weight, it is the tone of voice.  I mean all of those contribute to 
intuition; it is whatever prior knowledge you have that informs your sub-
consciousness as you are working through these things.” 
 
However, one principal felt that to not exercise discretion at all, and to follow a 
rule, policy, or legislation would indicate indifference, if not cowardice: 
Melvin:  “I think it is easier [to follow the procedure book] because then it is not 
you making the decision.  You are gutless then.  You need to be able to make a 
decision and use your discretion around this decision and stand by it.” 
 
Some principals understood discretion in a more colloquial sense as a “gray area” 
in their decision-making, as opposed to decisions that were more obvious, or black-and-
white: 
Frank:  “I don’t think we work in definites, in black and whites…this policy of the 
example [vignette] is black and white, and I’m not seeing a lot of discretion in 
that one… There’s gray areas…I don’t believe we would have policies.  I think we 
ignore them a bit and we operate in more of a practical world than sometimes the 
policies let us do, and we operate in more of a child-centered world…So if you’re 
a black and white person, and follow policy, you’ll get back up.  Sometimes you 
look for ways to fit a situation, or you know if there’s a hard, fast rule, again I 
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look at the impact on the child and say, does the ends justify the…giving this child 
a three day suspension, or should it be more than a three day because he did 
this…is that serving the purpose? Sometimes you have to bend the rules a bit.”   
Amanda:  “I think it [decision-making] is black and white for lots of principals, 
actually.  I think suspension is too easy.  I think my colleagues at the high schools 
[use] suspension, just because it is easy…I am sort of this nebulous girl who tries 
to fit in the square box of policies and procedures.” 
 
Lauren:  “It [following rule or procedures] depends on your situation.  I mean, it 
is kind of like I am not ignoring the suspension law, but I am trying to work within 
it for the betterment of the student…and school and staff…I think there is a lot of 
gray area.” 
 
Some principals suggested it may be difficult to make an appropriate 
discretionary decision, unless they have what they perceive to be all pertinent and 
relevant information regarding a particular disciplinary issue (research sub-question 7): 
Frank:  “The hardest ones [decisions] are…the social ones where there are not 
clear lines and  sides.  Those are hard to apply…where you got to judge.  You 
have to make sure you have all your information, when mediation doesn’t work, 
and you’ve got to make some decisions about really who’s at fault and who’s 
not.” 
Adam:  “It was very important for me to understand where these [fighting] boys 
came from in terms of how they wound up in situations, so I spent a long time 
actually talking to a whole bunch of kids, to try and get some sense of how this 
[fight]…occurred…so it is very important…the physicality is extremely 
important…this was a fight you know, so for me that is highly important to spend 
the time to figure out what happened.” 
Lauren:  “I guess [it is] not being fair, I guess maybe [me] being bullied by a 
teacher, not listening to all the information and reacting inappropriately by 
giving a child an inappropriate consequence when I do not have all the 
information.” 
 
Danielle:  “I try to get the facts and I try to ensure that the decision I am making 
is the best decision for the student and the school and I’m not making it because 
my buttons have been pushed.” 
 
Sometimes information was required if the decision is challenged by a parent or 
stakeholder, and it could be useful in aligning the decision with board policy or 
preventing the administrator from making a poor decision: 
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Harold:  “I just make sure we have everything documented in an objective fashion, 
right?  So that you can say, ‘This is the situation,’ and if you need to fall back on 
school board policy at those times you can, because they [parents] will likely look 
toward the school [and challenge you].” 
 
Sarah:  “I would talk to that teacher [about the incident].  I would talk to the 
student to find out exactly what he had said…and…ask the teacher to write some 
report….eventually she would have to write up a report on that and talk to my 
superintendent.” 
 
Amanda:  “[When you are uninformed] you started to second guess yourself.  I’d 
rather be fully informed and give the kid a ‘cool off’ for the afternoon in the 
library before I suspend them rather than throw them out of my building and not 
be fully informed.  I am not going to make those mistakes, because I have done 
that before.”   
 
Some of the administrators considered inappropriate exercises of discretion in 
disciplinary situations (research sub-question 7) as being decisions principals may treat 
very simplistically and quickly when, in fact, they are really more complex: 
Shawna:  “All of a sudden, as we are investigating, we are finding that there is 
more [to consider].  Start peeling back the layers.  It is never cut and dried.  When 
you start peeling back the layers and all of a sudden you find that he has been 
talking about hurting someone.…the difference is when it comes to kids…it’s not 
so cut and dried.  [If] you resort to things that are the easiest…[if you] say ‘You 
are going home,’ and then they go home to chaos and they are going home to 
whatever…that is always the easy way to do it, isn’t it?” 
 
Adam:  “I learned very early on in my administrative career, I did come down in 
a sort of very cut and dried and hard-and-fast response in a couple of situations, 
which ultimately proved to be counterproductive.” 
 
Harold:  “It  [a quick response] is not best for the school…certainly not best for 
Gary [student in vignette] to suspend him for two weeks, but it’s the easy way of 
doing it….it’s zero thinking.” 
 
Frank:  “I got out the board policy book and The Education Act and [made] some 
pretty easy decisions, because I can say this is what this says and this is what we 
have to do no matter what.”  
 
Danielle:  “Well, if you are just sending students away from school because you 
know it’s easier [and] would make the teachers happy, [then] they can be someone 
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else’s problem, send them off to another high school…because it’s easier than 
having to work through the process of helping that student to be better.” 
Most principals had the perception many appropriate decisions were not able to be 
made in a hard-and-fast manner, without consideration of the student at the center of the 
decision or of the context (research sub-question 7): 
Danielle:  “It is just very easy to make hard-and-fast decisions.  They [principals] 
rely on the rules; they don’t hear about the young person.  They don’t know about 
the young person.” 
 
Adam:  “You know, most of the time a hard-and-fast response is not the 
appropriate response.  You need to pick up on the nuances and the context of the 
situation.  Now having said that, I also have experienced the situation where you 
had to have an immediate response, no conversation; you just need to deal with 
it.” 
 
Melvin:  “In the context of this school hard and fast rules do not work.  Hard and 
fast discipline does not work because what happens is the kids have none at home.  
There is no discipline and so when they walk in the [school] door, they just rebel 
immediately….I use the hard, fast rules only when I need to and have I ever 
pulled it [statement of rules] out and put it in front of a kid?  No, not once, but yet 
I have every parent sign it.” 
 
Amanda:  “It [good decision-making] is part of the understanding of children.  To 
some principals it [the school] is a corporation…it is a hierarchy to the next job.  
It is corporate…so sadly it is a hierarchy of size of school and it is sad because it 
looks like each child does not matter…you are compensated according to size.” 
 
On the other hand, taking the necessary time often appeared to be a required 
  
element in order to appropriately exercise discretion in decision-making: 
Miriam:  “When it comes to a [quick] decision... [I will pull] a kid from recess or 
something like that, but if it’s having an in-school suspension, or an at-home 
suspension, I wouldn’t say I make those hastily.” 
Sarah:  “I think you have to be able to take the time you need to think something 
through.  Sometimes the decision does not have to be made right away.  Maybe 
you can take twenty-four hours to sleep on it and think about it and think about 
what the best way is…and if you can just take that time that helps, so being able 
to not rush into a decision [is necessary].” 
 
Frank:  “Some issues in bullying… are pretty easy to see, but when you just get 
the normal, your every day run-of-the-mill things that come through here, you 
really have to take your time.” 
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Consequently, if decisions were made in haste, without consideration of  
 
circumstances or situation, principals may consider them also to be inappropriate  
 
exercises of discretion in decision-making: 
 
Sarah:  “If you have a lot of things happen in one day and you have got somebody 
who just does something over the top and you’ve had it and you make a rash 
decision without taking the time to slow everything down…[and do not consider] 
the circumstances or even the needs of the child in that situation.” 
 
Amanda:  “When they [principals] do something that is inappropriate and make 
that snap decision, ‘Your kid is suspended,’ [and] then have this litany of reasons 
[as to] why he should have been….” 
 
Lauren:  “You really need…to take the time to talk to the adult, the child, 
whatever and not make a snap decision.  I think that is one of the things I learned.  
I can always say ‘I won’t have more information until tomorrow.  I need to think 
this over’ [and] take the time because I think we’re pressured not to take the time 
and to react [quickly].” 
 
Miriam:  “When you have one of those [busy] days you make decisions a little 
more quickly…and I do try not to do that, unless someone was physically being 
pummeled or something like that.” 
 
For one principal, however, a certain type of decision was always easy to make: 
 
Frank:  “Those are easy ones…the drugs and the alcohol in schools.  Absolutely 
black and white.  Those are no-brainers.” 
 
Yet, at other times, there appeared to be no opportunity to exercise discretion, that 
is, when an apparent line in the sand had been crossed and a quick decision was 
necessary.  Again, decision-making was contextual for the principals, and there were 
some situations, safety being one, in which there was no flexibility or judgment (research 
sub-question 5): 
Harold:  “The no-smoking policy, a drug policy, those things I deal with rather 
quickly…that was the quick consequence.” 
 
Lauren:  “Safety. Drugs.  They need to be out of here for drugs and alcohol.  I 
mean, I know last year we had kids with alcohol in water bottles and their parents 
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were called in and they were definitely suspended....if there is harm to the person 
themselves or to others within the building, definitely they need to be 
suspended…also the kid that we just suspended, the last thing he needed to do 
was be at home for three days…but it was just kind of, it was a bottom line that he 
crossed the line of threatening a staff member and so it was for the good of all.” 
 
Amanda:  “We’re a family here and the student marginalized one of our staff, and 
I cannot allow bigotry.  In fact, I would have allowed him to hit his teacher out of 
anger, before a racial slur…that is when it is about tolerance and acceptance of 
others, no that is my line right there…at some point it is black and white, you 
know and that is black and white to me and that is a feeling I have.” 
 
Adam:  “The possibility of a gun in the school has to be dealt with immediately or 
knives or whatever, anything that would threaten the safety of the kids.” 
 
Frank:  “People will want a line to be drawn in the sand.  And if this, this young 
guy has stepped over that line a number of times [vignette], I think at some point 
we need to draw the line.  It sounds that this is a number one of a number of 
things he has done…it’s time to draw a line.  It would be time to draw a line with 
him.  And to say, ‘You know, there’s got to be an empty road somewhere, now, 
and we’ve got to keep everyone safe.”  
 
Shawna:  “I mean, if you are suspecting kids are bringing drugs to school and 
knives or whatever the case is, I mean absolutely you do need to follow that 
[policy].” 
 
5.5.2 Theme Two: Principals’ Understanding of Their Role in 
Discretionary Decision-Making 
This theme focused on the way in which principals understood their role in 
discretionary decision-making.  The participants appeared to understand their role 
through the responsibility they felt, the amount of time they spent on discipline, their 
need to investigate situations, their desire for collaboration and shared decision-making, 
and their obligations under the doctrine of in loco parentis.  The principals’ 
understanding of their role in discretionary decision-making answered research sub-
question 2 regarding influences on discretion, research sub-question 3 concerning how 
discretion is understood and practiced by school administrators, research sub-question 6 
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concerning types of knowledge they believe they need to make discretionary decisions,  
and research sub-question 7 concerning appropriate and inappropriate exercises of 
discretion.  
The principals’ role in discretionary decision-making was perceived in various 
ways by the participants although all seemed conscious of the importance of their 
position within the school environment.  Two of the principals defined the role of the 
principal as a decision-making one: 
 Harold:  “[Decision-making] that’s what we always do.  Right?  I go home and I 
 don’t want to have a decision about supper and neither does my wife.” 
 
 Adam:  “I go home at the end of the day and my wife says, ‘Would you like to do 
 this or this?’ and I say “I do not care, having made decisions all damn day.  You 
 decide.’  To me, that [making decisions] is entirely what we do.” 
 
 The principals’ understanding of the influences upon their discretionary decision-
making (research sub-question 2) changed depending upon the time and the individual 
stakeholder’s perception of their role.  Stakeholders’ perceptions could affect the types 
and the number of disciplinary referrals to the principal and, as a result, their exercise of 
discretion: 
Amanda:  “The old philosophy of administration by the principal’s office when I 
was young was you sent your problems to the office; the office handled them and 
sent them back.  Well, children are not problems.  They’re making poor choices in 
the day, so you have to help them make a better choice…I do not ignore 
established rules like no running in the hallway; it is not safe, but some rules 
[e.g., no hats] are just legalisms of the building and I say they are stupid.” 
 Adam:  “I would say [my] role is varied and changing constantly, depending on 
 the situation.  Sometimes it is very much to be that enforcer, that heavy person in 
 the school, and at other times it is about brokering responses between teachers 
 and student and students and students.  It is, I would say, equally about educating 
 as to what are acceptable and not acceptable behaviors, responses and actions 
 within the school, not necessarily to be punitive, but to inform.” 
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 Other principals felt that the weight of the responsibility of making decisions for 
all those individuals within the school environment influenced their decision-making: 
 Adam:  “On one hand, I bear the responsibility in the building for the safety of 
 the children that are attending that school, and that is something that weighs 
 heavily on my mind on any given day and, therefore, I need to make sure that 
 those kids are as protected as I can possibly make it.” 
Danielle:  “I try to hear what parents and staff have to say, though, because it’s 
real and I mean their feeling is valid, too, and it is real, and I have to let them   
know what I think is best for the young person within our school [because I am the 
one responsible]”. 
Melvin:  “We are given, as principals, a lot of discretion in terms of what we 
make decisions about, from our senior admin…the common sense decision-
making is what we are given…common sense decision-making…is as long as you 
are making decisions with common sense, you are going to be supported.  Once 
you get outside of that, I think it’s hard for them to support you…I think we have 
to be given that responsibility, but it is an important responsibility to handle 
properly.” 
 
 The volume of disciplinary situations appeared to influence their discretionary 
decision-making (research sub-question 2).  The principals indicated the time they spent 
attending to disciplinary issues could range anywhere from 10–80% daily, depending 
upon whether follow-up, such as communicating with parents about disciplinary issues, 
was included, or whether disciplinary concerns were shared with a vice-principal.  Adam, 
in his school of 430 students, noted he spent “5–10% at the worst” with the “students 
themselves” each day, but 30–40% talking “to the parents, explaining the situation, the 
response, contacting, letting them know.” Melvin indicated 40–45% of his time was spent 
with only eight to twelve students whose misbehavior in his school of 160 students was 
“chronic.”  Lauren indicated that while discipline accounted for 60–70% of her and the 
vice-principal’s time in their school of 520 students, the behavior of a group of twenty 
students occupied a majority of that time.  Sarah indicated she and her vice-principal 
could “easily” spend up to 80% of a school day on discipline in their school of 340 
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students, which included “dealing with the situation, giving the consequence…[and] 
doing a whole lot of teaching.” 
 Five of the principals understood their role in disciplinary decision-making  
through the legal principle of in loco parentis and the wide discretion they believed it 
afforded them (research sub-question 2).  Some appeared unaware that their interpretation 
might not reflect an accurate understanding of the principle
14
: 
Amanda:  “It [The Education Act] is too out-dated and too archaic…but I tell you 
what covers your ass is the loco parentis….I think that is the only line that they 
need to really print.  Just put in The Education Act, in loco parentis.  Because that 
is the one really when we are going to go head-on in the court of law.  I can say 
that I did that [decision] in a caring, kind way and in loco parentis.  Because you 
are making the best decision you can at that moment.” 
Adam:  “It’s kind of my guiding principle in terms of discretion.  What would I do 
with my own kid in this scenario and what I would want done with my own kid in 
this scenario…given the framework?  Because we do have guiding policies, but 
the discretionary part of a policy, which to me, I default to that, [is] in loco 
parentis…I am the parent here while they are in the care of the school.  I am the 
parent and I am to be just a judicious and responsible parent…the standard that I 
would be held to in a legal sense would be much higher than a parent would be.” 
Danielle:  “I think we take a greater role as far as being parents; we attempt to do 
more, not thinking that the parents can’t, but the parents are, they are stretched, 
so we just sort of try and fill in some of those gaps.” 
Melvin:  “I think of my role as a principal, but also my role as a father [Nora: As 
in loco parentis?].  Yes, absolutely.” 
Sarah:  “I think that if I am acting in loco parentis that I am covered by The 
Education Act and if I am ensuring the safety of students, there are certain things 
that I need to do and there are certain laws that I need to follow, and I mean a 
law is a law, so then you would need to follow it.  But when it comes to making a 
decision about discipline or consequences of any kind, then I have some leeway.” 
                                                 
14
 Dr. G. M. Dickinson of Western University offers reasons principals might refer to in loco parentis as 
guiding their decision-making, even though the “doctrine is of less and less relevance, especially in the 
discipline area.”  He reasons “they like the sound of it; it makes them sound learned; they received less than 
an accurate ed law grounding; phrases have a way of hanging on long after their shelf life; and the courts 
haven’t come right out and put a stake through its heart” (personal communication, March 15, 2011). 
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Many principals understood their role in disciplinary decision-making as having 
the ultimate decision or as being at the end of the decision-making chain (research sub-
question 3): 
 Harold:  “Well, I’m the end…because the buck stops here, right?  And I have to 
 answer to the board or the trustees if they get involved, right? 
Frank:  “That persona is still in the schools…of where the buck stops.  You’re the 
end of the line…so you are the top of the food chain in the discipline. I don’t think 
that part of it has really changed because there’s an office; there’s a place to be 
sent…if things go wrong in this school, they’re my responsibility.  If we’ve got 
kids who are truant, who aren’t coming to school, that’s my responsibility, that’s 
my role that I play.  I’ve got to make sure…that the  kids are ready to learn.” 
 Melvin:  “I mean that maybe one of the flaws of our school system is that, you 
 know, we are seen only as authority figures rather than someone who is helping 
 them with the learning and, in particular, in the principal role.  I mean when you 
 end up here, it means you’ve hit the last kind of level that you can.” 
Sarah:  “It [discipline] ends up coming to me…like I do not have to necessarily 
make all the decisions, but in the end when somebody said the buck stops here, it 
does really, and then I mean it does not just stop here.  Then it moves up the 
chain,  you know, to the superintendent, but in my school it comes to me in the 
end.”  
 However, staff sending a misbehaving student to the principal’s office for 
disciplinary consequences was not always perceived by principals as being a necessary 
part of their discretionary decision-making, and not a part of their practice that they 
encouraged (research sub-question 3) : 
 Lauren:  “If the child is always sent to me for the problem, it doesn’t help  
 anything get better in that classroom, so again it is more of the educational 
 component overall…but I deal with playground issues, bus issues and classroom 
 issues…[I am] where the buck stops.” 
Danielle:  “I try to be supportive of my staff.  I believe I have a very strong staff, 
and I also try to encourage them to believe that they have the skills necessary [to 
deal with misbehavior].  I encourage them to ‘own’ the problem because the 
minute they abdicate their authority, I think that they lose their credibility.  I 
support them if they feel that I need to be involved.  I support them, but I’ve also 
said to them that you might not like how I choose to resolve the issue once you 
turn it over to me.” 
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Amanda:  “The cash and carry kinds of behaviors…where somebody is 
misbehaving in the classroom, then they pick up the kid and they bring them to me 
and then I am supposed to take care of them without [knowing the] background.  
So they say he  was talking in my class, interrupting instruction.  Fair enough, but 
by bringing me the cash and carry problem…I won’t have it.  My role for student 
discipline is to track discipline, to track conduct…I want to be at the front end of 
proactive, as opposed to the back end of cleaning up the mess.” 
Nonetheless, many principals also saw one of the dimensions of their role as 
supporting teachers in student disciplinary situations
15
; this support appeared to be an 
expectation in some cases and an influence on their discretionary decision-making 
(research sub-question 2): 
Frank:  “I’d have to get a sense on what his immediate teachers talked about 
[student Gary in vignette].  I’m making some assumptions here.  I’m assuming 
that teachers will expect that this kid gets dealt with because he’s had chances.” 
Shawna:  “My role is to work with my teachers, so that my teachers know our 
overriding philosophy of this school…and if the teachers function with structure 
and routines and expectations in their classroom they end up dealing with all the 
little minor things in the school.  The kids should form relationships with their 
teachers…it’s when the kids that are really struggling and going and having a 
really tough time…distracting the rest of the class, then that becomes my role 
supporting the teachers in that and finding ways to problem-solve with these kids 
that are struggling with being in the classroom.” 
Danielle:  “It [suspension for student Gary in vignette] would depend on your 
staff.  Is your staff going to buy into your feelings about this young man, or are 
they going to say ‘We have to do something’?  So you walk a fine line, and your 
staff needs to feel supported.” 
Lauren:  “You know it [student behavior] just was not appropriate; they were not 
treating a teacher respectfully [and were suspended].  As a first step I like to go 
into the classroom and take [over] the classroom [so that] the teacher and the 
student [have the opportunity to] try to come to terms with what is happening.”  
                                                 
15
 The study of Saskatchewan teachers conducted by Martin et al. (2012) found the majority of teachers’ 
self-reported difficulties with school administrators were when principals or vice-principals “failed to 
support teachers at critical points in time when they genuinely needed leadership and assistance” (p 19); 
many of these times involved behavioral incidents with students. 
222 
 
However, teachers who expected support from their administrators appear to have 
a professional responsibility as well: 
Amanda:  “I said, ‘Your job is to problem-solve with that child and to think of a 
better solution for tomorrow so they can make a better choice for tomorrow.  
Because you send them to me, what do you want me to do?’ So it has to be a 
threat to themselves, threat to others and a threat to a teacher or a respite.  I 
suppose I allow teachers that if they are just fed up.” 
Most of the principals understood a large part of their role as being an 
information-gatherer in disciplinary situations involving students.
16
   The principals 
interpreted knowledge they needed in decision-making as factual information specific to 
the behavioral incident.  This factual information would inform their decision-making 
and would be collected through such means as questioning students, listening to stories, 
and interviewing witnesses.  This information they garnered, then, would be one of the 
kinds of knowledge that would inform their discretionary decision-making (research sub-
question 6): 
Frank:  “But you don’t know until you’ve investigated.  So it’s two weeks [length 
of suspension for student Gary in vignette], but the first part of that also gives you 
time to look into it more.” 
Lauren:  “The issue on the weekend [in vignette] to me is not a school issue.  That 
is an issue that is outside the realm of school and I would try to collect some 
information.” 
Melvin:  “When I make my decision I want to know all of the different stories from 
all of the different people involved in what happened…I want the facts or the 
version of the facts from the people involved.  I want the version of the facts from 
the witnesses.” 
                                                 
16
 T. Greenfield (1980) contends “any administrator who foolishly sets out to base his action on facts alone 
will find himself swept away in the maelstrom of action created by those who will not yield their human 
capacity and—as they see it—their right to decide, to choose, to impose value on the world and to impose 
self and will” (p. 43).  He adds that the “basic consideration in this matter is simply that ought cannot be 
derived from is.  Facts are, but they cannot tell us what to do [emphasis in original]” (p. 43). 
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Danielle:  “I have to be informed.  I cannot make a decision without…it can’t be 
done at arm’s length.  Lots of people do it at arm’s length, but I can’t.” 
Sarah:  “I just make sure I have really clear facts; that I have reports from 
teachers, that I have…the information that I need to explain to the parent that, no, 
this actually did happen and your child was involved, and so I make sure to have 
my ducks in a row…before I call the parent and when I talk to a teacher.” 
Not having all the information may result in principals feeling hesitant or 
conflicted in applying the rules and may undermine their confidence: 
Adam:  “If I can’t get a good read on the situation, if I can’t really figure out 
what has happened, if there is not any clear evidence of what’s actually 
transpired, I really struggle with those situations because I don’t want to punish 
or penalize in any way somebody mistakenly, and so I get very nervous when I 
just don’t have a clear handle on what’s actually transpired.” 
Furthermore, not being fully informed or not gathering all available information 
could result in inappropriate discretionary decision-making: 
Amanda:   “I am not going to make those mistakes [in decision-making] because I 
have done that…before I was an administrator I was a classroom teacher.  That 
happened with me and I wanted him punted and I went down and I was not fully 
informed.  It was bad.  I learned very quickly in my career.” 
Gathering all available information for an informed decision, however, may allow 
principals to justify their decision-making to stakeholders (research sub-question 10): 
Shawna:  “I think in most cases you have to sort of investigate everything, right?  
You have to say in at the beginning that it [suspension] may be right for that many 
days but we need some time to look into things...but our job is to investigate the 
whole thing, right?  Not just the snapshot and I find if you actually investigate 
absolutely everything and put it all together…they [families] accept that because 
you have done the work.” 
 Principals, for the most part, appeared to understand discretionary decision-
making in a collaborative sense, and they valued shared decision-making, especially in 
complex disciplinary situations (research sub-question 3): 
Sarah:  “It could be up to ten days’ suspension if that is what the policy states, and 
then give them [stakeholders] what we’ve decided as a team here and with our 
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superintendent what it would be, especially for something as serious as this 
[vignette].” 
Adam:  “To kind of clarify a little bit…I suggest bringing in school guidance 
counselors or those sort of extra professional people even outside agency people 
[vignette].” 
Shawna:  “I like to think that the discretion that I would use would be going to my 
colleagues within the building.  Almost a team approach in terms of something is 
happening.  What can we do here together?” 
Melvin:  “I would probably seek out somebody that would know a child that I did 
not know to get their advice…as principal of a school, if I have a vice-principal, 
which I do, I would bring the vice-principal in on the decision-making 
process…and I mean certainly I guess I would say even further to that is involve 
the superintendent, but I would also involve the parent in the decision-making 
process as well [vignette].” 
Lauren:  “I know that I have some principals who phone me just to talk things 
over because they do not have a vice-principal and they phone and say ‘I just 
need another view on this.  What are your thoughts?” 
 One principal acknowledged the need for increased collaborative decision-
making: 
Danielle:  “I have to get better at asking other administrators what they have 
done… not that it always guides me, but at least it gives me that spectrum of 
where they’re sitting as well.  I sometimes don’t think to ask.  Then it depends on 
the situation as to which administrator I might phone.” 
 Some principals indicated their decision-making often was shared with their 
school resource officer, especially in issues they saw as having legal overtones, perhaps 
to compensate for their lack of knowledge in a particular area (research sub-question 6): 
Harold:  “No I don’t think he should be charged [student in vignette], but it would 
be up to the resource officer, but a lot of times the resource officer, in my 
experience, has [input]…we have discussed it and come to a consensus.” 
Sarah:  “I will bring in the resource officer and then that would probably go to a 
different level.” 
Lauren:  “I think I would have the resource officer involved as well, and I also 
have a vice-principal, so there would be more than one person involved [response 
to vignette].” 
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 Shared decision-making may also provide some protection against a backlash to 
their decision-making and, seemingly, some justification for that decision. 
Amanda:  “I do not make the decision by myself because I do not want everybody 
coming down on just me.  I wanted a collective decision.” 
 
5.5.3 Theme Three:  Principals’ Espoused and Identified Values in Their 
Discretionary Decision-Making 
This theme focused on principals’ understanding of their valuation processes in 
discretionary decision-making.  The participants understood and acknowledged the place 
of values in their decision-making by explicitly stating and identifying them (research 
sub-question 4, research sub-question 5, and the over-arching research question).   
However, unarticulated values appeared to influence their decision-making as well.  It 
should be noted all principals appeared to value safety as being of primary importance in 
their discretionary decision-making.  This would suggest this value would be at the top of 
a hierarchy of values that inform principals’ decision-making.  School safety appeared to 
pre-empt all other values when principals made decisions. This value is discussed under 
Theme Six. 
Many principals appeared to value responsibility, respect, dignity, caring, 
tolerance, and belonging as guides in decision-making.  These values did not appear to 
assume a hierarchy of importance in their decision-making (research sub-question 5): 
Frank:  “When the kid does swear at a teacher…do we run and get in their 
face…Or do we figure out why and then you show them how to take responsibility 
for the mistake they made?” 
Shawna:  “So if I treat them like they are my own kids, that means with respect…I 
try very hard to work from a respect issue.  If I want my kids in the building to be 
respectful, I better be treating them respectfully as well…treating people with 
dignity…there is hope…a caring way.” 
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Amanda:  “Belonging…love, kindness, respect, mutual respect, security [are 
values that] inform my decisions.” 
Harold:  “Our assemblies are based on the Circle of Courage and they are 
belonging, generosity, mastery and independence.  Those are what guide us 
throughout the year…we work on that…[I] model and believe in them.” 
Melvin:  “Really it is to be kind to others and try to be kind to yourself and 
respect everybody that you interact with.” 
Lauren:  “I just mean the honor, respect, responsibility kind of thing [informs my 
decisions]…you know are they being respectful, are they being honest, have they 
been treating others how they want to be treated?” 
Sarah:  “I would find that there is compassion.  There is a lot of caring that goes 
into thoughts before I give out any kind of consequence…as long as you have 
respected their child and respected the other children of the other parents.” 
Adam:  “Tolerance as a value is huge for me and I do not feel there is enough 
tolerance in our system any more.  When we talk about the need for tolerance, but 
actually I find that we are becoming increasing intolerant as a society.” 
Frank:  “Everyone needs to be heard…everyone belongs here…everybody has 
value, everyone has core strengths.” 
Personal religious values were not explicitly indicated by most principals as 
informing their decision-making; however, decision-making may be seen by principals as 
being guided sometimes by a personal philosophy: 
Shawna:  “It’s hope and faith that guides you.  As opposed to my religion…it is 
about humankind, it is not about religion.” 
 
Sarah:  “I have my own conscience as well, my own beliefs in being honest and 
being kind to people.” 
 
Danielle:  “I think it is more like a personal philosophy about the worth of young 
people and where they belong in our society.  So recognizing their worth would 
be a value as well.” 
Three principals, however, acknowledged the influence of their personal religion 
in their discretionary decision-making: 
Frank:  “I’ve been brought up in the Christian church, I’ve been brought up in a 
Christian family, and it cannot impact my decisions…but that’s part of the 
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Christian values, like when I said it’s not fundamental, but that is the welcoming 
piece of it, that we all add value to it, that’s part of my faith.” 
Danielle:  “You know that [Christian values] is probably part of my underlying 
values…you know only church on Sunday and Sunday school, but it was a pretty 
strong message.  We need to treat people well…it’s part of who I am…I just sort 
of think of how I was raised has sort of informed my values.” 
Amanda:  “I am a spiritual person…I am still Christian…but more on the 
spiritual as I will get older I think, and so I always encourage with students that 
they have outlets.” 
Many principals viewed the value of acting in the best interests of their students 
as guiding their discretionary decision-making.  This articulated value appeared to be 
fundamental to their decision-making (research sub-question 5): 
Sarah:  “It [decision-making] also has to be good for the child.” 
Adam:  “What is going to keep them safe to start with and what is going to be the 
best response to ensure their learning program, [that] their learning is as good as 
we can make it.” 
Amanda:  “You make them [decisions] in the best interests of the family, of the 
child always.  It is always about the child…principals make decisions not 
according to The Education Act, not according to the building…they make it in 
the best interests of the child at that time.” 
Harold:  “You’re dealing with people your judgment can affect tremendously, and 
it should always be on the best interests of the individuals involved.” 
Danielle:  “I would not [doubt myself] if I feel like I have made the decision with 
the best interests of the student…is it in the best interests of the young person?  
And whose best interests does this serve?  And if it’s not the young person, then I 
need to go back and rethink it.  Who am I really making happy?” 
Melvin:  “Again it comes down to whatever the rule, law or procedure is.  If it is 
something that is going to be hurtful to a community or to a child, I think it is 
asinine…like tardiness?  Who cares?  Like what is best for the kid.” 
Two principals perceived the  rights of students and the inherent dignity involved 
with rights as values informing their decision-making: 
Danielle:  “Yes, students at the center of the decision-making process…student 
rights would inform the decision…it’s a piece I sort of consider separate from the 
work.” 
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Melvin:  I mean they have the basic rights that every human being does.  Do we 
need to have a Charter of Rights for students?  Maybe for some of those 
hardliners; for me, no…there is a basic right that these kids have to be treated 
with respect.” 
The principals also appeared to value student-centered decision-making: 
Frank:  “In public education…we come at it with more of a child-centered  
[approach]…I don’t think discipline and child-centered education go hand in 
hand today…child-centered would be number one” 
 
Danielle:  “It’s the young person.  We have to keep the student at the center all the 
time…the entire ecology of the young person…I am very student-centered.  
Everything that I do, my first question to myself is  who is at the center of the 
circle?” 
 
Others valued what they believed was the exercise of good judgment for students 
in their decision-making.  They valued common sense decision-making, which they 
seemed to understand as being synonymous with good judgment: 
Lauren:  “I think you have to model good judgment…I think people that make 
more good judgments maybe are more ‘people type’ persons.  People, you know, 
worry more about the instructional side of teaching children…[in order] to make 
good choices…it makes a huge difference when you are dealing with people, the 
decisions you make because there could be long-lasting consequences.” 
Melvin:  “We are given, as principals, a lot of discretion in terms of what we 
make decisions about.  I said the common sense decision-making…as long as you 
are making decisions with common sense, you are going to be supported.” 
Amanda:  “I think you have to be able to exercise good judgment to be in this 
business, and principals are leaving at an alarming rate and they are not staying 
in this.” 
Frank:  “I think what makes a poor principal is an inability to make good 
judgment calls…walk in to any community and they’ll tell you whether they’ve got 
a good principal at their school or not…their ability to make good calls.  To make 
good, consistent, reasonable decisions…but there has to be some sort of rhyme 
and reason to it…if you’re seen as someone who is approachable, that people can 
talk to, and that you’re fair.  That all has to do with good judgment and common 
sense.” 
Shawna:  “I mean you are hoping you’re trying to exercise good judgment with a 
lot of things…why would I apply this policy if it does not make sense?” 
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Harold:  “This is where common sense comes in, right?  It’s how you react, or 
base your decision.” 
Lauren:  “I mean it is reading people and making judgments about people…we 
made a judgment that we invested the time in this child and we tried to teach him 
how to make good choices.” 
For some, making good judgments included making moral judgments: 
Miriam:  “I guess there’s sort of a moral judgment as to what we think is the right 
thing for that person or that student…I think it’s moral, character development.  
Is this right? Is this wrong?  Is this going to help the child make better decisions 
in the future?” 
Shawna:  “You have morals, right?  The difference between what is right and 
wrong.  Sometimes there are things that are morally, you just know you’ve got to 
do something because it’s good for that kid.” 
Interestingly, one principal, while acknowledging his values, indicated he did not 
want to impose them on students: 
Melvin:  “It is not my job to impose my values on them, but it is my job to use the 
values that I was raised on to teach these children and that is not to impose and 
say that they have to think the way I do.” 
 
5.5.4 Theme Four: Principals’ Understanding of the Significance of 
Experience in Discretionary Decision-Making 
This theme focused on the way in which principals appeared to understand the 
role experience played in their discretionary decision-making.  The participants 
understood experience in various ways, such as in the length of their professional 
experience, as an aid to establishing comfort with and confidence in their decision-
making, as serving to create trust among stakeholders, as being essential in relationship-
building, and as being an integral component of justification and accountability (research 
sub-question 2, research sub-question 6, research sub-question 9, and research sub-
question 10).   
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Most principals noted the way in which their professional experience affected 
their discretionary decision-making.  Their understanding of experience, however, may 
refer to their interpretation of the type of specific information pertinent to a particular 
case they believed they required to inform their decision-making (research sub-question 
6):
17
  
Lauren:  “[I make] a judgment call…based on my experience and also on the 
experience that others who have been around longer have had with that 
particular child.” 
 
Adam:  “When you are responding in a disciplinary sense, something has 
happened.  What you want is to have it not happen again, and so if I feel 
comfortable given the responses I get as we are working through the process…. 
If I had a sense that this could be something that might come back, then my 
response may have been far more significant....I think I learned that from 
experience…[that] the contextual element of response is super important.” 
Amanda:   “[I consider] past experiences, like I knit together all the past 
experiences and I fuse that with the families that I am dealing with…I won’t be in 
it [the principalship] ten years from now, but I will make a different decision 
tomorrow just from today…just because I learned more today than I did 
yesterday, and so now I know.” 
Harold, who will retire at the end of the current school year, understood 
experience as an important influence in his decision-making: 
Harold:  “I don’t call my resource officer unless it’s a serious situation...and I 
think it’s through experience…I am confident to make decisions…you have 
interpersonal skills, and common sense skills…but I think common sense comes 
from confidence and experience, as a teacher, as an administrator, as an 
educator….” 
                                                 
17
 Dr. D. Allison of Western University notes this distinction and suggests “time in role can be very 
misleading,” and that it is “quite separate from time on the job.”  Some principals can benefit from their 
experience more than others.  He maintains “experience is necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
expertise”; in other words, experience “doesn’t guarantee” expertise.  Principals gain expertise by 
exposure, that is, “doing the work that is connected to the role,” and by their “ability to benefit from the 
experience, and learn from it, and make sense of it.”  “Reputation amongst your peers” or “judgment of 
your peers” are conditions that are necessary for one to be considered an expert (personal communication, 
July 11, 2011).   
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He stressed frequently throughout the interview the number of schools where he 
had worked, and how his experiences had affected the exercise of his discretion: 
Harold:  “Experience and consensus…I make decisions that way because I think 
it’s common sense, and experience and judgment, that I will not do things that 
some others [principals] do…I feel comfortable enough in my experience that I’ll 
deal with it this way, instead of thinking, okay this situation happened, I have to 
do this.  This situation happened, I have to do that.” 
For some principals notions of comfort with, and confidence in, their decision-
making were connected with experience.   The amount of time principals spent in the role 
may or may not provide them with confidence in decision-making:  
Adam:  “I do find I second guess myself a lot and I think it has mostly to do with 
the fact that, professionally-speaking, I spent most of my career as a high school 
teacher.  That’s what I trained for, that is what I worked in for fifteen years.  Now 
I find myself trying to understand the world of elementary education and it’s not 
one that I have any background, training or experience in.  So even now, three 
years in, I still find myself very much out of my depth in terms of professional 
information and, to be perfectly honest, interest….[because of a knowledge gap], 
and so in that sense I really do find myself kind of every day thinking, is this the 
right way to decide?” 
Miriam:  “I think I’m very good at what I do, even though I question myself 
sometimes....I sometimes think…probably I question myself when, sort of, you 
know, when it rains, it pours, when you have one of those days.” 
Shawna:  “I just think I have more memory bank to draw from…more experience.  
You go, ‘I have been in this situation; this is what I did.  This worked, this didn’t.’  
I think that’s where the confidence comes, in knowing that I have been in this 
situation before and this is how it’s going to be.” 
Melvin:  “I think that the thing we suffer from in education is that we constantly 
are questioning ourselves about our decision-making process without really 
thinking it through.  Are we comfortable with it?  I think we second guess 
sometimes.  Do I?  I am getting way better than not.  I am way more comfortable 
than I was five years ago…because you are dealing with everybody else’s shit all 
the time.  You are dealing with everybody else’s discipline all the time.  And so to 
me that empowers you.  You say ‘Look you brought them [students] to me.  You 
are going to be okay with what I am going to do here.  Now if you have any 
questions, feel free to ask and we will talk about it, but if you are going to submit 
to my authority, if you want to give up your decision-making in this, then we 
better be comfortable with it.’ And that is not an arrogance thing, that is just up 
front.” 
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Sarah:  “The more situations you have to deal with, the more difficult situations 
you have to deal with, I think you develop a little bit more experience dealing with 
those things…[and you gain] more confidence as well, and I think confidence is 
part of that.  You know when you are talking about that parent who is really 
rough around the edges and that you know when you phone you might get yelled 
at and those you get used to, not taking things as personally, I think, when you 
have more experience.” 
Sometimes the opportunity to defend a decision may provide a principal with a 
measure of confidence, despite having not extensive experience in the role (research sub-
question 10): 
Danielle:  “I guess because I am fairly new to the role…sometimes I will just ask 
for the clarification around something and then say, ‘This is what I am thinking I 
might like to do,’ and as long as I can sort of defend my decision I do not spend a 
whole lot of time second guessing myself.” 
Yet, one principal believed his two years’ experience as a principal enabled him 
to justify his decision-making to educational stake-holders (research sub-question 10): 
Melvin:  “Well, I think you know part of the justification has to come based on 
[your] experience.” 
The lack of administrative and other experience, on the other hand, could be seen 
as an influence hindering principals’ discretionary decision-making.  Some principals 
appeared to judge younger administrators based on their years in the role: 
Danielle:  “Four years ago, I had no intention of being an administrator…but I 
looked around at those people who were becoming administrators and it 
concerned me and I thought I can do that and maybe I need to do that…just some 
of the people that were being appointed, they lacked experience.  They were 
young, with three years or four years in a classroom…well, their judgment’s 
going to be limited, their scope is narrow; they don’t have that field of 
opportunities and exposures.  I think they stick a little closer to the script.  I think 
that’s when you tend to stick to the book [when you are inexperienced].” 
Shawna:  “[When I would be] sitting around the table with young principals or 
young vice-principals or whatever, I would sit and listen and I would think, yes, 
experience does definitely [inform my decisions] because you have been in a 
number of different schools and in different situations.  You can sort of almost see 
how things can, not that you see how they play out, right?  But you learn to say 
what can I deal with?  What can I control?  What can I make a decision about?  
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And what I can’t?  So I guess that obviously is a huge difference, is the 
experiences you’ve had.” 
Harold:  “Common sense. Probably the number one thing that drives me…in my 
situation, I think that your interpersonal skills and the fact that you understand 
what common sense is will help you to make the decision. It comes with 
experience [and] common sense.  I think new principals have to be more careful 
that they’re following board policy in situations.” 
For other principals, experience appears to allow them the discretion to determine 
whether or not to enforce policy: 
Miriam:  “I feel it is my obligation [to enforce rules, policies, The Education Act].  
I feel fine about it and they influence my decisions a lot.  But as I’m saying, I also 
think I’m smart enough and I’ve been around enough that I use some of that 
discretion in discipline issues.” 
Danielle:  “I think you have to be within a stone’s throw of accepted procedures.  
I do not think you want to feel like you are that one vigilante person out there 
without the support of the school system behind you…and maybe with time and 
experience, I’d be okay with that.” 
Most of the administrators seemed to understand their ability to exercise 
discretion in their decision-making as being related to the level of trust they were able to 
establish with staff, students and their families, their supervisors, and other stakeholders.  
By establishing trust with various stakeholders, they also appeared, in some instances, to 
build confidence in their own decision-making.  They also suggested they might create an 
appropriate measure of accountability (research sub-question 9): 
Frank:  “As administrators, you’ve got to build trust.  They [stakeholders] are 
going to trust that you’re making a decision on some sound backing and moral 
grounds, and that it’s in keeping, and that you’re consistent.” 
Harold:  “My superintendent is very understanding.  He must trust my judgment.  
It’s not going to come given to you.” 
Melvin:  “You know, they [principals] did not get there by accident, and I would 
like to think that the people in the principalship have displayed some sort of 
leadership or courage that has allowed them to be trusted, not just by their 
employer, but by the community.” 
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Shawna:  “I think that if you build a good relationship with the parents when stuff 
happens, they trust you.  I’ve had parents say to me, ‘You know what?  We know 
you care about our kids.’  I am sure there are ones out there that probably will 
disagree, and I know they’re there, too, right?” 
Adam:  “If you are not responding in a way that is acceptable to the community, 
you’ll quickly lose any support you have of that community and then your job 
becomes impossible, so you know you need to be somewhere in that range of 
acceptability for the community you’re serving.  If you do not have a trust 
relationship then I would say, particularly in this community, you can’t move 
forward with anything…if you are exercising bad judgment, you know, people will 
notice soon enough, and then you will not have the confidence of the staff, the 
parents or even the children.”   
The establishment of trust with stakeholders might also enable them to provide 
justification for their decisions (research sub-question 10): 
Sarah:  “I think when you put the time and effort into it [considering 
circumstances], you cut down the number of incidents with those particular 
children by a lot because when you are doing that you are building relationships 
and you are building trust…there are probably certain parents that if I get to 
know the situation and I know the parents, but I make sure that we’re dealing with 
the situation in a way that I can then defend or explain, or justify.” 
The principals appeared to emphasize the need to build strong relationships in 
their schools, which helped not only to build trust, but also to enhance their judgment as 
decision-makers and resulted in the perception of effectiveness in their roles, and 
provided them with a measure of accountability (research sub-question 9): 
Miriam:  “I think effective principals…build relationships with kids and 
community and parents…effectiveness [is] related to their ability to exercise  
good judgment…I mean, if you’re an effective principal, and you’ve built good 
relationships and you have good communication, I think people believe that you 
do make good judgments.” 
Amanda:  “I think a lot of administrative work is like fly fishing.  You get the kid 
on the hook.  You’ve got to let him run for a while...you know what I mean?  You 
have got to build that relationship so they come back in.  A lot of us want to bring 
him in right away and throw him on the dock…and there is also a ‘customer 
service’ kind of administrator.  They are just going somewhere else.  They are in 
the job for short-term, because they are not building relationships.  You need to 
build relationships with kids and with staff.” 
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Some principals believed they could not make decisions without knowing the 
family or the students; knowing the individuals involved appeared to be part of the 
knowledge principals needed to make appropriate discretionary decisions ( research sub-
questions number 6 and 7): 
Danielle:  “I have to know Gary [student in vignette].  I have to know his family.  I 
have to be informed.  I cannot make a decision without [this information].  It can’t 
be done at arm’s length.  Lots of people do it at arm’s length, but I can’t.  Without 
the emotion of knowing the kid, having the connection.  It is not about a 
relationship, it is about having a connection with that kid, and if it were just a 
paper and pencil activity, it would be much easier to just come up with a decision, 
but they are never just papers or pencils.  They are really living and breathing 
young people and decisions that I make will impact them.” 
Melvin:  “To me it is that building of a relationship that is the hammer.  It is not 
finding ways to be punitive to kids.  If we set up our plan around being punitive, 
we are in trouble… I would say nine out of ten times the kids will turn over 
whatever I think that they have before I have to search them and that is a part of 
building that relationship.” 
Amanda:  “But I better know my families, so discretion could be that the kid did 
not eat this morning, therefore he was an absolute ass in class, and I know that, 
so I need to get him something to eat.” 
 The specialized knowledge principals indicated they would need in their decision-
making, in addition to the facts of a particular disciplinary case, may include a respect for 
the dignity of the individual (research sub-question 6): 
Shawna:  “I have some students who come from very traditional First Nations’ 
beliefs.  So we have to be respectful of everyone’s faith.  When we are talking with 
our First Nations kids I always try to find out from them if they grew up 
traditionally, and if they grew up traditionally and if they have faith in their 
elders.  Those are really important pieces to know about our kids that always 
comes back to knowing your kids.” 
Melvin:  “Secondly, [my decision-making] would be based on my knowledge of 
the individual kid.” 
Lauren:  “The way I approached her [misbehaving student] was based on what I 
knew about the community, or about her community or her family, and trying to 
build a relationship with her…and her grandma phoned me one day because of 
something that happened and I said, ‘You know who I am and that I worked with 
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your grandchildren before this.’  She said, ‘Yes, I know that is why I am calling 
you,’ because I had already made a connection, so I think it is really important.” 
 
5.5.5 Theme Five: The Role of Policy/Legislation in Principals’ Use of 
Discretion in Their Disciplinary Decision-Making 
 The participants appeared to understand in various ways the influences of policy 
and legislation upon their discretionary decision-making, for example, as a support, as a 
guide, or even as a defense against possible litigation (research sub-question 4 and 
research sub-question 7). 
 The principals’ understanding of their obligation to follow policy could be 
reflected in their responses to the vignette questions.  Nine of the ten principals indicated 
they would impose a suspension on the student, Gary; however, the length and type of 
suspension would vary anywhere from a three-day suspension to the full ten days, as 
outlined in the policy.  One principal, Danielle, indicated an in-school suspension would 
be levied but for an unspecified time.  Amanda indicated she would not suspend the 
student, regardless of the policy.    
 Some principals appeared not to be rule-bound and believed they were afforded 
considerable flexibility in enforcing policies in many situations (research sub-question 4).  
There appeared to be times when they felt they could ignore the established rule, law, or 
policy: 
Adam:  “We talked about The Education Act [(1995)].  It is a pretty loosey-goosey 
description of what power is in terms of the principal’s discretion…how you apply 
things.  There you got huge amounts of leeway.  There are other policies that are 
far more tightly defined, and so I think a wise person, feeling that a policy does 
not accurately address the situation you are facing, consults.” 
Danielle:  “It depends on whether it is a reasonable and rational rule, law, or 
procedure…I can ignore it easily…is it reasonable and is it good for students?” 
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Melvin:  “I feel that I have been trusted to make the common sense decision.  I 
think the bounds of the rules are very flexible.” 
Frank: “If we went by the letter of the law of The Education Act [1995], schools 
would be empty, half the schools in this city would be empty…I think the 
expectations of what the Education Act states and what is the day-to-day practice 
in a school, I think they’re two different things.” 
Lauren:  “I am trying to work within it [suspension policy] for the betterment of 
the student.” 
Amanda:  “I agree that there needs to be some form of guideline, but I wish there 
weren’t rules and I wish there weren’t guidelines.” 
 One principal felt obligated to enforce policy based on his understanding of the 
school board expectations about how important the policy was: 
Frank:  “You need to have an understanding of what the board, of what our 
particular school board is asking of you and what they expect, and sometimes it 
always isn’t in line with personal philosophies of what you like to see in a school, 
so I don’t follow the board policy unless I’m told to…I guess it’s a personal read 
on how pressing it is.” 
 Another principal felt bound more by the school board policy than by The 
Education Act (1995): 
Sarah:  “First thing I go to would be our school board policies and our 
procedures.  If it was something serious, I consult that.” 
Amanda took the discussion to another level.  She saw the ignoring of policy, or 
selective enforcement, as a catalyst for change: 
Amanda:  “I am willing to bend that policy…based on personal values, just on 
who I am as a person and what the needs are…somebody has to sort of challenge 
an occasional policy and law, otherwise you do not get the [high school] 
daycare.” 
 Sometimes the participants felt policy or legislation could be used as a means to 
defend their decisions, if they were questioned by parents or other stakeholders: 
Miriam: “I usually always use it [The Education Act (1995)]...it helps to back 
you.” 
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Harold:  “You can say ‘this is the situation’ and if you need to fall back on school 
board policy at those times [parental challenge of a decision], you can because 
they will likely look toward the school (and challenge you on that).” 
Shawna:  “It is very important to [follow the law], and so if I went to [the 
students’] lockers and said ‘You know what? The lockers are the school’s.  I can 
open them.’” 
Frank:  “Usually more often than not, you can get a consensus…it isn’t always 
agreement about the discipline…the consequence that has to happen, and if you 
can’t, that’s when you can fall back on policy and say, ‘You know, The Education 
Act says I can suspend up to three days for this without telling anyone.  I’m just 
doing it.’” 
Most of the participants did not claim to know the school division policies 
relating to discipline well (other than the policy on suspension), and three admitted their 
knowledge of The Education Act (1995) was negligible: “Don’t know it well” (Danielle); 
“Do I know it?  Yeah, no, not really” (Melvin); and “I couldn’t spout any of that, any 
specific thing, but I know I’ve read it” (Harold).  Frank, however, agreed that he knew the 
provincial legislation “somewhat, but it’s kind of archaic,” an opinion shared by Shawna. 
Sarah indicated she had “read” The Education Act (1995), but it was not “the first thing” 
she went to when a “serious” issue with a student arose.  She explained, “[The] first thing 
I go to would be our school board policies and our procedures.”  Lauren indicated she 
believed that “at the high school…you have to have a better knowledge of the law.”  
Miriam added she would “keep…those pages about suspension and gross misconduct and 
keep them photocopied and handy.…I would enforce it [The Education Act (1995)] as I 
saw fit.”  Amanda believed “principals make decisions not according to The Education 
Act [1995].”  Only one participant mentioned relevant case law and its impact upon his 
decision-making.  Adam indicated principals “need to be guided by that case law 
response and you need to be within the certain range,” although he did not mention any 
specific cases that might be germane to decision-making in disciplinary situations.  
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At other times, the principals felt policy was to be used as a guideline for 
decision-making, and the repercussions for not referring to it, they believed, could be 
significant—litigation, for example.  In terms of the third research sub-question regarding 
how they understood and practiced discretion, the principals appeared to understand 
discretion as being an inherent part of policy and indicated they had the flexibility to 
exercise it in their decision-making in most situations.  Certainly, there were areas in 
which  the participants believed that policy must not only be consulted but also adhered 
to, especially in the area of school safety.  They appeared to feel rule-bound and unable  
to exercise any discretion in occurrences that jeopardized student safety:  
Frank:  “We open ourselves up in today’s world to court cases and criticism if we 
don’t follow [policy]…you can always push the fire uphill if you use discretion, 
which I believe most educators do, and use policies as a guideline; however, I 
wouldn’t use violence policies as a guideline, but there are attendance things… 
that we don’t follow on a daily basis by the letter of the law, because in any given 
situation it’s not the best thing for that child.” 
Sarah:  “I just had to explain that for this type of incident [weapon in school] that 
typically it could be up to ten days’ suspension if that is what the policy states….” 
Lauren:  “You know the policy [described in vignette] is meant as a guideline, a 
very strong guideline, but you have to take in the circumstances that are 
happening at the school.” 
Melvin:  “[I am] highly discretionary, but you know what?  Really where I am not 
discretionary about is safety.  Everything else is pretty much open.” 
One principal felt very strongly that the policy in the vignette was a zero tolerance 
policy that he was obligated to enforce.  Moreover, adhering to it could serve him well if 
a related incident were to occur in the future: 
Harold:  “First of all, it’s a zero tolerance policy.  If that school policy wasn’t in 
place, I would handle it much differently.  So I think the fault is the school policy 
right here…I think you have to follow that…and the reason why is it could come 
back and could backfire on you if something happens…if he comes back in a week 
and shoots somebody then, and everybody knew he had the other gun, you are 
hanging yourself.” 
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Other principals indicated that zero tolerance still provided them with flexibility 
in their decision-making: 
Lauren:  “It depends on the circumstances…I have a hard time enforcing…zero 
tolerance [in] a situation like that [fighting].” 
 
Melvin:  “No enforcement [of zero tolerance].  Not even close.” 
One principal desired more policy directives and less discretion for protection 
against what she saw as increasing litigation in the field of education.  Increased legal 
knowledge on the part of principals did not appear to be considered: 
Miriam:  “Maybe as principals we’re going to start to need things a little more 
cut and dried…more clear, you know and I keep coming back to…we’re [going to 
be seeing] them [lawsuits].  I don’t feel I need that right now, but that might be 
something in the future…something [policy] that would always back us.”  
In general, the principals seemed to feel policy could serve as a framework to 
inform their decisions, in addition to other influences: 
Adam:  “Given the framework, because we do have guiding policies, but for the 
discretionary part of a policy…I default to…in loco parentis.” 
Lauren:  “We sometimes have the constable in just to find out legal ramifications 
depending on what the issue is.  I do go to the website and look at the policies and 
then procedures, I guess…but, it [policy] certainly guides me, especially in one of 
those situations where you are torn, which way to go with it.  I mean certainly 
looking at the admin procedures and seeing what the guidelines are.”
18
  
Policy could also be relied upon in other ways, especially by those who wished to 
use it for their own advantage, such as possible career advancement; self-serving reliance 
on policy emerged as an inappropriate exercise of discretion (research sub-question 7):  
Amanda:  “They [principals who desire promotion] are going to follow every 
policy, dot every ‘i’.  They are not going to challenge policies, rules, and 
procedures.” 
                                                 
18
 It is worthwhile to note the broadly accepted distinctions between policy and procedure described on 
pages 80–81.  
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Danielle:  “The ones that are cut and dried, they hide behind the suit…the 
downtown suit.  There are principals who are looking to move up to bigger 
schools and knowing that they need to have proven that they can ‘handle it,’ 
whatever that means…sticking to the policies, the scripts.” 
Other inappropriate decision-making identified by the principals included a 
reliance on policy for the ease it provides in decision-making for the administrator, as 
opposed to exercising discretion, which requires more thought, judgment and, sometimes, 
courage: 
Melvin:  “They [some principals]are fearful of what that might mean in terms of 
their job performance…[they] do not handle conflict well and so it’s easier to say 
‘It is out of my hands,’ than it is to actually use some discretion in making some 
decisions about how you treat kids…they hide behind the rule book or the 
bureaucratic clock.” 
 Danielle: “It is very easy to stick to a policy.” 
Harold:  “I follow school board policy.  It’s easier that way.  Suspend him 
[student in vignette] for two weeks because that’s the school board policy, and if 
he doesn’t agree with it, then I’m sorry, that’s the policy and if you [student’s 
father] need to, you need to take it up with the school board.” 
Frank:  “Bringing a gun into school with the intent of intimidating or creating 
violence in the school.  That’s a policy that’s easy to follow.  It’s the social 
policies that are tough.  It’s the bullying and the intimidating, the things that 
aren’t so ‘in your face.’  Those are tough.” 
 Still, other reasons for inappropriate decision-making may include administrators’ 
failure to keep up to date on policies, a perception that they cannot exercise discretion or 
that they lack alternatives to following policies, and sheer laziness: 
 Harold:  “There are those that fall behind the policies…maybe they’re not able to 
 control it themselves…maybe they don’t want to bother, maybe this is the way 
 they think you have to go.” 
 One principal indicated policy served as a basis for discretion, or as an initial  
point from which to begin decision-making: 
Adam:  “Policies are great in that they give you an anchor and anchoring point to 
start from, and so that policy is your reference point, and then from there that 
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discretionary part…then you go from that anchor point to decide where you need 
to go.” 
 
5.5.6 Theme Six: Student-Specific Influences Affecting Principals’ 
Discretionary Decision-Making 
 This theme focused on the way in which influences that were specific to the 
student(s) involved in the misbehavior affected the principals’ discretionary decision-
making.  The participants appeared to understand in various ways student-specific 
influences upon their discretionary decision-making, such as safety considerations, the 
intent behind student behavior, the student’s personal circumstances, equitable treatment, 
the student’s academic achievement, the reaction of the misbehaving student, the 
educative goal of discipline, the message to stake-holders, and the student’s disciplinary 
history (research sub-question 4,  research sub-question 5, and research sub-question 7).  
When they spoke about influences affecting their exercise of discretion, all 
principals identified those which were specific to the particular student(s) involved in the 
disciplinary situation, as opposed to pressures that were external to the situation.  The 
primary consideration in their decision-making was the safety threat the actions of the 
misbehaving student posed to the school, students, and staff.  Many participants alluded 
to their “responsibility” or “duty” in this regard.  The principals appeared to value school 
safety above all else; if the safety of students, staff, or the school were jeopardized in any 
way by the actions of any student(s), their discretionary decision-making would be 
influenced: 
Amanda:  “When you are an administrator in the building, you have to be able to 
have the discretion of deciding what is best at this time…you will always question 
your next move so you have to hope that 90% of the decisions you make are going 
to be great.  So in my discretion, I am in charge of this building which has taken 
me a lot to get my head around.  Oh, my good God!  I am in charge of this 
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building.  The care and safety of everybody in this building…the care, concern 
and safety of the building, of all.  That is a pretty daunting job.”  
Harold:  “Obviously, the safety of the individuals, on all sides [informs decision-
making]…the entire school, and on both sides of the question, of the individuals 
or the groups or whatever.” 
Adam:  “Safety is definitely the priority…for safety in the school, safety outside of 
the school….” 
Melvin:  “My job is to create a safe environment for education and having a 
pellet gun or gun or whatever at school is not a safe situation…I think there is an 
expectation within any community across the world that a school is a safe haven 
for kids to learn.  I think my role as a principal, but also my role as a father… 
says that I have to govern the safety of the kids as I’d want to for my child, too.” 
 For some principals, issues of school safety meant they were left with no 
discretion in their decision-making:  
Lauren:  “When it is a safety issue, I think we have to be really tough on safety 
issues [and follow policy].” 
Sarah:  “If it is something to do with safety, that is for sure the kind of time when I 
call my superintendent because when we are talking about safety it is something 
that could result in harm to somebody…I would say I have less [discretion].” 
Frank:  “I think I bend them [rules].  I don’t think I ever ignore them, and if it’s a 
safety issue, I’d never.” 
 The principals also used school safety as a justification for their decision-making 
by basing a decision on whether or not a student posed a threat to school safety (research 
sub-question 10): 
Shawna:  “I would have to have a great big picture here.  I could only justify that 
[a ten day suspension] if, in fact, there were safety issues where he was looking to 
harm someone.  Safety for all in the school [is paramount].” 
Another influence upon principals’ discretionary decision-making—student 
intent—related directly to principals’ concern for school safety.  The intent of the 
offending student was especially noticeable in the vignette question; all of the 
participants indicated that Gary’s motive for bringing a weapon to school would clearly 
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mitigate, or aggravate, the circumstances and affect policy enforcement (research sub-
question 4):  
Sarah:  “So I would not have any hesitation about a suspension and because it 
was a full gun and it would depend what he did with that if he had pointed it at 
someone or taken it out of his backpack.”  
Miriam:  “I think I would do the three day [suspension as opposed to ten days] 
because it wasn’t used in a threatening manner, it isn’t a sharp knife and it isn’t a 
different type of gun…because I don’t think he brought it with the intent…he has 
to know you can’t bring it to school, intent or no intent.” 
Shawna:  “It’s so important when we frame it we are not sending him away…we 
want to be able to work with him…find him some help because somehow he had a 
need to bring that to school.  What was the need about?  Is there something 
happening with friends that he needs to show that?” 
Danielle:  “Maybe in-school suspension, maybe not that great of a length.  A 
pellet gun can still do damage, but I do not believe that this is about intent to 
harm in any way.” 
Adam:  “Gary tells me that nowhere was an intention of his to use it [gun] in any 
sort of aggressive way with other children on the school yard, and so to me if that 
would be a circumstance, that may shape [my] response a little differently.” 
Melvin:  “I probably would not follow the minimum two weeks…it would all 
depend on the circumstances in terms of my read of him in my office and the risk 
that I thought he presented to the school…my read on his emotional state and the 
reason for why the gun is here.” 
Lauren:  “I don’t think he has brought the pellet gun to school with the intent of 
harming anybody or threatening anyone.  There has got to be a consequence 
because he did bring the pellet gun to school, but is it a straight blanket two-week 
suspension?  I think it is really important to know the intent the child had and 
whether he had threatened anybody with this gun.” 
Harold:  “Do you enforce that policy?  The other aspect of it is a boy is bringing a 
pellet gun to show his friends.  He’s not bringing it to harm others.” 
Frank:  “And the whole intention, it all depends on what the child’s intention 
was.” 
Amanda:  “I would not [enforce a school suspension].  I do not think he brought it 
to do any harm.  I think he brought it just to show his friends, just like the boy in 
my school a couple of years back who brought a little knife.  He had no intention 
of using it.” 
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The personal circumstance of a student also influenced the principals’ 
discretionary decision-making. A student’s personal situation was one type of knowledge 
the principals indicated they required in order to exercise discretion (research sub-
question 6):   
Amanda:  “We always look at nutrition.  One of the things I look at first is 
nutrition to see if they had eaten.  Because if blood sugar drops, then discipline 
goes up.  I also look at the construct of the house.” 
Shawna:  “It’s always context.  I mean for a kid using the ‘f-off’ language there is 
context around that.  If last night all hell broke loose at home, and mom and dad 
were fighting and the police came out to the house and you find out that the kids 
were actually apprehended, taken by social services, and then they’re still 
plunked here the next day at school.  They’re kept here and we find out that they 
have been placed in foster care and all of a sudden the kid starts swearing.  Give 
me a break.  Of course we are going to do something different with that child. 
That is where your discretion is.  It’s about context.” 
Lauren:  “The voice of reason or the judgment that a person has [is] based on 
knowing background.  Discretion is based on the background information that 
may play or influence a decision.”  
For many principals, it was important to ensure that students be seen to be treated 
fairly (research sub-question 4).  They seemed to want to be perceived as being fair in 
their discretionary decision-making.  Their consideration of personal circumstance in the 
exercise of discretion appeared related to what they believed would result in the equitable 
treatment of students: 
Sarah:  “Equal doesn’t mean equitable.  So it depends on the student, what their 
needs are…how I figure out how that student ticks.  It helps me to figure out how I 
can approach the situation with that particular student and for every student it is 
different because they each have their own personalities and their own strengths 
and weaknesses and their own stories at home as well.”   
Melvin:  “For instance in a situation I have been in where there was a knife 
brought by two different students, one got a one-day suspension and the other got 
a seven-day suspension.  The difference was one admitted to having the knife and 
admitted to what they did…and the other one threatened to shank six 
students…denied saying it to anybody, lied about it.  I just said, ‘You know what, 
you need some time off to think about that.  We need to look at your total risk 
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assessment.’  So again it was based on the individual kid and the individual 
situation…it is very contextual.” 
Harold:  “You have to look at the situation before you deal with it…it [discretion] 
would enable you to make a more fair decision…fairness is that all parties believe 
they’ve been treated, and I won’t even say equally, but fairly, and that they 
understand from both sides.” 
Miriam:  “I think it’s that sort of equal versus fair concept, you know.  I don’t 
think you have…what’s equal…you’re not equal with all students, but you try to 
be fair depending on the student.  I think I’m making fair decisions…which isn’t 
necessarily equal.” 
For some principals, equal treatment of students, without flexibility, did not 
appear to necessarily ensure fairness or equality but, perhaps, ease of administration: 
Melvin:  “I think there are lots of people who just say, ‘You know what?  There is 
a procedure book.  The procedure book says to do this and there is no flexibility 
in those procedures and I am going to treat everybody exactly equal.’ Because if I 
enter my discretion that leaves me open to someone coming back on me about 
something.” 
Frank:  “Having the policy makes it easier as an administrator, but it doesn’t 
make it right.” 
Principals also may selectively enforce policy if they believed it did not allow for 
the consideration of personal circumstances: 
Shawna:  “He [a student was high on drugs and policy indicated he was to be 
suspended] was couch surfing, living from place to place, so I mean how do you 
deal with that?  So there’s context there and it’s knowing the big picture. It does 
not make sense to apply this policy.  Knowing the kids and knowing the 
background and knowing what is going on at home.  All of that comes into play.” 
Miriam:  “I think the home life is important.  It think it would be more detrimental 
for him [student Gary in vignette] to be at home for two weeks.  When I was at my 
former school, which is a pretty core [inner-city] school, it had to be something 
serious for me to actually send a child home…even though the policy is 
suspension.” 
One principal decided to selectively enforce policies in a situation if he felt 
hesitant or conflicted about his discretionary decision-making: 
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Adam:  “I have to say honestly I have had scenarios in front of me and…this 
would be so much easier if I just didn’t deal with it…I may have the sense that 
something is there, but I am hoping that it may just let itself kind of dissipate and 
in some cases it has, and in other cases it hasn’t.” 
For some of the principals, not to consider the context or circumstance of a 
disciplinary situation would be an inappropriate exercise of discretion, and could possibly 
be considered unprofessional (research sub-question 7): 
Amanda:  “When it [decision-making] is hot-headed, like they just made that 
decision now and hadn’t looked at the whole [situation], that’s catastrophic.” 
Danielle:  “Some teachers will kick the kid out of class and shut the door on the 
kid, and then there are some teachers that you can say to them, ‘Okay this young 
person lives on their own, they are taking a bus across the town.  They have a job 
that they work at until two in the morning.’  When you explain that to the teacher, 
the teacher will say, ‘Well, why didn’t I know that?’  Well, why didn’t you find 
out?  Those are professional responsibilities.” 
Shawna:  “Yes, I would [consider a decision inappropriate] because they did not 
investigate…they did not look at the context of the child’s life and what is going 
on at that moment.” 
Harold:  “Ignoring it [rule or procedure] to the detriment of the student is, I think, 
deplorable…to the detriment of the community or of the staff.” 
Another influence was the potential effect of the principals’ disciplinary decision-
making upon the academic achievement of the student or students involved.  This 
influence was especially apparent in the questions pertaining to the student Gary in the 
vignette: 
Amanda:  “I would not enforce the school suspension just because it seems to be 
 sort of a linear event…and then they are a racial minority.  I wonder about his 
            academic achievement…so I worry a bit about that.  He is struggling 
            academically.” 
Miriam:  “It could be an academic issue.  Obviously he struggles because often 
disrespect and insubordination come with the fact that they [students] can’t get it, 
so they use behavior to cover that up.  He’s struggling academically.  It’s 
[suspension] harmful to him academically.” 
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Adam:  “I could see maybe being out for a week and then in-school maybe an 
 additional three or four days or a week.  I would not want to keep this young man 
 out of school for an extended period of time, simply because he, as it indicates 
 here, he is struggling academically and has had kind of a rocky road in the school 
 so far.” 
Danielle:  “I do not think anything good occurs for students when they are left out 
 of the school system…to punish him by removing him is not doing anything for 
 him…or his education.  He is already struggling.” 
Lauren:  “My concern is the loss of his education as well, while he would be out 
 of school for two weeks.” 
Only Melvin directly indicated that academic achievement would not have been 
an influence at all in his decision-making in the vignette: “The academics part does not 
really matter to me at all that much.” 
The reaction of the student in a given disciplinary situation was an influence upon 
the principals’ discretionary decision-making.  Adam felt his discretion to enforce a 
policy on suspension would be exercised depending upon the student’s response to the 
incident.  He described a situation in which some grade-eight girls were starting fires on 
the playground after school hours.  When they were confronted “they burst into tears; the 
remorse is absolutely right there.”  As a result, he concluded he did not have to “have a 
hard, hard reaction to what potentially could have been a very serious incident.”  This 
desire to use policy as necessary to assign either a lenient or harsh consequence, 
depending upon the remorse or empathy displayed by the misbehaving student is also 
apparent in the words of other principals: 
Melvin:  “I want to know his frame of mind…where he comes from.  If this is a kid 
who feels remorse, I am probably more likely to go—you know what?  He just 
made a mistake.” 
Harold:  “If you get them to the point that they understand what they’ve done.  
Empathy is probably the most lacking in many, many, many adolescent children 
that are violent.  They don’t care.”  
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Sarah:  “It depends on the situation of who the child is, what the attitude of the 
child is in conversation with me and with the adults in the school…I mean from 
everyone’s perceptions, how the child is feeling, if there is any remorse, what they 
are ready to do to set things straight.” 
Lauren:  “Well, he [student Gary in vignette] has been in trouble, but he does 
sound quite remorseful?”  
Frank:  “How he [student Gary in vignette] responds to mistakes he’s made in the 
past would be one [influence on decision-making].  You can walk in and say 
you’re sorry and then walk out and do the same thing the next day, and with that 
type of kid maybe you’d follow policy more.”  
Principals also felt their disciplinary decision-making had to provide an educative 
opportunity for the student or students directly involved; in fact, many identified this 
component as being a primary focus of any discipline policy or decision: 
Frank:  “I think it’s a reality that some kids at some point need the consequences 
to go along with the discipline.  The goal of having a discipline policy which we 
all work under would be to keep some order and…provide an opportunity for kids 
to learn…and that would drive all of our policies.” 
Shawna:  “Your own children, you try to problem-solve with your own kids, 
always.  [The] difference is, is that our own children we’re hoping we have taught 
them some problem-solving.  Our students don’t have those skills.  So that is why 
it is so important for us to teach them that there is another way to do it, but they 
also have to learn what crossing the line means because that’s what happens out 
in a real world.” 
Danielle:  “In a situation like this [the vignette] I think we want to just know that 
we have the parents on side and that we are looking at coming out from the same 
end, and the young person is going to learn, is able to perhaps problem-solve 
himself.  I always think that if students need to be consequenced, that is teaching 
them discipline.” 
Sarah:  “I think it [discipline] has to be a learning experience.  It has to be 
opportunity to learn…a teachable moment, really…so that we can move forward 
instead of continually punishing.” 
Lauren:  “[Discipline is] to educate children in ways that they can change their 
behavior or make a plan, as a consequence for a bad choice or a wrongdoing.” 
 For other principals, discipline is a mechanism enabling schools to establish a 
framework for student learning to take place: 
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Adam:  “Fundamentally you want to set up an environment that maximizes 
learning and discipline needs to contribute to that.  If it does not contribute to it, 
then it has no place.”    
Melvin:  “I think the goal of discipline in a school is to maintain a sense of order 
in order for us to get a learning agenda or a learning plan across for kids.” 
Miriam:  “For every action, there’s a consequence.  I think the goal is for lessons 
learned…you know kids make mistakes, even good kids make bad choices.  As a 
result, there’s a cause and effect…the other goal of discipline in schools is to 
maintain order and semblance…and to help change behavior.” 
Shawna:  “I will be the first one to say these kids need structure, absolutely they 
need structure…that structure means setting boundaries, having expectations, but 
doing it with care and compassion.  It is when there is no structure and there is 
chaos [and they can’t learn]…I just talked to a student today who is in grade eight 
and has been in eighty schools…if you have proper structure in place, these kids 
will do it [learn].” 
It would appear that while a primary purpose of discipline might be an educative 
one for the student or students involved, and in this way influence the principals’ 
decision-making, more than half the principals indicated they believed others also must 
learn—in other words, that their discretionary decision-making must send a message to 
students, staff, and community:  
Miriam:  “I can use a knife incident as an example…the boy was in grade eight 
and kids talk.  I think in this community a kid bringing a knife to school is very 
uncommon yet.  So I think the fact he did have to be suspended for three days sent 
a message home that this is serious stuff…and I even think the fact that the kid 
who is a little shit is scared shitless…I think it was a good thing, but I think it also 
showed I don’t think you’re really all that tough of a kid even though you walk 
around here being defiant to anyone and everyone.” 
Danielle:  “In an elementary school you could probably have a conversation with 
the staff and explain the rationale for the decision you had made and why it varies 
from policy.  In a high school you might have a harder sell, but I would certainly 
want my staff to feel that there has been a consequence and there had been a 
message that was sent…however, I do not believe in sending kids away…they 
need to feel that this is where they belong and to tell them they cannot come, it 
just sends a wrong message.” 
 Melvin:  “So I look at it [two boys fighting] and I go okay now, we are going to 
 make a decision.  I am going to say what am I going to do with the first boy and 
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 what am I going to do with the second boy?  What is the message for the whole 
 school?  Well, if I was not using any discretion, it will be everybody gets three 
 days and that is it.  But, really, the first boy who started it, he probably should get 
 the three days.  This other guy is defending himself.  He was probably more 
 violent than he should have been, so I am going to go three days, one day.  So 
 now when we say do I make my decisions based on the whole school?  Well, no 
 because I made that decision for one guy on the whole of the school because 
 everyone needs to know that starting a fight is wrong, but this guy who was just 
 defending himself, he got too violent.” 
 Lauren:  “It is very important that the other parents and the teacher know that we 
 are dealing with it [vignette] and we are taking the gun being at school very 
 seriously, and I think a note would have to go out…to inform parents that yes, 
 there was a gun at school, but it has been dealt with.” 
Sarah:  “I try if something is serious…where a child is hit or there is fighting or 
that kind of thing, that I am being consistent in that, so that  the message is 
consistent out there with students that if they decide to go in this direction, that’s 
probably what is going to happen.” 
Nonetheless, the actions of the misbehaving student also send an important  
message which should be considered by the decision-maker: 
 Danielle:  “He [student Gary in vignette] feels that his actions are suggesting that 
 he is not feeling comfortable or he is looking for some way to attract attention to 
 himself and I think that that is the message that needs to be listened to as opposed 
 to just sending him away.” 
 The message that is being sent by the principals, however, may be related to the 
manner in which they justify their discretionary decision-making to the larger school 
community (research sub-question 10):  
 Adam:  “It [suspension in vignette] still is important that the school 
 community understand that this is a significant response to a potentially 
 significant event.  So bringing a weapon to school, whatever the intent, is still a 
 significant issue and, therefore, it has to be seen by the community that there is a 
 significant response.  So in that sense, yes, there is sensitivity to the 
 community’s perception of it.” 
Some principals considered the disciplinary history of the student as an aspect or 
circumstance influencing their disciplinary decision-making: 
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Lauren:  “Discretion is based on the background information that may play on or 
 influence a decision…we have been keeping track particularly at this school 
 because it has been done in the past, charted how much kids have been to  the 
office…so it certainly helps you regulate what the consequences should be  
when you can track how many times you have dealt with the child.” 
Amanda:  “I wanted to know what has been done prior [interventions] and I 
 wanted to know if it is the first offense.” 
Melvin:  “The office referrals, disrespect and subordination is [sic] a marker [in 
vignette].  It tells me that you know what?  He does not like to be told what to do 
necessarily, does not like to follow rules, but that does not necessarily make him 
violent.  It is just like if I am going okay, let us explore this a little bit more.  It 
does not immediately make me think this is a bad apple or bad seed that we need 
to go after.  No, but does it say you know what?  This kid has maybe some issues 
with authority, perhaps.” 
Sarah:  “It depends what kind of things the student has been involved with before, 
 if there had been other suspensions or other incidents that had led up to this, then 
 that I take into consideration as to the length of the suspension.” 
Frank:  “Well, you’ve got history which he [student Gary in vignette] obviously 
demonstrated, inappropriate behavior of some kind in the school.  He’s had 
problems with an art teacher.  So you know he’s got a history of trouble…history, 
like how many mistakes he’s made in the past…absolutely is one [influence on 
decision-making].” 
 
5.5.7 Theme Seven: External Influences and Pressures Affecting Principals’ 
Discretion in Disciplinary Decision-Making 
 This theme focused on principals’ perception of the external influences and 
pressures that affected their discretionary decision-making in disciplinary issues. These 
influences are distinct from those identified in Theme Six, which were specific to the 
student or students involved in the misbehavior.  The participants appeared to understand 
external influences in various ways; these influences could result in their feeling 
pressured in their decision-making (research sub-question 2 and research sub-question 5).  
As well, all principals perceived they have a level of accountability to various stakeholder 
groups for their decision-making.  Many felt they met this need for accountability 
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through justifying their decisions to the individuals involved (research sub-question 9 and 
research sub-question 10).   
 The principals appeared, in many instances, to understand the external pressures 
of staff, parents and community as being of lesser influence on their discretionary 
decision-making than were the student-specific influences; furthermore, they appeared to 
associate the need for accountability and justification more so with these external 
influences. 
 The expectations of teaching staff appeared to influence the discretionary 
decision-making of principals: 
Frank:  “I think anybody who’s been in a building more than three or four years, I 
think it’s rubbed off from the older teachers that there’s an expectation…they 
expect that there’s a suspension involved.  You know they’re not expecting some 
sort of mediation.” 
Danielle:  “Because they [principals] don’t want to go down the road of defending 
themselves or their actions to staff who maybe are going to question why it 
happened.  Because they have parental pressure, it is easier than trying to explain 
to parents.” 
Amanda:  “They are always breathing down your neck that we need to suspend 
them because that will heal them…The staff in my school want something punitive 
and disciplinary…teachers want something done, whether that be you assisting 
them in getting something done, or you do it.  They want something done.” 
 The influence of staff expectations could also be related to the level of trust 
teachers had in administrators’ decision-making: 
Adam:  “[For] the boys who were fighting…the teachers would say, ‘What do you 
mean that they have [only] one recess off?’  They might think that that may be a 
little light, but you know, I think they are getting to know me well enough to go, 
‘Okay, there must be something else going on here.’  And I did go back and 
explain to the teachers.” 
Miriam:  “One thing I have found here with this staff in the year that I have been 
here is I don’t really think the staff has questioned me, which is a really nice 
feeling.  I think they seem to be quite confident that I will handle things…I found 
my staff at the last school, you know there were a couple [of teachers who said] 
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‘You should do this, and you should do that.’  Well, first of all you’re a third year 
teacher and that’s pretty ballsy of you to say that to me.” 
 Certain parental and community expectations appeared to influence the 
principals’ discretionary decision-making at times, and these expectations could be 
related to what they perceived  to be their knowledge of their school community: 
Frank:  “There are some communities…you’d have a lawyer there, so you have to 
be very precise…you better make sure that you follow the policy and say the right 
things in the suspension letter and follow up the way you said you were going to 
follow up because you’re going to be held accountable for it.  Some communities 
have a lot of forgiveness and others not so much…you have to know your 
community…you have to know what’s a big deal to your community.  Compared 
to my school and [name of school]…the expectation of the communities would be 
different…in this type of community, it’s kind of a working class, blue collar 
community.  You can tell a parent and the parents understand that the kids are 
what they are, and they might not always like to hear that, and you might have to 
work through that…I think you can be far more honest with some communities 
than you can with others.” 
Miriam:  “I have experienced that [her decision-making questioned] probably 
more from a community expectation or parents’ expectation.  I wouldn’t say 
community expectation; it’s been more individual parents, certain kids and 
certain parents, and truthfully, those are the parents who wouldn’t support the 
school in a normal situation.  Today at recess the parent made a mountain out of 
a mole hill…I’m starting to pick my battles, and I don’t know if that’s necessarily 
the right thing.  It’s the right thing for me, health-wise, and sometime you realize, 
you know what you’re going to win and what you’re not, and is it worth it?  I 
think I feel a little bit pressured.” 
Shawna:  “I think I made the right decision at that time for the child, but I maybe 
didn’t make the right decision for all the stakeholders in place…I think mistakes 
happen when all the stakeholders are not considered and perhaps circumstances 
may have not been communicated clearly…I see discretion as having the ability to 
alter an intervention, such as a suspension, to meet the needs particularly of the 
child but also to accommodate the needs of other stakeholders.” 
Adam:  “I made some decisions at the beginning of last year that were not 
necessarily within that sort of range of norms of this community…what I found is 
that when I started getting the resistance I had to step back and ask ‘Why this is 
happening?  What is going on here?’  I had little time to adjust to this new 
[school] context.  I was still operating very much in that mode for that other 
community, and the responses that would have been appropriate and acceptable 
over there were not here.  In the end I agreed.  They were not acceptable.  They 
were overly harsh responses here.” 
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Sarah:  “I guess it [intimidation by parents] would depend…this person [a parent] 
had come in a number of times…I would feel uneasy.  It wouldn’t be a 
comfortable situation for me, but I have had to do it [make a decision] many times 
before, and I would do it again if I knew that in my heart of hearts this was the 
right decision and the right thing to do.” 
Amanda:  “In some schools…you can make a few decisions, you can make a few 
mistakes and nothing would come back to you, really…but at [name of school] 
you make your decisions and they are transparent and the community becomes 
whoosh…so you want to always be politically correct around them, making sure 
that they are always informed, because they are the ones…it is kind of an octopus 
model.  You think of all their little tentacles, feeding into the head…I learned that 
last year, very quickly learned that.” 
Harold:  “There’s no doubt [in my school community] how I deal with situations 
that come up with students. That’s where the perception of me as a principal is 
judged…I think that there are communities that are highly academic that would 
be driving the perception of the school and then, hence, the principal.  That comes 
from gaining their trust about how you deal with a situation.” 
 One principal indicated she did not want to have to consider the influence of  
parents in her decision-making: 
Danielle:  “I try not to make a decision rashly or in the heat of the moment.  I try 
to make my decision logically with knowing everything I need to know…not 
because a parent has pushed my buttons or because I am feeling pressured by 
teachers or parents…I don’t want to appease parents.” 
 The pressure of legal action if policy is not adhered to was an influence upon 
some of the principals’ decision-making: 
Frank:  “One of them is being scared of the kickback of parents…not me 
personally, but I’ve seen people, you’re scared of…or of your staff.  You do things 
because you think you’re going to please your staff…whether it be your 
superintendent, or the parent.  I don’t want a bipolar parent running in here and 
running up one side of me and down the other.  So if I ignore that [the student’s 
behavior] I won’t have to deal with the parent…you open yourself up to, and in 
some cases nowadays, to legal action.  You’re open to more criticism, you’re 
open to high risks, because with today in the wrong community, you could have a 
lawyer knocking at your door because you didn’t treat their kid the same as 
somebody else.” 
 Some of these external influences with negative consequences could be legal 
pressures upon their decision-making:   
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Miriam:  “I think parent pressure is huge, and I think it’s going to become more 
of that and…like I said every other day you pick up the newspaper, there’s some 
lawsuit against [school division] or a school in Saskatchewan.  We’re not talking 
about the crap in the States any more.  We’re talking about the neighborhood 
school down the street where you know the principal and the teacher and they’re 
good people.  Well, to use that student Johnny [pseudonym] as an example.  That 
kid’s not worth my career…and I think we’re going to see more of that in the 
future.” 
 
Danielle:  “Those who just stick to the script because it is the script…I think that 
we all lose, but definitely the young person for sure, [and] generally society I 
would suspect at a later date…but this situation [local lawsuit] became a legal 
matter…I do not think that anyone learned anything positive or productive.  I 
think it was more a case of ‘if I have a lawyer, and I take a stand.’  In the end the 
kids didn’t learn anything…like there are consequences.  Now let’s see if we can’t 
mediate this…but the parents didn’t like the consequence and so stepped in 
…involved lawyers…there would have been a lot of tension.  It’s not an easy 
situation.” 
 
Melvin:  “You have cautions about the community influence and then the whole 
legal ramifications [in decision-making].” 
 Principals appeared to understand some of the external influences upon their 
decision-making as being those that required a measure of accountability on their part 
(research sub-question 9).  They understood their accountability as extending to students, 
staff, parents, community, and their supervisors: 
Melvin:  “I think we have to answer to the parents.  I think we have to answer to 
the public.  I think we have to be able to justify why we did what we did, and I 
think if we use common sense, there is no problem with accountability for you as 
an individual.” 
Danielle:  “I can’t be making a decision that I can’t defend because unless I am 
just going to go with ‘that is the policy, that is the rule,’ and I guess that is a 
defense. Isn’t it?  That’s one way of looking at it.” 
Frank:  “Should I be held accountable?  Absolutely.  That part of one of the 
reasons why when you let yourself work angry, then you open yourself up to 
criticism.  People who work under policy don’t need as much risk management.” 
Miriam:  “I think you always should have a reason.  Therefore, you’re 
accountable…we’re accountable to our superintendent…you have to have 
accountability to the students and to the staff and to the parents.” 
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Adam:  “I believe we are held accountable by our communities…because what, in 
my experience happens if you get outside of those acceptable norms, then you 
upset the balance in the community with the decision.  The community will 
typically make life miserable here at the school, but will also take the concerns up 
a level, which will then cause a reaction back down.” 
Lauren:  “I am accountable to my superintendent, I am accountable to the 
parents, and to my staff, students…I guess the parents and my superintendent [are 
most important].” 
Sarah:  “I think that you are highly visible as a principal, and you need to be 
treating people with respect and making clear, reasonable decisions.” 
Shawna:  “We should all be accountable for the things we do.  I mean, if I’m 
expecting my kids in the school to be accountable, absolutely I should be.” 
Amanda:  “In the end, you hold it.  That is the sad part.  You can distribute all you 
want, but in the end, you hold that decision.  That is your job.  That is why it is a 
daunting position.” 
Harold:  “We should be accountable to the people involved.  This is where 
common sense comes in.” 
One principal understood being influenced by the possible negative reaction of 
parents in order to justify or to defend their decision-making as an inappropriate exercise 
of discretion (research sub-question 7):  
Frank:  “If I don’t phone that child’s parent and say this is what I’ve dealt with 
today only because of their reaction that I’m going to get on the phone?  That’s 
not appropriate.  That’s part of the negative things about doing this job, that you 
have to deal with tough people.  And nobody wants to do it.” 
The principals understood justification as an important and obligatory aspect of 
the decision-making process (research sub-question 10).  Many principals would justify 
their decision-making by explaining the reasons for their decision in a particular situation 
directly to the stakeholders.  What is more, the stakeholders’ perceptions of the reasons 
for a decision were of great concern to the principals.  The administrators tried to balance 
their need to justify their decision against the amount of information they could divulge, 
given privacy concerns: 
258 
 
Adam:  “I think it is really important that the people you work with understand 
why you are making the decision you are making.  Even if they disagree with it.  I 
think it’s important that they understand and, of course, you cannot always give 
all the details.” 
 
 In their discussion of the vignette, most principals appeared to think justification 
for their actions and decisions was required.  All principals indicated they needed to 
justify their decision to impose the suspension, or not, to the various stakeholders in the 
scenario: 
Sarah:  “I mean the student has to understand, right?  Has to understand how 
serious the situation was.  I have to also be able to justify this to other parents 
that are in the school.  Other students in the school have to see that it was taken 
seriously when it comes to a safety issues…the staff, the parents of that child of 
course are going to want some kind of explanation.” 
 
Melvin:  “I think, you know, part of the justification has to come based on 
experience, based on what you have established as the culture of your school…I 
think I would have to justify to the child’s parents…to the staff…to the community 
at large.” 
 
Shawna:  “I think I am able to justify my decision because I would look at the 
whole big picture here…but if [there] is only one thing I looked at, then I couldn’t 
justify what decision we make.” 
 
Most principals indicated they would have to either inform their superintendents 
or justify their decisions to them, and recognized their need for support from their 
supervisors.  They did not indicate whether their decisions would change if they were not 
supported by their superintendents; clearly, most felt confident they would have their 
approval: 
Lauren:  “I have to justify to the parents, to the staff, to other students and I mean 
definitely the superintendent.” 
Danielle:  “I would communicate to Gary, his family, my staff, [and] my 
superintendent, my thoughts behind why I am shortening it [suspension] or 
perhaps turning it into a different type of a suspension…I think you are always 
going to have that thing on your shoulder making sure that whatever decision you 
make that you can justify it to parents.” 
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Frank:  “I think the [suspended] child…and whether or not he agrees with it 
would be the least of my worries.  I would justify to staff, my direct supervisors, 
and then the parents…but the other kids in the school…you’d never justify it to 
them.” 
Miriam:  “I would probably have to justify it to my superintendent…or just 
explain my reasoning, and I find my superintendent finds that I know my kids 
best…but he’s my boss and I would do that…just the parent and my 
superintendent.” 
Adam:  “I think when we make decisions like this, we need to have some rationale 
that we can justify why we are doing this…I can balance my thinking on this 
against somebody else…and talk it through with my superior…I would justify it to 
Gary [student in vignette]...and to his parents.” 
One principal indicated justification was necessary only to those individuals who 
have knowledge of an incident or disciplinary situation: 
Amanda:  “I have to justify the decision to my superintendent…I do not need to 
justify the decision-making to the community because the weapon was not 
exposed…I need to justify to Gary and his father [in vignette] and my immediate 
staff.” 
 
5.5.8 Theme Eight: Principals’ Use of Discretion to Balance Individual and 
Group Interests and Rights 
The eighth theme focused on how principals understood their use of discretion in 
order to balance individual and group interests in the school setting.  The participants 
appeared to interpret discretion as enabling them to find the tension between these 
competing rights and interests depending upon the situation and context.  The principals 
understood that the differentiation afforded them through the exercise of discretion also 
enabled them to treat everyone fairly, or equitably, although not equally, and helped them 
to resolve this tension (research sub-question 8).   
Some principals appeared to believe that by exercising discretion in disciplining 
students they could achieve a balance through equity or fairness: 
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Melvin:  “I think that sometimes if we treat…what’s the old thing about the 
difference between the equality and equity?  We cannot treat every kid the same 
and if we have a hard and fast rule we are not really teaching reality.” 
Miriam:  “I think I’m making fair decisions, which isn’t necessarily equal…I 
guess it would almost be like a balance.” 
Lauren:  “I mean, equal is not always equitable.  So I think I make it [decision] 
based on what I know about the child…but I also see how it affects the rest of the 
school.” 
In finding a balance between the individual and the entire school, most principals 
exercised discretion in their decision-making based on what they thought was best for the 
entire group depending upon the seriousness of the situation: 
Melvin:  “When it is real public out there and it is going to affect the whole rather 
than the individual…I look at that and I go, ‘Okay.  What’s best for the whole of 
the school?” 
Amanda:  “[My decision] is always for the greater good…the safety and concern 
of all students.” 
Danielle:  “There had been a history with one [student] being the instigator and 
one had known gang connections.  Now you are deciding what’s best for the 
school and for the rest of the students.” 
Frank:  “But at some point it’s the best thing for the group.  I shouldn’t say that, 
because the best thing for this boy in this vignette probably isn’t to be sent home.  
But the best thing in that situation when you take into consideration the other kids 
that are impacted is to probably clear some space between everybody…the 
individual’s at the center of it, but there’s a lot more other players involved with 
some of our decisions.” 
Harold:  “It’s not hard to bring them to understand that it’s not the rights of three 
or four people, it’s the rights of the whole school...you have the one bully in the 
classroom driving everybody crazy so that the rights of all the students and, in a 
sense, in the community [are infringed].” 
Shawna:  “There is the odd time you have to make a very tough decision when you 
know there is an individual in the building that perhaps is not keeping things for 
the general good.  Sometimes you do have to make that tough decision and if not, 
kids have to learn that it is not always about just me.” 
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Adam:  “Gary [student in vignette] is also a child in the school and needs an 
education, which is our primary purpose as an institution.  So for me, it is very 
important that I can say to myself and go to bed at night and say, ‘I balanced 
those two things.’” 
5.6  Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a description of the ten research participants.  The research 
question and the ten sub-questions are considered within the framework of the eight 
themes that were elicited through a coding of the verbatim transcripts.  Findings of the 
research focused on the following eight themes: (1) principals’ understanding of 
discretion in disciplinary decision-making; (2) principals’ understanding of their role in  
discretionary decision-making; (3) principals’ explicit and identified values in their 
discretionary decision-making; (4) principals’ understanding of the significance of 
experience in discretionary decision-making; (5) the role of policy/legislation in 
principals’ use of discretion in their disciplinary decision-making; (6) student-specific 
influences affecting principals’ discretionary decision-making; (7) external influences 
and pressures affecting principals’ discretion in disciplinary decision-making; and (8) 
principals’ use of discretion to balance individual and group interests and rights.  The 
participants’ own words, in addition to quotations from relevant literature and scholars in 
the field, are used to illustrate the themes. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 Analysis and Interpretation of Findings  
This study examined the disciplinary decisions of elementary school principals in 
an urban school district in Western Canada; the emphasis was more on an interpretive 
approach of the decision-making process in contrast to the legal aspect of “achieving 
outcomes” (Hawkins, 1992, p. 14) through the exercise of discretion.  The inquiry, which 
is limited by its methodology in that it examines this process “‘from a distance’” 
(Mintzberg, 1979, p. 12), sought to determine how principals report negotiating within 
the parameters of the discretion afforded them in law and maintaining their own values 
system in student disciplinary issues.  From the data obtained through semi-structured 
interviews with ten participants, eight themes emerged; there was substantial overlap 
among the themes, and many of the principals’ statements could be attributed to more 
than one theme.  The interpretation of the findings of the study will be guided by the 
framework of the ten research sub-questions, with the eight themes serving as a basis for 
the analysis and discussion.   The analysis also includes an interpretation of the findings 
in light of the literature and other relevant research inquiries. 
6.1  Research Sub-Question One  
What is the nature of discretion in general? 
Discretion is complex and multi-faceted.  Torres and Chen (2006) point to its 
“puzzling and often misguided nature” (p. 191).  A consideration of discretion relies 
heavily upon theory, a somewhat contested literature (Bodenheimer, 1977) which could 
be seen as mirroring the phenomenon itself.   It is usually associated with judgment (Hall, 
1999; Meyer et al., 2009; see also Manley-Casimir, 1974) and, apart from its use as a 
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legal term, discretion is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the 
English Language as “the act or faculty of discerning, discriminating, or judging” (Gove, 
1976, p. 647).  When considered as a “feature of decision-making” (Hawkins, 1992, p. 
27),  discretion is “dynamic and adaptable” (p. 45), and suggests a freedom of choice 
within certain defined boundaries, or the “ability to make decisions which represent a 
responsible choice and for which there is an understanding of what is lawful, right, or 
wise may be presupposed” (Gove, 1976, p. 647).  Lipsky (1980) argues discretion is a 
“relative concept,” (p. 15) and is sensitive to job situations.  In organizations, discretion 
exists because some work is so complex “the elaboration of rules, guidelines or 
instructions cannot circumscribe the alternatives,” and it contains a “human dimension” 
that calls for “sensible observation and judgment” which cannot “be reduced to 
programmed formats” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 15).  Additionally, the organization within which 
the decision-maker is working provides a “context and limits to the decision-making” 
(Bell, 1992, p. 94; see also Hawkins, 2003; Manning 1992).    
Discretion is necessary when the law, for various reasons, provides no “uniquely 
correct” answer (Bix, 2004, p. 97).  Pound (1959) contends discretion “is only to be 
exercised where the law itself provides for it, and its exercise, where in the nature of 
things that is possible, is to be guided by principles” (p. 35).  Ross (1991), in analyzing 
the “‘prescribed by law’ requirement in s. 1 of the [Canadian] Charter,” asserts 
“vagueness is an inherent part of the delegation of discretionary authority; the breadth of 
the discretion is directly related to uncertainty in the application of the law” (p. 385). It is 
here “discretion suffuses the interpretation of rules, as well as their application” 
(Hawkins, 1992, p. 35).  The interpretation of rules involves, on the part of the decision-
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maker, “discovering its meaning, characterizing the present problem, and judging 
whether that problem is addressed by the rule” (p. 35).   In characterizing the relationship 
between interpreting rules and exercising discretion, Hawkins (1992) points to “tensions, 
ironies, and contradictions” (p. 37), some of which may involve a discrepancy or the 
“lack of fit” between the “the written law and the practices of legal actors” (p. 38).   
Bell (1992) suggests discretion occurs as either a power to choose, a choice made 
“in relation to another,” or a choice “conferred or legitimated by the law” (p. 93).  
Discretion also may be viewed, in the “classical approach of legal theorists,” as either a 
power conferred or as “the result of some absence or indeterminacy of the legal 
materials” (p. 97).  That is to say, the role of discretion may be distinguished as “powers 
of choice deliberately granted or legitimated in the hands of a decision-maker,” as well as 
“those choices and freedoms to manoeuvre which arise out of the indeterminacies or 
inadequacies of legal regulation” (Bell, 1992, p. 102).  In the latter case, Dworkin (1977) 
is dismissive, contending “discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as 
an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction” (p. 31).  However,  Bell (1992) 
points to areas of legal sociology with limited rules and few reasons for acting, in which 
“the discretion-holder exercises significant choice in the way he relates to other actors,” 
the “legal reasons” for decisions are not foremost, and “rules play only a limited part, 
calling into question a model of ‘ruled justice’” (p. 89).  Nonetheless, the importance of 
the “legitimation” and “justification”  (Bell, 199, p. 97) of discretionary choice cannot be 
over-stated, insofar as the ability required to provide “legal reasons why others should 
view such an act as authoritative and effective” (p. 105).  Discretion, Bell (1992) adds, 
entails a choice that “can be legitimately exercised within a framework (p. 93), and the 
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formal constraints in that the decision “must be rationally justified and related to the 
purposes for which the power is conferred” (p. 94).  The key aspect, however,  is the 
“creative function” of the decision-maker which identifies “politically important power, 
even if there is not unlimited choice” (p. 94).   Bodenheimer (1977) also notes the 
“creative activity” of the decision-maker (p. 1150). Those who exercise discretion wield 
power, and the holder of discretion affects “unilaterally the positions of others” (Bell, 
1992, p. 95).  
With respect to legal discretion, when, as Bodenheimer (1977) asserts, “the judge 
is ‘legislating’ in penumbral situations or unprovided cases, he relies, according to Hart, 
on social purposes, public policies and—occasionally—moral considerations in filling the 
open spaces in the law” (p. 1150).  However, he takes issue with Hart’s lack of specificity 
in defining the limits of “judicial lawmaking discretion,” since these “gapfilling devices” 
are not rules per se (p. 1162).  He goes on to note that “these residual sources of law are 
regarded by Hart as extralegal factors and not as part of the law”        (p. 1150); these are 
the spaces where discretion is exercised.   
The participants in the study had difficulty providing, and most of them failed to 
provide, a definition for discretion when they were asked for one during the semi-
structured interviews.  When I probed them further, some principals appeared to 
understand discretion as being synonymous with judgment or they seemed to perceive it 
as being an aspect of their decision-making, a feeling they had, or a gray area.  Not one 
principal associated the word with its legal sense.  However, that is not to suggest the 
principals did not understand the legal requirements for the exercise of discretion or that 
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they were not at all knowledgeable about discretion.  They may have understood 
discretion in a way that was different from how it was presented during the interviews. 
6.2 Research Sub-Question Two 
 What are the influences upon discretion? 
 K. C. Davis (1969) contends “facts, values, and influences comprise the exercise 
of discretion” but suggests influences often “crowd out thinking about values”  
(p. 5).  Hall (1999) agrees the exercise of discretion involves “a careful weighing of 
factors, influences and circumstances” (p. 161).  Influences identified in Theme Seven 
are forces external to the administrators which affect their discretionary decision-making, 
such as pressure from superiors, expectations of parents and community, expectations of 
staff, threat of possible legal action, and the need for accountability in, and justification 
for, discretionary decision-making.  The last two influences will be analyzed separately in 
research sub-questions 9 and 10.  Begley’s (2010) research identifies “arenas” or 
“sources of influence” (p. 44) upon administrators’ decision-making, such as the 
community, peers, and the organization itself, and these are consistent with the multiple 
influences upon decision-making identified by the principals in this study.   What is 
more, the context for a decision, such as the student-specific influences identified in 
Theme Six, also appears to have considerable affect upon principals’ discretionary 
decision-making, and supports Hodgkinson’s (1978b) assertion that “decisions never 
occur in a vacuum” (p. 61).   The principals often insisted their choices “depended” upon 
the situation (i.e., those student-specific influences identified in Theme Six such as 
personal circumstances, intent, and reaction of student) and contextual aspects, leaving 
open the possibility for inconsistency in decision-making between similar situations 
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encountered by individual administrators.  These student-specific influences are analyzed 
in research sub-question 4.  Half the principals in the study indicated their roles were 
evolving because of influences such as school board and parental expectations, changes 
in student demographics, or changes in societal norms, such as an increased willingness 
of stakeholders to turn to litigation to resolve disputes in schools.  
6.2.1 Influences of Senior Administration and School Board 
Affirming Ashbaugh and Kasten’s (1984) research into principals’ values in 
decision-making, the principals in this study appeared to be influenced by their 
perceptions of the expectations of senior administration and the school board.  Most 
principals understood they were required to consult with their superintendent before 
“making a difficult decision,” and this belief could be seen as having a “substantive, 
long-term impact” on their discretionary decision-making (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1984, p. 
206).  As Frank noted, there was an expectation on behalf of the Board “that we deal with 
violence issues…it would probably be what my up above me thinks, then the staff and the 
parents….I would look at what the expectations on me are, of the school, and the school 
being the Board, the upper administration and the staff.”  These professional norms were 
a part of the “institutional culture” (Torres & Chen, 2006, p. 191) and appeared to limit or 
to constrain the discretion the principals felt they could exercise in certain complex 
disciplinary decisions.  However, there was no indication the principals worked with 
senior administrators to ensure compliance of policy, nor did they indicate clear 
expectations were given to them by central office staff to ensure policy compliance or 
implementation, and it seemed “senior administration did not spend a lot of time on 
planning for implementation [of policy]”  (LaRocque & Coleman, 1985, p. 159).  The 
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principals simply may have not chosen or may have neglected to mention their senior 
administrators’ acknowledgement and support of policy implementation strategies.   
Yet, as LaRocque and Coleman (1985) discovered, “implementer cooperation is 
not automatic,” and “without deliberate intervention of senior administration at the school 
level, misinterpretation, symbolic compliance, co-optation, and even noncompliance are 
more likely to occur than mutual adaptation” by principals in schools (p. 160).  Their 
study also found “policy itself is the determinant factor in implementation” and that if the 
beliefs of senior administration and the board are that “issuance of authoritative 
statements (i.e., policies)” will “influence school implementation” without the provision 
of implementation activities, explanations, or information, then implementation is not 
likely to be successful (p. 157).  Although the principals in my study did perceive their 
senior administrators were responsive to their decision-making, that did not necessarily 
seem to suggest their superintendents were “actively involved,” monitored, or provided 
“appropriate feedback” to them in policy implementation (p. 161). 
As identified in Theme Two, and consistent with Lipsky’s (1980) assertion of 
seeking information among “like-minded” peers (p. 115), the principals expressed the 
need for collaborative decision-making as part of their role, by making references to  
“distributed leadership” (Shawna and Amanda)  and to “flat organizations” (Frank).  
They emphasized the lack of hierarchy in their decision-making processes at the school 
level.  Despite their understanding of the need for collegial and consultative procedures, 
however, they did acknowledge they also understood these decisions could be overturned 
by pressure or influence from more senior administrators.  While some principals 
indicated their relationship with their superintendent was mutually respectful, it is unclear 
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what influence the lack of support from a senior administrator would have upon their 
discretion, although it could be reasonably assumed it may be considerable.  LaRocque 
and Coleman’s (1985) research suggests the attitude of senior administrators has a 
“critical effect on [policy] implementation” (p. 158).  If a values conflict ensued between 
the superintendent’s perception of the value of safety and the principles or Type I values 
of administrators (Hodgkinson, 1991), for instance, it could be argued one of three things 
could happen: administrators may “compromise their own integrity” (Ashbaugh & 
Kasten, 1984, p. 205) at that transrational level, they may choose to receive censure from 
their superior, or they may step down from their role.  One could reasonably assume the 
first choice might be the more common occurrence, depending upon the severity or 
urgency of a decision.   
Frank, for instance, said he would not change a decision until he was “told to,” 
and only when it depended upon “how pressing it [the issue] is.”  Melvin, on the other 
hand, suggested he would never change his decision to meet administrative expectations, 
since being forced to overturn a decision would make him a “toothless shark.”  Amanda, 
who admitted to overtly defying board policy, characterized one particularly 
controversial decision as “career-limiting; when you do something like that [her decision 
to facilitate off-campus smoking by a grade eight student], it can be career limiting, so if 
I’m not in this office next year, you’ll know why.”  Just how prepared these principals 
were willing to be insubordinate was not demonstrated; nonetheless, Amanda said she 
would make the same decision again, despite having learned what she called her 
“lesson.”  Generally, though, the principals appeared to prefer to avoid transrational 
values, or those based on principle, a finding that aligns with Roche’s (1999) study, and 
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they tended to avoid moral issues and to resolve values conflict in any situation at a lower 
level, consistent with  Hodgkinson’s (1991) third postulate of “avoidance” (p. 103).   
 The principals often seemed to appreciate they needed to reconcile their 
responsibility for school safety and the well-being of students with their need to ensure 
the approval of their direct supervisor, whose influence was a primary consideration.  
Nonetheless, they seemed to make many decisions “relatively free from supervision by 
superiors or scrutiny by clients [students]” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 14).  Most principals alluded 
to their need to discuss their decision-making with their superintendents, particularly in 
complex disciplinary issues, as reflected in the vignette question involving weapons and 
school safety.  The principals’ discretion appeared somewhat restricted, if not by policy 
in those situations involving safety, then by the need for “compliance with superiors’ 
directives” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 19).  As a result, despite comments to the contrary, their 
professional autonomy would not appear to be absolute.  Lauren indicated “if they 
[superintendents] say hands down bottom line, this is it, then that’s it…then I say this is a 
division policy and I have to stand by it.”  Miriam, on the other hand, suggested she 
enjoyed more autonomy and stated her superintendent “still knows what school’s about” 
and was “always kind of behind us as much as he can be.”  Consequently, she believed 
her superior would support her decision-making since she assumed they would usually 
agree on outcomes and consequences.   What is more, “building the trust” (Frank) of 
superiors also appeared to be related to the principals’ ability to exercise discretion; with 
the establishment of trust, principals appeared to believe they had greater flexibility or 
latitude in their decisions.  Forced compliance with a supervisor’s directive, however, 
would directly affect the principals’ discretion in disciplinary issues, although to what 
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extent their compliance may simply be symbolic or monitored by the district office was 
not clear.  Accordingly, compliance would also reduce their “responsibility and 
accountability” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 153) and potentially shield them from criticism or 
conflict with stakeholders.   
Despite the fact eight of the principals saw themselves as the final determiners in 
the school-level decision-making chain, that is, the “buck stops here” (Frank), it would 
appear their discretionary decision-making could be over-ruled, or at the very least, 
constrained by their superiors, especially in matters of the metavalues of maintenance, 
efficiency, or effectiveness Hodgkinson (1978b, 1991) identifies.  Examples given by the 
principals included issues of safety where length of school suspension may be overturned 
by a superintendent, or by overt opposition to established school board policy (such as no 
smoking on school grounds), which could result in a supervisor’s reprimand or censure.  
The principals perceived their supervisors did allow for “individual adaptation of rules 
and policies according to the specific circumstances of their schools” (LaRocque & 
Coleman, 1985, p. 158), and for the most part the administrators gave the impression they 
generally were free to assert their autonomy in decision-making.  Although senior 
administrators may have encouraged flexibility in principals’ decision-making, they also 
may have had as a goal an overall consistent approach in their support of decision-
making among the principals of the schools for which they were responsible.  That is, 
they may have structured the choices for the principals in safety issues, for example, in 
order to create a “degree of standardization in programming throughout the school 
division” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 14), or may have “utilized [policy] implementation strategies 
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that treated the schools identically, and from a distance” (LaRocque & Coleman, 1985,   
p. 160). 
6.2.2 Influence of Parents and Community  
Most of the principals acknowledged the influence of parents upon their 
discretionary decision-making; however, many believed they would not necessarily allow 
this “pressure” (Miriam) to affect their decisions.  Hodgkinson (1991) asserts that 
organizations, such as schools, depend upon outside support from parents and other 
stakeholders, and there is a “natural tendency” for administrators “to seek to avoid 
offending any perceived interest group” and, instead, to “develop allegiances or 
coalitions” among these groups to support policy (p. 60).  A “pathology of consensualism 
or ‘squeaky wheel’ administration” can result, wherein the administrator “sacrifices value 
in the face of perceived pressures,” and responds “only to the most vocal lobby” in a 
desire to “extinguish complaints” (p. 60).  Statements made by some of the principals 
were not consistent with Hodgkinson’s (1991) notion of consensualism, and reflected 
their perception they would not be swayed in their decision-making.  Melvin, for one, 
was adamant he would never bend to a parent’s demands, as was Amanda who “couldn’t 
care less.”  Sarah said she “would feel uneasy” but would stand firm in her decision if it 
were challenged by a parent.  Even Frank noted he did not “want a bipolar parent 
running in here and running up one side of me and down the other…that’s part of the 
negative things about doing this job, that you have to deal with tough people.”  Such a 
scenario, he emphasized, would not influence his decision-making.  The principals also 
gave the impression they were not making decisions based upon the “line of least 
resistance” (p. 122) to external influences—according to Hodgkinson’s (1996) third 
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postulate of avoidance—although they may have been.  The level of influence parents 
had upon the decision-making of the principals was not clear, but it could be reasonably 
assumed that it could affect their choices, especially if parental influence was supported 
by a central office senior administrator.  Moreover, Torres and Chen (2006) claim 
discretion is influenced by “contrasting perceptions of appropriate student behavior and 
conduct” (p. 191).  This contention is substantiated by Miriam who confessed to 
conceding to parental demands when a student’s mother made “a mountain…out of a 
molehill” with respect to her decision-making in a student behavioral incident.     
The influence of parents and community upon the principals’ decision-making 
also appeared to vary depending upon the location in the city of any specific school.  
Hall’s (1999) research similarly revealed “disparate documentation procedures” among 
principals, depending upon the degree of “affluence and influence” of a student’s parent 
(p. 143).  Comparable processes were alluded to by Adam, who changed his procedures 
for documentation because of “community perception,” not necessarily “parent 
pressure,” after moving from an inner-city school to one in the suburbs.  He indicated the 
characteristics and values of the school community forced him to “re-calibrate…for the 
social context that I found myself in…and it forced me to look at my practice from 
different angles and different dimensions.”  Frank had also noticed the differences in 
parental attitudes and expectations in schools from one area of the city to another.   
The manner in which parents’ lack of support would affect the decisions of the 
principals in any situation was unclear. If parents did not support the school and 
“trounced it” in front of the student, Miriam, for one, indicated her discretionary 
decision-making would be affected.  She seemed more kindly disposed in her decision-
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making towards those who supported the school, but alluded to having experienced more 
positive parental and community supports at a previous school in which she had been 
principal.  Perceptions of their relationships with students, such as the history of conflict 
with a male student to which Miriam referred, may be other influences upon principals’ 
decision-making.  Fear of parents’ criticism or “the opinion of them [principals] in the 
community” (Melvin) may influence the exercise of discretion by administrators.  For 
example, Miriam described what she saw as a widespread deterioration of parenting 
skills, maintained the “parents really have driven me crazy” and concluded that parental 
support for the school was “shifting” away.  All of these perceptions affected her 
decision-making, despite her hard work.  She believed “parent pressure is huge…and I 
think it’s going to become more of that…every other day you pick up the newspaper, 
there’s some lawsuit.”   These findings in some ways mirror what Hodgkinson (1978b) 
views as an “administrative value bias,” typified by the notion of “self-denial, hard work 
[and] deferred gratifications,” that are reflected in administrators’ “natural affinity” for 
the stereotypical belief they may be overworked and underappreciated in their 
“nomothetic commitment to the organizational values” (p. 130).   In a similar way, 
Lipsky (1980) points to decision-makers’ own “subjective assessments of the validity of 
their work” (p. 114) as being highly-specialized yet little-understood or even 
underappreciated in their role. It may be reasoned the principals might include 
information in their decisions that may support these perceptions and ignore other, 
relevant information in disciplinary situations.   
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6.2.3 Influence of Staff  
The expectations of staff in student behavioral incidents appeared to be a lesser 
consideration in the principals’ decision-making.  Many of the principals were disdainful 
of teachers who made numerous student referrals to the office and who perceived the 
principal’s role as simply being the school disciplinarian who enforces rules and 
determines appropriate consequences.  Melvin pointed out  his staff wanted him to be 
more punitive (which he was against) and to develop a “really hard and fast, consistent 
set of expectations that if they [students] do not follow then we are going to go after 
them.”  Similar expectations of staff appeared to frustrate and even anger the principals, 
who seemed to view discipline as a shared responsibility between teachers and 
administrators.  Amanda, for one, claimed she would “no longer attend to the 
disciplinary conduct” in her building, while Danielle said that in deciding to send 
students away some principals would “make the teachers happy because the student can 
be someone else’s problem.”  Sarah indicated she would not be swayed by staff 
challenges to her decisions, although she would “like to make sure that they understand” 
the basis for her choices.  In a similar way, Adam indicated that although pressure from 
teaching staff would not influence his decision-making, he would ensure that they would 
“understand why he [was] making the decisions” he made.  What consequences for 
misbehavior would be considered appropriate is subjective and a matter of interpretation; 
the principals pointed to past choices they had made that were different from the 
expectations of staff and stakeholders.  In those cases, they perceived they had stood 
firmly behind the decision they had made, despite questions or challenges from staff.   
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In the area of student suspensions, all principals readily acknowledged their 
authority to suspend students and the expectations of staff and parents for them to use this 
disciplinary consequence with students as a primary response in disciplinary cases.  
Lipsky (1980) contends educators “decide who will be suspended and who will remain in 
school, and they make subtle determinations of who is teachable” (p. 13).  Most 
principals indicated they did not believe suspensions were always an appropriate or an 
effective disciplinary consequence.  However, the frequency with which they suspended 
students, or the grounds upon which suspensions were issued, other than for safety 
concerns, was not clear. 
6.2.4 Other Influences 
Another influence upon the discretionary decision-making of principals is what 
Hodgkinson (1978b) identifies as the “factors of personality” of the decision-maker, 
which “insert themselves into whatever range of discretion is left available” in the 
“rational decision making process” (p. 60).  At times, things such as “self-interest, 
ideology, ambition, imagination, attitudinal predisposition, and prejudices” (p. 60) may 
have influenced the principals’ decisions and, although they did not always acknowledge 
them as such, they often identified these influences in other administrators’ decisions.  
Adam, for one, said he felt “very often a great deal of pressure to make the right 
decision,” although he acknowledged he was “clever enough to understand that I am 
going to get  it wrong sometimes.” The principals also pointed to those administrators 
they believed were ambitious  and made decisions based on their desire for career 
advancement and the opportunity to move “downtown” (Danielle). They were critical, 
too, of those administrators whose decision-making was perceived as “black and white” 
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(Amanda) because their decisions were seen as being self-centered, and not student-
centered.  Hodgkinson (1978b) identifies characteristics such as ambition, opportunism 
and a desire for success as constituting what he terms “careerism,” which may influence 
decision-making and negatively affect students through “unfulfilled obligations” or a 
“shucking of responsibility” (p. 165).   
  Attitudes, which Hodgkinson (1978b) pictures as being at the “interface of self 
and world” (p. 109; see also Begley, 1999b) and which  manifest themselves in behavior, 
may have reflected the unconscious, or conscious, values of the principal.  Amanda, for 
one, championed values of mutual respect and security, yet she defied board policy as she 
“held” cigarettes for a grade eight student and allowed her to smoke just off school 
property in an effort to encourage the girl to stay in school.  In order to effect what she 
saw as desirable change, her espoused “out of the box” attitude which challenged “an 
occasional policy and law” and which was the “side of me which is Mother Teresa” 
became behavior that did not necessarily reflect her expressed values, or else reflected 
unconscious values or values known on some other level.  This finding does not support 
Hall’s (1999) research which found personal characteristics did not appear to be a 
“prominent influence” (p. 160) in principals’ discretionary decision-making.    
March (1994) points to the “degree of uncertainty, or risk” (p. 6) involved in 
decision-making alluded to by some principals as an element of their discretion.  
Amanda, for one, did not appear to be risk-averse in her decision-making, and she did not 
express regret when censured by her superiors for her controversial decision to 
undermine board policy, despite saying she had “learned her lesson.”  Others, such as 
Harold and Sarah, indicated an unwillingness to stray from policy mandates when the 
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consequences of or alternatives to their decisions were unknown.  In the principals’ 
decision-making, risk seemed to be a reflection of their perception of their role obligation 
and the conscious or unconscious need to meet the expectations of that responsibility, or 
of their own personality or experiences, or of some other unknown aspect of their 
decision-making. Meyer et al. (2009) also note the role of conscience in informing the 
boundaries for the exercise of discretion.  Only one principal, Sarah, identified 
conscience as being an aspect of her discretionary decision-making; however, that is not 
to conclude conscience is not an influence in the principals’ exercise of discretion or that 
it does not help to determine the parameters for its use. 
6.2.5 Student-Specific Influences 
Other influences upon the principals’ decision-making related to the individual 
student or students involved in the disciplinary incident.  Some of these influences, 
identified in Theme Six, were the personal circumstances or life situation of the student 
involved, as well as his or her academic and disciplinary history. 
All principals valued the ability that discretion afforded them to account for 
personal and life circumstances in student disciplinary incidents.  Most of the participants 
understood that “an in-depth knowledge of the student and the ability to use that 
knowledge in a pedagogically meaningful way [could help them] to determine the 
appropriate disciplinary measure” (Brown & Zuker, 2007, p. 252).  Whether they used 
that knowledge consistently in their decision-making was not clear; however, they 
endeavored to make accommodations in their decision-making for students whom they 
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understood as being especially challenged by race, poverty or disability.
19
  For the 
principals who worked or who had worked at inner-city schools, life situations and 
personal circumstances directly influenced their decisions (see also Taylor, 2007).  For 
example, Shawna noted her school had a school population that was “95% Aboriginal” 
with the “highest concentration of low income families” in the city.  There was “lots of 
poverty” in the community, and the school had a “very transient population…one student 
in grade eight has been in eighty different schools.”   As she indicated, her discretion was 
“all about context” and looking at the “big picture for the child” when she made a 
disciplinary decision.  With such extreme personal circumstances existing for her 
students, it may have been difficult for her not to consider the context in any disciplinary 
situation.   Other principals, such as Frank, who worked at a suburban school, indicated 
life circumstances of the student influenced their decision-making, yet these 
considerations did not appear prominent; other influences, such as staff and community, 
may have been more important.  Consideration of circumstances may have been a 
function of place or of the philosophy of the individual principal; indeed, that is how 
Shawna characterized it—her “philosophy of reclaiming youth.”  However, there did 
appear to be a gap in their mindset or education when it came to differentiating on the 
basis of student-specific circumstances.  
                                                 
19
 Their consideration of these aspects is similar in some ways to the “consideration of gender, race, ethnic, 
and cultural background as well as Aboriginal status” in the sentencing of young offenders under the YCJA 
(Roberts & Bala, 2003, p. 401; see also R. v. Gladue, 1999). 
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Interestingly, fewer than half the principals considered the disciplinary history of 
the student in their decision-making and a progressive discipline regime
20
 did not appear 
to be at the front of their minds.  In the vignette, by way of illustration, only four 
principals, Frank, Sarah, Melvin and Amanda, directly mentioned the prior behavioral 
incidents of the student Gary as influencing their decisions.  A student’s disciplinary 
history did not appear to be an important consideration for all the principals.  That does 
not mean, however, they never considered the disciplinary background of their students.  
Miriam, in fact, mentioned her frustration in decision-making because of the number of 
behavioral incidents that involved one student in her school whom she identified as a 
“bully.” As a result, she questioned her own ability to be fair.  Lauren, in a related way, 
tracked incidents of student misbehavior in a binder, a practice initiated by her 
predecessor.  She categorized every disciplinary incident referred to the office and 
believed this system helped her “regulate what the consequences should be” and to use 
the examples “to support [her] decision.”  No principals, except one, mentioned the age 
of a student as being an influence upon their decision-making, despite that given the fact 
they  practiced in elementary schools with students ranging in age from five to fourteen 
years, age may be expected to be an influence.
21
  The principals simply may have chosen 
not to mention age as being an influence, age may not have been foremost in their minds, 
or they may not have understood age to be an influence at all upon their decisions.  One 
                                                 
20
 Progressive discipline is defined as a “series of defined steps progressively applied as disciplinary 
interventions to improve student behavior” (Roher, 2007, p. 217). 
21
 As a point of comparison, it should be noted the age of young people is a consideration in the approach 
to sentencing in youth criminal justice. Abella J. of the Supreme Court of Canada asserts in R. v. D.B. 
(2008) youth  have less maturity than adults and  “a reduced capacity for moral judgment.”  As a result, 
they are entitled to a “presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability [emphasis in 
original]” (para. 41).   
281 
 
other student-specific influence upon decision-making noted by the principals was the 
academic history of the student(s) involved in the disciplinary situation.  Only half the 
principals indicated the academic achievement of a student would be an influence 
affecting their disciplinary decisions, while one, Melvin, openly stated that he refused to 
consider lack of academic progress as a basis for his decision-making.  Academic 
progress may not have been an important influence in minor disciplinary incidents; 
however, when major sanctions, such as suspension and expulsion, are being considered, 
the continuance of the academic program, it could be argued,  should be an important 
consideration in the principals’ decision-making.  
The lack of importance the principals appeared to attribute to student-specific 
influences such as disciplinary history, academic performance, and age contrast with 
Ontario’s Bill 212, the Education Amendment Act (Progressive Discipline and School 
Safety, 2007),  in which student history is a required component of the progressive 
discipline process.
22
  As well, in the sentencing of criminal offenders, an individual’s 
past circumstances are also heavily considered.  Under Bill 212, Ontario principals are 
“required to consider ‘mitigating factors’ or ‘other factors’ prescribed by the regulations” 
(Roher, 2007, p. 215).  The “‘other factors’” that “must be taken into account if they 
would mitigate the seriousness of the activity for which the pupil may be or is being 
suspended or expelled” include the pupil’s age, history, and the use of a progressive 
discipline approach (Roher, 2007, p. 216; see also Bill 212 (2007); and O. Reg. 472/07).  
                                                 
22
 In their analysis of the YCJA, Roberts and Bala (2003) note age is “the most important  mitigating factor 
relevant to young offenders” and that “correlation between age and severity of punishment is the one 
feature common to all Western juvenile justice systems” (p. 412).   They also point out that “previous 
findings of guilt of the young person” are circumstances that must be taken into account in youth 
sentencing (p. 412). 
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The principals may have considered these elements in their decision-making, but they did 
not seem to be foremost in their minds.  However, the apparent lack of importance the 
principals in the study attached to these details may reflect a gap in their mind-set, 
training, or knowledge.  It is not clear how these factors would be interpreted or how they 
would impact the disciplinary decision-making process (Trépanier, 2007).         
Additionally, under Ontario’s Bill 212, for students on long-term suspensions or 
expulsions, school boards are required “to coordinate the types of support required to 
assist the student in continuing his or her learning” (Roher, 2007, p. 214).  The academic 
progress of students is a primary concern for schools; indeed, all study participants 
indicated the primary need for order and discipline in schools was to create a suitable 
environment for learning.  It is ironic, then, that the academic progress of all students did 
not appear to be a more prominent influence in their decision-making.   
6.3 Research Sub-Question Three 
 How is discretion understood and practiced by school administrators in their 
decision-making?  
The principals appeared to interpret discretion more as being an element of larger, 
more complex issues than as being a part of every single decision they made (Lacey, 
1992; see also Vorenberg, 1976).  If assuming the law, broadly defined for this 
investigation, is a system of rules as defined by Hart (1961), then the principals appeared 
to consistently make disciplinary decisions within the penumbral area he described.   
Moreover, the principals often seemed to exercise their discretion in a quasi-legal 
fashion; in fact, one principal, Adam, drew that precise analogy.  Judge-like, they would 
collect information, make decisions, and assign consequences all within the broadly 
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defined authority delegated to them through statute; moreover, discretion appeared to be 
exercised at all stages of their decision-making process.   
Meyer et al. (2009) and Begley (2010, p. 49) suggest there are types of personal 
and professional discretion exercised by principals in their decision-making (see also 
Frick, 2009; Haynes & Licata, 1995).  The principals in this study did not appear to 
consciously recognize discretion in this sense, although they may have intuited it in a 
different manner.  From their statements, it is not apparent if professional discretion  and 
personal discretion are specific types of discretion, if they are functions of one another, or 
if they operate independently.   If it is assumed professional discretion and personal 
discretion can be differentiated, however, the manner in which they may be 
distinguished, and the requirements or conditions for the exercise of each type were not 
acknowledged and did not appear to be considered by the principals in this study.  If both 
professional discretion and personal discretion are acknowledged and understood by the 
principals, then the distinction may help or guide them in their disciplinary decision-
making to make decisions that support student well-being.  If the principals did not 
recognize this distinction, however, then they may not always meet their professional 
obligations, they may find their accountability in decision-making to be compromised, or 
their “professional autonomy or expertise and discretion” may be negatively influenced 
or affected (Begley, 2010, p. 49), either consciously or unconsciously, by personal 
considerations.  Being aware of, or being sensitive to, a distinction between personal and 
professional discretion would be helpful for principals because, in some disciplinary 
situations, they may experience a tension between their obligations in exercising 
professional discretion and their own values in exercising personal discretion.  This 
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tension could cause hesitancy, anxiety, or angst to affect their disciplinary decision-
making, especially in situations where there were conflicts between “personal moral 
positions and those of the profession, school district or community” (Begley, 2010, p. 
49), and could result in inconsistency in decision-making or force them to make decisions 
that do not serve students well.   
6.3.1 Obligation to Fulfill Legislated Role     
Hodgkinson (1978b) describes administrators as seeking to accomplish 
“organizational [emphasis in original] ends” (p. 81) through the use of power.  Authority 
is the term used for “legitimized power” (Hodgkinson, 1978b, p. 83), and the principals 
in the study were delegated their authority through The Education Act (1995).  All 
principals in the study acknowledged their authority and responsibility for maintaining 
order and discipline in the school setting as set out under the statute, but it would be 
reasonable to assume each principal interpreted this obligation differently; as a result, 
their interpretation of their role and their function within it would influence their 
decision-making, especially if those roles are not clearly defined in legislation and if they 
are delegated wide discretion.  For instance, certain principals may understand their roles 
as being authoritative disciplinarians, while other may see themselves more as 
conciliators and mediators (see Hall, 1999).  The principals appeared to understand their 
authority in the latter sense, although there was fluidity in their role, and they also 
seemed to understand their position required them, at times, to be authoritarian.   
They appeared to recognize their statutory obligation to provide a safe and orderly 
school environment and, similar to Hall’s (1999) research subjects, they seemed to do so 
“through an integration of district policy, discretion and collaboration” (p. 139).  Also, 
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consistent with the principals in Hall’s (1999) study, most of the administrators appeared 
to interpret discretion as the “freedom to choose between a range of options” (p. 139).  A 
common thread woven through the principals’ understanding of discretion in student 
disciplinary issues was the flexibility, or latitude, it afforded them in their decision-
making.  This flexibility was not one they acknowledged as being necessarily delegated 
to them through provincial legislation or school board policy, although they may have 
simply assumed their discretionary authority as disciplinarians. The principals did not 
indicate an awareness of any specific or unique legal responsibilities or requirements in 
exercising their discretion, despite the fact they may have been aware of this obligation.  
Neither did they mention any occasion on which their exercise of discretion may have 
extended beyond the limits of that which they were delegated, nor did they suggest they 
consistently considered the reasonableness of their actions.  In fact, they appeared to 
assume their decision-making was, in most cases, reasonable.  They did not indicate if 
they interpreted “inaction decisions” (Hall, 1999, p. 159) as being exercises of judgment, 
but even choosing to do nothing suggests an exercise of discretion.  Again, these 
considerations may reflect a lack of precise understanding of the parameters or 
requirements of their authority.  Perhaps the principals’ perception of discretion may 
have been a function of the magnitude of the behavioral incident or of the age or grade 
level of the students involved, or some other, unknown circumstance. 
In their responses, the principals gave the sense they knew what they were doing 
in much of their decision-making, as identified in Theme Two (their understanding of 
their role); perhaps some were exercising good judgment and others were not, depending 
upon the circumstances of the disciplinary issue. However, their interpretation of the 
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broad discretion they assumed through the doctrine of in loco parentis, for example, may 
suggest they do not know as much as they think they do, or as much as they need to, in 
order to fulfill the obligations of their position.  Their apparent lack of consideration of 
legal principles, relevant case law or Supreme Court decisions parallels Manley-
Casimir’s (1974) assertion over thirty years ago that the day-to-day operation and 
management of public schools seem “largely untouched” by “landmark decisions” 
affecting the “educational enterprise” (p. 347).  He further suggests public school 
administrators “seem indifferent to court decisions and appear either reluctant or unable 
to incorporate judicially specified standards into their daily administrative behavior”     
(p. 347).  Such indifference appears to be reflected in the principals’ comments, and their 
lack of reference to case law or their interpretation of the principle of in loco parentis, for 
example, may suggest they may not be making decisions in accordance with “judicial 
decisions” (p. 347).   On the other hand, they simply may have chosen not to make 
specific references to legal or law-related issues or topics. 
For most of the principals, discretion appeared to reflect the ability to judge or to 
make decisions as they saw appropriate and, at times, their decision-making may be 
perceived at best as arbitrary, and at worst serendipitous, although they themselves did 
not characterize it in that way.  However, the principals’ “application of discretion” was 
not always “free and flexible” as Hawkins (1992) describes, but often appeared to be 
“guided and constrained” (p. 13) by norms, professional standards, and social and 
organizational rules, despite the autonomy they seemed to believe they enjoyed in 
decision-making.  The principals in LaRocque and Coleman’s (1985) study “valued their 
autonomy” and suggested they were “‘running the show at the school’” and “‘making all 
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the decisions’” (p. 162), but this finding was not borne out consistently by the principals 
in my study, although they perceived they were free to make decisions as they saw fit.  
The apparent lack of monitoring of most of their disciplinary decisions by central office, 
however, is similar to the “absence of systematic monitoring procedures” (p. 162) noted 
in LaRocque and Coleman’s (1985) research.  The “lack of interference by central office 
staff” (p. 162) may have contributed to the sense of freedom in decision-making the 
participants in my study appeared to be afforded, although some of them, such as Miriam, 
Lauren, and Sarah, seemed to understand that they were required to defer, or else wanted 
to defer, to their Superintendent’s decision-making in complex disciplinary situations, 
especially those which included out-of-school suspension, as required by school board 
policy.  Others, such as Melvin and Frank, seemed to suggest their decision-making was 
rarely scrutinized by their supervisors.  There may have been a prevailing belief by senior 
administration that if the principals were “professionals” and “well-qualified” (LaRocque 
& Coleman, 1985, p. 162) in terms of experience or education, there were few complaints 
about them by parents or students, there were no data to suggest otherwise, or there was a 
lack of contentious issues, then they did not require monitoring of their decision-making.  
However, this finding in LaRocque and Coleman’s (1985) analysis is incongruous with 
the majority of the principals’ characterization of themselves on the demographic sheets 
in this study as being inexperienced, although their inexperience does not suggest they 
necessarily felt unqualified to act in their roles.  Yet, none of the participants in my study 
indicated a desire for closer monitoring of his or her decision-making practices by senior 
administration; they appeared to believe their superintendents perceived they were doing 
a good job in their roles.    
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6.3.2 Discretion Perceived as Good Judgment 
The principals clearly echoed the finding in Ackerman’s (2003) study that 
discretion should include the exercise of good judgment (Galligan, 1986; see also Hall, 
1999).  They interpreted discretionary decision-making as necessarily based upon sound 
judgment, or common sense which they deemed essential to their role as school leaders.  
Some, for example Melvin, assumed they were appointed to that role because of their 
ability to exercise good judgment.  He was critical of those administrators who “do not 
handle conflict well” and who “would much rather just not talk to people than actually 
say this is what I believe about something.”  He believed those administrators did not 
“have the capability…they do not have the skill set” to exercise discretion in their 
decision-making and “stand by it and be able to justify it.”  This finding supports Torres 
and Chen’s (2006) suggestion there may be “various levels and types of intelligence”    
(p. 191), or even levels of skill needed to exercise discretion well.  The other principals 
did not appear to consider that there was a certain level of intelligence or skill necessary 
for the exercise of discretion.  According to Shawna, “discretion should be based on 
sound decision-making practice.”  They appeared to assume that everyone was capable of 
exercising discretion and that its appropriate and reasonable exercise was more situation- 
or context-dependent than skill-dependent. 
Conversely, if the principals did not make useful, sensible decisions, they could 
be seen as ineffective and, one might reason, lose the support of stakeholders.  As Frank 
noted, “If you’re seen as someone who is approachable, that people can talk to you, that 
you’re fair, that all has to do with good judgment.  Practical is another word that would 
go with good judgment I think, because if you’re making impractical decisions about 
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things, they’re not common sense stuff.”  Harold saw good judgment as being the product 
of experience and “judgment…comes from experience…and judgment brings on the 
effectiveness [of a principal].”  However, as Vorenberg (1976) observes, the official is 
often “encouraged by statute to exercise his best judgment with great freedom and little 
guidance” (p. 654).  Good judgment is highly contextual and subjective, and the fact the 
administrators simply assumed they were exercising it does not imply they were doing so.  
They did not consider, or may not have been aware, that sometimes in their goal of just 
decision-making they may have been making their decisions guided by the “rule of 
normality” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 112), that is, choosing within established expectations of 
behavior.  Consequently, good judgment filtered through their notion of standard and 
deviant behavior may constrain the fair treatment of a student.   
Manley-Casimir (1974) astutely points out that “the crucial question is, What 
constitutes ‘good’ or ‘considered” judgment?” (p. 351).  Good judgment in discretion 
may be understood in a number of ways, and the fairness of any discretionary decision is 
highly subjective.  It is difficult to determine whether some principals consistently 
exercised good judgment and others did not, although it may be reasonable to assume not 
all principals exercised good judgment in every situation. Furthermore, the principals 
may have interpreted their judgments and decisions as being either good or not good, or 
as being somewhere along a continuum of judgment.  They believed, however, not all 
students start out equally and, as a result, they clearly desired the “flexibility and 
individualized treatment” (Hall, 1999, p. 159) and the freedom of choice discretion 
afforded them in their decision-making to make what they hoped were good judgments. 
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As in Hall’s (1999, p. 141) inquiry, a sense of justice, together with their personal 
philosophy, served to guide the judgment of many of the principals.  Danielle, for one, 
noted how her “personal philosophy” was based on the value she placed on  “the worth of 
young people and where they belong in our society” and served as a basis for her 
decision-making.  Sarah added that her “own beliefs in being honest and being kind to 
people” were values that helped to inform her judgments.  Ideologies are unique and, as 
Amanda concluded, her discretionary decision-making was based on her “own 
paradigm…[which] is probably not  congruent with others.” Although many of the 
principals expressed similar beliefs about their treatment of students, individual 
philosophies as a foundation for discretionary decision-making can lead to diverse and 
widely inconsistent consequences for student misbehavior, which may or may not serve 
students well.  At other times some of the principals also spoke of discretion as an 
intuitive or “gut” feeling (see also Frick, 2009).  Amanda offered that “you’ve got to go 
with your gut,” while Miriam felt decisions were made with “your gut and your heart,” 
and Lauren believed “you go through gut sometimes.”  Hawkins (2003) suggests that 
these hunches are used by decision-makers, when they “are conscious of a lack of an 
orderly or seemingly rational way of reasoning,” to take present situations and fit them 
into previous, familiar cases, which leads to “routinised behavior” (p. 211). 
Some principals spoke about their exercise of discretion as being an imposition of 
moral judgments, and they relied upon their sense of right and wrong (see Hall, 1999; see 
also Lipsky, 1980). Their moral judgments were guided by their values and, perhaps 
rightly or wrongly, on what they believed was good or best for a student.  Frank, for 
example, believed he was “making a decision on some sound backing and moral 
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grounds,” while Shawna thought “sometimes there are things that are morally, you just 
know you’ve got to do something because it’s good for that kid.”  Their judgments of the 
“moral worthiness” of individuals (Lipsky, 1980, p. 109) seemed to be negotiated within 
contextual limits and could be affected by any number of other aspects, such as dominant 
behavioral norms, lack of resources such as time, or even by what they regarded as the 
objectives of the disciplinary consequence.  Lipsky (1980) argues the problem here is not 
that “moral evaluations” are made among the offense, the offender and the consequence 
in the decision-making process, but that “diffuse moral assumptions of dominant social 
orientations” are likely to influence these decisions (p. 110).   
The differentiation of students also may be based on the principal’s personal 
interpretation of the distinction between worthy and unworthy, or deserving and 
undeserving, students.  Lipsky (1980) characterizes worthy students as those who are 
“more likely to respond to help” (p. 111) than others and, as a result, are more gratifying 
to work with.  Miriam, for example, indicated her anger and frustration with one boy who 
had teased a special-needs student and who, as a result, had been threatened with a knife 
by another student who came from a disadvantaged family background.  Initially, she had 
not wanted to suspend the knife-wielding student and instead focused on the victim as 
someone who “in all my years of teaching I can’t find one thing I like about that kid [the 
bully]…he’s rude, he’s disrespectful, he’s defiant, he does nothing.”  Ultimately, she 
adjudged the victim as not “worth ruining your life over.”  Miriam outlined the dilemma 
she experienced in making the disciplinary decision in this case, and worried that not 
being able to exercise discretion by considering all aspects of the situation (including the 
relative worth of the bully) would not ensure a fair or just resolution.  Her conflict 
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reflects the “interhierarchical conflict” Hodgkinson (1983) identifies when values are “in 
contention at different levels” or the “principle of principle [emphasis in original]” 
 (p. 203).  Her decision to “override” her own “private affect (III)” (Hodgkinson, 1983,  
p. 203) and ground her decision at the Type I level of principle reflects the “moral 
complexity [emphasis in original]” of “leadership” (p. 204).  Her inner turmoil also 
appears to mirror what Willower (1999) identified as the “gray areas” of administrative 
practice where tough choices are required “between closely competing goods or the lesser 
of evils, [and where] moral valuation comes into play” (p. 132; see also Frick, 2009).   
6.3.3 Discretion Required for Fairness  
The most salient feature of discretion, as interpreted from the study’s findings and 
as understood by the principals, is its exercise by decision-makers so they might 
differentiate treatment of students in order to be fair.  For the principals, justice appeared 
“intimately related to the exercise of discretion” (Manley-Casimir, 1977–78, p. 85).  
Their understanding of good judgment in their decision-making was related to fairness, 
which many principals were quick to point out was synonymous with equity, not 
necessarily equality, although it can be reasoned that finding the tension between equality 
and equity might not be achieved simply by exercising discretion. The value principals 
placed upon fairness, or at least the desire to be perceived as being fair, corroborates the 
findings of Hall’s (1999) study, and was evident in Theme Three.  Curiously, whether 
their decisions were perceived by students always as being fair or as examples of good 
judgment was not a consideration mentioned by any of the principals.  The principals said 
they valued fairness for students, that is, students “getting what they deserve as the 
consequence of their own individual actions and efforts” and personal situations 
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(Yankelovich, 1994, p. 23), although as final arbiters in a retributive sense, they may not 
have been mindful of all the elements which can contribute to student misbehavior, such 
as the role and responsibility of the school itself.   It is important to note that although the  
fairness they espouse appears to be a very solid value serving as the basis for a decision, 
it may be forced out, as Davis (1969) claims, by other constraints such as lack of 
information, resources or time, and result in consequences that are decidedly not fair or 
just.  Putting the student at the center of the decision, it can be argued, will not 
necessarily ensure fairness, either.  The principals appeared to value equality insofar as 
rules could be said to apply to all students, but discretion yielded them the flexibility they 
required to adapt rules to their personal definitions of equity.  They may have tended to 
over-compensate, at times, in their attempts to appear fair and just; as a result, a minority 
student, for instance, may not have received a consequence which was appropriate to the 
misbehavior while, on the other hand, a student who was a member of the dominant 
group may have received a harsher consequence.  The administrators seemed to 
understand that while leeway in disciplinary decision-making occasionally was required, 
at other times more severe consequences were needed because of “prevailing norms” 
(Vorenberg, 1976, p. 663).  Arguably, something may be lost in terms of the educative 
aspect of discipline if the opportunity to apply leniency or, conversely, harsher 
consequences is not afforded principals (Vorenberg, 1976).   
The principals in the study appeared to firmly believe they were treating all 
students “alike” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 112).  It may be somewhat ironical in that they desired 
consistency in decision-making that was just, yet their practice of differentiation of 
students could result in outcomes that are anything but consistent or just.  Moreover, 
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there may have been consistency within the discretionary decision-making of one 
principal based on personal philosophy and values, but among all the principals, there 
appeared to be inconsistency in their decision-making on issues that appeared to be 
similar.  This disparity in treatment was evident, for instance, in their responses to the 
duration of the school suspension levied for the student Gary in the vignette; the length of 
suspensions determined by the principals varied from zero to fourteen days.  Brown and 
Zuker (2007) argue “if students are to be treated differently, this must not be an arbitrary 
or accidental result but must flow from a proper exercise of administrative discretion”   
(p. 239).  Despite having school board policies designed to assist them to interpret and to 
administer student suspensions, this wide range in the number of suspension days in the 
vignette suggests the principals, based on Brown and Zuker’s (2007) assertion, 
understand the proper exercise of their discretion in very different ways. 
Hawkins (2003) questions the notions of consistency and inconsistency in 
discretionary decision-making, contending these terms may be recognized in ways that 
are different from the research assumptions.  For example, researchers or scholars may 
have discerned “‘similarity’ in a case where none may have existed for the decision-
maker” (p. 205).  Furthermore, while there may be assumptions there were “no 
differences in the cases as framed” by the principals in this study, they may have been 
“responding rationally—and consistently—to what they…regarded as differences in key 
features” in the scenario (Hawkins, 2003, p. 205).  Even without discretion, however, 
inconsistency in decision-making may arise, since decision-makers may “frame the same 
phenomenon…differently” (Hawkins, 2003, p. 205), and treating two unlike cases in 
similar ways can still result in unfairness. 
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Individual values, too, can lead to “inconsistency in administrator response” to 
similar situations (Hall, 1999, p. 142; see also Manley-Casimir, 1977–78) which may 
reflect Hodgkinson’s (1978b) second postulate of “degeneration” (p. 116), in which 
values tend to lose their intensity over time.  Perhaps the inconsistency in discretionary 
decision-making that may result stems from different objectives, purposes, philosophies, 
preferences, or some other quality not considered by the principals.  However, 
inconsistency “can pass unnoticed” when policies are vague, and there is a temptation by 
the administrator “to resolve issues at the pragmatic or lower levels” (Hodgkinson,  
1978b, p. 195).    
The principals differentiated treatment in order to achieve fairness for students, 
and they appeared to believe that their decisions were made in good faith; nonetheless, 
their decision-making could contain an element of bias or a prejudicial attitude (Lipsky, 
1980).  As Ashbaugh and Kasten (1984) emphasize, “administrators in organizations are 
not exempt from value bias in the decisions they make” (p. 196).  Lipsky (1980) further 
asserts it is useful to “assume bias” in discretionary decision-making and to question 
“why it sometimes does not occur [emphasis added],” rather than to assume “equality of 
treatment” and to ask “why it is regularly abridged [emphasis added]” (p. 111).  The 
principals, however, sought to counter any claims of discriminatory decision-making and, 
instead, emphasized ethnicity, socio-economic status or gender, those student-specific 
aspects identified in Theme Six, as being accommodated fairly through their 
discretionary decision-making and, in so doing, assumed they were unbiased in their 
decisions.  They appeared highly sensitive to any perceptions of bias and were indignant 
toward suggestions that the exercise of discretion could result in disparity.  It appears 
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they interpreted these student-specific elements as mitigating circumstances, not 
aggravating ones.  For instance, they stressed a student’s ethnicity would not influence 
their decision-making, and all principals noted in their responses to the vignette questions 
that the fact Gary was a racial minority student would not affect their decision.   Their 
“tacit assumptions” that they were “honourable” leaders and administrators align with 
what Hodgkinson (1991) identifies as a pathology of organizations, since there is no 
evidence to support or to refute that they are such teachers and administrators; in fact, he 
suggests there is no “prima facie ground for this presumption” (p. 60).   
Those principals who had experience in inner-city schools with racially diverse 
student populations, especially appeared to assume they were neutral, or unbiased, in 
their decision-making, which they may have been, despite any decisions which may 
reinforce disproportionate outcomes for students based on race, gender, or poverty.  On 
the other hand, students’ personal circumstances, such as poverty or a dysfunctional 
home life, were identified as mitigating factors for differentiation in their quest for 
fairness among students.  The criteria for their interpretation of what constituted 
mitigating circumstances were not identified.  Conversely, most of the principals 
understood lack of flexibility in decision-making, and administrators’ inability to 
consider context, would result in inequity and would be inappropriate and, possibly, 
unprofessional.  If discretion is not delegated to principals, it is legitimate to question 
how else they might account for mitigating factors in their decision-making (Vorenberg, 
1976).    
The principals appeared well-intentioned and genuinely desirous of treating 
students fairly, yet good intentions cannot guarantee equitable outcomes for all students.  
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Through the differential treatment of students, they seemed to believe they were being 
fair and just in their discretionary decision-making; however, their understanding of these 
constructs, or their perceptions about “causal relationships” (Martin et al., 2012), may 
have changed over time.  If the purpose of the exercise of discretion, to quote K. C. Davis 
(1969), is that the “goal of individualized justice be attained” (p. 19), it was not possible 
to determine if the principals always were able to meet that objective in their disciplinary 
decision-making. 
6.4  Research Sub-Question Four 
 What influences, values or circumstances do school administrators consider in 
their decision-making? 
 No one consistent element or circumstance served as the basis for the principals’ 
discretionary decision-making; instead, there appeared to be a number of influences and 
values.  Those influences that may be understood as being external to the principal are 
analyzed in research sub-question 2.  There was no way to precisely measure the 
influences on decision-making.  As noted previously, Theme Six suggested principals 
consider many influences in their decision-making, including circumstances that were 
more focused upon the individual student who was misbehaving, such as personal and 
family circumstances, the intent of the misbehavior, the student’s reaction to the 
misbehavior, and the student’s academic and disciplinary history.   
All principals appeared to be highly sensitive to the social contexts of all 
disciplinary situations.  Consistent with the observations of Meyer et al.’s (2009) study, 
many of the principals’ disciplinary decisions appeared to have been made within 
“prescribed normative decision frameworks” (p. 26), but context and circumstances may 
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have caused these frameworks, at times, to be inappropriate.  The student-specific 
influences identified in Theme Six, such as family background, intent and reaction 
appeared to be important aspects of the principals’ decision-making.  For example, the 
administrators’ concern with the home situation and the academic progress (see also Hall, 
1999) of the student Gary, in the vignette question, says much about their willingness to 
consider mitigating factors; however, the degree of influence this information would have 
upon their decision-making is difficult to determine.  The context and circumstances of 
individual cases appeared to be variable influences across the entire group of principals, 
although some principals indicated that one particular aspect (e.g., socio-economic) may 
have had more influence upon their discretion than others.  
6.4.1 Values-Informed Decision-Making 
 The principals’ recognition of values-informed decisions is consistent with the 
bulk of the literature in administrative decision-making.  They understood values as 
guiding their decisions and, although they may not have understood values as being a link 
between need and behavior (Hodgkinson 1978b, 1991), the participants believed values 
were acquired or learned.  Despite their insistence on gathering information, obtaining the 
facts of a situation and making their decision accordingly, the administrators appeared to 
make judgments based on values which could be affected by various influences.  Their 
values, though, were linked in some way to the information they used in any given 
disciplinary incident, and in some instances this information gave individual principals a 
“set of standards or guidelines for acceptable action” (Campbell-Evans, 1988, p. 25).  At 
other times, however, they may have simply disregarded the information altogether 
because of constraints such as time, the credibility of the informant, or the lack of 
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complete information.  On the last point, Begley and Leithwood (1989) contend “values 
provide structure for problem-solving” when “problem-relevant” information is lacking 
(p. 37), and their assertion appears consistently borne out by the comments of the 
participants in this study.     
 The values of “caring, responsibility, accountability, fairness and commitment to 
students” appeared to pervade the decision-making of the principals (Hall, 1999, p. 141), 
and they perceived these values informed their decision-making. However, there may 
have been other values which ran contrary to these espoused values that served as their 
decisional base.  One might expect that principals would treat their students with a 
“degree of care with attention to their circumstances and potential” (Lipsky, 1980,          
p. 167), and the study participants did emphasize the value of building caring 
relationships with students through other values such as honesty and kindness.  However, 
this caring appeared to be balanced against decision-making which could be described as 
“paternalistic and protectionist” (Walker, 1995, p. 4) at times, perhaps a function of the 
ages of students in elementary schools, or of their statutory duties under provincial child 
protection legislation. Thus, in certain cases, what the principals may interpret as  
decision-making informed by one value may be actually based on something quite 
different.  For example, what some participants may understand to be decision-making 
based on the value of caring may be obscured by a sense of their need to “safeguard” the 
“purposes and mandates” of the school division (Walker, 1995, p. 4) and in so doing, 
they could subordinate students’ interests and rights. 
The value of “the efficacy of individual effort: the view that education and hard 
work pay off” (Yankelovich, 1994, p. 23) influenced the principals’ decision-making and 
300 
 
appeared to favor some students over others.  The principals’ subjective evaluation of 
those students who simply may have made an error in judgment, but who generally were 
good citizens of the school and adhered to the rules, completed their work and were not 
disruptive in class, seemed to influence their decision-making in their efforts to achieve 
the objective of fairness.  The notion of intent is linked to error in students’ judgment, 
and all principals suggested their discretionary decisions, and the disciplinary 
consequences, could be based in whole or in part on the intent of the misbehaving 
student; this finding is consistent with the circumstances the principals considered in 
Manley-Casimir’s (1977–78) study.  However, intent may not be such a reliable predictor 
when, as March (1995) observes, decision-makers “attribute intent from observing 
behavior or the consequences of behavior.”  So whereas intent and even a show of 
remorse may serve as trustworthy indicators in some cases, they may be misleading in 
others.  In the example of the girls lighting fires on the school playground, Adam 
indicated they had cried and shown remorse for their actions, behavior which he 
understood reflected a lack of intent to cause harm or to jeopardize school safety.  These 
responses, however, could also be interpreted as the girls’ fear of being punished for 
misbehavior, and not necessarily as remorse for what they had done.
23
   
                                                 
23
 Dr. A. Leschied of Western University indicates children do not “tend to behave as if they are getting 
caught.  The whole idea re deterrence and threat of punishment is that kids think about what they do, [i.e.,] 
the odds of getting caught, and weigh the cost/benefits of what will happen if they are caught (i.e., is it 
worth doing the crime?).”  He continues that children “don’t do that [since] most behaviours are impulse 
ridden and in the moment decisions…such that kids only show ‘remorse’ after the fact, once they are 
caught.  For punishment/deterrence to be successful…the consequence has to come soon after the 
behaviour [and be] associated in time with the event…to have an effect” (personal communication, 
February 28, 2012). 
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Colman and Otten (2005) advocate for a “student’s acknowledgement of 
responsibility for his or her wrongdoing” as a mitigating factor in the “determination of 
appropriate student discipline” in cases of misbehavior (p. 299).  Half the study principals 
support this contention, since they indicated they would want to see a sense of remorse in 
a student.  The form this remorse would take is open to broad interpretation, and no one 
consistent response came from the participants.  A sincere apology would, as Colman and 
Otten (2005) suggest, shift the focus from a “punitive approach to misbehavior” to one 
that encourages “reparation and forgiveness” (p. 295) and may have been highly 
considered by the principals but simply not mentioned. 
The extent to which the principals’ interpretation of the intent of student 
misbehavior should serve as the basis for decision-making—in their desire for fair 
decision-making with meaningful consequences—may be considered in light of research 
conducted on youth sentencing.  As Cesaroni and Bala (2008) assert in their analysis, 
when young people commit crimes they “generally do not consider the likelihood of 
being caught and punished….[They] do not think about the consequences of their acts” 
(pp. 468–469).   They point to research that indicates “the cognitive and psychosocial 
reality is that adolescents have less judgment and greater impulsivity than adults”          
(p. 469).  What is more, youth “are not considering the legal consequences of their 
acts…and tend to perceive themselves as invulnerable” (Bala, 2011, p. 10).  The 
principals simply may have chosen not to mention an understanding of “adolescent brain 
development” (Bala, 2011, p. 10) as a feature of their decision-making, or they may have 
had no knowledge of this literature; consequently, the effect this awareness might have 
upon their exercise of discretion is unknown.   
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Some principals interpreted their values to be an extension of their personal 
philosophies or ideologies (see also Hall, 1999).  This notion supports Hodgkinson’s 
(1978b) theory of administration which he contends is “philosophy in action” containing 
the “dual aspects” of “rationality, or logic, and values” (p. 3).  In distinguishing between 
management and administration, Hodgkinson (1978b) describes the former as being more 
routinized, specific and “susceptible to quantitative methods,” whereas the latter deals 
with “the formulation of purpose, [and] the value-laden issues” (p. 5).  While he further 
observes the practices of management and administration are “means-oriented” and 
“ends-oriented,” respectively, and the true administrator is a “philosopher” and the true 
manager is a “technologist,” Hodgkinson (1978b) maintains the distinction between the 
two is blurred, and often “deliberately so” (p. 5).  However, as a general rule, the more 
“valuational” the decision-making, the more administrative in nature it is, and the less 
“valuational,” the more managerial it is (p. 6).    
The decision-making of the principals in this study mirrored Hodgkinson’s 
(1978b) description because it appeared quite fluid; at times, the study participants were 
concerned with  the “ends, aims, and purposes” (p. 6) of school policies.  At other times 
they seemed to make many decisions that were rote, formulaic, programmed or 
“contingent and determined” (p. 61).  Some of these latter decisions may have fallen into 
“the category of the managerial and technical” Hodgkinson, (1978b, p. 61) describes, or 
may have been made at the Type III level of personal preference.  Nonetheless, the 
importance of the routinized decisions should not be minimized, as they, too, can have 
serious consequences for students.   This is  not to suggest these decisions were made 
independent of values or purposes, but that they may constitute those types of 
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discretionary decisions Hawkins (1992) characterizes as “repetitive,” based on 
“familiarity” (p. 41) or “precedent” (p. 40), or on some other decisional base.  What is 
more, the principals understood their decisions as not being based upon their own likes or 
dislikes, or Type III values; in fact, they appeared to perceive their decisions were value-
neutral in terms of personal preference.  Those disciplinary situations principals described 
as being quite involved and values-complex were often made in collaboration with 
others, with the will of the majority at Type IIA or the consensus level.   In a way that 
mirrors the participants in Roche’s (1999) study, many of the principals appeared to 
agonize over “achieving a fair, [and] just solution,” when their “intentions suffer[ed] 
greatly at the hands of practicality” (p. 260), thereby contesting the traditional notion of 
administrators as simply being “rational, technical bureaucrats”  (p. 264; see also 
Marshall et al., 1996). 
6.4.2 Espoused Values in Decision-Making 
Theme Three also identified the values principals explicitly considered in their 
decision-making.  However, these also may be interpreted as espoused values.  Heifetz et 
al. (2009) suggest there may be a gap between espoused values and actual behavior in 
organizations (see also Roche, 1999).
24
  For example, a decision-maker may be 
committed to the value of diversity, but does not make much headway in that area 
because of “career advancement” opportunities (p. 92).  Willower (1999) similarly 
describes the holding of certain values to which there is “verbal commitment rather than 
                                                 
24
 Argyris and Schön’s (1974) discussion of “espoused theories of action and theories-in-use” (p. 8) 
suggests that “the theory of action” to which one gives allegiance and which is “communicate[d] to others” 
may or “may not be compatible with his espoused theory” (p. 7).  They go on to note dilemmas of 
“inconsistency,” “effectiveness,” and “value” may arise when there is “incongruity” (p. 31) between one’s 
own “”theory-in-use” and his or her “behavioral world” (p. 29).   
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concrete action” (p. 132), while Begley (2010) notes individuals may “often articulate or 
posture certain values while actually being committed to quite different values” (p. 40).  
Values not espoused by the principals may have been unconscious, assumed, or taken-
for-granted (Roche, 1999).  Adam, for one, emphasized the value of tolerance as 
informing the disciplinary decision-making in his practice, although he also mentioned 
that community expectations could significantly influence his decision.  Perhaps he was 
well-intended in many cases and he was able to respond through action to that which he 
was verbally committed, but values are not absolute, and in action they may appear 
differently to each decision-maker.   If it can be reasonably assumed that school 
principals are to take leadership in instilling values such as respect, tolerance and fairness 
in their students, they should model these values in their discretionary decision-making in 
disciplinary issues.  Espoused values should be consistently demonstrated.  Simply 
valuing the primacy of inclusive, respectful and tolerant environments and believing that 
one’s decisions reflect these values, do not ensure that one’s choices or actions do so.   
6.5  Research Sub-Question Five 
 Is there a hierarchy of influences, values or circumstances that shape school 
administrators’ exercise of discretion in their decision-making? 
The principals either could not describe or were hesitant in describing the values 
that informed their decision-making, and when asked to identify them, they appeared to 
have given them little consideration; the notion of values in decision-making did not 
seem to be foremost in their minds.  This finding is consistent with Ashbaugh and 
Kasten’s (1984) research.  A conclusion in Campbell-Evans’s (1985) inquiry that 
principals were somehow not “in tune with their moral or Type 1 values” (p. 90) or that 
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their values were “relatively unconscious and unquestioned” (p. 90) might reflect the 
administrators in the present study.  When asked directly, principals in this study did not 
“attribute their values to a single source,” and most of them indicated “their value set was 
a composite of their total life experiences” (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1984, p. 206), such as 
religious teachings, professional learning and family life.  Although they acknowledged 
the difficulty some complex issues presented, they appeared not to reflect upon the 
reasons or the value basis for their decision-making, or to question many of their 
decisions once they were made.  This lack of self-reflection at an abstract level may be a 
result of the hectic pace of their roles.  Alternatively, Campbell-Evans (1985) suggests 
some principals may express “things in more surface and essentially managerial ways” as 
a result of their working environment, and in a manner more oriented towards practical 
considerations with “limited direct reference” to values (p. 90); her observation was 
supported by the comments of most of the principals in my study. 
In seeking a hierarchy of influences, values or circumstances that shape 
discretionary decision-making, this particular research question was neither suggesting 
nor intending a quantifiable or numerical value or ranking should be attached to these 
aspects.  The listing was my interpretation of what the participants understood as being 
important in their decision-making.  While questions related to hierarchy were part of the 
methodology, the analysis was based on my observations and interpretations of the time-
span and frequency of the listing of influences, values and circumstances by the 
participants and of the relative importance with which they spoke about these elements.    
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6.5.1 Core Values in Discretionary Decision-Making 
Heifetz et al. (2009) suggest some people may focus on only a few values in 
complex situations—these are their “core values” (p. 92; see also Begley, 1999b; Hall, 
1999; Yankelovich, 1994).  Specific core values identified by the principals that 
structured their decisions in times of complexity were justice, fairness, dignity, 
responsibility, compassion, empathy, tolerance and respect.  The principals appeared to 
defer to a few core values, especially when they faced intricate and complicated 
disciplinary situations.  It is difficult to determine which of the core values was primary, 
although the values of justice and fairness appeared to predominate in response to 
interview questions.  On the other hand, perhaps they were able to hold a number of these 
core values simultaneously (Heifetz et al., 2009).  Their espoused core values are 
consistent with the core values identified by Walker (1998) in his study of the decision-
making of senior educational administrators.  Other core values may have been held by 
the principals but simply “did not figure prominently” in their responses (Campbell-
Evans, 1985, p. 90).    
Hodgkinson (1983) reasons that “any value can be manifested or held at any level 
[emphasis in original],” and gives the example that “Type II honesty would be valued 
because it has reasoned about [sic] or because it is the norm of the group” (p. 41) but 
notes it could also be held as a Type I principle, or even as a Type III preference to 
dishonesty.   In a similar way, the principals’ articulated core values can be grounded at a 
Type II level.  The notion of core values is not inconsistent with Hodgkinson’s (1983) 
contention of Type II values being the “modal level” (p. 47) within organizations since 
they appear to be held at the level of “collective justification” (Hodgkinson, 1978b,        
307 
 
p. 112), that is, as the values or expectations of the school division or as a perceived 
standard or a “collective judgment” (Hodgkinson, 1983, p. 49) in their roles as 
professionals.   They would also support a “rational analysis” (p. 49) in that values, such 
as justice or empathy, could be the “norm[s] of expectancy” (p. 45) for various 
stakeholders.  Core values also may be grounded at a Type II level by the principals’ 
desire for some “future state” (p. 42), such as a fair or just resolution as a consequence of 
a disciplinary situation, or by the need to reflect “tolerance” (Adam), “respect” 
(Shawna), or “responsibility” (Lauren) for all stakeholders in decision-making outcomes.    
6.5.2 Value of Safety  
The principals indicated the safety of students, staff and school was a value that 
informed many of their decisions, and it appeared as if this value would trump all other 
values; indeed, the metavalues of organizational maintenance and growth identified by 
Hodgkinson (1978b, 1983) depend wholly upon this value.  This finding of the primacy 
of safety, however,  is not consistent with Campbell-Evans’s (1985) study wherein there 
was no hierarchical component to the values guiding principals’ decisions; her inquiry 
supported “the view of a fluid dynamic value system” (p. 92).  Neither does it align with 
Vinzant and Crothers’s (1998) research which revealed that generally no one value 
appeared to influence or force a decision to the exclusion of others.      
The principals in the present study, however, understood safety as non-negotiable 
when the “going got tough” (Frank).  In fact, circumstances and situations relating to 
general safety and student well-being became more important than the circumstances and 
interests of the offending student in a serious disciplinary situation.  The principals would 
triage (Lipsky, 1980) disciplinary incidents and treat cases they interpreted as involving 
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school safety as their primary focus.  When school safety was threatened by acts of 
student misbehavior, the principals appeared to evaluate the potential outcomes by 
looking at the consequences of their decisions and determining whether anyone would or 
could be harmed.  In this way, the value of school safety seemed to shape their decisions 
and support “normative standards” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 110).  The value of safety as a 
rationale for decision-making would not be inconsistent with the predominance of Type 
II values of consequences and consensus that Hodgkinson (1978b) identifies for 
administrators.  A safe school would be the “future… state of ‘desirability,’” and school 
safety presupposes a “given scheme of social norms, expectations, and standards”         
(p. 112) that are enlisted at the Type II level of grounding.   However, if one value could 
be identified as being paramount for the participants in my study, it was school safety.  Its 
importance was evident when all participants, without fail, indicated the safety of all 
students and staff was their primary concern or duty in their decision-making and even 
supplanted their concern for the rights and interests of individual students.  The finding 
supports, to some extent, Vorenberg’s (1976) hypothesis that if rules are not specific but 
are quite broadly defined, discretionary decision-making might sacrifice a student’s rights 
for a “more important target” (p. 664) or goal—in this case, the value of school safety.  In 
the same way, Roher (2007) argues that “individual rights should not override the rights 
and safety of all others in the school.  The collective rights of all the students and staff in 
the school should not be superseded by the consideration of mitigating factors for one 
student” (p. 217).  On the other hand, however, as McCarthy and Soodak (2007) point 
out, some school administrators “must be persuaded” that maintaining school safety and 
protecting students right “are not mutually exclusive goals” (p. 472).     
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6.5.3 Value of the Best Interests of Students  
The principals also valued what they perceived to be in the best interests of their 
students as the basis for their decision-making; that principle is grounded at 
Hodgkinson’s (1978b) Type I level of value resolution.  This finding is consistent with 
the results of Dunbar and Villarruel’s (2002) inquiry, Meyer et al.’s (2009) study and 
Frick’s (2009) research.  Begley’s (2010) study goes so far as to identify the “‘students’ 
best interests’ as the meta-value of choice” for principals (p. 50; see also Walker, 1995).  
Since this study dealt with decision-making concerning the well-being and discipline of 
students, it could be reasoned that a higher frequency of the principals’ decisions would 
be grounded at the level of principle, or Type I, than at the level of personal preference 
and, in many cases, the best interests of students was identified by the principals as the 
basis for their decisions.   Doing what was best for students was a value that sustained 
and propelled administrators’ discretion for the study participants.  There appeared at 
times to be fluidity between the values of best interests and safety and often, in their 
decision-making, the principals understood safety as being in the best interests of all 
students and staff.   
Some of the principals’ decision-making based on the best interests of students, 
however, often appeared to lose its force (see Begley & Leithwood, 1989), and find 
resolution at the Type II level of consensus or consequences, in accordance with 
Hodgkinson’s (1978b) second postulate, where values tend “to lower their level of 
grounding over time” (p. 116).  This finding also may be reflected, in part, in Roche’s 
(1999) research where the value of doing what was best for students appeared to be 
“subsumed into the realm of unconscious assumption” by the principals in his study         
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(p. 267), and instead of grounding decisions at the Type I level of principle, they 
grounded them at the Type II level of rational resolution.  While all the principals 
articulated their intent to make decisions based on the principle of “what is in the best 
interests of the student” (Miriam), and they seemed to believe that they did so, they often 
appeared, ultimately, to make decisions based on what was best for the entire school or 
group at the nomothetic level (Hodgkinson, 1978b).  However, in a way similar to the 
principals in Roche’s (1999) study, the principals in my study were “not necessarily 
unconcerned” with issues of principle simply because they chose to “employ” Type II 
solutions (p. 268) in their decision-making; however, they often would justify these Type 
II decisions based on a Type I grounding of what they believed was in the students’ best 
interests. 
Hodgkinson (1983) contends that while values tend to “describe” what is 
“desired,” ethics “prescribe” or “tell us what we ought to do” (p. 218).  When ethics are 
applied to administration they yield “differing discretionary bases” for action (p. 218).   
He identifies a number of ethical positions, such as “guardianship,” “social equity,” and 
“hyper-professionalism” that can “provide a set of imperatives and decision rules for 
application to problems of administrative discretion” (pp. 221–222).  The principals’ 
espoused value of acting in the best interests of students could reflect Hodgkinson’s 
(1983) “human relations” ethical position wherein leaders adopt as their “pre-emptive 
ethic the psychological and material welfare of those with whom [they] have to deal 
within [their] organizational field” (p. 221). 
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6.5.4 Values of Consensus and Consequences 
The principals worked to accomplish the “organization’s goals” of maintaining 
order and discipline through their discretionary decision-making, and they sought to 
ensure (perhaps unconsciously) the value of school safety “as efficiently as possible” 
(Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 109) through their judgments based on the Type II value levels of  
the rationality of consensus and consequences (Hodgkinson, 1978b, 1991; see also 
Hawkins, 1997).  This resolution at Type II is the aspect of Hodgkinson’s (1978b) model 
that is “best applied to the research data” (Campbell-Evans, 1985, p. 87).  The finding 
corroborates MacKay’s (2008) observation that, given the magnitude of their role in 
ensuring school safety, many school administrators are focused on “the collective good” 
and, aided by their broad discretionary power, may be comfortable “limiting individual 
rights” to further this “larger good” (p. 24).  In reconciling the “dialectical tension 
between the idiographic and nomothetic aspects of the organization” (Hodgkinson, 1991, 
p. 146) and professional norms, ultimately the principals in this study appeared to resolve 
most of their decisions at Type IIA and IIB, the modal level for administrators identified 
by Hodgkinson (1978b; see also Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1984; Begley, 1999b, 2010).   This 
finding also supports Campbell-Evans’s (1985) research and Roche’s (1999) inquiry, in 
which principals mostly used both “consequentialist and nonconsequentialist strategies” 
(p. 263).  Roche (1999) defines the former as being “based primarily on calculating the 
good in terms of consequences, where the ends justify the means,” and the latter as being 
“concerned with some clear intrinsic view of the right or one’s duty” (p. 257).  Also, as 
exemplified in Roche’s (1999) research, the principals did not seem to resolve 
disciplinary situations at the level of personal preference or Type III; nor did they reveal 
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“personal preferences, likes or dislikes” (Campbell-Evans, 1985, p. 91).  Nonetheless, 
they may have occasionally capitulated to discretionary decision-making at this level 
because of frustration, self-interest or unrelated personal considerations.  Begley (2003) 
suggests that “self-interest is infrequently acknowledged as a motivation” because of the 
principals’ need to be “publicly accountable” (p. 7).   
The principals seemed to make most of their decisions within the penumbral 
space Hart (1961) describes; however, unlike his paradigm in which judges should not 
make discretionary judgments based on what they think is “best” (Hart, 1983, p. 137), the 
principals in this study appeared to do just that and, indeed, generally strove for what 
they believed was “right,” the Type I deontological level (Hodgkinson, 1996).  They 
based their decisions on moral judgments, that is, on a continuum of rightness (Begley, 
1999b), within the confines of their delegated legal authority, and guided by professional 
and social norms. Nonetheless, in complex disciplinary cases, specific influences upon 
their decision-making would force resolution not with the usual Type II values but, 
instead, with Type I, and the perceived need to do what is “right [emphasis in original],” 
according to “The Principle of Most Principle,” which forced the administrators to 
“abrogate the general logic of primacy of the larger interest” in the organization 
(Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 147).  This exception to the usual Type II resolution is apparent in 
the principals’ inclination toward leniency in the suspending of Gary, the student in the 
vignette, despite the two-week mandated suspension in the school policy.  
6.6  Research Sub-Question Six 
What kind(s) of knowledge do school administrators believe they need in order to 
make discretionary decisions in matters of student discipline? 
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March (1994) maintains decision-makers gather “more information than they 
could conceivably use” (p. 216).  Lipsky (1980) further contends these decision-makers 
search for information that affirms their treatment of individuals and their “patterns of 
practice,” and then “receive and incorporate information” consistent with their view of 
the world, leaving out that which may contradict it (p. 114).  All principals indicated they 
required knowledge to inform their decision-making.  Possible types of knowledge they 
believed they needed included knowledge of laws, policies, administrative theories, 
experiential knowledge, factual information regarding specific incidents and the 
understanding of circumstances. Two kinds of knowledge were identified as being 
essential to the principals’ decision-making.  First, all principals understood specific 
details of events as being pertinent to their investigation of student misbehavior.  The 
other type of knowledge integral to their decision-making in disciplinary situations was 
experiential knowledge from prior incidents.  This is not to suggest other kinds of 
knowledge were not necessary to inform their decisions; in fact, the types and amount of 
knowledge they required in each instance varied depending upon severity and complexity 
of the situation.  Legislation and policies, for example, did not always seem to be 
important considerations for the principals.  There may have been other kinds of 
knowledge they used in their decision-making but they simply did not, or could not, 
identity them.   
6.6.1 Need for Factual Information 
A dominant pattern in Theme One was the perception among all the principals of 
the need to gather information and to investigate fully during decision-making, especially 
in complicated disciplinary situations.  The principals appeared to understand this process 
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as applying discretion to the facts and to their interpretation or sense of a policy or rule, 
and in this way seemed to believe it may lend more legitimacy to the exercise of their 
discretion and mean a lesser chance of making a mistake or an error in judgment.  Their 
desire to find the facts is consistent with what McLachlin (1992) calls “the most 
fundamental way judges exercise discretion” (p. 170).  Despite information that is “often 
incomplete and sometimes conflicting,” the principals would work to resolve “conflicts 
and fill these lacunae by making inferences and choices,” thereby exercising discretion 
(p. 170).  The participants’ need for fact-gathering appeared to be dependent, in some 
ways, upon the complexity and uniqueness of the disciplinary incident.  However, the 
trustworthiness of their fact-finding may be questionable, because the principals may not 
correctly interpret relevant information, may have only partial knowledge, may consider 
irrelevant information, or may consider information obtained from individuals who have 
a particular bias or vested interest.  Also, when gathering information from students, the 
principals may receive inaccurate details, especially from very young students, focus on a 
part of the information which may not be relevant, or overlook other integral pieces of 
information.  As Hawkins (1992) puts it, they may freely take into account information 
that could be “of questionable accuracy, reliability or relevance” (p. 16; see also 
Hawkins, 1998).  In some complex or involved disciplinary cases they may never gather 
all the information or hear all voices in their decision-making.  Despite their assertions to 
the contrary, then, and based on their perceptions and interpretations of information, they 
may not be making the best decision.  It is important, however, that they endeavored to 
gain as much information as possible in their quest to be fair.   
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Nonetheless, the type of information and the manner in which it is acquired by 
principals also could be a cause for concern.  For example, Roher (2007), in his analysis 
of Ontario’s Bill 212, the Education Amendment Act (Progressive Discipline and School 
Safety, 2007), notes that for “criminal and quasi-criminal offences” committed in schools 
the police have “a duty to investigate,” and at some points the responsibilities of both 
principals and the police overlap (p. 211).  In these cases, if principals persist in 
“reviewing the incident” by “interviewing witnesses or seizing property,” their actions 
“could hamper or prejudice the police investigation” (p. 211).   
Fulfilling their perceived need to investigate and gather information may not 
always result in fair, equitable, or appropriate discretionary decision-making.  Consistent 
with Roche’s (1999) study, however, when the principals indicated they had knowledge 
of or sought complete information about a disciplinary problem, they “rarely” 
acknowledged the influence of values in a decision, although the values may have 
become “unconscious or assumed” (p. 266).  In this way K. C. Davis’s (1969) assertion 
about influences (and facts) crowding out values appeared to be corroborated by the 
principals’ decision-making.  In those disciplinary cases where they believed they had 
acquired the appropriate or necessary facts concerning a behavioral incident, however, 
the participants may have simply chosen not to acknowledge or to have been aware of the 
influence of values in their decisions.  They also appeared to default to principles or 
transrational values when knowledge was “absent or unavailable” and the complexity or 
urgency of a disciplinary situation made “rational processes…impossible or 
inappropriate” (Begley, 1999b, pp. 266–267).  Generally, in these situations, decision-
making was based on what they perceived was in the best interests of the student.   
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6.6.2 Information Specific to Situations 
The principals appeared to understand that they would be better placed to exercise 
good judgment in their disciplinary decision-making through the accumulation of 
information.  Despite Hodgkinson’s (1996) admonition to the contrary, the principals 
appeared to want to distill an “ought from an is [emphasis in original],” that is, to derive 
values from facts, the “naturalistic fallacy” (p. 123).   He believes “no amount of fact-
gathering or information seeking can ever conclusively put them ‘in the right’ [emphasis 
in original]” (Hodgkinson, 1978b, p. 62).  While facts and values are “inextricably 
intertwined” (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 124), and information-gathering may help to arrive at 
“value premises,” factual bases do not “prove those premises” (p. 56). As Campbell-
Evans (1988) discovered, values may act as the “filter through which facts are screened 
and evaluated for the purposes of selecting one course of action from many”  
(p. 25).  This notion is echoed in Pal (2001), who asserts “‘facts’” are always constructed 
through values and theories [emphasis in original]” (p. 22).  Hawkins (1992) contends 
that even when rules are clearly defined, the facts “upon which the application of a rule 
may depend have always to be interpreted” (p. 35).  For example, the information Adam 
used in his decision not to suspend the girls who lit fires on the school playground was 
based on the value of empathy and on his understanding of the need to show remorse for 
misbehavior.  Shawna, too, based her decision not to suspend a homeless student, who 
had come to school high on drugs, on the values of dignity and belonging.  The 
principals, although desirous of facts and information to inform their decision-making, 
made “concrete choices in specific situations” (p. 22) about which facts were relevant to 
their decision-making and which were not.  They may have been unaware, or perhaps did 
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not consider, that they also exercised discretion in determining which facts they 
considered or the people with whom they chose to speak.  In those situations when they 
made decisions independent of a knowledge base, values appeared to more heavily 
inform their decisions.  This finding supports Begley’s (1999b) suggestion that when 
“knowledge schema is unavailable…urgency requires” administrators to fall back upon a 
“core set of values” (p. 252).   
  While the principals in this study appeared to have been loathe to act 
independently of what they saw as a required base of knowledge or a gathering of facts, 
they also may simply have fallen back upon common practice, consensus, professional 
norms or expectations forming the culture of a particular school, or upon the accepted 
way of making decisions at Hodgkinson’s (1978b) Type IIA or Type IIB levels.  As an 
illustration, they would assign a student suspension as a default disciplinary consequence 
in order to meet the expectations of staff or stakeholders or to support the way in which 
disciplinary issues were typically handled in the school, despite their belief in the 
effectiveness of this strategy.  The “repetitive” (p. 39) nature of discretion identified by 
Hawkins (1992) supports this finding of resorting to common practice in making 
decisions in situations with which they felt familiar or experienced, or which they felt 
they had encountered before, and about which, therefore, they had the required 
information.  Hawkins (2003) cautions, however, that “the more decision-makers decide 
cases repetitively…the more inevitable the onset of decision-making routines becomes”         
(p. 206).     
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6.6.3 Knowledge of Colleagues  
Unlike the principals in Begley’s (2010) research, the principals in this study 
tended “to seek information among peers, who may be expected to be like-minded” 
(Lipsky, 1980, p. 115).  March (1994) believes “collective decision making allows 
participants to rehearse arguments and to develop justifications” or to practice 
rationalizing their decisions, and also “provides an opportunity for individuals to reduce 
their own internal uncertainty about difficult decisions” (p. 216).  The findings of this 
study would support this assertion.  Although the principals seemed to feel more 
confident and justified in their decisions made with colleagues, collaborative decision-
making is not failsafe.  Certain perspectives may dominate and negatively affect the 
decision-making process; on the other hand, fresh insight may be gained in decision-
making that is collaborative.  Shawna was one principal who spoke about a decision she 
had made in consultation with other professionals regarding an instance of physical 
violence among four girls in her school. She noted she was ultimately held accountable 
and was subject to much criticism by her staff; in the end, she regretted having made the 
decision.  Amanda, on the other hand, revealed she felt “lonely and isolated as an 
administrator,” and collaborative decision-making may have helped to alleviate some of 
these feelings.   
More than half the principals in the study responded to the vignette by indicating 
their need to collaborate with their school resource officer, grounding their decisions at 
the Type IIB level of consensus Hodgkinson (1978b, 1991) identifies.  Such collaborative 
decision-making may have helped them to justify their decisions, but it also may have 
provided them with the necessary legal information they did not possess.  The support of 
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the resource officer may have given them confidence and a legitimacy they may not have 
felt on their own.  Consistent with the findings of Meyer et al. (2009), most of the 
principals in this study also indicated their desire to collaborate with other members of a 
school team, such as educational psychologists or social workers, or with other 
professional staff in decision-making in complex disciplinary situations.   Hall’s (1999) 
study also found that administrators wanted to work with their colleagues, especially in 
situations involving youth violence, where “the gravity of the decision determines the 
extent of involvement [of colleagues and other professionals]” (p. 150).  Hodgkinson 
(1996) disputes the desirability of “consulting and co-opting interested or knowledgeable 
parties” in order to widen the scope of the decision-making process (p. 56).  He argues 
that this is not rational decision-making, but decision-making by “political suasion,” and 
that assigning conflicts and problems to consultants and experts may result in the 
insertion of different and unfamiliar values into the decision-making process which may 
limit or usurp the administrator’s “responsibility and freedom of choice” (p. 56). 
6.6.4 Knowledge Based Upon Experience 
A dominant pattern that emerged in Theme Four was the influence of principals’ 
experience, as they interpreted it, upon their decision-making.  Experience could be 
understood as one type of knowledge they required to help them exercise discretion.  The 
principals’ understanding of experience in supporting their decision-making aligns with 
Hawkins’s (1992) description of the nature of discretion as being based on “precedent” 
(p. 40).  As Lipsky (1980) asserts, decision-makers are “particularly inclined to believe 
that experience provides the basis for knowledge in assessing the client world” (p. 115).  
Consistent with Hall’s (1999) study, Harold, who was in his final year before retirement, 
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indicated he routinely relied upon his experience as an educator and administrator as a 
basis for his discretionary decision-making.  This reliance may constitute what Roche’s  
(1999) research described as an experienced principal following a “standard practice” in 
decision-making based on values that have “become unconscious or assumed” over time 
(p. 266). 
How reliable experience may be for informing decision-making is questionable 
and dependent upon the context and the individual.  Questions of memory may affect 
decision-making based on experience, especially regarding details of specific events, and 
types of behavior problems or norms that can change over time.  Emotional responses 
and anxiety, which can cause individuals to lose perspective, may alter the circumstances 
in decision-making, too.  However, when a serious situation involving student 
misbehavior arose, both experienced and less-experienced principals indicated they 
would involve others in problem-solving, despite their acknowledged level of experience.  
As Hall (1999) reasons, “well-structured problems” (p. 150) that are familiar may be 
solved with minimum effort by relying on “past experiences;” however, more complex 
and less-defined problems require “more deliberation and involvement by others” or, 
perhaps, do not rely upon the need for experience at all (p. 150).  Hawkins (2003) notes 
that when discretion is exercised, decision-makers “categorise most events according to 
some existing framing scheme derived from past events and organizational precedents” to 
help inform their decisions (p. 212).  There will be particular consequences flowing 
“from the type or category settled upon” which will then simplify the problem or conflict 
(p. 212). 
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Hodgkinson (1978b, 1996) identifies three types of administrators.  One type, the 
“collegial administrator,” is not in his or her original profession, is only in the role for a 
specific time, may have had “no preparation in the field” and is one whose “professional 
allegiance is not administration” (Hodgkinson, 1996, pp. 58–59).  Principals may be 
considered such administrators (Hodgkinson, 1978b) because, for the most part, they 
were educators, consultants, or educational leaders in their original profession.  In their 
current administrative role, then, eight principals indicated on the demographic 
information sheet they were “inexperienced,” based on the definition provided for them 
(i.e., being in the role for less than five years).  Adam, for example, believed that he was 
inexperienced and ever ill-prepared for his principal’s role at the elementary level, 
despite his formal education and his more than fifteen years’ experience as an educator 
and administrator at the high school level.  Because he did not have the benefit of 
experience at the elementary school level, he lacked confidence, and frequently second 
guessed himself.  His self-described “knowledge gap” caused him to feel inadequately 
trained for his current role: “The teachers come at me all the time about this, that and the 
other thing.  I do not really know what they are talking about…I really do find myself 
kind of every day [saying] jeez, is this the right way to get it?  If I ran a high school I 
would feel much better because I understand that world.”  He indicated this lack of 
experience affected his discretion, and he may have avoided making decisions in certain 
situations, referred decisions to others, or sometimes felt frustration or uncertainty during 
the decision-making process.   
In this inquiry, the principals’ espoused belief in the need for experience is 
consistent with Haynes and Licata’s (1995) study of elementary principals’ decision-
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making that linked experience to “creative insubordination” (p. 21), a component of 
discretionary decision-making; their research revealed a “principal’s total years of 
experience as a school administrator” was “positively related” to a willingness to exercise 
creative insubordination (p. 31).  Also noteworthy  in Haynes and Licata’s (1995) study is 
the finding that experienced principals were “cynical” about “professional discretion 
justified by degrees and certificates” and, instead, relied in their  decision-making more 
on what they had learned on the job, “their school context and what they [were] trying to 
accomplish” (pp. 32–33).  The principals in my study, while reliant on their experience 
and knowledge of their school community in their decision-making, offered little 
comment on professional credentials, and only one made passing reference to having 
taken an education law class at the graduate level. 
Similar to the findings in Allison and Allison’s (1993) inquiry into the effect of 
experience and time in role, the participants in my study referred to past disciplinary 
cases, although the circumstances were not necessarily identical.  The principals, though, 
unlike those in Allison and Allison’s (1993) study, seemed quite prepared to indicate how 
they would proceed in any given situation, based on effective past practices, and 
understood these prior situations as informing their current decision-making.  As a result, 
while the principals’ attention “to relevant details in problem situations is also an 
important and probably related factor in administrative expertise” (Allison & Allison, 
1993, p. 319), nonetheless, “continued experience in the role can have a positive effect on 
expertise” (p. 318).   
Only two of the principals interviewed in this study stated they considered 
themselves to be “experienced,” that is, having experience in the role of principal for 
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more than the five years defined in the demographic survey, and none used the word 
“expertise” to describe his or her discretionary decision-making.  Although they may on 
some level have considered themselves experts, the concept of “judged expertise” 
(Allison & Allison, 1993, p. 317) was not mentioned by the principals.  Those who had 
extensive experience working in schools for more than twenty years, such as Harold, 
Miriam and Danielle, appeared to draw heavily upon past practices to inform their 
discretion, and they did not question, but assumed, the measure of ability experience 
provided them with respect to recognizing and resolving disciplinary issues.  They 
appeared to believe that experience appropriately informed their decision-making and did 
not indicate whether it gave them “incomplete or partial solutions” (St. Germain & 
Quinn, 2005, p. 88).   As Allison and Allison (1993) assert, “experience in schools”      
(p. 317) in any role may affect decision-making.  This assertion is supported by the 
finding that Frank, in his fourth year of the principalship, considered himself 
“experienced” because he had been in “the administrator’s chair” for eleven years, 
including seven years as a vice-principal. It could be reasonably assumed the other 
principals may draw upon their experiences as vice-principals or in other leadership 
positions to inform their discretionary decision-making.  However, the extent to which 
they were able to benefit from their experience appeared to vary, although they did 
indicate it provided them with some measure of confidence in exercising their discretion.  
This confidence could have either a positive or negative effect upon their decision-
making, because it may have given them some assurance in exercising discretion in a 
similar situation, or a false measure of confidence in challenging situations that were not 
truly similar.  Perhaps they were able to use their experience in different ways or at 
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different levels, or drew upon their experiences differently in their own contexts (St. 
Germain & Quinn, 2005).     
6.6.5 Confidence Related to Experience 
As revealed in Theme Four, the principals also seemed to see a correlation 
between experience and their confidence in decision-making; this correlation seemed to 
be related to the trust they had established among parents, guardians and community 
members.  Hawkins (2003) contends decision-makers gain confidence from “being able 
to see similarities in other cases” (p. 212) and are able to make discretionary decisions 
more efficiently, with less anxiety and greater ease.  The principals’ confidence appeared 
to be linked to their ability to exercise sound and fair judgment through their experience, 
which was, in turn, based upon their knowledge of the school community; in their 
exercise of discretion, a relationship existed among confidence, judgment, trust, and 
knowing one’s school, its students and their families.  The relationship between the 
experience the principals had and the level of confidence they felt to exercise discretion 
in their disciplinary decision-making is consistent with that in Hall’s (1999) study, where 
“level of experience” (p. 161) appeared to be a considerable influence on discretion (see 
also Crowson & Porter-Gehrie, 1980, p. 66).   As Adam pointed out, “If you are 
exercising bad judgment, you know, people will notice soon enough and then you will not 
have the confidence of either the staff, the parents or even the children…it [discretion] 
would be linked to confidence based on knowledge of the job,[and] knowledge of the 
role.” Shawna agreed, saying experience “absolutely” would inform her discretion.   
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6.6.6 Experience in Role and Exercise of Discretion 
Most of the participants, however, seemed to suggest the more extensive their 
experiences in school, especially at the level of principal, the more confident and 
comfortable they were in exercising discretion in disciplinary situations, and they would 
not really worry about the repercussions of their decisions.  Harold, Adam, Danielle and 
Shawna indicated their experience afforded them greater discretion, and they gained 
confidence in their decision-making.  Harold equated his confidence and experience to 
the common sense he possessed.  While experience may serve to inform many decisions 
in a satisfactory manner, it would not be a fail-safe method for discretionary decisions, 
because cases can appear similar on the surface, but after time, they may prove to be 
more dissimilar, or other circumstances may become more relevant.  Experience, 
however, may also lead to ambivalence in decision-making.  Conversely “typification,” 
whereby “familiarity with the broad features of routine cases” may cause decision-
makers to routinize their decisions “for reasons of efficiency,” or give them confidence, 
is “another way of providing a rational defence against criticism” (Hawkins, 2003,         
p. 212).  Basing decisions solely on past experience may not always be the most 
equitable, appropriate, or effective choice, but it may be more expedient and may offer 
easier and quicker solutions for harried principals.  The research of Meyer et al. (2009) 
suggests conscience serves as a “vehicle or conduit for past experience” (p. 24) to inform 
discretionary decision-making in the area of principals’ succession; however, the extent 
to which conscience contributed to the construction of the decision-making framework of 
the principals in my study, if it contributed at all, was not mentioned by the participants 
and was not evident in the findings. 
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St. Germain and Quinn’s (2005) inquiry into principals’ tacit knowledge, or 
knowledge “grounded in experience” (p. 75), revealed that in the problem-solving errors 
of “expert” school administrators, or those who had at least five years’ experience (p. 79), 
“timing—arguably a characteristic of either judgment or intuition—was critical” (p. 77).  
Novice principals, their research showed, tended to reach a decision either too early or 
too late in the problem-solving process.  The notion of timing among novice, or newly 
appointed, principals may help to explain Amanda’s error in allowing the student to 
smoke off school property; being new to her role, she may not have considered all of the 
consequences of her decision before she made her choice.  On the other hand, she may 
have based her decision on strategies she had used previously as a teacher.  Many of the 
principals understood that time may help them make better decisions, and if they felt 
rushed or pressed for time, their decision-making could be adversely affected.  St. 
Germain and Quinn (2005) contend that dealing with ever-increasing challenges may 
provide principals with greater problem-solving skills and “expertise” (p. 77), yet 
experience alone is not necessarily an indicator of, or precursor to, “expertise” (p. 87; see 
also Allison & Allison, 1993).  Routinized problems could lead to boredom or 
nonchalance and poor judgment in decision-making, and it can be reasoned that many of 
the principals relied on prior experiences when they were forced by circumstances to 
make decisions in a hurry.  As St. Germain and Quinn (2005) conclude, tacit knowledge 
“is untaught but integral to successful decision-making in situations in which time is 
limited” (p. 88).    
Begley (2010) identified knowledge attained through “life experiences, 
professional training, and reflection” as a motivating force “behind the adoption of a 
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particular value” (p. 42) which, in turn, influences decision-making.  Melvin agreed, 
noting it was “personality and…life experience rather than…experience in [the] job…not 
age and not number of years in the position” that informed his decisions, partly because 
he saw himself as being relatively young in his role as principal.  In terms of training, 
four principals described what they understood to be a vast difference between 
administration in a high school and administration in an elementary school, especially in 
the area of discipline, and suggested that the experiences at one level might not 
necessarily serve to appropriately inform decisions at the other, or may at least leave 
administrators with less confidence in their discretionary decision-making. 
6.7  Research Sub-Question Seven 
 What do school administrators perceive to be appropriate and inappropriate 
exercises of discretion in student disciplinary issues?  
Although many administrative decisions (disciplinary and otherwise) are made 
quickly, those decisions relating to complex and serious disciplinary incidents appeared 
to be made over a longer period of time by the participants; indeed, that is how many of 
the principals categorized their perception of appropriate and inappropriate exercises of 
discretion—by the rapidity, or lack thereof, with which decisions are made.  The 
principals in this study seemed to interpret appropriate discretionary decision-making as 
that which was contextually based and collaborative, whereas inappropriate exercises of 
discretion appeared to be those decisions that were formulaic and made in haste, without 
consideration of what they considered relevant circumstances (see Heilmann, 2006).  
Inaction (which is also an expression of judgment) and selfish or career-enhancing 
decisions were also considered inappropriate by the participants. 
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6.7.1 Perceptions of Inappropriate Exercise of Discretion   
Mintzberg (1979) characterizes a school system as a “professional bureaucracy 
[emphasis in original]” which is an organization whose work leads to ‘predetermined or 
predictable…standardized’” behavior that is complex and “decentralized” (p. 348) and 
relies “on the skills and knowledge” of its “operating professionals” to function (p. 349). 
In professional bureaucratic organizations, he continues, “considerable judgment” can be 
exercised by professionals who can be described, in some cases, as “incompetent or 
unconscientious” (Mintzbeg, 1979, p. 373).  These are professionals who may neglect to 
keep current in their field, who are more concerned with career advancement, or who are 
not truly focused on the needs of the people they are serving (Mintzberg, 1979).  
Leithwood (1999) maintains, however, “virtually all relevant evidence suggests that 
school administrative practice is already highly ethical” (p. 25).  Nonetheless, many of 
the principals in the study commented upon colleagues who may have been influenced in 
their decision-making by a desire to move to a bigger school and an accompanying larger 
pay cheque, or by a promotion to a more senior position at the district office; some of the 
participants were scornful of what they considered an inappropriate exercise of discretion 
in decision-making by putting what they saw as personal motives before students’ 
interests,  as if the decision-maker had given up on a student.    
Those individuals the principals perceived as making “hard-and-fast decisions” 
(Adam)  in the course of a school day may have different priorities and influences or may 
feel they are exercising discretion appropriately when they make decisions quickly.  
Sometimes, despite good intentions, hasty decisions may be made out of frustration, in 
error, or for some other reason, and they may not be the best decisions in a given 
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situation.  At other times, decisions made easily may be the correct ones.  Taking time in 
exercising discretion may not result in the most effective resolution, either, and could be 
perceived by stakeholders as indecision and weakness.   Nonetheless, the principals in the 
study appeared to see “cut-and-dried” (Shawna) and “snap” (Lauren) decision-making as 
inappropriate, as masquerading as sound judgment, and as bordering on lack of 
professionalism.  Heavy-handedness did not appear to be appropriate, either; most of the 
principals displayed a preference for leniency, through the consideration of mitigating 
circumstances, as an appropriate response.  Yet the mitigating, or aggravating, 
circumstances they considered may or may not have been appropriate in any given 
situation. 
Some of the principals were disdainful of those administrators they perceived as 
doing things too “easily” (Melvin), or “by the rulebook” (Amanda), or following policy 
to the letter, since they considered them to be self-serving, opportunistic, and concerned 
not with the welfare of children, but with self-aggrandizement or the advancement of 
their own careers.  Such principals may be considered “careerist” administrators, one of 
four archetypes Hodgkinson (1996, p. 91) characterizes; careerists are self-centered and 
self-concerned, and believe rules can be “bent, broken and evaded if the end result can be 
unpenalized success” (p. 92).  Other principals, according to Melvin, “hide behind the 
rulebook” or the “bureaucratic cloak” (Danielle) because they wish to avoid conflict or 
controversy, and doing so is “easier because then it is not you [the principal] making the 
decision” (Melvin).  To what degree this perception is accurate is unclear, and what it 
suggests about those who do not follow the letter of policy in their decision-making 
appears flawed.  The principals  did not indicate they were prepared to question their 
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colleagues about these decisions, although one principal (Danielle) indicated she had 
moved into administration to counter what she saw as inexperience and, perhaps by 
association, incompetence in younger principals who, she believed, would not be capable 
of making decisions that would positively benefit children.  Again, youth and 
inexperience do not necessarily indicate poor judgment in decision-making (Allison & 
Allison, 1993).   
Mintzberg (1979) also describes the professional who “confuses the needs of his 
clients with the skills he has to offer them” and “concentrates on the program that he 
favors…to the exclusion of all others” (p. 376).  This description may be reflected in the 
discretionary decision-making of some of the principals in the study who unquestioningly 
assumed their decisions were aligned with students’ needs as they identified them and 
were entirely appropriate in providing equitable treatment of students when, in reality, the 
decisions may have been inappropriate.  What some of the participants interpreted as 
good judgment in their decision-making may have actually empowered certain students 
in ways they should not have been or did not wish to be empowered. Also, the 
collaborative decision-making they appeared to need involving safety issues and the 
school resource officer, for example, may have been misguided at times or may have 
served to elevate situations to an unnecessary level of seriousness.  On the other hand, by 
eschewing the additional layer of accountability afforded by consultation or 
collaboration, the few principals, such as Frank, who did not perceive collaboration as 
appropriate in discretionary decision-making may have selectively, and unscrutinized, 
enforced policy of the school division or acted capriciously beyond their authority or 
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capability, or both.  If they had worked collaboratively they may have had to relinquish 
some of their authority or control in decision-making.  
6.7.2 Appropriate Exercise of Discretion in Policy Implementation 
Shipman (1969) asserts “there can be no sharp separation between policy and 
administration.  Policy is the value content of the administrative process” (p. 122; see 
also Hodgkinson, 1978b).  LaRocque and Coleman (1985), too, identify policies in 
administration as forming “the critical link between the policy realm and the realm of 
programs and practices” (p. 152), while highlighting the “critical importance of 
administrators, both district and school level, to the success of policy implementation 
efforts” (p. 155).  As administrators, principals “make policy” (Hodgkinson, 1978b, p. 
68; Lipsky, 1980, p. xiii) and exercise discretion to do so.  Hall (1999) contends 
discretion is a central element in principals’ interpretation and implementation of policy.  
Hawkins (1992) maintains, as borne out in the findings of the study, that principals’ 
“interpretive behavior is involved in making sense of rules and in making choices about 
the relevance and use of rules” (p. 13).   
The manner in which the study participants implemented the rules and policies 
appeared to be on a continuum and seemed, for the most part, negotiable in many 
disciplinary situations.  In the case of the vignette regarding the weapon in school, Harold 
believed he would have no choice but to implement the suspension outlined in policy.  In 
his words, “I follow school board policy…that’s the school board policy, and if he 
[student’s father] doesn’t agree with it, then I’m sorry, but that’s the policy…I don’t have 
any say.”  Adam, on the other hand, believed policy to be a “starting point” and asked 
himself “Does this policy make any sense whatsoever in the context I am dealing in right 
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now?”   Shawna, too, said that although she was familiar with policies on suspension and 
expulsion in the school division, she did “not feel bound [to implement them], as I feel we 
are given discretion depending upon circumstances and context.”  While they also may 
have been reluctant to “reflect on the appropriateness of the basic assumptions underlying 
established policy and practice in specific instances,” some of the principals simply may 
have adhered to what they perceived was the school division policy, or what they thought 
was best for the student based on “unconscious assumptions” (Roche, 1999, p. 267).  
Harold, for instance, despite having been a principal for almost twenty years, revealed he 
did not know whether there was a policy on weapons in the school division.  All of the 
principals appeared to understand they possessed the personal skills or abilities (see 
LaRocque & Coleman, 1985, p. 158) to implement policy. However, relying solely upon 
policies as a basis for decision-making was interpreted by them as an inappropriate 
exercise of discretion, whether or not they possessed the ability to do so.   
6.7.3 Enforcement of Policy and Legislation 
Some of the administrators in the study perceived that school policies were too 
constricting or limiting upon their discretion (see Simon, 1957), that a specific policy 
may have been overly rigid or strict, or that legislation, such as that outlining reasons for 
suspensions, did not align with their own beliefs or values.  If this were the case, 
principals appeared to think they could determine whether or not to enforce the policy or 
law.  Hawkins (2003) believes “how a particular rule applies in a particular circumstance 
will inevitably be reserved for, or assumed within, the discretion of the legal actor 
concerned” (p. 207).  Furthermore, in line with the conclusions of LaRocque and 
Coleman’s (1985) research on the implementation of community policy relations in 
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public schools, if the values articulated in a policy aligned with the principals’ own 
values, they were more inclined to accept and internalize the “values and goals of the 
policy,” support it, and change their “role behaviors and role relationships” to be 
consistent with the policy (p. 157).  As Melvin concluded, he did not “feel any 
obligation” to enforce a policy he believed was “counterintuitive to what a child needs,” 
although in specific cases he did feel somewhat constrained by procedures for a student 
search because it was a “legality issue.”  It appeared principals were guided by their own 
interpretation of what was good for a child, despite rules or policies to the contrary.  
Their interpretation may beg the question of why policy is there in the first place.  It is 
worthwhile to note the principals did not refer to specific school board policies unless 
asked, and in those cases referred only to the policy on student suspension with which 
they seemed most familiar, or the authority to suspend for “gross misconduct” under The 
Education Act (1995).  
LaRocque and Coleman’s (1985) study revealed few “teacher respondents had 
ever read, or were even aware” of certain policies (p. 159).  It was not clear if their 
finding reflected the level of awareness of specific policies relating to discipline by the 
participants in my study.  The principals may simply have chosen not to refer to the board 
policies relating to student discipline  Two principals commented on their belief the Act 
was outdated legislation, a notion which may have provided them with some justification 
in their choice to enforce it as they saw fit; however, most principals alluded to the Act in 
reference to serious disciplinary situations, suggesting that discretion was variable 
depending upon their interpretation of the severity of a disciplinary incident.  They may 
have been more conversant with board policy and legislation than they admitted or, 
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conversely, may have been less knowledgeable and, as a result, spoke only in generalities 
about policy and legislation.  Unlike the principals in Roche’s (1999) inquiry who felt 
they needed to be consistent in their application of policy, the principals in my study did 
not appear to believe they needed to apply policies consistently.  They seemed to support 
Hawkins’s (2003) maxim that “rule breaking may be a threat to order, but rule 
enforcement is not necessarily conducive to order” (p. 207).  Instead, they believed they 
had to apply policy differentially based on circumstances, and that consistency in policy 
implementation was not necessarily a good thing and could bring about disparity in 
outcomes for students.  As a result, discretion as it was exercised by the principals, could 
undermine the “intent of the statute” or policy (Vorenberg, 1976, p. 665). 
6.7.4 Values in Policy Implementation 
Aaron, Mann and Taylor (1994) argue policy analysts are now recognizing values 
are not “independent of public policy” and refer to the idea that responses to policy 
“depend upon people’s values;” as a result, they muse about how policy might affect or 
“directly or indirectly” change values and the responses people have to policies (p. 3).  
The principals’ interpretation of their exercise of discretion in implementing policy also 
served to promote their thinking that they were compassionate, caring administrators 
(also see Heilmann, 2006) as identified in Theme Six through their consideration of 
student-specific influences affecting their discretionary decision-making.  The values 
they espoused in Theme Three, such as respect, dignity, and tolerance served to reinforce 
this notion as well.  Those of their colleagues who they believed acted without 
demonstrating the qualities of caring and compassion, and who appeared whimsical or 
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capricious in their decision-making, were considered to be inappropriately exercising 
their discretion and possibly abusing that power. 
In her study of values in principals’ decision-making, Campbell-Evans (1988) 
discovered “where policy conflicted with their values, principals responded by 
implementing the policy and then worked to change or amend it to correspond to their 
value position.  In cases of internal conflict, value choice preceded decision action”        
(p. 86).  Most of the principals in my study either appeared to ignore a policy’s intent 
entirely if it conflicted with their own espoused or even unconscious values or worked to 
“ameliorate” what they interpreted as “negative” effects of a policy (Haynes & Licata, 
1995, p. 23) upon students by adapting it to their value position, much like the 
participants in Campbell-Evans’s (1988) study.  This avoidance of policy implementation 
may have been a result of many things, such as misinterpretation or misunderstanding, 
their uncertainty of a policy’s intent, a subjective evaluation of the policy’s importance in 
their school, its impact on the best interests of a student or students in general, or simply 
a desire to undermine central office dictates for personal reasons.  Haynes & Licata’s 
(1995) finding that administrators who were newly appointed to the role of the principal 
tended to “cling to established policy and infrequently [made] policy adaptations” (p. 32) 
was not corroborated by the principals in this inquiry, although Danielle, as noted earlier, 
perceived “young, inexperienced” principals had “limited judgment” and as a result 
would “stick a little closer to the [policy] script.”  Sossin (2002) argues administrators 
will use policies or rules intended to guide discretion “to mask more human (and 
sometimes more humane) motivations” (p. 832).  He concludes many decisions are 
“motivated by human frailties… [such as] discrimination, spite, laziness, [and] 
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selfishness” (Sossin, 2002, p. 832; see also Hodgkinson, 1978b, p. 60).  Although none of 
the study participants indicated these frailties served as a basis for their decision-making, 
they may well have been in certain disciplinary situations.  
6.7.5 Selective Enforcement of Policy 
When it served their purpose, however, the principals would selectively choose to 
enforce policy (Manley-Casimir, 1977-78), especially in matters of school safety or in 
cases in which they appeared fearful their decision-making may be subject to legal 
scrutiny.  In many ways their decision-making mirrored Walker’s (1998) belief in policy 
implementation based on utilitarian principles whereby administrators selectively 
implement that part of a policy which will bring the “greatest benefit” (p. 300) and the 
least detriment for the greatest number of students.  Similarly, the research of Marshall, 
Patterson, Rogers, and Steele (1996) on “career assistant principals (CAPs) [emphasis in 
original]” (p. 272) revealed they would “often find policy, orders, roles, rules, and 
resources inadequate” (pp. 287–288); consequently, they would “make their own 
judgments” rather than follow the dictates of policy in order to maintain relationships 
with their students and to resolve conflicts (p. 288).  However, as Torres and Chen (2006) 
observe, different policies, and their intent, may “demand different levels of discretion” 
(p. 190); this appeared so with the principals.  Their discretion was variable, as was their 
need to adhere to rules and policies. They did not assume the rules operated “in a simple 
causal way:” “‘the rule is this, therefore I must do that’” (Hawkins, 2003, p. 206). This 
finding was revealed, for example, in Theme Five in their understanding of policy and 
legislation; abiding closely to the intent of policy, especially in safety matters, would 
provide the principals with support or “back up” (Frank) for their decision-making.  Most 
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appeared to feel they had little discretion in the area of school safety, and some 
principals, such as Harold, even sensed there was zero tolerance, or no discretion, in this 
particular realm.  Safety, however, can be very broadly defined.  In matters of minor 
behavioral incidents involving safety, for the most part, the principals believed they had a 
wide degree of discretion.  This specific pattern of exercising discretion may not always 
serve them well, especially if they initially underestimated the severity of a situation and 
did not follow policy dictates in their decision-making.   
 Smith and Foster (2009) contend “school policy and practice” must “provide 
equal opportunities to students,” a process that involves taking “a hard look at the extent 
to which they [educators] are accommodating students of diverse backgrounds, needs, 
and aspirations” (pp. 35–36).  In a similar way, Sossin (2002) maintains “a fair, impartial 
and reasonable decision cannot be divorced from the needs, expectations and rights of 
affected parties” (p. 854).  The principals emphasized that their decision-making, through 
the exercise of discretion, had to accommodate for the diversity they found in their 
schools.  Consistent with an awareness that policies by their design can result in 
unintentional “adverse impact discrimination” (Hamilton & Sinclair, 1991, p. 101), the 
school leaders in this study avoided implementing a policy when they believed it would 
not result in fair or just outcomes for students or when it did not “make sense” (Shawna) 
to them.  They indicated that they would alter policy in order to act fairly on the basis of 
such personal circumstances as poverty or ethnicity, but they did not appear to consider 
the imposition of their own values in their decision-making or to have an awareness of 
some of the assumptions they made.  There was no indication, however, whether the 
principals’ interpretation of policy would guard against the negative effect of its 
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implementation, or whether selective enforcement or avoidance may have caused an 
adverse impact upon their students.  
 Research has indicated policy implementation will be “more successful” if “the 
beliefs and attitudes inherent in the policy” are close to “existing norms,” and that 
educators are more likely to implement a policy if they feel it offers a solution that is “an 
improvement to the status quo” (LaRocque & Coleman, 1985, p. 156).   The decision-
making practices of principals interviewed in the study are consistent with this finding, 
although successful implementation of policy in some cases may have been interpreted 
differently by individual principals.   For example, Melvin’s declaration that he would 
not “purposely be going out and finding ways to break” policy, but that he was “not 
going to go out and follow it to the ‘T’ just to follow it to the ‘T’” may reflect this finding.  
Acceptance of the policy by the principal could be “related to compliance,” while non-
acceptance could be related to “noncompliance, symbolic compliance, or co-optation” 
(LaRocque & Coleman, 1985, p. 160).   For instance, Amanda found she could not 
support the implementation of a hat policy (see also Henriksson, 2008).  In other words, 
she “saw no need for it, judged the goals and assumptions of the policy to be 
incompatible with [her] own, and derived no sense of challenge or satisfaction” from its 
implementation (LaRocque & Coleman, 1985, p. 156).  She indicated “rules have to be 
established through kids…if you don’t want hats, you better have a reason why.  I am not 
ignoring it.  I will say no hat in the hallway…if the hat goes by me, it is not going to be 
my first priority, frankly,” and added that such rules were “stupid” and she would 
exercise discretion in her decision.   Danielle also indicated she would “ignore” them.  As 
LaRocque and Coleman (1985) contend, educators are more likely to implement a policy 
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if they feel it addresses “a real problem or need” (p. 156).  Because the hat policy did not 
appear to align with an identified problem or need for her students, Amanda was 
noncompliant with it.  In much the same way Melvin said he did “not feel any obligation” 
to enforce a policy that “is counterintuitive to what a child needs.” 
6.7.6 Policy as Guide to Decision-Making 
For the principals in this study, as reflected in Theme Five, policies and 
legislation appeared largely to serve as decision-making guides or frameworks that 
enabled them to exercise wide discretion (Downey, 1988) and helped to facilitate their 
administrative practice.   However, in a manner similar to that described by Meyer et al. 
(2009), the principals’ exercise of discretion in decision-making appeared to expand or 
contract depending upon the circumstances and their “interpretation of [their] arena[s] of 
action” (p. 32).  Consistent with the findings of Dunbar and Villarruel (2002), there were 
multiple understandings of the policies by all participants in this study.  Some of the 
principals interpreted policy as a means of giving students another chance, or of doing 
what they believed would be good for the child or young person involved.  However, 
there appeared to be a lack of knowledge about relevant policies and legislation, and 
these participants, like those in Dunbar and Villarruel’s (2002) study, made “vague 
comments” alluding to parts of school division policy but did not convey a “substantive 
comprehensive understanding” of policies and legislation (p. 101).  Again, although the 
principals made no reference to legislation affecting their practice, such as the YCJA 
(2002), this does not mean they were unaware of their legal responsibilities and 
obligations.  Also consistent with the results of Roche’s (1999) investigation is the use of 
the modification, adaptation or overturning of system policies by principals if they 
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believed they “impinged unfairly on teachers, children, and families in their school 
community” (p. 264). 
The findings of my study also support LaRocque and Coleman’s (1985) assertion 
more than twenty years ago that “there is little reason to believe that [educational] 
administrators, as part of their training, have developed a keen sense of their 
responsibilities as policy implementers” (p. 155).  However, the principals in the study 
may have had a sense of their responsibilities as implementers of policy, but chose not to 
implement it for any number of reasons.  Or, perhaps they used “policy and regulations to 
evade decision responsibility” (Manley-Casimir, 2003, p. 271).   LaRocque and 
Coleman’s (1985) suggestion, however, that policy influences administrators “by creating 
a climate of opinion” (p. 160) is clearly reflected in the principals’ varying beliefs 
regarding discretionary power and the use of student suspensions in disciplinary 
situations.  If, however, policy-making is, as Hodgkinson (1996) maintains, “decision 
making writ large” (p. 49), then administrators “directly or indirectly, formally or 
informally, by persuasion, influence, manipulation [or] control of information…do in fact 
determine policy decisions” (p. 58).   
6.7.7 Implementation of Suspension Policies 
Similar to the findings in Hall’s (1999) research, there was inconsistency among 
administrators in their beliefs about the intent and efficacy of suspensions, but most of 
the principals viewed suspensions as a “consequence for aggression” (p. 144).   The 
expectations of staff, parents and other stakeholders about suspension as the disciplinary 
consequence for a wide range of behaviors appeared to be an important influence upon 
the principals.  Danielle, Melvin and Amanda commented on the difficulty in resisting 
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their staffs’ desire for student suspensions and how they personally valued inclusive 
rather than exclusionary environments.  Despite Mendez and Knoff’s (2003) assertion 
that principals view suspensions as punishment rather than as a consequence for 
inappropriate behavior, suspensions did not appear to be perceived  as especially punitive 
sanctions by some of the principals who spoke about them as “providing a break” for the 
parties involved.  For them, suspensions appeared to be a necessary response to certain 
types of behavior.  This inclination mirrors Hodgkinson’s (1996) “excisionistic fallacy” 
according to which administrators seek to resolve value conflicts by “excising the source 
of the problem” and removing the “need for its consideration” (p. 124).  In this way, by 
removing or excluding the individual, which yields a “delusory appearance” of having 
resolved the “value issues,” the principal does not necessarily address the “root value 
question” but avoids it and does not speak to the “truth of the rights or wrongs [emphasis 
in original]” of the incident (Hodgkinson, 1996, p. 124).   Errors such as these, 
Hodgkinson (1996) concludes, “are often unconscious” (p. 125); they appeared so with 
the administrators in the study. 
For some of the administrators suspension may have become the default 
disciplinary consequence because it was encased in legislation, it was an expectation of 
staff and parents for misbehavior, or they lacked the creativity or willingness to examine 
other alternatives.  Similar to the findings in Campbell-Evans’s (1985) research, the 
principals seemed to consider somewhat the “consequences” of levying a suspension 
“prior to [taking such] action” (p. 90), but they did not suggest they used a standardized 
process, which they may have done.  Sarah believed in student suspensions only as a 
“last resort,” and Danielle didn’t support “sending students away.”  Four of the principals 
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felt suspending students for attendance concerns was wrong and made no sense (see 
Costenbader & Merkson, 1998), although they may have done so.  Melvin said it was 
“silly” to do so, Lauren believed it was “hypocritical,” while Shawna and Frank said 
“absolutely not.”  None of the principals, however, spoke about the perceptions of 
students regarding suspensions, thereby emphasizing the unilateral focus of the 
consequence.     
Although some principals indicated they would not suspend students even if they 
felt pressured by stakeholders to do so, or if they believed there was no other option 
available, because of their desire for safety at all costs, it was not clear whether their 
resolve would hold in situations of serious school violence.  Others, such as Danielle, 
were scornful of administrators who applied suspensions “capriciously” (Duke et al., 
1978, p. 306) believing it was an ineffective form of discipline as opposed to other 
options.  Instead, many of the study principals said they searched for a broad range of 
options to suspensions in their efforts to respond to misbehavior.  However, suspension 
was frequently cited when they gave examples of disciplinary consequences they had 
assigned to their own students.  This penchant for suspension may be explained by simple 
hypocrisy, hypercriticality of colleagues and peers, absence of alternative measures, or 
bowing to what they saw as zero tolerance provisions.   
The principals’ reliance upon suspension reflects to some extent Lipsky’s (1980) 
contention that, despite the educational goals of schools, decision-makers differentiate 
based upon their perceptions of the “relative normality” of behavior, regarding some 
students as being “able to benefit from intervention” and others as being “unresponsive or 
unworthy of help”  (p. 113).  Decision-makers will tend to differentiate their responses 
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based upon deviations from these standards of behavior.  That is, they expect, in a 
“normal distribution” of students, there will always be a set of pupils for whom 
suspension is necessary because they may not be especially cooperative or show 
“deference” for procedures and, as a result, will “be singled out for particularly harsh 
treatment” such as exclusion “from the school population through suspensions and other 
punishments” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 113). 
6.8  Research Sub-Question Eight 
Do school administrators believe the exercise of discretion assists or hinders 
them as they work to balance competing rights in the school setting? 
 As identified in Theme Eight, the principals struggled with the tension that exists 
between balancing the rights of the individual and the rights of the rest of the school 
population in disciplinary issues. Disciplinary cases in which the participants were 
required to strike a balance between competing interests in the school setting reflected 
those areas of “open texture” described by Hart (1961, p. 132).  Most administrators 
emphasized that finding this balance was a crucial, ongoing aspect of their decision-
making and they perceived the exercise of discretion was essential in enabling them to 
reconcile competing interests.  For the principals, finding a balance was also dependent 
upon their short- and long-term goals for individual students and for the advancement of 
the learning agenda as the overall mission of the school.   To this end, the principals 
understood they needed to maintain their authority and, more importantly, to be seen as 
maintaining it, in addition to building consensus, gaining support,  and achieving 
reasonableness with  “common sense actions and logical conclusions” (Biggs, 1993, p. 
157).  Other considerations that affected their decision-making as they sought to balance 
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interests was the level of acceptability of the behavior; the need for consistency in their 
decision-making; the reasonableness of the application of applicable rules, legislation, or 
policy; the seriousness of the disciplinary issue; and the availability of resources such as 
time and personnel. 
6.8.1 Acknowledgement of Student Rights   
For the purposes of the study student rights are defined as the following:  
the fundamental freedom to practice one’s religion, to be free from religion, and 
not to be forced to practice another’s religion; freedom of thought, opinion, and 
expression; and the right to gather in groups, legal right to life, liberty, and 
security of the person, and the right not to be denied these rights without first 
being granted a fair hearing; a limited right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure; the right not to be arbitrarily detained and the right to be 
informed of the reason for the detention; as well as the right not to be subjected to 
any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.  The equality rights provision in 
the Charter means that students are protected from discrimination in education. 
(Watkinson, 1999, p. 194).   
Brown and Zuker (2007) briefly provide a historical context for children’s rights 
as evolving from a pre-industrial society in which children were viewed as chattels or 
property of their parents, through an age of industrialism when they were seen as needing 
protection, to a post-industrial age when they are now seen as persons with the “right to” 
(p. 255).  None of the principals indicated knowledge of Charter rights and few 
mentioned the notion of student rights, but that does not mean they were unaware of them 
or did not consider them as they sought to reconcile competing claims. It is difficult to 
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determine how often, if ever, the exercise of discretion by the elementary principals in 
this study infringed upon the rights of students in their schools in the examples they 
provided.  Although they may have had different intentions, the principals may have 
made decisions that did not consistently respect or protect student rights, or there may 
have been unintended outcomes to their decision-making that may not have respected 
them.  Furthermore, they may have tried to balance students’ rights against their own 
interests, biases or assumptions.   
When asked whether the rights of students would inform his decision-making, 
Melvin replied that students “have the basic rights that every human being does.  Do we 
need to have a Charter of Rights for students?  Maybe, for some of those hardliners, but 
for me, no.”  The principals appeared more inclined to interpret rights not as an 
entitlement, but in terms of a dominant notion of corresponding student responsibilities, 
although it is not clear whether they, or teachers, were educating students about these 
responsibilities.  Nonetheless, it appeared they expected students to be responsible and 
regulate their own behavior and to be aware of the rights of others.  The standard set by 
these expectations does not appear to be entirely consistent with Torres and Chen’s 
(2006) call for greater attention to be “placed on cultivating leadership that ethically 
balances the safety interests of the school and the privacy interest of the student” in order 
to ensure student rights are protected and honored in the school setting (p. 203).  The 
principals seemed to understand student rights as being limited, rather than supported, by 
their discretionary decision-making.     
In the realm of school safety, the principals appeared quite willing to trump 
individual student rights for a greater good—that of the entire school population usually, 
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but not solely—and most principals indicated this norm or standard would be the basis 
for decision-making in order for the school to accomplish its goal of educating students.  
They firmly indicated their decision-making should send a message to the student body.  
Shawna said her students would have to learn that “it is not always about me,” whereas 
Amanda affirmed her decision-making “is always for the greater good.”  These decisions 
could also be the path of least resistance.  Their perception of the greater good is 
consistent with the findings of Frick and Faircloth (2007) in which one subject believed 
“the balance between the individual and the group was skewed more toward the group” 
and, in fact, the “uniform treatment of all students” helped to meet the administrator’s 
purpose (p. 26).   It did not appear that the principals consistently questioned whether this 
greater good was, in fact, the least detrimental decision for all students involved and, if 
so, whether the decision was the correct way to achieve their own goal or purpose 
(Walker, 1998).  In their decision-making, the “collective justification” (Hodgkinson, 
1991, p. 98) of the principals may not have benefitted the individual student, respected 
his or her rights, or benefitted all members of the group, even though they assumed it did.  
The individual student may have been seen as a means to achieving an end, not as an end 
in itself (Walker, 1995), although the principals said they took pains to ensure they were 
perceived as treating all students with dignity, even if there were decisions made that 
privileged the many over the few. 
The participants’ desire to send a message about misbehavior echoes, to some 
extent, the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation, especially as these 
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principles relate to youth justice under the YCJA (2002).
25
  This need to send a message 
was also linked to their need for accountability in, and justification of, their decision-
making.  All principals emphasized their decisions should indicate not only to students 
but also to other stakeholders their level of tolerance for misbehavior, the sanction for 
misbehavior, and the application of fairness and justice.  Cesaroni & Bala (2008) contend 
“deterrence theory is based on the assumption that punishment can prevent future 
offending and it is linked to a belief that harsher punishments will reduce levels of crime” 
(p. 268).  While the principals did not refer to social science research that suggests 
knowledge of harsher consequences will not deter youth’s “offending behavior” (Bala, 
2011, p. 10), they generally avoided imposing harsh sanctions for student misbehavior in 
most disciplinary situations.  However, their support of less punitive consequences was 
juxtaposed against a belief that certain behaviors, such as bullying (Miriam) or racially-
motivated acts (Amanda), should be denounced as conduct that was particularly 
intolerable and in those cases they could use sanctions that had a “general deterrent 
effect” (Bala, 2011, p. 9).  It is worthwhile to note that “general deterrence is not a 
principle of youth sentencing under the present regime [the YCJA, (2002)]” (R. v. B.W.P., 
2006, para. 4), and that judges “cannot sentence one young person with the aim of 
sending a message to other youth” (para. 12).  Certainly, many criminal acts committed 
                                                 
25
 Charron J. of the Supreme Court of Canada defines “deterrence” in R. v. B.W.P. (2006) as “the 
imposition of a sanction for the purpose of discouraging the offender and others from engaging in criminal 
conduct”  (para. 2).  When deterrence is aimed at the particular offender, “it is called ‘specific deterrence’; 
when aimed at others, ‘general deterrence’” (para. 2).  The Court goes on to note that when general 
deterrence is factored into a sentence, the offender is “punished more severely…because the court decides 
to send a message to others” (para. 2).  Denunciation  is described as “‘a symbolic, collective statement that 
the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values’” (Public 
Legal Education, 2012, p. 5). 
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by young people are distinct from student misbehavior in schools, yet the principals 
seemed unaware of any parallels that could be drawn between their disciplinary decision-
making and the underlying notions behind the principles of deterrence and denunciation 
in youth sentencing.   They appeared to understand the application of certain disciplinary 
consequences as being necessary to send a message to students or to denounce 
objectionable conduct.  In arguing against the addition of denunciation and deterrence as 
sentencing principles under proposed amendments to the YCJA (2002), Bala (2011) 
points to “the fact that moral development and judgement [of youth] are not fully 
developed until adulthood” (pp. 9–10).  It is not clear from the findings of the study if the 
principals understood or took into consideration the stages of moral development and 
judgment in children and young people.  Research indicating the principle of deterrence 
has an effect upon judges but not upon youth (Bala, 2011; Cesaroni & Bala, 2008) may 
be reflected in some of the discretionary decision-making of the principals in the study. 
6.8.2 Exercise of Discretion to Balance Competing Interests 
The principals in this study seemed to interpret justice and fairness as consistent 
with Rawls’s (1969) notion of finding the proper balance between competing interests.  It 
may be reasoned that the consideration of the area of discretion delegated to the 
principals leaves the nature of justice and of the balance between interests to the 
“judgment of individual officials” (Vorenberg, 1976, p. 676).  As Shawna realized, it may 
not always be possible to accommodate the interests and needs of all stakeholders as 
evidenced by her collaborative decision-making in the incident involving a fight among 
girls in her school that resulted in sustained criticism and solid resistance by her staff and 
colleagues. In her words, “Mistakes happen when all the stakeholders are not considered 
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and perhaps circumstances have not been communicated clearly…discretion is not a 
biased action…but the ability to meet the needs particularly of the child but also to 
accommodate the needs of other stakeholders.”  
The principals understood the exercise of discretion as enabling them to be fair in 
their decision-making and to balance all interests, but in their attempts to resolve 
disciplinary issues, they may have unwittingly assumed the values of fairness and justice 
were “differentiated by degree rather than by kind,” (p. 152), an error Hodgkinson (1991) 
calls a “homogenetic fallacy” (p. 151) adopted by administrators.  Justice and fairness 
appear to be absolutes for the principals as they individually interpreted them, but, as 
Willower (1996) suggests, absolutes often break down in practice.  However, it appeared 
to be of primary importance to them that they were perceived as being fair by students 
and stakeholders and, in that way, they created a “climate of mutual respect and justice” 
(Manley-Casimir, 1979, p. 25).  The need for fairness also appeared to be related to their 
challenge of reconciling decisions with consequences that may include their being 
accused of being either too harsh or too lenient.  While they seemed to believe their 
exercise of discretion in reconciling competing interests and rights usually resulted in a 
perception of fairness among the students, staff and stakeholders, they also understood 
dissatisfaction on the part of students, staff and stakeholders to be an indication that they 
may not have achieved fairness in balancing interests through their exercise of discretion. 
6.9  Research Sub-Question Nine 
 What do school administrators perceive to be an appropriate measure of 
accountability for their discretionary decisions? 
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 Begley’s (2010) study identified accountability as a “meta-value for school 
principals” (p. 49).  If one can assume that the principals in the study spoke truthfully, 
care for their students is a priority.  Yet, despite being well-intentioned, principals must 
be accountable for their decision-making and consequent actions.  Indeed, all of them 
indicated they assumed responsibility for their decisions.  They specified they were 
accountable to their stakeholders and school community, especially in their responses to 
the vignette questions, and they gave examples of challenges to their decision-making in 
the form of the external pressures and influences indicated in Theme Seven.  Their 
perceptions reinforce Ehrich’s (2000) identification of a number of accountability 
frameworks within which principals work, such as community, legal, and bureaucratic.   
She contends “principals are in a precarious position; they are located at the interface 
between competing sets of demands by specific shareholders” (Ehrich, 2000, p. 121).  
Although the study participants did not point to these specific accountability models, they 
seemed to understand “alternative types of accountability such as moral and professional 
accountability [which] center around relationships between people; relationships built on 
trust and support, not relationships that are characterized by control and hierarchy”         
(p. 121).  
6.9.1 Determining Measures for Accountability 
It may be difficult to identify and to agree upon the measures for effectiveness or 
appropriateness of administrators’ discretionary decision-making. As Lipsky (1980) 
maintains, “the more street-level bureaucrats are supposed to act with discretion, and the 
broader the areas of discretionary treatment, the more difficult it is to develop 
performance measures” (p. 168).  One can reasonably assume there should be a system of 
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checks and balances for administrative decision-making.  The principals did not refer to 
specific measures of their performance in decision-making; if they assumed they were 
making sound judgments, they perceived them as being fair.  Nonetheless, aspects of 
decision-making can be difficult to assess, such as the type and level of impact upon 
individual students involved in any disciplinary incident.  The number of disciplinary 
situations principals may attend to in one day could be interpreted as a quantitative 
measure of the job they perform, but it is not wholly reflective of their role.  On one 
hand, a principal may be a popular administrator with students, yet may not be the fairest 
arbitrator in disciplinary situations; on the other, the administrator who is feared and 
disliked by students may be quite capable of administering discretionary decisions that 
are adjudged by all stakeholders to be fair.  Finally, the extent to which privacy and 
confidentiality can impede access to information may further limit measures of 
accountability. 
6.9.2 Accountability to Supervisors 
A few of the principals indicated the need for direct accountability to their 
superintendent, but this responsibility appeared to be for more complex discretionary 
decisions, not for ones which they may have considered routine.  The principals valued 
their perceived autonomy in exercising discretion, and consistent with LaRocque and 
Coleman’s (1985) study of policy implementation at the school level, there appeared to 
be few mechanisms to monitor the principals’ decision-making by a supervisor unless, 
one assumes, a complaint was made to central office by a stakeholder or a suspension 
was issued.  There seemed to be few formal structures in place for accountability 
purposes—as documentation was not mentioned—although the principals may have 
352 
 
assumed such a process was taking place.  Perhaps their accountability was measured in 
some other way that was not formalized or they did account for their decisions but simply 
did not acknowledge doing so.   However, much of their decision-making appeared to 
occur in an environment where very little accountability was required; that is, some 
follow-up was done, but it appeared to be based upon the judgment of the individual 
principal.  The principals also understood they were to demonstrate responsibility for 
their decisions depending upon the magnitude of the behavioral incident, and the number 
of students involved; that is to say, the greater the severity of the incident, the greater was 
the need for accountability.  Their belief supports Manley-Casimir’s (1977–78) 
contention that many of the minor disciplinary decisions made in schools take place 
behind a closed door in the principal’s office with little apparent accountability.  
Nonetheless, even minor decisions involving students, such as a loss of recess privileges 
for a morning, can affect student well-being and require some level of accountability.  
Leithwood (1999) refutes the notion that there is little public scrutiny of the actions of 
principals, arguing it is “extremely difficult” for school-based administrators to “behave 
in a professionally unethical manner” without being detected, since much of their work is 
“highly visible to students, parents, teachers, and members of the nonparent community” 
(p. 26).  Administrators may or may not be acting in a manner that is deliberately 
unprofessional or even unintentionally unethical; nonetheless, they can be exercising 
poor judgment and do so with little apparent accountability. 
 The principals believed there to be a shared understanding between them and 
their supervisors about the acceptability and appropriateness of the principals’ decision-
making, despite the lack of compliance with policy directives.  The principals’ 
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assumption about senior administration’s support of their discretionary decision-making 
and the  level of accountability the principals determined was necessary, dependent upon 
the incident, may have resulted from a lack of communication “regarding their 
[superintendent’s] expectations” (LaRocque & Coleman, 1985, p. 164).  Discretion did 
not appear to be school- or site-specific, but the amount of discretion exercised appeared 
to vary depending upon the type of student misbehavior; that is, the principals appeared 
to understand they had very broad discretion in minor incidents of misbehavior, but less 
room in more serious or complex incidents.  In this way, their level of accountability 
appeared to be directly related to the severity or urgency of a disciplinary situation. 
6.9.3 Accountability to Stakeholders 
Millerborg and Hyle (1991) outline a process to help principals be accountable in 
their decision-making.  They affirm that the “astute leader reflects on issues, examines 
the conflict from different perspectives, determines if ethical and legal considerations 
exist, and proceeds to make decisions that uphold self-respect as well as public trust and 
confidence” (p. 16).  The principals in this study appeared to follow this process to 
varying degrees as they worked through their disciplinary decisions, yet they struggled 
with certain aspects of gaining the trust of their school community (see also MacCarthy 
& Soodak, 2007).  They believed they could provide accountability to stakeholders and 
gain their trust through decision-making that reflected good judgment, although they 
recognized not all stakeholders may view their decisions in this way.  They also seemed 
either to be unaware of or to chose to ignore the roles the broader institution of education 
or the school itself may have had in their decision-making.  In considering the need for 
accountability, the principals may not have considered how changing patterns and trends, 
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such as the growing use of technology or increased student diversity,  may have affected 
their implementation of school division discipline policies, or their level of 
accountability, or even whether their students and their families held values similar to 
their own.   
If the legal requirements of discretion are to be met by administrators, then they 
must ensure it is exercised in good faith, reasonably, upon proper grounds and according 
to certain procedural standards.  Manley-Casimir (1977–78) also contends discretion 
must be controlled “within the designated limits” and checked to ensure there is no 
“arbitrariness or illegality” in its exercise (p. 86).  Their decisions would also have to 
adhere to “legal standards and educational considerations” (Manley-Casimir, 1977–78,  
p. 86).   He argues for a model of discretionary justice in school discipline because of 
principals’ wide discretionary power and in his belief, as noted previously, discipline is 
often “dispensed on a one-to-one basis” in a “closed office,” and enforced through “rules 
and sanctions” (Manley-Casimir, 1977–78, p. 85).  The discretionary power afforded the 
principals in the study appeared very broad, there seemed to be no formal mechanism for 
accountability and there was little transparency in their decision-making.   For example, 
while principals may be unaware, at times, of the legal requirements governing their 
actions, such as in searches, arguably many students and parents may be even more 
ignorant about them.  On the other hand, some parents and students may have a 
misguided sense of entitlement.  Since discretion is a part of all stages of the decision-
making process, students and stakeholders are required to assume the good faith and 
reasonableness of administrators.  The principals, however, did not indicate whether they 
always afforded students the chance “to discuss or disagree with the accusation” of 
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misbehavior or if the process involved “protective steps for the student” (Biggs, 1993, p. 
178).  They did not suggest they followed the requirements for procedural fairness, 
although they may have.   
Brown and Zuker (2007) point out the “common law duty of procedure fairness” 
requires “at a minimum” the individual must be informed “in advance…of a matter 
which may affect his or her individual rights,” be given a “reasonable opportunity” to 
make submissions and to respond and “be told the reasons for the decision” (p. 48).  They 
go on to note “principals and school boards have a duty of fairness when they are 
considering whether to suspend or expel a student” (Brown & Zuker, 2007, p. 245).   
Their assertion is grounded in the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Nicholson v. 
Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional Municipality) Cmmrs. Of Police (1978) that “in the 
administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness” (para. 22).  The 
requirements of procedural fairness are variable and depend, as established by the Court 
in Nicholson (1978), upon the circumstances, the nature of the matter before the person 
making the decision, and the provisions in the statute.  Furthermore, in Knight v. Indian 
Head School District No. 19 (1990), L’Heureux-Dubé J., in considering Nicholson v. 
Haldimand-Norfolk (1978), ruled the general duty to act fairly “depends upon the nature 
of the decision to be made by the administrative body,” the “relationship between the 
body and the individual” and the effect “on the individual’s rights” (para. 28).  If the 
study participants did not afford students the opportunity to be heard or did not tell them 
why their actions necessitated a disciplinary sanction and simply imposed a disciplinary 
consequence, they could be infringing upon students’ rights and, in some instances, their 
actions could be subject to legal scrutiny via judicial review.  Yet, in speaking directly 
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about their accountability, some principals in the study expressed fears of increasing 
“legal action” (Frank) in education and the spectre of judicial review, but they did not 
seem to be concerned about a lack of legal knowledge.  They seemed concerned, 
frustrated or even angered, however, if their decisions were challenged by parents or 
other stakeholders. 
6.10 Research Sub-Question Ten 
 In what ways do school administrators justify their exercise of discretion? 
 The principals in this study understood they needed to justify their discretionary 
decisions in various ways to various stakeholders.  Whether they actually did so on a 
consistent basis, or in the manner which they described, is unclear.  Ultimately, what the 
principals determined would be the best for the entire school, or a Type II value 
resolution of consensus and consequences, appeared to be key justifications in their 
decision-making.  Decisions made at these levels appeared to be more defensible than 
would those resolved at the principle (Type I) or preference (Type III) levels.  Their 
inclination “to gravitate towards the rational motivational bases of consequences and 
consensus” (Begley, 2010, p. 49) may stem from a need to justify their decision-making.  
Hawkins (2003) points out decisions are more “readily justifiable or defensible if they 
can be presented as following ‘normal practice’ or a ‘routine procedure’” (p. 213), and in 
this way decision-makers develop “understandings of what are ‘normal cases’” (p. 212) 
as one way of defending against criticism, typifying their decisions, and deciding with 
ease and simplicity.   
However, as Hodgkinson (1983) contends, when there are value conflicts, then 
they will be invariably justified at either the Type I  “principle of hierarchy (or the 
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principle of principle) [emphasis in original],” or what “one should [emphasis in 
original]” do, or at the Type III “principle of least principle” (p. 203), where one should 
seek “to avoid conflict, reduce value tensions…[and] scale the level or argument 
downwards” (p. 204).  This contention is reflected, in part, in the decision-making of the 
principals in my study.  When the principals described what appeared, for them, to be 
complex disciplinary decisions that involved conflicting values, if they evoked a Type II 
level of grounding of consequences or consensus, ultimately they would justify their 
decision-making by grounding the decision either in the Type I level of principle of what 
was best for students, or in the Type III level of affect for “pragmatic reasons…the 
affective wear and tear upon [them]…[and] the sheer emotional involvement” (p. 204).  
In those cases they may simply, give in to the influences of parents or stakeholders in an 
effort to negotiate, avoid conflict, or “put out fires” (p. 204).  For example, Frank spoke 
about the influence of irate parents upon his decision-making and his justification, at the 
Type III level, to avoid further conflict in a way that may be described as the  “least 
exhausting and destructive” (p. 204); this resolution would also help to support the 
maintenance and efficiency of the school’s learning program.  In another instance, 
Amanda’s desire to keep a student in school by allowing her to smoke during recess 
periods conflicted with school board policy and provincial law, yet she justified her 
decision at a Type I level of principle and was “sanctioned” by her supervisor.      
  There appeared to be different degrees of justification required depending upon 
the seriousness of the behavioral incident, although student safety seemed to be the 
default reason for many of their decisions.  Their reasoning may be explained by their 
legislated responsibility to maintain order and discipline and, in part, by Torres and 
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Chen’s (2006) claim that “in an era of ever-present youth violence and drug use, policies 
wedded to the safety-above-all-else framework are…easier to justify than policies that 
constrain discretion on the basis of civil rights” (p. 203).  In this sense, the finding of the 
principals’ justification of safety first as a rationale for action would support 
Hodgkinson’s (1983, 1991) contention of justification taking place ultimately at the Type 
I or Type III levels.   All administrators appeared to indicate justification was necessary 
in the complex behavioral  situation of Gary in the vignette, yet they did not seem to 
perceive justification was as necessary in those minor disciplinary incidents whose 
“inconspicuous nature belies their importance” (Manley-Casimir, 1974, p. 354).  
Arguably, many of these seemingly unimportant decisions can have importance 
consequences for the well-being of students.    
6.10.1 Justification Based on Best Interests of the Child 
Lipsky (1980) contends differentiation in the treatment of individuals can 
sometimes be attributed to the desire to act “in the best interests of clients or the best 
interests of the greatest number” and, in doing so, the decision-maker “rationalizes, 
excuses, and justifies…intervention orientations” (p. 112).  The comments made by many 
of the principals in justifying their decision-making support Lipsky’s (1980) contention.  
Most of the participants justified their discretionary decision-making by explaining it was 
based on a personal conviction they understood as being what was “the right thing for 
kids” (Danielle) or “the best thing for a student” (Frank), as identified in Theme Three 
(see also Frick, 2006, 2009; Hall, 1999; Haynes & Licata, 1995; Roche, 1999; Tuten, 
2006; Willower, 1996).  Their adoption of the best interests of their students as a basis for 
decision-making is also consistent with the practice of the principals in Begley’s (2010) 
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study for whom it was the “meta-value of choice” (p. 50).  This justification for decision-
making by the participants in my study also aligned with the findings of the subjects in 
Haynes and Licata’s (1995) study who provided  the rationale of “doing what [was] best 
for their students” as “justifiable on a practical or ethical basis,” thereby affording 
themselves what the researchers termed the “legitimacy of the justifiable” (p.33).   
Walker (1995), however, warns against a simplistic interpretation of the best 
interests of children and urges for a more guarded and “critical” use of the notion by 
school administrators (p. 6).  The maxim, which has “enormous potential” to direct 
“goodness, rightness, and appropriateness of policy and practice” also has the “capacity 
to cover non-action or detrimental choices” concerning children (p. 5).  He cautions 
against the “opportunistic” interpretation by school leaders of the best interests principle 
that contains a “hint of soft Machiavellianism which gives self-permission to bend a 
personal or professional value system to benefit kids.  Altering a pseudo-system of values 
[feigned or false] is done at the discretion of the leader” (p. 5).  In my study, none of the 
justification for principals’ decision-making based on the best interests of students 
appeared “hollow” or  “sententious” (p. 3), nor did the administrators appear to embrace 
“platitudes, sophisms, and manipulations” (p. 7) when they spoke of making decisions in 
the students’ best interests.  However, they assumed everyone had the same 
understanding of the phrase, and did not indicate how best interests were determined, 
what they are or when they had been met (Walker, 1995).  The principals gave the 
impression their decision-making based on best interests was not superficial or predicated 
on “taken-for-granted meanings” but on a “broadly accepted ethical framework” that was 
capable of finding common ground and consensus in decision-making (Walker,  
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1995, p. 8).     
The intentions of the principals in the study to act in the best interests of students 
appeared to be genuine, but according to Ashbaugh and Kasten’s (1984) study, the 
principle is of “ little use as a guide to action unless it can be made operational and 
delimited” (p. 205), and can be seen as a platitude or as being too simplistic. As they 
point out, “the best interests of one group of children (poor children, for example, or 
handicapped children) may not be the same as [those of] another group (for example, the 
gifted)” (Ashbaugh & Kasten, 1984, p. 205).  Such general statements do not and cannot 
relate to all sub-groups of students and could be used to justify decisions of “questionable 
benefit” (Walker, 1995, p. 4).  To assume there is one “single best interest” (Ashbaugh & 
Kasten, 1984, p. 205) to be determined by one individual may be misguided.  Walker 
(1995) also cautions against the teleological assumption by some principals who have the 
“superior concept of good, right or excellence on behalf of a particular child, such that 
their ideations trump those of the parent” (p. 4).  This “prospective rather than 
retrospective” assessment of events, facts, and circumstances involving students, calls for 
judgment of the “potential impact” of the decision upon the child or young person (Boyd, 
2004, p. 169) and may be difficult for an individual administrator to predict. The 
expressed desire of the principals in this study to work collaboratively at decision-making 
may be a safeguard against one person solely determining what is best for a student or 
students, although in most situations the principals appeared to base their decision-
making precisely on their own understanding and interpretation of the best interests 
principle.   
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6.10.2 Justification by Acting in Place of the Parent 
Conversely, the principals may also have understood doctrine of in loco parentis 
to mean they dealt with the students in a caring and compassionate manner.  Both Adam 
and Shawna, for example, justified making disciplinary decisions based upon how they 
would treat their own children (see also Walker, 1995); however, their own children may 
be quite unlike those children with whom they work in the school setting.  This 
justification for decision-making, however, may enable them to rationalize dealing more 
severely or more leniently with the student, depending on the circumstances of the 
disciplinary issue.  Furthermore, the use of the doctrine of in loco parentis as a 
justification for disciplinary decision-making by half the principals in the study may not 
serve them, or students, well.  Alexander (1978) contends that up to the mid-twentieth 
century, especially in England and the United States, “school administrators, by virtue of 
standing in loco parentis, were not required to adhere to any particular standards of fair 
play when sitting in judgment over actions of students” (p. 337).  As MacKay and 
Sutherland (2006) observe, the doctrine of in loco parentis “has been eroded almost to 
the point of extinction in the past several decades” and, realistically speaking, has “little 
or no place in today’s schools” (p. xviii).  It should not be considered “a primary source 
of authority” as considered in Ogg-Moss v. The Queen (1984), where the Supreme Court 
of Canada ruled the doctrine “has little, if any, relevance in institutional settings” (p. xix).   
Arguing the combination of “authority of the in loco parentis doctrine and the power 
conferred on teachers by statute” results in an “almost omnipotent, legal status” for 
teachers, MacKay and Sutherland (2006) assert it creates a “dangerous model” that is 
“inaccurate and misleading” (p. 45).  Because the in loco parentis role “has diminished, “ 
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they conclude teachers now “more commonly” act “in various capacities as agents of the 
state” (MacKay & Sutherland, 2006, p. 195).  Nonetheless, by the  authority delegated to 
them under The Education Act (1995), which they seem to have understood through the 
principle of in loco parentis, some of the principals in this study may interpret 
expectations of an “almost superhuman standard” (MacKay & Sutherland, 2006, p. 45) 
which, in turn, could lead them to decision-making that may be erroneous in a legal sense 
and detrimental to students. 
  What is more, the broad discretion they perceive they are afforded as a 
“surrogate parent” (Sitch & McCoubrey, 2000, p. 178) may not accord students their 
rights.  For example, some of the principals, such as Shawna, appeared unaware of a 
potential infringement on privacy rights in student searches, and their interpretation of the 
in loco parentis doctrine had the capacity to be detrimental to student well-being.  The 
principals did not seem to question their assumptions while acting in place of the parent 
or the consequences, intended or otherwise, in their decision-making based on that 
premise.  They did not allude to their role as state agents as such, and perhaps may have 
been unaware of this role or simply chose not to discuss it.   
6.10.3 Justification by Rule Enforcement 
None of the principals in the study either provided or was able to provide a 
standardized code of conduct for his or her school, although one, Sarah, mentioned a list 
of rights and responsibilities the staff reviewed with students at the start of each year.  
Nonetheless, Duke et al. (1978) claim that “in theory at least” even listing student rights 
can serve “to protect students from administrative abuse of authority” (p. 305).  Melvin 
mentioned a list of shared expectations to which he did not refer during the course of the 
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school year, although he had parents sign it every fall.  Danielle noted she had brought to 
her new school a series of very simple belief statements, such as “responsibility builds 
responsibility, nobody is treated like a nobody and problems are opportunities,” that had 
not been “embraced” by the school.  Lauren indicated that the rules in her school, such as 
“no chewing gum” were just “understood.”  Amanda noted her staff wanted to create a 
“handbook with rules and regulations” for student conduct, but she had said she did not 
want “to have [her] hands tied,” and agreed, instead, to a series of guidelines because she 
did not want to be “the sheriff in the building.”  Shawna’s school had no formal code of 
conduct other than “expectations written out about cell phones” and a series of belief 
statements in the school such as “hands off” and “what does being safe, respectful and 
responsible look like?”  Adam acknowledged The Education Act (1995) gave him a “lot 
of leeway to respond in an appropriate manner,” but a formal codification of rules in the 
school was “not terribly closely adhered to.”  Instead, “the one rule that everybody knows 
and is reinforced constantly is the idea of hands off.”  This finding supports Duke et al.’s 
(1978) contention that “school and classroom rules often lack uniformity and their 
enforcement is reputed to be consistently inconsistent” (p. 305).  If one student is 
disciplined and another student is not for the same infraction, Duke et al. (1978) wonder 
if students would have “legal recourse” (p. 306) in such a case, or if inconsistency in rule 
enforcement could leave teachers and school administrators legally liable. 
  While the principals might not have been making rules for every situation they 
encountered, they appeared to have a series of understandings about what acceptable 
student behavior looked like and seemed to enjoy not feeling rule-bound.  It may have 
been they interpreted some rules as being “over-inclusive, penalizing too much conduct,” 
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so they must be relaxed; other rules may be too “difficult to formulate with adequate 
precision” in order “to fit the varying types of situation” so that “informal adjustments” 
are necessary” (Bell, 1992, p. 90).  Their sense of what was appropriate enabled them to 
act, at times, in an arbitrary manner, without having to provide specific justification for 
their decisions.  The perceptions of stakeholders might be quite different, however, as 
Danielle, Amanda, and Melvin each indicated, their staffs had wanted them to codify 
acceptable student behavior.  Arguably, a clearly defined and transparent procedure for 
decision-making would provide staff and students who are affected by decisions with a 
better understanding of how discretion is exercised.  In this way, too, principals would 
have greater need to justify their decision-making and to provide reasons for it.  They 
may do this, however, in any case.  Yet, it does not mean an expansive list of rules is 
required for student behavior.  Duke et al. (1978) wonder if some educators promulgate 
“more rules than they can possibly enforce,” and suggest, instead of creating more rules 
or harsher consequences, establishing fewer rules that may be “taken more seriously by 
students and teachers” (p. 306).  They also question the “legality of rules” such as not 
chewing gum, or not using the washroom, and ask if they are “essential to maintaining 
classroom order” (p. 306) and contrary to notions of student rights.   However, without a 
formalized code of conduct, the exercise of administrative discretion may lead to 
inconsistency in rule enforcement.    Nonetheless, the principals’ discretion appears to be 
very broad, and without articulated codes of behavior, the checking of discretionary 
decisions, according to K.C. Davis’s (1969) model, cannot be guaranteed. 
 Sometimes the principals in the study seemed ready to absolve themselves of 
responsibility for decisions that they believed may not have served well the students or 
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the school community.  Perhaps out of frustration from dealing with habitual misbehavior 
or from meeting hostility by parents, some principals may blame the students or their 
families and justify their decision-making that way (Lipsky, 1980).  Miriam, for instance, 
mentioned what she saw as an increase in parental expectations that was influencing her 
decision-making: 
“Parenting has changed so much…emails come from parents [saying] ‘I don’t 
 think it’s fair that my kid’…and I’m getting to the point where, you know, well if 
 that’s what you want, and you don’t think it’s fair…I’m not going to fight that 
battle because it’s not worth it.  Whereas five years ago you wouldn’t have gotten 
an email like that.”   
 
Her perception appears to reinforce Lipsky’s (1980) contention that if students are 
seen as the products “of inadequate background conditioning, ” which may include such 
influences as family dysfunction, poverty, or emotional or physical neglect, the 
administrator can be relieved of the burden of responsibility “if their charges [i.e., 
students] fail to progress” (p. 153). 
6.10.4 Justification to Superiors    
The principals in the study who perceived they needed to discuss or justify their 
decision with their superintendent appeared content to do so.  However, other principals, 
such as Melvin, who saw themselves acting autonomously, or without the constraints of 
centralized decision-making, may have been acting in either a responsible or 
irresponsible manner depending upon their interpretation of the acceptable level of 
discretion they are delegated by policy and legislation.  Melvin’s belief in the trust central 
office had placed in his decision-making, and the flexibility he was afforded, justified his 
choices and enabled him to challenge his superintendent’s direction.  For example, he 
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understood he would not have to increase or decrease a student suspension, even if he 
were told to do so: 
“I do not know if I would change it [the decision] necessarily, but I would 
 advocate.  Well, I would not change it…because you are taking the power out of 
my hands… I would think that if my superiors want to come in and overrule and 
make a longer suspension, based on a secondhand account that occurred, I think 
that I would advocate strongly against that.”  
 
The principals perceived their discretionary decisions as being supported by their 
supervisors and interpreted a freedom to act in what they understood to be the best 
interests of their students, a finding consistent with that of Meyer et al.’s (2009) study of 
decision-making in principals’ succession.   
6.10.5 Model for Justifying Discretionary Decisions 
However, Manley-Casimir (1974) emphasizes discretion is “responsibly 
exercised” when all relevant considerations are accounted for, when reasons are given for 
the decision and “when the reasons themselves are defensible” [emphasis in original]”  
(p. 351).  He maintains the “crucial aspect of the exercise of discretion is the basis upon 
which the decision is made [emphasis in original]” (p. 351) and is linked to the 
“substantive” dimension (p. 352) of the exercise of discretion.  He advocates for a school 
governance model based on K. C. Davis’s (1969) notion of discretionary justice and 
extends it from “high-visibility decisions” which constitute “an important minority” to 
those “‘garden variety’ decisions of low visibility” that administrators make daily in 
schools (Manley-Casimir, 1974, p. 354).  He believes one way to achieve justice is 
through “structuring discretionary power” that adopts “open statements of plans, policy, 
rules, findings, reasons, and precedents together with a fair informal procedure [emphasis 
in original]” (Manley-Casimir, 1974, p. 355).  Consequently, he urges that schools should 
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have a clearly defined code of behavior.  This way, there can be a powerful statement for 
justification; if those affected by the decision-making know how the “discretionary 
power” is to be exercised, “the likelihood of injustice is reduced” or if abuses “do occur 
steps can be taken to correct them” (Manley-Casimir, 1974, p. 355).  Arguably, if the 
rules are not known, students may be especially vulnerable to whim, favoritism or bias on 
the part of the administrator, and justification for a decision in those cases may be 
difficult to provide. 
6.11 Chapter Summary 
 The general purpose of the research was to determine how elementary principals 
negotiate within the constraints of administrative discretion in order to maintain their own 
values system.  This chapter analyzed the findings of the research by responding to the 
ten research sub-questions through the discussion of the eight dominant themes that 
emerged from the in-depth interviews.  The analysis considered the nature of discretion, 
the influences upon discretion, the types of knowledge needed in discretionary decision-
making, appropriate and inappropriate exercises of discretion, and the levels of 
accountability and types of justification necessary for the exercise of discretion in 
disciplinary situations.  The findings were also interpreted through the literature.  The 
major focus of the analysis was on the principals’ decision-making in disciplinary issues, 
and Hodgkinson’s (1978b, 1991, 1996) hierarchy of values provided the conceptual 
framework for examination of the findings.  The legal authority delegated to the 
principals through statute and policy was an additional lens used for analysis and added 
insight into the manner in which they mediated and sought compromise among 
competing interests in their decision-making.       
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 Conclusions and Implications for Further Research 
What is needed in organizational studies of schools are  
explorations that tell us more about the hidden injuries  
of learning, teaching, and being an administrator.  In  
approaching this task, such studies must work with the  
unique, the specific, to reach larger insights that carry  
conviction and meaning beyond themselves. (T. Greenfield, 1978, p. 20) 
7.1 Conclusions 
Discretion is inherent in principals’ decision-making, and the well-being of 
students is dependent upon its reasonable and legitimate exercise in disciplinary 
situations.  The elementary principals in this study are afforded wide discretionary power 
in their disciplinary decision-making delegated through legislation, case law and school 
board policies. How they choose to exercise this discretion is based, in part, on their own 
values systems, their perceptions, preferences and assumptions, and also on external 
influences such as context and circumstances, expectations of parents or other 
stakeholders, and resources such as time.  Ultimately, discretionary authority can 
empower principals “to think about formal equality in relation to social realities, with the 
goal of ensuring substantive equality for disadvantaged groups” (Boyd, 2004, p. 166).  In 
light of these assertions, and mindful of those decisions that may be detrimental or 
injurious, it is appropriate to consider what may be gained or lost by the exercise of 
discretion in student disciplinary issues.   
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Sossin’s (2002) description of  discretionary decision-making as often based on 
“assumptions, value judgments, first impressions and broader personal and ideological 
agendas which are rarely disclosed” (p. 835) provides an accurate portrayal of the 
exercise of discretion by the principals in this study.  Indeed, Hodgkinson’s (1978b) 
appraisal that administrators’ “essential competence lies in the area of judgment” (p. xi) 
is, in part, corroborated by the research findings.  While discretion allows for the 
individualizing of student disciplinary issues and for creativity in dealing with them, 
there is also much opportunity for flaws in individual judgment, which could result in 
disciplinary decisions which are too lenient and not preventive or proactive, or those 
which are too harsh for particular circumstances.  This is not to say that “rules are good, 
discretion is bad” (Hawkins, 2003, p. 206; see also McLachlin, 1992; Dicey, 1885).  The 
appropriate and just exercise of discretion appears to require an exquisite balance, which 
Lipsky (1980) characterizes as being between “compassion and flexibility…and 
impartiality and rigid rule application” (pp. 15–16).  In their discretionary decision-
making in matters of student discipline, the principals seem to be positioned between the 
Charybdis of wide-ranging latitude, where capriciousness and arbitrariness reside, and the 
Scylla of rigidity, where restrictive policies leave them little room for flexibility or for 
differentiation in the treatment of students.  Shumavon and Hibbeln (1986) speak about 
the balance between the “need for flexibility and the need for control” (p. 8).  The 
challenge is to find the tension that exists between the fair, responsible and just use of 
discretion and that which is capricious and unjust (Manley-Casimir, 1974).  
Based on the findings of this study, the principals perceive discretion is necessary 
to maintain school safety, balance competing rights, and be fair and just in their 
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disciplinary decision-making in order to support students.  The nature of their role clearly 
indicates there is a need “for flexible powers” (Ross, 1991, p. 386) but, as Stefkovich 
(2006) points out, “what one educator may view as free expression, another may see as 
disruption” (p. 158).  Much is left to the interpretation and understanding of the 
individual administrator.  Discretion can be “freeing to competent administrators who 
prefer to rely on their own good judgment,” yet the “knowledge and the empowerment” 
that accompany discretion “behoove school officials to use their discretion wisely” 
(Stepkovich, 2006, p. 158; see also Howe & Covell, 2010).  Furthermore, according to 
Geraldine Knudsen, lawyer for the Saskatchewan School Boards Association, three basic 
principles should guide school administrators when dealing with legal requirements and 
their administrative responsibilities: applying good judgment and common sense, keeping 
in mind the best interests of the student, and applying the notion of fairness (LEAD 
School Law and System Governance Workshop, Regina, SK, November 23, 2011).  
Unfortunately, though, as Biggs (1993) wryly observes, “sensible discretionary decision-
making is difficult to teach” (p. 185).  Likewise, Sossin (2002) contends, “rules, 
regulations and surveillance are necessary because we simply cannot trust that a 
bureaucrat’s common sense and good nature will prevail” (p. 832).  Paquette and Allison 
(1997) offer a possible response to the exercise of discretion and policy-making in 
organizations.  They believe in the promotion of “different types and levels of discretion 
where they make the most sense given formal organization goals and structures and the 
values of those that create and live and work within them” (p. 181).  The notion of 
delegating broader or narrower levels of discretion at different times and for different 
types of behavior may aid in supporting common sense and good judgment.  Other 
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possibilities exist which can serve to frame discretion in order to appropriately and 
effectively guide and support principals in their disciplinary decision-making.    
First, rules for discretion must be specific enough so decisions can clearly align 
with policy and legislative pronouncements, provide “intelligent” judgment (Vorenberg, 
1976, p. 652) and limit, as much as possible, the exercise of unreasonable discretion.  To 
this end, then, policy statements, manuals and memos should contain directives to inform 
principals’ practice.  Specific boundaries can provide options for and limits to principals’ 
decision-making that will protect not only them but also their students.  The extent to 
which discretion can be tolerated may depend upon a case-by-case basis; overall, 
however, a short-leash principle (i.e., controlled, checked, or restrained) may provide the 
best insurance that alternatives and consequences will be carefully and deliberately 
considered.  It is, however, important to be mindful of Hawkins’s (2003) assertion, as 
previously noted, that by reducing discretion “somehow greater justice will be a natural 
consequence” (p. 207).  Nonetheless, school officials should become fully aware of how 
they make their decisions, what values and influences affect their decision-making, and 
why they make the decisions they do.  If principals are making decisions based on what 
they perceive are reasons of school safety or in the best interests of the child, then they 
should be guided by the requirements for the exercise of administrative discretion and be 
mindful of standards such as acting upon proper grounds, acting in good faith, and acting 
reasonably.  School-based administrator discretion should be based upon the principles of 
administrative discretion.  
In addition to the question of the measure of principals’ discretion is 
consideration of the constraints and conditions required for its fair and reasonable 
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exercise.  For instance, two such stipulations for discretion may include requiring not 
only formal documentation subject to scrutiny by stakeholders (where matters of 
confidentiality allow), but also formal procedural requirements to control its exercise.  
First, documentation appears to be essential for accountability in discretionary decision-
making (Hall, 1999).   There seemed to be few formal mechanisms in place for the 
principals to be accountable to their stakeholders, despite their own recognized need for 
them.  In the way judges are required to “provide public reasons for their decisions and 
conform to just and articulable rationales” (Sheehy, 2004, p. 15) so might school 
administrators be required in their disciplinary decision-making to undertake similar 
practices.  Because principals appear to make decisions about student disciplinary issues 
with “relative autonomy from organizational authority” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 13), it can be 
argued there needs to be a system of checks and balances and procedural safeguards 
adhered to in order to provide a consistent level of accountability, especially in those 
situations involving serious disciplinary decisions (see also Hall, 1999) and to “restrict 
the potential for abuses while preserving the benefits” of discretion (Shumavon & 
Hibbeln, 1986, p. 8).   Perhaps the task of detailed documentation is overwhelming for 
time-strapped administrators; nonetheless, if the educational mantra for the twenty-first 
century is “safety and accountability” (Gorman & Pauken, 2003, p. 24), principals who 
are obligated to maintain order and discipline in schools may be better able to meet 
accountability requirements by providing written reasons for their decisions not only to 
the affected individuals or groups, but also to their colleagues and superiors and wider 
school community.  Transparency in administrators’ decision-making also may help to 
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build trust with stakeholders and may help to off-set perceptions of unfairness or injustice 
in disciplinary consequences.  
Second, K. C. Davis’s (1969) requirements for the structuring, confining and 
checking of discretionary power provide a practical framework when applied as a 
template for the exercise of discretion in schools.  If discretion is to be exercised justly, it 
must be “substantively” and “procedurally” fair (Manley-Casimir, 1977–78, p. 85; see 
also Alexander, 1978).  In order for administrators to obtain the “optimum amount of 
discretionary power” (p. 354) and to be provided with “normative standards to guide their 
behavior” (p. 347), Manley-Casimir (1974) advocates a model for discretionary justice  
that requires clarifying discipline plans and policies, creating fair practices that ensure 
“procedural due process,” establishing an appeal process for review (p. 357), and 
controlling abuse of discretion by providing options and alternatives in decision-making.  
However, what “the appropriate form of review” (Ross, 1991, p. 386) is for the 
discretionary decision-making of elementary principals could be difficult to determine, 
depending upon one’s perspective (i.e., student, parent, superintendent, or principal).  
Perhaps an independent committee of educators and stakeholders, such as that convened 
to review suspensions and expulsions, could vet complex decisions, or the creation of a 
youth advocate in schools (Chesler et al., 1979), a district youth advocacy officer, or a 
school ombudsman position could serve as a mechanism for appealing administrative 
decisions and help avoid unintended consequences of discretionary decision-making.  
Other suggestions for limiting discretion include using legal rules to confine it, 
controlling who is placed in the position of decision-maker, and restricting the context 
and circumstances that are to be considered (Hawkins, 1998). 
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Proudfoot and Hutchings (1988) itemize the basic rules of natural justice: the 
person hearing the case must be free from bias; the party must have the opportunity to 
present his or her case; the party must receive notice of the hearing and is entitled to legal 
representation; the party is entitled to have an opportunity to appeal; and the case must be 
conducted in a fair manner and it must be seen to be conducted fairly (pp. 45–46). 
Alexander (1978) believes “at very least, natural justice requires the school administrator 
first to provide the child with a hearing which is impartial and free of bias, and secondly 
to guarantee the student that fairness will prevail” (p. 355).  What is more, the 
administrator must “give the student adequate notice of what is proposed, allow the 
student to make representations on his own behalf, and/or appear at a hearing or inquiry, 
and to effectively prepare his case and answer allegations presented” (Alexander, 1978, 
p. 355).  In order to prevent “laxness or denial of proper procedure” Alexander (1978) 
refers to “judicial precedents of both natural justice and due process” that can “add 
specificity and restrain administrative prerogative by reducing the administrator’s 
boundaries of discretion” (p. 356).  These boundaries, he suggests, may be limited 
through the use of a number of guidelines, such as, specifying clearly the rules that have 
been broken, having an open mind, allowing ample time for a defense to the allegations, 
allowing students to present witnesses on their own behalf, and considering the right of 
students to remain silent so as not to incriminate themselves (Alexander, 1978,             
pp. 356–357).  These guidelines could be modified or adapted to suit the complexity and 
seriousness of the behavioral incident.    
 Furthermore, expectations for policy implementation and adherence by principals 
should be clarified and reinforced by senior administration since selective enforcement 
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and even “non-compliance” of policy occurs often at the school level (LaRocque & 
Coleman, 1985, p. 164).  These expectations should be supported by the development of 
a mechanism to monitor in-school administrators’ decision-making practices on an 
occasional and on-going basis. The principals in the study did not appear to believe they 
were consistently rule-bound or required to follow policy and legislation at all times; 
when it served their purpose they would refer to their authority as delegated in the statute, 
but more often than not they appeared to make decisions based on their experience and 
their sense of a situation, leaving themselves open to claims that they acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Vorenberg (1976) suggests if officials rely solely on discretion, they may 
be left with the belief they know more than they do, a condition which could lead to 
disparity in their treatment of students.  The principals’ understanding of current 
legislation and school policy indicates they may need more knowledge in this area, 
especially because they appeared to feel they were exercising discretion appropriately, 
but seemed unaware of its requirements or constraints or that their decisions could be 
subject to judicial review.  This apparent unawareness may have resulted from the fact 
that, for the purposes of the study, they were more concerned with the exercise of 
discretion from a social-science rather than legal perspective.  They appeared to act on 
the assumption that courts generally would be willing to support their decision-making 
with respect to student discipline; curiously, their fears of what they saw as increasing 
litigation in education did not appear to prompt them to become more knowledgeable in 
the field of education law. 
Personal ideology and  interpretation of the purpose of and need for discipline are 
threaded throughout the principals’ decision-making.  The task of exercising discretion 
376 
 
includes negotiating within the confines of law and the boundaries of one’s own values 
system.  The principals readily admitted they often wrestled with decision-making in the 
“gray areas” (Campbell, 1999, p. 160; Frick, 2009; see also Willower, 1999, p. 132).  
Although all principals interpreted their use of discretion in their disciplinary decisions as 
differentiation based on student needs, as MacKay (2009) notes, their “dual 
responsibility” includes not only “‘short term’ accommodation” needs, but also an 
analysis of their practice to determine the “often hidden barriers” that may serve to 
merely concede difference among individual students and make decisions that simply fit 
them into the dominant paradigm (p. 47).  Many of their decisions align with the former 
category of exercising discretion to accommodate for circumstances or context, but the 
application of student consequences in their disciplinary decision-making reflects 
MacKay’s (2009) analysis of molding students into the prevailing notion of fair and 
equitable environments.  As a result, it would appear Hodgkinson’s (1991) vision of 
administrative introspection  that calls for the adoption by administrators of the 
“megamaxims” of knowing “the task…the situation…the followership…[and] oneself” 
(p. 153) is required.  School principals should be encouraged to become reflective in their 
disciplinary decision-making and give attention to their practice as a “philosophical and 
moral enterprise” (p. 160).  Begley (2004) also calls for a twenty-first century 
administrative practice that is “professionally effective, ethically sound and consciously 
reflective” (pp. 4–5), based upon self-knowledge and a “sensitivity to the orientations of 
others” (p. 5).    
Additionally, administrators in schools should consistently model respect for 
student rights (see also Sitch & McCoubrey, 2000).  While the principals in this study do 
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not appear to focus specifically on the notion of student rights, they may, either 
consciously or unconsciously, strive to protect and respect them in the school setting.  On 
the other hand, they may believe acknowledgement of rights or the “involvement of 
students in their disciplinary decisions” (Sitch & McCoubrey, 2000, p. 196)  may lead to 
an erosion of their traditional authority, or a lack of understanding about rights on their 
part may lead to resistance “based on the fear that children’s rights will inhibit school 
order” (p. 197).  The vagueness of their references to student rights and responsibilities, 
however, suggests a greater awareness and affirmation of student rights may be required 
in order to lessen the risk these rights could be abrogated by discretionary decision-
making in disciplinary issues.  Such indications also necessitate deep personal reflection 
upon principals’ own interpretation of children’s rights, their understanding of student 
rights, and the way in which they respond to these rights in the school setting.  
Manley-Casimir (1979) foresaw over thirty years ago the obligations of principals 
to “guard and respect the rights of students,” and he argued for changes to school 
administrative processes which would “place limits on the traditional authority of school 
officials” in the regulation of student conduct in order to afford students educational 
opportunities to “learn to exercise rights with due care and concern for the rights of 
others” in a manner that aligns with their growth, development and maturation (p. 13).  
Watkinson (1999) describes, in part, the evolution of the notion of student rights in 
Canada.  She contends that while recent judicial decisions have provided a “more 
expansive interpretation” of the idea of students rights, “education theory and practice 
continue to follow the authoritarian model, and it is the democratic model that is a 
prerequisite for the recognition of student dignity and the promotion of student rights”  
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(p. 195).  As well, some educators may feel their “professional autonomy” is challenged 
or may perceive the “erosion of their competence” (p. 195) as an inherent danger of 
considering student rights.  Yet, Watkinson also notes a gradual and promising change in 
that more educational scholars and practitioners “are promoting and realizing a caring 
and community-oriented democratic school environment” (p. 195).  The perception of the 
principals in this study, however, may not have moved greatly from the “in loco parentis 
justification as enunciated in provincial legislation” to the idea of the “child as a ‘person’ 
in his or her own right” (Manley-Casimir, 1979, p. 10) despite the entrenchment of the 
Charter.  Students’ rights must be reconciled with traditional patterns of power and 
authority that are inherent in principal-student and teacher-student relationships and 
manifested through the exercise of discretion in disciplinary situations.  Suggestions that 
“guidance and training on strategies for disciplining children that respect them as people 
with rights and responsibilities to respect the rights of others” (Canadian Coalition, 2009, 
p. 53) make for sound educational decision-making and good common sense.  In this way 
“it might be possible to both maintain order and respect rights” (Sitch & McCoubrey, 
2000, p. 200).    
7.2 Implications of the Findings 
7.2.1 Implications for Administrative Practice 
Torres and Stefkovich (2009) urge school officials to “reexamine their beliefs 
about class, culture, and minority representation and the impact each poses on [sic] 
decision making, especially in the area of discipline” since they are allowed 
“considerable discretionary interpretation and application of law” (p. 469).  Begley 
(2004) also advocates for gaining awareness of others’ value orientations.  Training in 
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decision-making for principals, which may include the awareness of their own values 
system and its influence upon their decision-making, should be required (Ashbaugh & 
Kasten, 1984; Hodgkinson, 1991) in order to guard against negative outcomes for 
students.   Sheehy’s (2004) suggestion judges should aim for “self-awareness and 
informed decision-making” (p. 15) by “becoming cognizant of their own values and 
assumptions” while also “enlarging their understanding of the relevant social context” (p. 
14) can also provide valuable direction for principals in their discretionary decision-
making.  As W. Greenfield (1995) affirms, “school administrators have a special 
responsibility to be deliberately moral in their conduct, that is to consider the value 
premises underlying their actions and decisions” (p. 69).  Despite advocating for an 
empirical approach to educational administration, Willower (1999), nonetheless, calls for 
administrators’ greater attention to valuation, or “the process of making moral choices” in 
schools (p. 132).  He emphasizes the “importance of praxis, or thoughtful practice” 
wherein values must not be divorced from the processes of “critical thinking and 
reflective analysis” that are required “to abet moral choice” in administrative decision-
making (Willower, 1999, p. 132).  
 Handler (1992) advocates for the establishment of conditions to “facilitate the 
creation and nurturing of empowerment in discretionary dependent relationships”          
(p. 354).  This model should include the consideration of student rights and decision-
making based on the best interests of the child principle, which “must be ‘a primary 
consideration’” (Howe & Covell, 2010; see also Birrell & Marshall, 2007).  In order to 
guard against discretionary decision-making that may be seen as manipulative or 
coercive, this principle, when used as a basis for decision-making, has the potential to 
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empower students and their parents and to engage their participation in resolving 
disciplinary conflicts.  As Walker (1995) contends, “the leader’s position, then, is to gain 
the support of others in facilitating the best interests of children” (p. 6).  A collaborative, 
decision-making model that listens to all voices and includes a chance for appeal may 
offer greater chances for student well-being, opportunity for growth and a positive regard 
for the principles of fairness, mutual respect, and responsibility.  Moreover, this model 
could be enhanced by a framework in which the “burden of proof’ in disciplinary cases 
shifts from the student to the school system, so that if a “constitutional right or interest is 
implicated,” then “administrators must provide facts or supply specific evidence in a 
discipline situation that the accusation or action taken toward a student is justified" 
(Biggs, 1993, pp. 178–179; see also Alexander, 1978). 
Kajs (2006) also believes school administrators should be trained how “to develop 
skills to investigate, analyze, and make judgments” effectively and, at the same time, 
remain “fair, humane, and consistent” in the discipline process (p. 25).  Campbell-Evans 
(1982) suggests the use of “in-basket exercises” or case studies may help enhance and 
augment administrators’ decision-making abilities (p. 101).  There may be a need for 
attention to “ethical issues and ethical aspects of decision making in preparing school 
administrators for their roles” (Millerborg and Hyle, 1991, p. 17); given the emphasis the 
principals in the study placed on values in their disciplinary decisions, such a focus may 
aid administrators in learning how to deal with complex disciplinary cases (see also 
Frick, 2009).  While Campbell (1999) acknowledges there is no one formula to resolve 
ethical dilemmas and ethics should not be treated as “another management strategy”  
381 
 
(p. 160), she offers that case study analysis by administrators of experiences from “their 
own professional practice” (p. 159), in addition to “firmer policy guidelines,” may help 
principals to “reconcile their own values and interpretation of ethics” (p. 160) as they 
encounter conflicting perspectives in their daily practice.  Meyer et al. (2009) advocate 
for “ethno-drama context-specific role-playing scenarios” (p. 34) for principals in 
graduate courses or in school-district professional development courses so that principals, 
or those aspiring to the principalship, may engage in the discussion and exploration of the 
role of discretion in decision-making.   
Kajs (2006) offers two documents to help administrators exercise their judgment 
“as professionals in determining the type of discipline to be applied for misconduct”     
(p. 22).  The first chart is entitled “Factors to Determine Discipline for Offense Using 
Administrator Discretion” and lists items, such as grade, age, offence, circumstances, 
prior history, student attitude and impact of offence, which school officials could use to 
analyze misbehavior and make a decision “regarding a disciplinary action” (p. 23).  A 
second table labeled  “Sample Disciplinary Management Actions” consists of 
“nonpunitive and punitive disciplinary actions to address offenses” such as peer 
mediation, verbal warnings, withdrawal of privileges, restitution, and suspension (Kajs, 
2006, pp. 24–25).  He suggests administrators can more effectively exercise discretion by 
considering the circumstances in the first table as “useful indicators” in developing their 
disciplinary responses found in the second chart (Kajs, 2006, p. 25).  Although such a 
systematic process may be time-consuming and, in certain cases impractical, it may allow 
principals to demonstrate a measure of accountability and transparency in their 
disciplinary decision-making.   
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The introduction of a process such as Hodgkinson’s (1991) “value-audit,” 
wherein administrators take stock of their own values, can serve to support principals’ 
decision-making and create “inner confidence that the best judgments have been made” 
(p. 136). His eighteen-point system of reflection, or some variation of it, may help them 
develop a “rich personal value structure and commensurate value skills” and lend them 
greater insight and knowledge in their judgments and help to determine if their values are 
aligned with school-division values, norms, standards, and policies (p. 136).  Begley’s 
(2010) version of this value audit not only encompasses the fundamental notion of careful 
reflection upon value bases in decision-making but also extends to include 
administrators’ regard for “justice” and a “respect [for] individual rights” in order to 
foster “critical thinking” in their discretionary decisions (p. 51).   Walker’s (1995) twelve 
ethical principles comprise a similarly reflective process designed to help principals 
mediate conflicting values in their discretionary decision-making.  Manley-Casimir 
(1974) supports K. C. Davis’s (1969) suggestion that the use of hypothetical cases to 
present problems, and the organization’s response with reasons, will serve to clarify 
“obscure or unclear policy” and will show administrators how to constrain their power   
(p. 355).  School boards and professional associations should encourage administrators to 
be more reflective in their practice (Ashbaugh & Kasten 1984; Campbell-Evans, 1982; 
Hodgkinson, 1978b, 1991; Millerborg & Hyle, 1991; Roche, 1999) and support 
collaboration and open dialogue with colleagues and other professionals by providing 
release time for these activities in order to enhance principals’ decision-making capacity.     
Knowledge of current, applicable case law, established legal principles such as 
the best interests of the child, relevant Supreme Court decisions, and education and 
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human rights legislation would provide administrators with an information base 
enhancing the prospect that their decision-making would reflect contemporary 
jurisprudence (see also Findlay, 2006; Peters & Montgomerie, 1998; Torres & Chen, 
2006; Warren, 1988).  Shumavon and Hibbeln (1986) also advocate for the exploration of 
“patterns in judicial decisions” so that administrators can determine “what [discretionary] 
behavior has been sanctioned” by the courts and what “freedoms or constraints in the 
exercise of administrative discretion” have been established in relevant case law (p. 2).  
In this way, the exploration may illuminate the extent to which judicial decisions may 
have had a “constraining effect” upon administrators and to what extent the “courts 
[have] failed to provide limits,” or if the “limits prescribed by the courts [are] too 
narrow” (Shumavon & Hibbeln, 1986, p. 2).  School divisions should provide their 
school-based administrators with “frequent, regular and high-quality in-service updating 
education law issues” (Leschied, Dickinson, & Lewis, 2000, p. 63) and encourage them 
to subscribe to education law journals and newsletters in order to keep current in the 
field.  Faculties of education in universities should ensure that aspiring administrators 
receive at least one course in education law in their preparatory programs at the graduate 
level in order to foster a greater awareness of rights and the responsibilities that 
accompany them.  It follows that principals and school officials should gain an 
understanding of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, especially Article 28 that 
provides for ensuring that “school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with 
the child’s human dignity and in conformity with the present Convention” (Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 1989). 
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If arbitrariness is to be avoided in discretionary decision-making structures, then 
schools require specific rules and comprehensive codes of conduct aligned with school 
district policy.  Torres and Chen (2006) call for policies that are specially designed and 
“carefully” (p. 203) worded to follow case law, so as to ensure student privacy rights, 
especially in cases of search and seizure, are not undermined.  The careful wording of 
policy, such as explanations of what circumstances warrant searches for instance, can 
help “to prevent inappropriate forms of discretion” (p. 203).  Furthermore, unclear school 
rules can place “too much discretion in the hands” (Canadian Foundation, 2002, p. 96) of 
school officials, echoing the concerns of the Supreme Court of Canada that vague laws 
can violate “the precept that individuals should be governed by the rule of law, not the 
rule of persons” (p. 96).   
Brown and Beckett (2006) advocate for a clearly defined, district-wide code of 
conduct—based on current research literature on school discipline and developed with 
input from school administrators and teachers—which supports “consistency and 
flexibility” in the administration of school discipline.  They believe such a code is crucial 
in teaching students self-discipline, countering accusations of lack of fairness, and 
supporting less disruptive behavior (Brown & Beckett, 2006, p. 253; see also Manley-
Casimir, 1977–78; Vorenberg, 1976).  Brown and Zuker (2007) identify a school’s code 
of conduct as a “critically important document” since American law has shown “failure 
to state and publish a rule” can result in the successful challenge by students of a 
“suspension or expulsion that tries to enforce the rule” (p. 250).  Furthermore, a student’s 
right to “procedural fairness includes the right to know the school rules, i.e., what 
behavior is subject to punishment” (Brown & Zuker, 1007, p. 250; see also Biggs, 1993).  
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Such codes would also help to provide a platform for administrators to justify their 
discretionary decision-making, in addition to offering a measure of accountability for 
stakeholders and others with an interest in the disciplinary decisions of principals. 
Codes of conduct, implemented at the district or school level, may serve to limit 
the discretion of school administrators.  Developed collaboratively by stakeholders at all 
levels, a code of conduct should be prefaced by the acknowledgement of the right of all 
stakeholders to a safe and orderly school environment and the attendant responsibilities 
of teachers, students, parents, community members and administrators in protecting this 
right.
26
  Martin et al. (2012) contend “explicitly defined” codes of conduct that are 
“regularly reviewed and enforced” would also work to ensure teacher safety and well-
being (p. 20).  Articulated standards of discipline followed by the identification of clearly 
defined “disciplinary offences” and “prescribed specific consequences” and sanctions for 
student misbehavior on a graduated scale of progressive discipline procedures should also 
be included (Brown & Beckett, 2006, p. 250).  Additionally, alternative measures that 
proactively address misbehavior could be contained in the code, such as conflict 
resolution, behavior contracts, peer mediation, mentoring programs, talking circles, or 
anger management strategies.  For codes of conduct to be implemented effectively, 
Brown and Beckett (2006) argue they must be published and widely distributed 
throughout stakeholder groups, written in “developmentally-appropriate language”        
(p. 249) and taught to students, and implemented by schools in the way they believe 
                                                 
26
 The Ontario Ministry of Education, for example,  requires school boards to align their board code of 
conduct with the existing provincial Code of Conduct “that sets clear provincial standards of behavior” that 
are applicable to all students, parents and community members and which list the roles and responsibilities 
of all stakeholders in developing effective policies and practices (Ontario Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 
2).   
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“would be most effective with their student populations” (p. 251).  They should be 
subject to annual review and be responsive to changes in laws and policies.  MacKay and 
Sutherland (2006) agree that teachers and students should be part of the rule-making 
process in schools.  They point, however, to the need to adhere to Charter principles in 
the creation of school rules, since “rules that in substance violate principles contained in 
the Charter may be subject to challenge” (p. 89), such as those restricting freedom of 
speech or expression.   
Manley-Casimir (1974) further advocates for rule-making that “establishes” 
boundaries and “confines the power” (p. 355) of administrators.  This way, through the 
application of well-publicized, rights-based and clearly-defined rules legitimately related 
to the educational purpose of the school (Duke et al., 1978), the administrator may be 
able to make decisions more easily and confidently.  As well, in order to be substantively 
fair, the reasons underlying the choice or action taken should be identified in light of 
prevailing norms and standards, thereby providing a layer of accountability for the 
decision (Manley-Casimir, 1974).  Hall (1999) also advocates for specifically worded 
policies and rules for student discipline, lest the exercise of discretion by school officials 
“yield inconsistency or disparity in decisions depending on administrative values and 
ideologies, social constraints, decision context and ambiguous student discipline 
objectives” (p. 159). Extending the notion even further, Shumavon and Hibbeln (1986) 
suggest that developing “behavior norms within the profession” and refining a code of 
ethics for administrators may “prevent possible injustice” (p. 8) in the exercise of 
discretion. 
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Another step school districts could take towards providing accountability to 
educational stakeholders is to have school boards collect key data on all suspensions and 
expulsions by school and district (Bhatarajee, 2003; Brady, 2002; Brown & Beckett, 
2006; Stader, 2004); making these numbers public by province and school division may 
aid in accountability and transparency. As Brady (2002) urges, “school districts, policy 
makers, and researchers must employ more uniform and reliable school discipline data 
collection and dissemination procedures.  School discipline data varies widely at the state 
and local levels [in America]” (p. 191).  So do they, too, in Canada, should they exist at 
all.  Suspensions/expulsions statistics could be disaggregated and analyzed by ethnicity, 
gender, and by the designation of special needs, and then used to inform principals’ 
discretionary decision-making in schools and in policy formulation at the district and 
provincial levels (Townsend, 2000).  Gleaning information after the fact from 
disciplinary decision-making in order to help with policy creation (Vorenberg, 1976) may 
reveal whether discipline trends exist and may also prove invaluable in providing 
guidelines for suspensions and expulsions as a disciplinary consequence.  Stader (2003) 
maintains administrators must “examine the consequences of their actions and, if 
necessary, make changes in policy and practice to not only keep schools safe but also to 
protect individual students from the capricious application of policy” (p. 64).  Mendez 
and Knoff (2003) further suggest analyzing suspension statistics for patterns of 
misbehavior in order to shift attention away from models that are “punishment-oriented” 
(p. 48) to those that encourage positive behavior supports and early intervention.  Torres 
and Stefkovich’s  (2009) study analyzed police involvement in disciplinary incidents in 
schools  based on “demographic variables” such as “poverty, minority composition [of 
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students], and urbanicity” (p. 466).  They suggest student discipline should be “carefully 
reviewed to measure whether decisions have a disproportionate impact on students across 
multiple social characteristics” (p. 469). 
  However, there may be socio-political questions raised by examining 
suspension/expulsion data in this fashion, and it cannot necessarily be assumed the 
analysis would be used for positive social justice reasons or to “address the inequities that 
underlie the results” (Bouvier & Karlenzig, 2006, p. 25) should they exist.  Reports based 
on this kind of data may “further contribute to the stereotypes and stigmatization” already 
faced by a group or groups if assumptions, biases and motives are not disclosed (Bouvier 
& Karlenzig, 2006, p. 25).  Furthermore, there may be legal and ethical implications of 
categorizing disciplinary consequences, such as privacy concerns and access to 
information among advocacy and stakeholder groups or the general public.  Other 
barriers to this type of examination exist as well.  Skiba, Michael, Nardo, and Peterson 
(2002), for example, urge caution when exploring statistics on suspensions and expulsion 
that support commonly held hypotheses of disproportionate discipline rates for racial 
minority students in the United States and argue they do not prove “bias in the 
administration of discipline” (p. 333), contending there may be other “possible 
explanations or reasons for disciplinary” disparity (p. 318).   Their study found that a 
disproportionate rate of suspension for African American students was associated with a 
“general overreliance on negative and punitive discipline” (p. 335) and a “higher rate of 
office referrals” at the classroom level (p. 335).  Torres and Stefkovich suggest the 
“severity of the student offense and deciding how to proceed” with disciplinary 
consequences may reflect “culture and values within a community” more than the 
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“interpretation of a law or policy” (p. 468).  Thus, the decision by a school administrator 
to “disregard, overlook, or ignore student offences” or to “hold students less accountable 
for their behavior” also may result in disproportionate discipline rates among groups of 
students (p. 468). 
Finally, school divisions may wish to review their administrative appointment 
procedures, reconsider their administrative transfer policies and enhance the consultation 
process if, as the study subjects suggested, knowing the community will aid principals in 
their discretionary decision-making and allow them to gain confidence in their decisions.  
Additionally, the suggestion that transfers from elementary to secondary administrative 
positions may not be seamless implies that the training of administrators through 
mentoring or shadowing programs might be advisable.  Unexamined transfers between 
elementary and high schools for principal appointments may leave administrators feeling 
ill-prepared for their job because of inadequate transition procedures and training. 
7.2.2 Implications for Future Research 
The topic of principals’ discretionary decision-making provides a rich source for 
future exploration.   
Discretionary decision-making could be further examined to increase 
understanding of the role gender plays in its exercise.  As Clark (2002) and Manley-
Casimir (1977–78) have noted, male and female administrators operate on different 
decisional premises; a future investigation of this possibility has the opportunity to be a 
fecund area of study.  While gender was not a lens through which the data in this study 
were analyzed, the principals indicated they perceived a difference in the way men and 
women exercised their discretionary decisions in schools, although they were either 
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unable or unwilling to describe this perception of difference.  Their perspectives may 
reflect elements of the decision-making process that are seen in terms of “other 
categories” (Alverson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 249) such as race, gender, disability, or 
ethnicity.    
Next, the perceptions of teaching staff and support staff (e.g., bus drivers, 
custodians) with respect to principals’ discretionary decision-making could be 
investigated to determine how, or in what ways, they may influence school 
administrators’ judgment in disciplinary issues.  Further exploration of the influence of 
the expectations of district-level senior administration upon policy compliance by 
principals in disciplinary situations may lend valuable insight into discretionary 
decisions.  As well, the perceptions of students and their parents and families as 
recipients of the discretionary decision-making of principals could be assessed to 
determine if their interpretations of best interests, “individualization” (Biggs, 1993,        
p. 164), justice, and fairness in student discipline are consistent with the goals of school 
administrators and school or division policies.  The differences, if any, between sub-
groups, such as males and females, could also be explored.  This investigation could 
complement further study of principals’ understanding of their notions of accountability 
and defensibility in their discretionary decision-making (see also Hall, 1999). 
The decision-making of secondary administrators may be a potential area of 
comparative study to determine if the age of students is an influence in exercising 
discretion in disciplinary decision-making.  An exploration of the decision-making 
practices of vice-principals or assistant principals, who are often delegated authority to 
discipline students in schools and who hold a unique role in the school setting, may offer 
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insight into the exercise of discretion.  The disciplinary decision-making of 
administrators in private or parochial schools is another area in which discretion could be 
investigated to see how it is exercised by principals in those particular settings.  
Furthermore, a comparative study among principals in different school divisions within 
one province, or among school divisions in different provinces or countries, could serve 
to reveal how discretion is exercised under different constitutional, legislative, school 
district policy, and possibly cultural, provisions and norms. 
An extension of this research could entail as a possible next step the systematic 
observation of the discretionary decision-making of principals in student disciplinary 
situations (see also Hawkins, 1997; McCarthy & Soodak, 20007; Mintzberg, 1973).  Such 
a methodological approach, however, may be subject to additional scrutiny in terms of 
privacy and confidentiality concerns of students.  Kmetz and Willower (1982) contend 
the “structured observation methodology” used by Mintzberg (1973) in his study of 
managerial work involves the “quantification of work activities” and its application in the 
school environment may ignore the “crucial one-time event” that may have significance 
(p. 76), especially with respect to the exploration of discretionary decision-making.  They 
offer that “participant and non-participant observation,” in addition to case studies or 
ethnographic studies, may be better suited in an examination of the work-life of 
principals (Kmetz & Willower, 1982, p. 76).  
Last, the decision-making of principals in other areas of school administration, 
such as curriculum and assessment, finances, or facilities may lend insight into the nature 
of discretion and its exercise in the school setting.  Furthermore, future researchers may 
wish to investigate whether various types of discretion exist, such as personal discretion, 
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professional discretion, “moral discretion” (Frick & Faircloth, 2007, p. 29), or “ethical 
discretion” (Walker, 1998, p. 293), or whether there are varying degrees of discretion.  
Such an inquiry may tease out the distinctions, if any, between different kinds or levels of 
discretion.  
7.3 Chapter Summary 
The principals in this study believed the exercise of discretion enabled them to 
maintain school safety, balance competing rights, and be fair and just in disciplinary 
decision-making in order to support students.  While discretion offers administrators 
creativity and flexibility and the opportunity to individualize cases, this latitude must be 
balanced against capriciousness and arbitrariness and decision-making that may not 
ultimately support student well-being.  The challenge is to find the tension that exists in 
the fair and judicious exercise of discretion, and that which is unfair or arbitrary. 
The findings suggest principals should gain an awareness of how they make their 
decisions and the values and influences that affect them in their decision-making.  The 
structuring of their discretionary power requires clear discipline plans and policies and a 
mechanism for appeal or review of decision-making.  Principals need to enhance their 
knowledge of current legislation and relevant case law and legal principles in order to 
appropriately inform their disciplinary decision-making.  This increased knowledge 
should include the area of student rights.  District-wide and school-based codes of 
conduct are necessary to aid in achieving fairness and providing accountability to 
stakeholders. 
Directions for future research include exploration of the perceptions of those who 
are the recipients of the discretionary decision-making of principals, such as students and 
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their families.  Alternatively, the influences of teaching and support staff, or of senior 
administration, upon principals’ decision-making could be investigated.  A comparative 
study of the discretionary decision-making of principals in other school divisions, 
provinces, or countries may offer additional insight into discretion in disciplinary matters.  
Finally, a study of discretionary decision-making in areas such as curriculum, finances, or 
facilities would help to illuminate further the nature of discretion as it is exercised in the 
school setting.       
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The Problem of the Penumbra: Elementary School 
Principals’ Exercise of Discretion in School Disciplinary 
Issues 
LETTER OF INFORMATION 
Introduction 
My name is Nora M. Findlay and I am a doctoral candidate in Educational 
Policy Studies at the Faculty of Education at The University of Western 
Ontario.  I am currently conducting research into elementary principals’ 
exercise of discretion in decision-making and would like to invite you to 
participate in this study.   
Purpose of the study 
The aims of this study are to discover how elementary principals understand 
and exercise discretion in their decision-making regarding student 
disciplinary issues.  
If you agree to participate 
If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to answer a series 
of questions in a semi-structured interview in your office after the end of the 
school day, or at a time and place that are most convenient to you.  The 
interview will last approximately one hour and will be audio-recorded if you 
agree.  You will be provided with a copy of the transcript of the interview 
and you will be able to change or to delete parts of the transcript if you so 
wish.  You are asked to review the transcript, make changes and return it to 
me within one week.    
Confidentiality 
The information collected will be used for research purposes only, and 
neither your name nor information which could identify you will be used in 
any publication or presentation of the study results.  All information 
collected for the study will be kept anonymous.  School and school district 
names will not be included, and pseudonyms will be used in order to 
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preserve your anonymity.  Once the study is concluded, the data will be kept 
for a period of two years in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s office.  After 
that date, the data will be shredded.  
Risks & Benefits 
There are no known risks to participating in this study. 
Voluntary Participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse 
to answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time with no 
effect upon your employment status whatsoever. 
Questions 
If you have any questions about the conduct of this study or your rights as a 
research participant you may contact the Manager, Office of Research 
Ethics, The University of Western Ontario.  If you have any questions about 
this study, please either contact me, or my advisor, Dr. G.M. Dickinson. 
This letter is yours to keep for future reference. 
 
Nora M. Findlay 
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The Problem of the Penumbra: Elementary School 
Principals’ Exercise of Discretion in School Disciplinary Issues 
Nora M. Findlay, Doctoral Candidate, Education Policy Studies 
University of Western Ontario 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study 
explained to me and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered 
to my satisfaction. 
Name (please print): 
 
Signature:                                    Date: 
[**********If applicable include:] 
Name of Person Obtaining Informed Consent: 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Informed Consent: 
 
Date:  
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Introductory Vignette 
I will read the following hypothetical vignette and then would ask you to respond to the 
questions which follow. 
 You are the principal of an elementary school located in the inner city of a large 
urban center.  Many of the students come from low socio-economic backgrounds and 
single-parent or blended families.  On Monday just before noon hour, the grade two 
teacher rushes into your office with a drawing made by one of her students, Daniel.   She 
had asked her students to depict one of their weekend activities, and Daniel, a racial 
minority student, had drawn a picture of an adult and two children shooting birds.  When 
asked, Daniel had indicated he and his father and his brother had been shooting ducks 
near a pond on Saturday night in one of the city’s large parks.  This was an activity they 
had engaged in before, and Daniel proudly boasted of his father’s accuracy in shooting.  
What is more, Daniel said his older brother, Gary a grade eight student, had brought the 
gun to school in his backpack to show his friends.  You immediately go to the grade eight 
classroom and ask Gary to come with you to your office and to bring his backpack with 
him.  Gary is a student who is struggling academically, and who has had numerous office 
referrals over the past few months by his classroom teacher for issues of disrespect and 
insubordination.  The art teacher also complained to you last week that Gary wasn’t 
completing assignments and was being disruptive in her class.  What is more, the father 
has belligerently come into your office on many occasions with various complaints, the 
latest being that his youngest son was being harassed by another student in his class.  At 
first, Gary sullenly denies knowing anything about the incident his brother has described 
and flatly refuses to open his backpack for you.  Upon further questioning, however, he 
finally admits to having a pellet gun with him and expresses remorse and is afraid of what 
will happen if his father finds out he brought the gun to school.  School policy indicates 
that if any student brings a weapon to the school the student faces a minimum two week 
suspension, and the resource officer must be involved.     
1. Do you enforce a school suspension for Gary? 
2. What influences or circumstances would shape your decision? 
3. Do you believe any influences or circumstances are more important than 
others? 
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4. In what ways will you justify your decision? 
5. To whom do you believe you must justify this decision? 
Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
Question Prompts 
1. What is the goal or goals of discipline in schools?  (Probe for interpretation of 
purpose of discipline, opinion of goals, particular school context.)  
2. Please describe your role as you see it with respect to student discipline in the 
school.  (Probe for interpretation of participant’s role.) 
3. How do you describe discretion in decision-making? (Probe for personal 
definition, key words, ideas, notions.) 
4. Please share your thoughts on the ways in which principals might appropriately 
exercise discretion regarding discipline in schools.  (Probe for specific examples.) 
5. Please share your thoughts on the ways in which principals might inappropriately 
exercise discretion regarding discipline in schools.  (Probe for specific examples.) 
6. How do you feel about your obligation to enforce rules, laws, and policies in 
decision-making in student disciplinary issues?  (Probe for participant’s 
interpretation of obligation, knowledge of legislation, case law.) 
7. What kinds of disciplinary situations make you feel hesitant or conflicted in 
applying a law, rule or school policy in your decision-making?  (Probe for 
specific examples, reasons for choice, selective enforcement of laws, policies.) 
8. What different considerations or principles might guide you in your decision-
making when disciplining a student?  (Probe here for gender, rights, personal 
faith, values.) 
9. What types of information or knowledge do you require when your make 
discretionary decisions in cases of student discipline?  (Probe for influences, level 
or degree of influences, circumstances,) 
10. Have you ever experienced a situation when what you personally believed was the 
right choice in disciplining a student was different from what was either the 
professional expectation or the community expectation?  (Probe for personal 
conflict, tension.)  Please describe how you resolved this discrepancy.  Who or 
what assisted you in that decision? 
11. In what ways do the characteristics and values of the school community affect 
your decision-making in school discipline cases?  (Probe for balance of rights, 
needs, interests, responsibilities.) 
12. What is your opinion of a principal ignoring an established rule, law or procedure 
when disciplining a student?  (Probe for reasons, justification, circumstances, 
considerations.) 
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13.  Should principals be held accountable for their decision-making in disciplinary 
issues?  (Probe for needs, interests of various stakeholder groups, understanding 
of defense of decision-making.) 
14. Some suggest that there are judgments that principals make that are unique to 
their profession?  Do you agree? (Probe for types of judgments, reasons, 
examples.) 
15. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of principals being related to their 
ability to exercise good judgment?  (Probe for understanding of judgment, 
principal effectiveness.) 
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Demographic Information 
 
1. What is your gender?   _______________ 
 
2. How long have you been a principal?   __________________ 
 
3. How long have you been an in-school administrator?  ________________ 
 
4. Do you work with a vice-principal or assistant principal?  __________________ 
 
5. What is the student enrolment at your school?  ___________________ 
 
6. Are you younger than 30?  Between 30 to 40?  Between 40 to 50?  Between 50 to 
60?  Over 60 years of age?  _______________________ 
 
7. Are you someone you would consider an inexperienced principal?  A principal 
with more than five years’ experience?  A principal who is within five years of 
retirement?                                  ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in this research study. 
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